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ACRONYM  DEFINITION
ACIA  Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
AIS  Automatic Identification System
AMAP  Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme 
  (Arctic Council working group)
AMSA  Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment
AMVER  Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue System
ARCOP  Arctic Operational Platform
ATON  Aid to Navigation
AWPPA  Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (Canada)
CCG  Canadian Coast Guard
CFC  chlorofluorocarbon
CH4  methane
CNIIMF  Central Marine Research & Design Institute 
  (Russian Federation)
CO  carbon monoxide
CO2  carbon dioxide
COLREG  Convention on the International Regulations
  for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
DEW  Distant Early Warning Line
DWT  deadweight tonnage
ECDIS  Electronic Chart Display and Information System
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone
EPPR  Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 
  Response (Arctic Council working group)
EU  European Union
GCM  Global Climate Model
GHG  greenhouse gas
GIS  Geographic Information System
GPS  Global Positioning System
HF  high frequency
IAATO  International Association of Antarctic Tour 
  Operators
IACS  International Association of Classification  
  Societies
ICC   Inuit Circumpolar Council
IHO  International Hydrographic Organization
IMO  International Maritime Organization
INSROP  International Northern Sea Route Programme
IPCC  Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
kW  kilowatt (1,000 watts)
LME  Large Marine Ecosystem
LNG  liquefied natural gas
LPG  liquefied petroleum gas
M/V  Motor Vessel
MARPOL 73/78  International Convention for the Prevention
  of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as Modified by 
  the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto
MF  medium frequency
MMT  million metric ton
MPA  marine protected area
NEP  Northeast Passage
NGO  non-governmental organization
nm  nautical mile
NOAA  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (U.S.)
NOx  nitrogen oxide
NSR  Northern Sea Route
NWP  Northwest Passage
PAME  Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment  
  (Arctic Council working group)
POP  persistent organic pollutant
ppm  parts per million
PSSA  Particularly Sensitive Sea Area
RACON  radar beacon
RORO  roll on, roll off (type of cargo ship)
SAR  search and rescue
shp  shaft horsepower
SOLAS  International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea, 1974 
SOx  sulfur oxide
STCW  International Convention on Standards of Training,
  Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers, 1978
TDW  tonnage draft weight
TEU  twenty-foot equivalent (measure used in container 
  shipping)
UNCLOS  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982 
USCG  United States Coast Guard
VHF  very high frequency
VTS  Vessel Traffic Service
WMO  World Meteorological Organization
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T
he Arctic is undergoing extraordinary transformations 
early in the 21st century. Natural resource develop-
ment, governance challenges, climate change and marine 
infrastructure issues are influencing current and future 
marine uses of the Arctic. The Arctic Council, recognizing these criti-
cal changes and issues, at the November 2004 Ministerial meeting in 
Reykjavik, Iceland, called for the Council’s Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment (PAME) working group to “conduct a comprehen-
sive Arctic marine shipping assessment as outlined under the Arctic 
Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) under the guidance of Canada, Finland 
and the United States as lead countries and in collaboration with 
the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working 
group and the Permanent Participants as relevant.” The Arctic Marine 
Shipping Assessment, or The AMSA 2009 Report, is the product of that 
Arctic Ministerial decision in Reykjavik and was approved at the 2009 
Ministerial meeting in Tromsø.
The decision to conduct the AMSA followed the release in 2004 of 
two relevant Arctic Council reports. First, the Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment (ACIA) was a major study that received global attention 
and reported on the rapid and severe climate change ongoing in the 
Arctic. One of the key findings of the ACIA was that “reduced sea ice 
is very likely to increase marine transport and access to resources.” 
The second report, the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP), pre-
sented the council’s strategic goals for protecting the Arctic marine 
environment. The AMSP called for future application of an ecosys-
tems approach to the Arctic Ocean and for a comprehensive assess-
ment of Arctic marine shipping.
The AMSA is designed to be circumpolar in breadth and also to 
consider regional and local perspectives. The assessment’s central 
focus is on ships: their uses of the Arctic Ocean, their potential 
impacts on humans and the Arctic marine environment and their 
marine infrastructure requirements. The AMSA does not place a 
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primary focus on determining the operational and economic viabili-
ties of specific marine routes within and across the Arctic Ocean. 
The AMSA, led by Canada, Finland and the United States, reached 
out to a broad community, including the global maritime community 
consisting of shipping companies, ship designers, shipbuilders, ship 
classification societies, marine insurers, non-commercial partner-
ships and shipping associations. With the support of the Permanent 
Participants (indigenous organizations) of the Arctic Council, town hall 
meetings were held in selected Arctic communities in Canada, Iceland, 
Norway and the United States to listen to issues and concerns about 
future Arctic marine activity. The AMSA linked directly with experts of 
PAME for marine environmental protection issues and overall guidance 
and leadership of the AMSA. Two additional Arctic Council working 
groups were also consulted: the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response (EPPR) working group on spill response and marine 
infrastructure requirements; and the Sustainable Development Working 
Group (SDWG) on issues related to the human dimension.
All ship types are considered in the AMSA under the general topic 
of Arctic shipping: tankers, bulk carriers, offshore supply vessels, 
passenger ships, tug/barge combinations, fishing vessels, ferries, 
research vessels and government and commercial icebreakers. The 
result of the AMSA data survey effort produced a comprehensive esti-
mate of how many ships (less naval vessels) operated in the Arctic 
for a given year. This survey represents an historic capture of infor-
mation from the Arctic states that can be used as a long-term data-
base against which to measure future Arctic marine traffic levels. In 
addition, more than 185 experts participated directly in the work of 
the AMSA. Thirteen major AMSA workshops were held from July 2006 
through October 2008 on a broad range of relevant topics, including 
scenarios of future Arctic navigation, indigenous marine use, Arctic 
marine incidents, environmental impacts, marine infrastructure, 
Arctic marine technology and the future of the Northern Sea Route 
and adjacent seas. The AMSA workshops provided extensive informa-
tion for developing the report sections.
© Fednav, Ltd.
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Synopsis of the Assessment Findings
The AMSA 2009 Report is focused on current and future Arctic 
marine activity. The results of this comprehensive assessment are a 
range of key findings linked to the main topics identified. These find-
ings are listed in full throughout The AMSA 2009 Report at the end 
of each section. Presented here is a synopsis, or review, of the AMSA 
findings for each section.
Arctic Marine Geography, Climate and Sea Ice: Arctic sea ice 
has been observed to be decreasing in extent and thickness during 
the second half of the 20th century and early 21st century. Global 
Climate Model simulations indicate a continuing retreat of sea ice, 
but also show that the winter sea ice cover will remain. There is a 
possibility of an ice-free Arctic Ocean for a short period in summer 
perhaps as early as 2015. This would mean the disappearance of 
multi-year ice, as no sea ice would survive the summer melt season. 
It is highly plausible there will be greater marine access and longer 
seasons of navigation, except perhaps during winter, but not neces-
sarily less difficult ice conditions for marine operations.
History of Arctic Marine Transport: There is a long history 
of Arctic marine transport conducted primarily around the ice-free 
periphery of the Arctic Ocean. Year-round navigation has been main-
tained since 1978-79 in the ice-covered western regions of the 
Northern Sea Route (between the port of Dudinka on the Yenisei 
River and Murmansk). Previous Arctic marine transport studies for 
the Northern Sea Route, Canadian Arctic, Alaska’s coastal seas and 
other regions have significant relevance to developing any future 
regulatory framework for the Arctic Ocean. Most of these past stud-
ies involved public-private partnerships and close international 
cooperation.
Governance of Arctic Shipping: The Law of the Sea, as 
reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), provides a fundamental framework for the governance 
of Arctic marine navigation and allows coastal states the right to 
adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the 
prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from ves-
sels in ice-covered waters (Article 234). The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) is the competent UN agency with responsibility 
for issues related to the global maritime industry. IMO has been 
proactive in developing voluntary Guidelines for Ships Operating 
in Arctic Ice-covered Waters, which continue to evolve. The 
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) has also 
developed non-mandatory Unified Requirements for their members 
that address ship construction standards of the Polar Classes, which 
are defined in the IMO Guidelines. There are no uniform, interna-
tional standards for ice navigators and for Arctic safety and survival 
for seafarers in polar conditions. And, there are no specifically tai-
lored, mandatory environmental standards developed by IMO for 
vessels operating in Arctic waters. Mandatory measures, drawn up 
in accordance with the provisions of customary international law as 
reflected in UNCLOS, would be an effective way to enhance marine 
safety and environmental protection in Arctic waters. Expanded 
Arctic marine traffic increases the possibility of, for example, intro-
ducing alien species and pathogens from ballast water discharge 
and hull fouling.
Current Marine Use and the AMSA Shipping Database: There 
were approximately 6,000 individual vessels, many making multiple 
voyages, in the Arctic region during the AMSA survey year; half of 
these were operating on the Great Circle Route in the North Pacific 
that crosses the Aleutian Islands. Of the 6,000 vessels reported, 
approximately 1,600 were fishing vessels. Nearly all shipping in the 
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will likely be unevenly distributed among and within communities 
and regions. Constructive and early engagement of local residents 
in planned Arctic marine development projects can help to reduce 
negative impacts and to increase positive benefits. Importantly, 
many local Arctic residents today depend heavily on marine resources 
for subsistence and the local economy; over-the-ice travel and boat 
transport allow the use of large marine areas during much of the 
year. Such life in the Arctic is dependent on movement over the ice 
and ocean and sea ice is integral to this movement.
Environmental Considerations and Impacts: The most sig-
nificant threat from ships to the Arctic marine environment is the 
release of oil through accidental or illegal discharge. Additional 
potential impacts of Arctic ships include ship strikes on marine 
mammals, the introduction of alien species, disruption of migra-
tory patterns of marine mammals and anthropogenic noise produced 
from marine shipping activity. Changes in Arctic sea ice will not 
only provide for possible longer seasons of navigation, but may also 
result in increased interaction between migrating species and ships. 
Black carbon emissions from ships operating in the Arctic may have 
regional impacts by accelerating ice melt. Other ship emissions dur-
ing Arctic voyages, such as SOx and NOx, may have unintended 
consequences for the Arctic environment and these emissions 
may require the implementation of additional IMO environmental 
regulations.
Arctic Marine Infrastructure: There is a general lack of marine 
infrastructure in the Arctic, except for areas along the Norwegian 
coast and northwest Russia, compared with other marine regions of 
the world with high concentrations of ship traffic. Gaps in hydro-
graphic data exist for significant portions of primary shipping routes 
important to support safe navigation. In addition, for safe opera-
tions in the Arctic there is a need for the same suite of meteoro-
logical and oceanographic data, products and services as in other 
oceans, plus comprehensive information on sea ice and icebergs. 
Except in limited areas of the Arctic, there is a lack of emergency 
response capacity for saving lives and for pollution mitigation. There 
are serious limitations to radio and satellite communications and 
few systems to monitor and control the movement of ships in ice-
covered waters. The current lack of marine infrastructure in all but a 
limited number of areas, coupled with the vastness and harshness of 
the environment, makes conduct of emergency response significantly 
more difficult in the Arctic. Z
Arctic today is destinational, conducted for community re-supply, 
marine tourism and moving natural resources out of the Arctic. 
Regions of high concentrations of Arctic marine activity occur along 
the coasts of northwest Russia, and in the ice-free waters off Norway, 
Greenland, Iceland and in the U.S. Arctic. Significant increases in 
cruise ships, a majority not purpose-built for Arctic waters, have 
been observed in the summer season around Greenland within the 
past decade. There have been recent marine operations in the ice-
covered central Arctic Ocean for scientific exploration and marine 
tourism.
Scenarios, Futures and Regional Futures to 2020: Arctic natu-
ral resource development (hydrocarbons, hard minerals and fisheries) 
and regional trade are the key drivers of future Arctic marine activity. 
However, there are many other factors and uncertainties of impor-
tance including governance, Arctic state cooperation, oil prices, 
changes in global trade, climate change variability, new resource 
discoveries, marine insurance industry roles, multiple use conflicts 
and Arctic marine technologies. Future Arctic marine activity will 
include many non-Arctic stakeholders, multiple users in Arctic water-
ways and potential overlap of new operations with indigenous uses. 
Arctic voyages through 2020 will be overwhelmingly destinational, 
not trans-Arctic. A lack of major ports, except for those in north-
ern Norway and northwest Russia, and other critical infrastructure 
will be significant limitations for future Arctic marine operations. 
The Bering Strait region, ringed with indigenous communities and a 
highly productive ecosystem with many species of marine mammals, 
fish and seabirds, may require formally established vessel routing 
measures. Offshore hydrocarbon developments may lead to increased 
marine traffic in the Bering Strait region. For the Canadian Arctic, 
the Northwest Passage is not expected to become a viable trans-Arc-
tic route through 2020, but destinational shipping is anticipated to 
increase. Marine transportation of oil from the Pechora Sea to Europe 
is considered technically and economically feasible; the volume of 
oil and gas may be as high as 40 million tons per year by 2020 on 
the western Northern Sea Route.
Human Dimensions: Marine shipping is one of many factors 
impacting Arctic communities. There may be some positive economic 
impacts to increased shipping. However, Arctic residents express 
concern for the social, cultural and environmental effects of such 
expansion. The possibility of oil spills is a major concern and hunt-
ers are especially concerned about the disruption of marine species 
and their hunting practices. The costs and benefit of Arctic shipping 
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The focus of the AMSA is marine safety and marine environ-
mental protection, which is consistent with the Arctic Council’s 
mandates of environmental protection and sustainable devel-
opment. Based on the findings of the AMSA, recommendations 
were developed to provide a guide for future action by the Arctic 
Council, Arctic states and many others. The AMSA recommenda-
tions are presented under three broad, inter-related themes that 
are fundamental to understanding the AMSA: Enhancing Arctic 
Marine Safety, Protecting Arctic People and the Environment, and 
Building Arctic Marine Infrastructure. It is recognized that imple-
mentation of these recommendations could come from the Arctic 
states, industry and/or public-private partnerships.
I. Enhancing Arctic Marine Safety
A. Linking with International Organizations: That the Arctic 
states decide to, on a case by case basis, identify areas of common 
interest and develop unified positions and approaches with respect 
to international organizations such as: the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO), the International Hydrographic Organization 
(IHO), the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the 
International Maritime Satellite Organization (IMSO) to advance 
the safety of Arctic marine shipping; and encourage meetings, as 
appropriate, of member state national maritime safety organiza-
tions to coordinate, harmonize and enhance the implementation 
of the Arctic maritime regulatory framework. 
B. IMO Measures for Arctic Shipping: That the Arctic states, in 
recognition of the unique environmental and navigational condi-
tions in the Arctic, decide to cooperatively support efforts at the 
International Maritime Organization to strengthen, harmonize and 
regularly update international standards for vessels operating in 
the Arctic. These efforts include:
---Support the updating and the mandatory application of rele-
vant parts of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered 
Waters (Arctic Guidelines); and,
---Drawing from IMO instruments, in particular the Arctic 
Guidelines, augment global IMO ship safety and pollution pre-
vention conventions with specific mandatory requirements or 
other provisions for ship construction, design, equipment, crew-
ing, training and operations, aimed at safety and protection of the 
Arctic environment.
The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Recommendations
C. Uniformity of Arctic Shipping Governance: That the Arctic 
states should explore the possible harmonization of Arctic marine 
shipping regulatory regimes within their own jurisdiction and 
uniform Arctic safety and environmental protection regulatory 
regimes, consistent with UNCLOS, that could provide a basis for 
protection measures in regions of the central Arctic Ocean beyond 
coastal state jurisdiction for consideration by the IMO.
D. Strengthening Passenger Ship Safety in Arctic Waters: 
That the Arctic states should support the application of the IMO’s 
Enhanced Contingency Planning Guidance for Passenger Ships 
Operating in Areas Remote from SAR Facilities, given the extreme 
challenges associated with rescue operations in the remote and 
cold Arctic region; and strongly encourage cruise ship operators to 
develop, implement and share their own best practices for operat-
ing in such conditions, including consideration of measures such 
as timing voyages so that other ships are within rescue distance in 
case of emergency.
E. Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) Instrument: That the Arctic 
states decide to support developing and implementing a compre-
hensive, multi-national Arctic Search and Rescue (SAR) instrument, 
including aeronautical and maritime SAR, among the eight Arctic 
nations and, if appropriate, with other interested parties in recog-
nition of the remoteness and limited resources in the region.
II. Protecting Arctic People and the Environment
A. Survey of Arctic Indigenous Marine Use: That the Arctic states 
should consider conducting surveys on Arctic marine use by indig-
enous communities where gaps are identified to collect informa-
tion for establishing up-to-date baseline data to assess the impacts 
from Arctic shipping activities.
B. Engagement with Arctic Communities: That the Arctic states 
decide to determine if effective communication mechanisms 
exist to ensure engagement of their Arctic coastal communities 
and, where there are none, to develop their own mechanisms to 
engage and coordinate with the shipping industry, relevant eco-
nomic activities and Arctic communities (in particular during the 
planning phase of a new marine activity) to increase benefits and 
help reduce the impacts from shipping.
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C. Areas of Heightened Ecological and Cultural Significance: 
That the Arctic states should identify areas of heightened eco-
logical and cultural significance in light of changing climate condi-
tions and increasing multiple marine use and, where appropriate, 
should encourage implementation of measures to protect these 
areas from the impacts of Arctic marine shipping, in coordination 
with all stakeholders and consistent with international law.
D. Specially Designated Arctic Marine Areas: That the Arctic 
states should, taking into account the special characteristics of the 
Arctic marine environment, explore the need for internationally 
designated areas for the purpose of environmental protection in 
regions of the Arctic Ocean. This could be done through the use of 
appropriate tools, such as “Special Areas” or Particularly Sensitive 
Sea Areas (PSSA) designation through the IMO and consistent with 
the existing international legal framework in the Arctic.
E. Protection from Invasive Species: That the Arctic states should 
consider ratification of the IMO International Convention for the 
Control and Management of Ships Ballast Water and Sediments, as 
soon as practical. Arctic states should also assess the risk of intro-
ducing invasive species through ballast water and other means so 
that adequate prevention measures can be implemented in waters 
under their jurisdiction.
F. Oil Spill Prevention: That the Arctic states decide to enhance the 
mutual cooperation in the field of oil spill prevention and, in collab-
oration with industry, support research and technology transfer to 
prevent release of oil into Arctic waters, since prevention of oil spills 
is the highest priority in the Arctic for environmental protection.
G. Addressing Impacts on Marine Mammals: That the Arctic 
states decide to engage with relevant international organiza-
tions to further assess the effects on marine mammals due to ship 
noise, disturbance and strikes in Arctic waters; and consider, where 
needed, to work with the IMO in developing and implementing 
mitigation strategies.
H. Reducing Air Emissions: That the Arctic states decide to sup-
port the development of improved practices and innovative tech-
nologies for ships in port and at sea to help reduce current and 
future emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), Nitrogen Oxides 
(NOx), Sulfur Oxides (SOx) and Particulate Matter (PM), taking into 
account the relevant IMO regulations.
III. Building the Arctic Marine Infrastructure
A. Addressing the Infrastructure Deficit: That the Arctic states 
should recognize that improvements in Arctic marine infrastruc-
ture are needed to enhance safety and environmental protection 
in support of sustainable development. Examples of infrastructure 
where critical improvements are needed include: ice navigation 
training; navigational charts; communications systems; port ser-
vices, including reception facilities for ship-generated waste; accu-
rate and timely ice information (ice centers); places of refuge; and 
icebreakers to assist in response.
B. Arctic Marine Traffic System: That the Arctic states should sup-
port continued development of a comprehensive Arctic marine 
traffic awareness system to improve monitoring and tracking of 
marine activity, to enhance data sharing in near real-time, and to 
augment vessel management service in order to reduce the risk 
of incidents, facilitate response and provide awareness of poten-
tial user conflict. The Arctic states should encourage shipping 
companies to cooperate in the improvement and development of 
national monitoring systems.
C. Circumpolar Environmental Response Capacity: That the 
Arctic states decide to continue to develop circumpolar environ-
mental pollution response capabilities that are critical to protect-
ing the unique Arctic ecosystem. This can be accomplished, for 
example, through circumpolar cooperation and agreement(s), as 
well as regional bilateral capacity agreements.
D. Investing in Hydrographic, Meteorological and Oceanographic 
Data: That the Arctic states should significantly improve, where 
appropriate, the level of and access to data and information in 
support of safe navigation and voyage planning in Arctic waters. 
This would entail increased efforts for: hydrographic surveys to 
bring Arctic navigation charts up to a level acceptable to support 
current and future safe navigation; and systems to support real-
time acquisition, analysis and transfer of meteorological, oceano-
graphic, sea ice and iceberg information.
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 Simultaneous with the globalization of the Arctic, marine access 
in the Arctic Ocean has been changing in unprecedented ways driven 
by global climate change. Arctic sea ice is undergoing an historic 
transformation - thinning, extent reduction in all seasons and sub-
stantial reductions in the area of multi-year ice in the central Arctic 
Ocean - which has significant implications for longer seasons of 
navigation and new access to previously difficult to reach coastal 
regions. The international scientific community has already taken 
advantage of these changes through pioneering voyages in the 
central Arctic Ocean. The same sea ice retreat also has important 
influences on the regional, Arctic marine ecosystems and future fish-
eries. Taken together, these changes present increased demands on 
the existing legal and regulatory structures challenged to meet the 
needs for enhanced marine safety and environmental protection in 
the face of increasing Arctic marine activity. Such challenges will 
T
he Arctic is regarded as containing some of the last 
physically undisturbed marine spaces on earth. Early in 
the 21st century, the Arctic has also been undergoing 
extraordinary environmental and developmental changes. 
Long known as a storehouse of untapped natural resources, high 
commodity prices and a growing worldwide demand in recent years 
have the Arctic poised as a significant contributor to the global 
economy. Increasing regional and coastal marine transport to sup-
port the exploration and extraction of oil, gas and hard minerals, 
coupled with the increasing presence of the global marine tourism 
industry, have brought a complex set of users to the maritime Arctic. 
The potential impacts of these new marine uses - social, environ-
mental, cultural and economic - are unknown, but will be significant 
for Arctic indigenous people and the marine environment already 
undergoing significant changes due to climate change.
Introduction
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The Ottawa Declaration of 1996 formally established the 
Arctic Council as a high level intergovernmental forum to 
provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination 
and interaction among the Arctic states, with the express 
involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and other 
Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, especially issues 
of sustainable development and environmental protection 
in the Arctic. 
The Arctic Council is comprised of Canada, Denmark 
(including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United 
States of America. 
In addition to the member states, the council created 
the category of Permanent Participants in order to provide 
for the active participation of, and full consultations with, 
Arctic indigenous representatives within the council. Open 
equally to Arctic organizations of indigenous people with a 
majority of Arctic indigenous constituency, the Permanent 
Participants represent a single indigenous people resident in 
more than one Arctic state; or more than one Arctic indig-
enous people resident in a single Arctic state. The follow-
ing organizations are Permanent Participants of the Arctic 
Council: Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan 
Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar 
Council, Saami Council and Russian Arctic Indigenous 
Peoples of the North.
Working groups of the Arctic Council execute the pro-
grams and projects mandated by the Arctic Council minis-
ters. Each working group, with its supporting scientific and 
technical expert groups, holds meetings at regular inter-
vals throughout the year, ahead of the meetings of Senior 
Arctic Officials and Arctic Council Ministers. The six working 
groups include: Arctic Contaminants Action Program; Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme; Conservation of 
Arctic Flora and Fauna; Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response; Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment; 
and Sustainable Development Working Group.
Arctic Council
require unprecedented levels of cooperation among the eight Arctic 
states and broad engagement with many non-Arctic stakeholders 
within the global maritime industry. 
Actions Leading to a Shipping Assessment
The Arctic Council anticipated the need to evaluate current and 
future increasing use of the Arctic Ocean. In 2002 at the Council’s 
third Ministerial meeting in Inari, Finland, the ministers recog-
nized “that existing and emerging activities in the Arctic warrant 
a more coordinated and integrated strategic approach to address 
the challenges of the Arctic coastal marine environment.” The min-
isters agreed to “develop a strategic plan for the protection of the 
Arctic marine environment under leadership by the Protection of the 
Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) working group.” The Arctic Marine 
Strategic Plan (AMSP) was developed by PAME and approved by the 
Arctic Council in 2004. Four strategic goals were outlined in the 
AMSP: reduce and prevent pollution in the Arctic marine environ-
ment; conserve Arctic marine diversity and ecosystem functions; pro-
mote the health and prosperity of all Arctic inhabitants; and advance 
sustainable Arctic marine resource use. The AMSP addressed the need 
for future application of an ecosystem approach to management of 
the Arctic marine environment and also called for a comprehensive 
assessment of Arctic marine shipping.
In November 2004, the Arctic Council released a major study, 
the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), which received global 
attention. The ACIA found that the Arctic: is extremely vulnerable 
to observed and projected climate change; is today experiencing 
some of the most rapid and severe climate change on Earth; and 
will experience accelerated climate change during the 21st century. 
Widespread physical, ecological, social and economic changes, many 
of which have already begun, were projected. Of particular relevance 
to marine use and Arctic transport, one of ACIA’s 10 Key Findings 
(#6) stated: “Reduced sea ice is very likely to increase marine trans-
port and access to resources.”
Consistent with the work of the AMSP and the ACIA, the Arctic 
Council Ministers in November 2004 in Reykjavik asked PAME to “con-
duct a comprehensive Arctic marine shipping assessment as outlined in 
the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) under the guidance of 
Canada, Finland and the United States as lead countries and in 
collaboration with the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response (EPPR) working group of the Arctic Council and Permanent 
Participants as relevant.” AMSA data gathering and planning began 
in summer 2005.
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Focus and Conduct of the Assessment
The focus of the AMSA is marine safety and marine environmen-
tal protection, which is consistent with the Arctic Council’s man-
dates of environmental protection and sustainable development. The 
AMSA was designed to be circumpolar in breadth, but also considers 
regional and local perspectives where impacts, particularly on Arctic 
communities, are considered to be greatest. However, the overall 
scope of the AMSA focuses on ships and their infrastructure needs 
and impacts in the Arctic Ocean.
The AMSA lead countries (Canada, Finland and the United States) 
recognized early in the planning the importance of contributions 
from the broader, global maritime community. Therefore, the AMSA 
reached out to such key stakeholders as non-Arctic states (examples 
include the United Kingdom and Germany), shipping companies, ship 
designers, shipbuilders, ship classification societies, non-commercial 
partnerships, marine insurers and non-governmental environmental 
organizations. With the assistance of the Permanent Participants of 
the Arctic Council, town hall meetings were organized in selected 
Arctic communities to listen to issues and concerns about future 
Arctic marine activity. AMSA also linked with the Arctic Council 
working group experts of the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response (EPPR) working group on issues related to spills, 
and response infrastructure requirements, and with the Sustainable 
Development Working Group (SDWG) on issues related to the human 
dimension. 
*Note: Ship traffic off the coast of Norway 
much higher than legend indicates.
z  Map 1.1  Shipping traffic in the Arctic for survey year 2004.  Source: AMSA
*
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The AMSA covers all types of marine transport under the gen-
eral topic of “shipping”: tankers, bulk carriers, offshore supply 
vessels, passenger ships, tug/barge combinations, fishing vessels, 
ferries, research vessels and government and commercial icebreak-
ers. Knowing the sum of the voyages completed by these different 
ships will help to understand the potential environmental impacts 
(especially from discharges and emissions) of Arctic marine shipping 
operations. An AMSA Database Survey, requesting these ship types, 
was sent to the Senior Arctic Officials of the Arctic states in February 
2006 to obtain the official shipping statistics of each state for the 
survey year 2004. The objective was to create the first baseline data-
base of all ships (less naval vessels) operating in the Arctic during 
a single year. Each Arctic state defined its own Arctic waters for the 
purpose of the AMSA data collection effort. The AMSA data effort 
yielded an historic survey that provides a comprehensive estimate 
for how many ships had operated in the Arctic for the survey year.
More than 185 experts participated directly in AMSA. Thirteen 
major AMSA workshops were held from July 2006 through October 
2008; workshop topics included: scenarios of future Arctic navigation; 
indigenous marine use; Arctic marine incidents; environmental 
impacts; Arctic marine infrastructure; and the future of the Russian 
Federation’s Northern Sea Route. AMSA town hall meetings were held 
in northern communities in Canada, Iceland, Norway and the United 
States. AMSA leads and team members conducted outreach and pre-
sented AMSA topics at 56 professional venues throughout the world 
during 2005-2008. 
 A large number of source documents were collected from the 
following activities: the results of the AMSA workshops, reports 
of the AMSA town hall meetings, the AMSA Data Survey, special 
reports created by maritime experts, and reviews of AMSA topics 
drafted by lead and contributing authors. These documents, referred 
to collectively as the AMSA Research Documents, will be found on 
the PAME and Arctic Council websites. The AMSA Research Documents 
represent a significant body of work and, while they have not been 
reviewed by the Arctic Council, the documents provided the back-
ground for drafting the AMSA 2009 Report, which was approved 
by the Arctic Council Ministers at the 2009 Ministerial meeting in 
Tromsø, Norway.
© Fednav, Ltd.
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 Modes of Arctic Marine Transport
In addition to the ship types to be addressed in the assessment, 
four modes, or types of voyages undertaken in the Arctic Ocean, were 
identified. They are:
Destinational transport, where a ship sails to the Arctic, per-
forms some activity in the Arctic and sails south. Examples include: 
large cruise ships sailing from southern ports to the west coast 
of Greenland in summer; LNG and oil tankers sailing from ports in 
northern Norway and northwest Russia to world markets; and an ice-
breaker from Europe conducting scientific operations in the central 
Arctic Ocean in summer. 
Intra-Arctic transport, a voyage or marine activity that stays 
within the general Arctic region and links two or more Arctic states. 
A key example is the marine route between the port of Churchill, 
Manitoba, Canada on Hudson Bay and Murmansk, Russia, touted as 
an “Arctic-bridge” between the two continents. Two other examples 
include an Icelandic fishing vessel working in Greenlandic waters, and 
tug-barge traffic operating between Canada’s Northwest Territories 
and the U.S. Beaufort Sea off the Alaskan coast. 
Trans-Arctic transport or navigation, voyages which are taken 
across the Arctic Ocean from Pacific to Atlantic oceans or vice versa. 
These are full voyages between the major oceans using the Arctic 
Ocean as a marine link. There are several options for trans-Arctic 
navigation. 
Cabotage, to trade or marine transport in coastal waters between 
ports within an Arctic state. A prime example is the year-round traf-
fic between the port of Dudinka on the Yenisei River and Murmansk 
- Russian-flag ships carrying nickel plates processed at the industrial 
complex in Norilsk to Murmansk for further distribution to Russian 
and international markets. Other examples are the summer sealift 
of cargoes to Canadian Arctic communities from southern Canadian 
ports and the delivery of consumer goods to Russian Arctic communi-
ties using the Northern Sea Route.   
© Neste Shipping Oy
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Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment: PAME
PAME is an example of the international cooperation that is a 
hallmark of the Arctic Council: while the PAME Secretariat is based 
in Akureyri, Iceland, its chairmanship in the spring of 2009 is held 
by Canada. 
Increased economic activity and significant changes due to 
climatic processes are resulting in increased use, opportunities 
and threats to the Arctic marine and coastal environments. These 
predicted changes require more integrated approaches to address 
both existing and emerging challenges of the Arctic marine and 
coastal environments. 
PAME’s mandate is to address policy and non-emergency pol-
lution prevention and control measures related to the protection 
of the Arctic marine environment from both land and sea-based 
activities, including coordinated action programs and guidelines 
complementing existing legal arrangements.
According to the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, PAME aims to 
improve knowledge and respond to emerging knowledge of the 
Arctic Marine Environment. The AMSA is the primary action item 
for this objective. The plan also calls on PAME to determine the 
adequacy of applicable international/regional commitments and 
promote their implementation and compliance; and facilitate 
partnerships, program and technical cooperation and support 
communication, reporting and outreach both within and outside 
the Arctic Council.
At the 2004 Arctic Council ministers meeting in Iceland, the 
Reykjavik Declaration asked the PAME work group “to conduct a 
comprehensive Arctic marine shipping assessment as outlined 
in the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) under the guidance 
of Canada, Finland and the United States as lead countries and 
in collaboration with the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response  (EPPR) working group of the Arctic Council and 
Permanent Participants as relevant.”
The Origin of the AMSA
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response: EPPR
The EPPR Secretariat rotates with the chairmanship of the 
Arctic Council and as such is located in the spring of 2009 at the 
Norwegian Coastal Administration, Department for Emergency 
Response, Norway.
Harsh conditions and lack of infrastructure in much of the Arctic 
create a higher vulnerability to emergencies than in more temper-
ate climates. Consequently, prevention, preparedness and response 
must be adapted to Arctic conditions. Accordingly, international 
cooperation in this area is of major importance.
The mandate of the EPPR working group is to deal with the 
prevention, preparedness and response to environmental emer-
gencies in the Arctic. Members of the working group exchange 
information on best practices and conduct projects (for example, 
development of guidance and risk assessment methodologies, 
response exercises, training, etc.). EPPR is not a response agency. In 
2004, EPPR was directed by the Arctic Ministers to expand its man-
date to include natural disasters.
Ongoing EPPR projects address oil pollution spill response in the 
face of increased Arctic shipping and development; technological 
support of radiological and other hazard assessments; and natural 
disaster response, particularly catastrophic river flooding.
The Arctic Council Ministers in November 2004 in Reykjavik asked PAME to “conduct 
a comprehensive Arctic marine shipping assessment as outlined in the Arctic Marine 
Strategic Plan (AMSP) under the guidance of Canada, Finland and the United States 
as lead countries and in collaboration with the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness 
and Response (EPPR) working group of the Arctic Council and Permanent Participants 
as relevant.”
185+
Number of international experts
who worked on the AMSA.
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The Assessment Report Structure
The AMSA 2009 Report is designed to educate and inform the 
Arctic Council, the Arctic community, the global maritime industry 
and the world at large about the current state of Arctic marine use 
and future challenges. The topics presented in the report include:
•	 Arctic	Marine	Geography,	Climate	and	Sea	Ice
•	 History	of	Arctic	Marine	Transport
•	 Governance	of	Arctic	Shipping
•	 Current	Marine	Use	and	AMSA	2004	Database	
•	 Scenarios,	Futures	and	Regional	Futures	to	2020
•	 Human	Dimensions
•	 Environmental	Considerations	and	Impacts
•	 Arctic	Marine	Infrastructure
The initial sections on Arctic marine geography and Arctic marine 
transport history provide background and context for the subsequent 
sections. The complex geography of the Arctic Ocean and its sur-
rounding coastline influences all aspects of Arctic marine operations. 
The history section emphasizes that industrial and commercial uses 
of the Arctic Ocean date back to the 17th century. There is also a 
rich history of marine operations in the Russian and Canadian Arctic 
regions, around Svalbard and Greenland, and off Alaska. Governance 
is identified in the AMSA as one of the key uncertainties and driv-
ers of future Arctic marine navigation, and this section provides a 
critical overview and current state of international and coastal state 
governance of Arctic marine activities. The section on current marine 
use provides a comprehensive and historic baseline of Arctic marine 
activity early in the 21st century, developed principally from the 
AMSA Data Survey. 
AMSA scenario workshops in 2007 and 2008 identified natural 
resource development and trade as key drivers and uncertainties. Two 
regional AMSA studies - for the Bering Strait and Canadian Arctic, as 
well as outcomes of ARCOP and INSROP - all emphasize oil and gas 
and hard minerals development as important indicators for future 
Arctic marine transport requirements.
The human dimension section communicates the results of the 
AMSA town hall meetings and identifies important concerns and 
issues of the Arctic indigenous people. Impacts are also highlighted 
in the environmental considerations section where ship types and 
their specific impacts are characterized. The final section of the 
report on Arctic infrastructure identifies the Arctic Ocean as a region 
with limited infrastructure in most areas, lacking communications, 
response capability, salvage and other basic services that are readily 
available to the maritime community in lower latitudes. 
 The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment is a comprehensive study 
and evaluation of Arctic marine activity today and the future. The 
AMSA 2009 Report highlights a single set of findings and recommen-
dations important to the future protection of Arctic people and the 
marine environment. The AMSA team of experts has also provided for 
each section in the report a list of non-negotiated research opportu-
nities that can be considered by the Arctic research community and 
organizations such as the International Arctic Science Committee. 
The AMSA Report is a strategic guide for understanding the com-
plexity and multiple factors that will determine the future of Arctic 
shipping  operations. Z
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Long known as a storehouse of untapped natural resources, 
high commodity prices and a growing worldwide demand in 
recent years have the Arctic poised as a significant contributor 
to the global economy.
© Fednav, Ltd. 
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Arctic Marine Geography
O
ur Earth has two polar regions, each with a large marine 
environment, that are vital to the well-being of the 
planet: Antarctica and the Arctic. Unlike Antarctica, 
though, which is a continent surrounded by an ocean, 
the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by continents. The Arctic Ocean, at 
14.056 million km2, is the smallest of the world’s five oceans (Table 
2.1). It is mostly an enclosed sea that has limited exchange of deep 
water with other oceans. Compared to the Mediterranean Sea, the Arctic 
has a much greater exchange of water, and it is more than 5.6 times 
larger. Consequently, the International Hydrographic Organization 
along with the International Maritime Organization recognizes the 
Arctic Ocean as one of the five major components of the world ocean 
that covers almost 71 percent of the Earth’s surface. More importantly, 
the Arctic Ocean is the least sampled of the world’s oceans and many 
areas remain where few, if any, soundings have been recorded. The 
implications of this lack of basic marine information are profound for 
charting hydrography and for basic Arctic navigation.
 The Arctic is bordered by numerous coastal seas, all of which are 
seasonally covered with sea ice. Working from Greenland eastwards, 
the waters adjacent to the Arctic basin itself are Greenland Sea, 
Norwegian Sea, Barents Sea, White Sea, Kara Sea, Laptev Sea, East 
Siberian Sea and Chukchi Sea - all fronting on the Eurasia continen-
tal land mass. The Bering Sea, the Beaufort Sea, the waters within 
the Canadian Archipelago including those of the Northwest Passage, 
Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait, Lincoln Sea, Baffin Bay, Davis Strait 
and Labrador Sea are all bordering on the North American continent. 
Most Arctic marine activity, such as fishing, offshore hydrocarbon 
development and ship transits, takes place in these coastal seas.
 Bathymetrically, the Arctic marine area is relatively shallow (Map 
2.1) with broad continental shelves. The shelf extends 100 to 200 
kilometers from the United States and Canada, and more than 1,000 
kilometers in places extending north from the Russian Federation. 
Depths over the shelves average between 100 and 200 meters but 
are variable, especially as the continental landmasses and islands are 
approached. At the continental slopes, the break between the shelf 
and the deep ocean basin, depths are between 300 and 500 meters. 
Arctic Marine Geography,  
Climate and Sea Ice
16 ARC TIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT |  ARC TIC MARINE GEOGRAPHY,  CLIMATE AND SEA ICE
Nautical Miles
5000
United States 
of America
Canada
Greenland
Iceland
Norway
Finland
Sweden
Denmark
Faroe
Islands
Russian
Federation
Arctic Circle 
Pole of
InaccessibilityNorth
Magnetic
Pole
North
Pole
z  Map 2.1  The Arctic marine area.  Source: AMSA
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Size (million km2)
Percentage 
of Earth’s 
Total Surface
Greatest 
Depth (m)
Average 
Depth (m)
Pacific 155.557 30.5 10,911 4,300
Atlantic 76.762 20.8 8,605 3,300 
Indian 65.556 14.4 7,258 3,900
Southern 20.327 4.0 7,235 4,000-5,000
Arctic 14.056 2.8 5,160 1,050
the world’s largest 10 islands. The next largest single island fringing 
on the Arctic marine area is Iceland (103,000 km²). On the west, the 
Arctic Ocean is bounded by Svalbard (Norway) of which Spitsbergen 
is the largest island; Franz Josef Land (Russian Federation) with 191 
islands; Novaya Zemlya (Russian Federation) with two major islands 
(Severny at 47,079 km² and Yuzhny at 33,246 km²); Severnaya Zemlya 
(Russian Federation) consisting of four major islands and 70 smaller 
ones; and New Siberian Islands (Russian Federation) with the Anzhu 
Islands and the Lyakhovskiye Islands. Between the New Siberian 
Islands group and the Bering Strait lies Wrangel Island (7,300 km²). 
Given these fringing islands, the distance from the nearest land to the 
North Pole is as little as 707 kilometers (382 nautical miles) (Table 
2.2), but this distance is different for each Arctic nation. Of interest 
to the marine world is the approximate 2,100 nautical mile (1134 
kilometer) distance (direct) from the Bering Strait to the North Pole 
to Fram Strait (between Greenland and Svalbard). All other distances 
along the coastal routes within the Arctic basin are longer.
Although technically not on the edge of the Arctic Ocean, the 
Aleutian Islands in the Pacific Ocean provide the southern limit 
of the Bering Sea, which links through the Bering Strait into the 
Chukchi Sea and the Arctic Ocean. A global maritime trade route - 
the North Pacific’s Great Circle Route - intersects with the Aleutian 
Islands and thousands of large ships pass north and south of these 
islands on voyages between the west coast of North America and 
Asian ports each year. 
The water connections linking the Arctic and the Pacific and 
Atlantic oceans are limited. The narrow and shallow Bering Strait 
(85 kilometer width; 30-50 meter depth) is the only link between the 
Arctic and the Pacific. There are more and wider passages between the 
Arctic and the Atlantic. Davis Strait between Canada and Greenland 
links Baffin Bay with the Labrador Sea and the North Atlantic. At 
its narrowest point Davis Strait is about 300 kilometers wide; at its 
widest it is over 950 kilometers. Between Greenland and Iceland lies 
Denmark Strait (290 kilometers wide at its narrowest). The widest 
passage is the Norwegian Sea at about 1,100 kilometers separating 
Iceland from Norway. 
These water passages between the Arctic Ocean and its northern 
coastal seas allow exchanges of water vital to the Arctic’s climate 
and marine ecosystems. By far the greatest exchange of water takes 
place between the Arctic and the Atlantic. Relatively warm dense 
salty water, as part of the North Atlantic Current originating in the 
Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, enters the Norwegian Sea con-
tinuing into the Barents Sea. This warmer water means that the 
Southern Barents Sea is not generally ice-covered, a significant fac-
tor in the regulation and control of marine traffic in this northwest 
There are two major deep basins - the Eurasia and Amerasia - sep-
arated by the Lomonosov Ridge stretching from the East Siberian Sea 
to the Lincoln Sea. The ridge is an underwater mountain chain rising, 
on average, 3,000 meters above the abyssal plain. On the Eurasian 
side of the Lomonosov Ridge, the basin is again split into two by the 
Nansen-Gakkel Arctic Mid-Ocean Ridge. Between the Lomonosov and 
Nansen-Gakkel Ridges lies the Pole Abyssal Plain in which is found 
the geographical North Pole at 90 degrees north. The depth of water 
at the pole is well over 4,000 meters. On the Amerasia side of the 
Lomonosov Ridge there are also two basins - the Makarov and Canada 
- separated by the Alpha and Mendeleev ridges. Of the two basins, 
the Canada Basin is the largest.   
Major islands and island archipelagos fringe the Arctic marine area 
and they help frame the marine routes, legal regimes and naviga-
tional options in the Arctic Ocean. The largest island is Greenland at 
2,166,086 km². The largest archipelago is the Canadian Archipelago 
with more than 36,000 islands including Baffin (507,451 km²), 
Victoria (217,291 km²) and Ellesmere (196,236 km²), which are among 
z  Table 2.1  Arctic Ocean compared to other oceans.  Source: AMSA
Country Closest Point to the North Pole Distance to Pole (km)
Greenland (Denmark) Kaffeklubben Island, Perry Land 707
Iceland Kolbeinsey, Eyjafjorour 2552
Norway Rossoya Sjuoyane, Svalbard 1024
Russian Federation Cape Fligely, Rudolf Island, 
Franz Josef Land
911
USA Point Barrow, Alaska 2078
Canada Cape Columbia, Ellesmere 
Island
769
z  Table 2.2  Distances from nearest land of Arctic states to the North Pole.  
Source: AMSA
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corner of Europe that is by latitude located in the Arctic region. After 
much mixing and cyclonic (counter-clockwise) circulation, cold, less 
salty water exits between Svalbard and Greenland and Greenland 
and Iceland. This exiting water consists not only of the modified 
North Atlantic waters but, more importantly, continental river water 
from Eurasia, especially from the Ob’, Yenisei and Lena rivers of the 
Russian Federation; freshwater from the Mackenzie River in Canada; 
and Pacific water which entered through the Bering Strait. The driv-
ing engine conveying the Pacific water and the river waters eastward 
is the Beaufort Gyre north of Alaska and western Canada. This gyre - 
a clockwise circulation of relatively fresh, less dense water - is driven 
by prevailing winds. When winds shift and the current lessens some 
water escapes and is caught up in the Trans Polar current, eventually 
linking with the outflow water into the Atlantic Ocean. Cold waters 
also exit from the Arctic to the Atlantic through Baffin Bay, Davis 
Strait and Hudson Strait. 
An important geographical limit and a defining line is the Arctic 
Circle (66 degrees 33 minutes north). At this latitude places receive 
continuous light for 24 hours per day once a year and as one moves 
poleward the number of days of continuous light increases until 
at the North Pole continuous light is experienced for six months 
Arctic Circle 
The Arctic Circle is the circle of latitude at 66 degrees 33 
minutes N (2606 kilometers/1619 miles from the North 
Pole) that encloses a northern area about 8 percent of 
Earth’s surface. The Arctic Circle is the southern limit of the 
midnight sun, where north of the circle there is at least one 
day each year when the sun does not set.
©
 Canadian Coast G
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between the Vernal (March 21) and Autumnal equinoxes (September 
21). Conversely, continuous dark is experienced at the pole for the 
other six months and decreasingly in time as one moves south. 
Significant for marine operations is that much of the central Arctic 
Ocean is shrouded in winter darkness with very low temperatures for 
half the year. This seasonal or diurnal cycle in the polar environ-
ment, while highly influential in the rhythmic behavior and adap-
tation of Arctic communities and animal populations, has broad 
implications for maritime use throughout the Arctic Ocean and its 
coastal seas.
The Canadian Maritime Arctic and Northwest Passage
The Canadian maritime Arctic is located across the north of 
Canada from the Beaufort Sea in the west to Baffin Bay in the 
east, and south to 60 degrees north latitude. The Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago stretches longitudinally about 1,900 kilometers from 
mainland Canada to the northern tip of Ellesmere Island. From west 
to east, it covers a distance of about 2,400 kilometers from Banks 
Island (west side) to Baffin Island (east side). The size of this 
roughly triangular area, including land and ocean, is approximately 
2.1 million km², about the size of Greenland. As mentioned previ-
ously, it comprises approximately 36,000 islands, making it one of 
the most complex geographies on Earth. The area is sparsely popu-
lated along the coastline. The largest settlement is Iqaluit, Baffin 
Island, at 6,100 people; the entire Baffin region includes most 
of the eastern and northern portion of the Archipelago including 
all of Baffin Island. The most northern settlement is Grise Fjord 
on Ellesmere Island. Resolute on Cornwallis Island and the shores 
of Barrow Strait are an important staging area for air and marine 
traffic. 
The Archipelago serves as a major impediment to shippers seek-
ing a link between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans or for internal 
shipment of resources or community supplies. There are five recog-
nized routes or passages, with variations, through the Archipelago 
(Table 2.3). They make up the much searched for Northwest 
Passage, which occupied European adventurers for more than 400 
years. The NWP is the name given to the various marine routes 
between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans along the northern coast 
of North America that span the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The 
first complete ship transit of the NWP took place from 1903-06 
by Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen following Route 3b (Table 
2.3). In 1940-42 the first eastward passage, using Route 4, was 
made by the St. Roch commanded by RCMP Sergeant Henry Larsen. 
This trip was followed in 1944 by a westward passage following 
Route 1, marking the first time the Northwest Passage had been 
navigated in a single season.
 All passages have common eastern and western approaches. 
In the east, ships must proceed through the Labrador Sea, Davis 
Strait and Baffin Bay - the exception is for Route 5, which requires 
a transit through Hudson Strait. In the western approaches ships 
proceed through the Bering Sea, Bering Strait, the Chukchi Sea and 
the Beaufort Sea before deciding which route to follow. In general, 
the operating season is short - from late July to mid-October - 
depending on the route and year. Of the various passages, routes 
1 and 2 are considered deep water ones, while the others have 
limiting shoals and rocks restricting the draft of vessels to less 
than 10 meters.
The Arctic Ocean is the least sampled of the world’s oceans and many areas 
remain where few, if any, soundings have been recorded.
Northwest Passage (NWP) 
The NWP is the name given to the various marine routes 
between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans along the northern 
coast of North America that span the Canadian Arctic 
Archipelago.
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Water Routes of the Northwest Passage 
Route Routing (East to West) Physical Description Of Note
1 Lancaster Sound – Barrow Strait – Viscount Melville 
Sound – Prince of Wales Strait – Amundsen Gulf.
Lancaster Sound: 80 km wide, 250 km long, deep at over 500 m. 
Barrow Strait: 50 km wide, 180 km long, deep, string of islands west of Resolute disrupts clear 
navigation.
Viscount Melville Sound: 100 km wide, 350 km long, experiences multi-year ice from M’Clure Strait.
Prince of Wales Strait: minimum width of less than 10 km about half way through the Strait, 230 
km long, limiting depth of 32 m.
Amundsen Gulf: irregular shape, 90 km wide entrance, approximately 300 km long.   
Suitable for deep draft navigation; the route 
followed by St. Roch in 1944 on westerly 
transit and the SS Manhattan in 1969.
2 Same as 1 but substitute M’Clure Strait for Prince of 
Wales Strait and Amundsen Gulf.
Collectively Lancaster Sound – Barrow Strait – Vis-
count Melville Sound is known as Parry Channel.
M’Clure Strait: 120 km wide at east end, 275 km long to Beaufort Sea, deep at over 400 m, experi-
ences multi-year ice from Arctic Ocean.
SS Manhattan attempted this route in 1969 
but was turned back.
Russian icebreaker Kapitan Klebnikov suc-
ceeded in a passage in 2001.
In September 2007 was clear of Arctic pack 
ice for a limited time since satellite photos 
have been available; there was  more ice 
in 2008.
3A Lancaster Sound – Barrow Strait – Peel Sound 
– Franklin Strait – Larsen Sound – Victoria Strait – 
Queen Maud Gulf – Dease Strait – Coronation Gulf 
– Dolphin and Union Strait – Amundsen Gulf.
Lancaster Sound and Barrow Strait: see Route 1.
Peel Sound: 25 km wide, deep at over 400 m at south end.
Franklin Strait: 30 km wide.
Larsen Sound: depths vary between 30 and 200 meters.
Victoria Strait: 120 km wide, at southern end is blocked by Royal Geographical Society Islands, 
worst ice conditions along the mainland coast of Canada.
Queen Maud Gulf: eastern entrance 14 km wide, but widens into an irregular area with width of 
up to 280 km before narrowing to 14 km at entrance to Dease Strait; numerous islands, reefs and shoals.
Dease Strait: 14 – 60 km wide, 160 km long.
Coronation Gulf: over 160 km long, many islands.
Dolphin and Union Strait: 80 km wide at Amundsen Gulf, 150 km long, caution should be 
exercised in passage, several soundings of less than 10 m have been recorded.  
Amundsen Gulf: see Route 1.
Of the 3A, 3B and 4 routes, this is considered 
the best option but with a draft limit of 
10 m.
3B A variation of 3A. Rather than following Victoria 
Strait on the west side of King William Island, the 
route passes to the east of the island following 
James Ross Strait – Rae Strait – Simpson Strait.
James Ross Strait: 50 km wide, but restricted by islands, extensive shoaling.
Rae Strait: 20 km wide, with limiting depths of between 5-18 m in mid channel.
Simpson Strait: about 3 km wide at narrowest point, most hazardous navigation area in 3B route.
The route of Roald Amundsen.
Also route of the MS Explorer, in 1984, the 
first cruise ship to navigate the Northwest 
Passage. 
4 Similar to 3A. Rather than following Peel Sound on 
the west side of Somerset Island, the route passes 
to the east of the island through Prince Regent Inlet 
and Bellot Strait.
Prince Regent Inlet: 80 km wide, free of islands, deep.
Bellot Strait: short and very narrow, strong currents, limiting depth of 22 m.
Route of St. Roch in 1940-42 on easterly 
transit.
5 Hudson Strait – Foxe Channel – Foxe Basin – Fury 
and Hecla Strait – Gulf of Boothia – Bellot Strait – 
remainder via routes 3A, 3B or 4.
Hudson Strait: 100 km wide, 650 km long, deep, also serves as entrance to Hudson Bay and 
Churchill port.
Foxe Channel: 130 km wide, deep, with limiting shoal in the middle that can be avoided.
Foxe Basin: very large, many islands in northern end.
Fury and Hecla Strait: 160 km long, very narrow with fast current. 
Gulf of Boothia: very large waterway connecting to Prince Regent Inlet to the north (see route 
4). No problems for navigation except at exit of Fury and Hecla Strait where Crown Prince Frederick 
Island is to be avoided.
Not generally considered a viable com-
mercial passage for moderate to deep draft 
ships.
z  Table 2.3  Adopted from Pharand (1988) with additional material from Sailing Directions, Arctic Canada, Vol. 3, 5th edition, 1994 and Canadian Arctic Shipping Assessment, 
Transport Canada, 2007.
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Several forms of floating ice may be encountered at sea. The 
most extensive is that which results from the freezing of the sea 
surface, namely sea ice; but mariners must also be concerned with 
“ice of land origin” - icebergs, ice islands, bergy bits and growl-
ers. Both icebergs and sea ice can be dangerous to shipping and 
always have an effect on navigation. 
•	 Young	ice:	newly	formed	sea	ice	less	than	30	centimeters	thick.	
It forms extensively in the autumn as ocean surface tempera-
tures fall below freezing and on leads that open in mid-winter 
due to shifts in the pack ice. It is not a significant safety hazard 
for most Arctic vessels although, when placed under pressure 
by winds or currents, it can impede progress.
•	 First-year	ice:	can	easily	attain	a	thickness	of	1	meter	but	rarely	
grows beyond 2 meters by the end of the winter. It is relatively 
soft due to inclusions of brine cells and air pockets and will not 
generally hole an ice-strengthened ship operated with due 
caution. Under pressure from winds or currents, first-year ice 
can impede progress to the point where even powerful vessels 
can become beset for hours or even days.
The Nature of Ice at Sea
©
 C
an
ad
ia
n 
Co
as
t G
ua
rd
•	 Old	 ice:	 If	 first-year	 ice	 survives	 the	 summer	melt	 season,	 it	
is then classified as old ice (subdivided into second-year and 
multi-year ice). It is typically 1 to 5 meters thick and is extremely 
hard. During the summer melt process, the brine cells and air 
pockets that characterize first-year ice drain out the bottom of 
the ice, leaving a clear, solid ice mass that is harder than con-
crete. Even ice-strengthened vessels are at risk of being holed 
by old ice. When under pressure, old ice can stop the most 
powerful icebreakers. 
•	 Icebergs:	are	large	masses	of	floating	ice	originating	from	gla-
ciers. They are very hard and can cause considerable damage 
to a ship in a collision. Ice islands are vast tabular icebergs orig-
inating from floating ice shelves. Smaller pieces of icebergs are 
called bergy bits and growlers and are especially dangerous to 
ships because they are extremely difficult to detect. 
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The Russian Maritime Arctic and Northern Sea Route
The physical environment of the northern coast of Eurasia - 
the Russian maritime Arctic - presents unique challenges to the 
mariner and to modern ship technology and systems. Shallow 
waters generally characterize the length of the coastline from the 
Norwegian-Russian border in the west (in the Barents Sea) to the 
Bering Strait. The average depths of the East Siberian and Chukchi 
seas are 58 meters and 88 meters respectively, making the entire 
coastal region in the east quite shallow for all marine operations. 
The average depth of the Laptev Sea is 578 meters (its northern 
limit extends into the Arctic Ocean basin); however, 66 percent of 
its area along the coast is in depths of 100 meters or less. The Kara 
Sea has an average depth of 90 meters and the Barents Sea is rela-
tively shallow along the coast (10-100 meters) in the southeastern 
region and slopes to depths of 200-300 meters to the northwest. 
From the early years of exploration in the 17th century to today’s 
offshore development and use of shipping routes, the consistently 
shallow bathymetry of this broad Arctic coast has been a key facet 
in all maritime affairs.
The Northern Sea Route is defined in Russian law as the set of 
Arctic marine routes between Kara Gate in the west and the Bering 
Strait. A number of narrow straits represent a significant constraint 
to navigation along the NSR. Yugorskiy Shar Strait is located along 
the south coast of Vaygach Island and is the southernmost entrance 
from the Barents to Kara seas (21 nautical miles long, 13-30 meters 
deep). Kara Gate is the main shipping strait between the Barents and 
Kara seas (18 nautical miles long, minimum depth of 21 meters) and 
shipping uses an established traffic separation scheme. Vilkitskiy 
Strait separates Severnaya Zemlya from the northernmost extremity 
of the Eurasian land mass, Cape Chelyuskin. This is a key NSR strait 
between the Kara and Laptev seas (60 nautical mile length, 100-200 
meter depths), but it is ice-covered except for a short period in some 
summer seasons. Shokalskiy Strait is located in Severnaya Zemlya 
north of Vilkitskiy Strait and is a second possible shipping route 
between the Kara and Laptev seas (80 nautical miles long, minimum 
depth of 37 meters). 
In the eastern reaches of the NSR, Dmitry Laptev Strait, oriented 
east-west, is the southernmost passage between the New Siberian 
Islands and the Russian mainland, linking the Laptev and East 
Siberian seas. This strait is 63 nautical miles long and has depths 
of 12-15 meters; however, the eastern approach has only depths of 
10 meters or less, restricting traffic to ships with less than a 6.7 
meter draft. Sannikov Strait is a second passage through the New 
Siberian Islands linking the Laptev and East Siberian seas (160 nau-
tical miles long, minimum depths of 13 meters). From a navigation 
perspective, the low surrounding New Siberian Islands make visual 
and radar observations difficult to obtain, especially during long 
periods of reduced visibility. Long Strait separates Wrangel Island 
from the Russian mainland and links the East Siberian and Chukchi 
seas (a 120-nautical mile southern route along the coast with 20 
meter minimum depths; a 160-nautical mile northern route with 33 
meter minimum depths). 
Several marine route distances are notable: from Murmansk to 
the Bering Strait is 3,074 nautical miles; and the Northern Sea 
Route from Kara Gate to the Bering Strait is 2,551 nautical miles. 
The Dudinka to Murmansk marine route that is maintained year-
round is 1,343 nautical miles, while it is approximately 500 nauti-
cal miles between the offshore region of the Pechora Sea (site of 
new oil terminals) in the southeast corner of the Barents Sea and 
Murmansk. Compared with the Canadian Arctic, the Russian mari-
time Arctic has many more viable ports located along the length of 
the NSR. Primary NSR ports from west to east include: Amderma, 
Dikson, Yamburg (Ob’ Gulf), Dudinka (north Yenisei River), Igarka 
(south Yenisei River), Khatanga (Khatanga River on the Laptev 
Sea), Tiksi (Tiksi Gulf near the Lena River), Zeleny Mys (Kolyma 
River) and Pevek.
   
Northern Sea Route (NSR) 
The NSR is defined in Russian Federation law as a set of 
marine routes from Kara Gate (south of Novaya Zemlya) in 
the west to the Bering Strait in the east. Several of the routes 
are along the coast, making use of the main straits through 
the islands of the Russian Arctic; other potential routes run 
north of the island groups.
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Arctic Climatology
   
One defining threshold of the Arctic environment that is often 
used is set by the 10°C July isotherm. This isotherm marks the 
southern Arctic boundary where the monthly mean temperature 
in July is below 10°C. This limit also closely corresponds to the 
northern limit of the treeline. Because of the mix of landmasses, 
water and ice in the northern latitudes the isotherm pushes north 
above the Arctic Circle in all of Eurasia, but is south of the Arctic 
Circle in much of central and eastern Canada, southern Greenland 
and the Aleutian Islands. For example, the mean monthly July tem-
perature at Honningsvåg, Norway (latitude 70° 58’ N) is 10.3°C; 
at Murmansk, Russia (latitude 68° 58´ N) it is 13.4°C. However, at 
Inukjuak, Quebec, Canada on the east side of Hudson Bay (58° 27´N) 
the average July temperature is only 9.4°C; at Paamiut, Greenland 
on the south west coast (62° 00´ N) it is 5.5°C. 
In January, mean temperatures everywhere within the Arctic 
Circle are all below 0°C, varying from about -5°C along the north 
coast of Norway to greater than -35°C in central Greenland, the 
northern part of the Canadian Archipelago and in northern Siberia. 
The average January temperature at the North Pole is estimated at 
between -30 and -35° C; however, this is difficult to know given that 
no permanent recording station exists at the pole. Over virtually all 
of the Arctic Ocean mean winter air temperatures are not as cold as 
they are in fringing continental land masses in Siberia, Alaska and 
Canada.
Precipitation, generally, is light within the Arctic at less than 
250 millimeters per annum. Only along exposed coastal regions in 
southern Baffin Island, western Greenland and northern Scandinavia 
are amounts greater than this regularly experienced. The main com-
ponent of the precipitation in the central and high Arctic is snow, 
but it too is light, at less than 25 centimeters per annum. Although 
light, snow tends to be blown in all regions and accumulates in 
drifts and around structures; in marine environments drifting snow 
accumulates along ice edges and other features on the sea ice cre-
ating considerable additional barriers to normal navigation. Almost 
all snow disappears nearly everywhere in the summer, except in 
glacier areas.
One of the factors explaining the climatic patterns and annual 
weather events in the Arctic is the distribution of high and low 
pressure systems through the year. In winter two semi-permanent 
low pressure areas set up in the region: one over Iceland and the 
Geographic North Pole 
The Geographic North Pole, the Earth’s northernmost point, 
is located at the northern end of the Earth’s axis of rotation. 
The latitude of the Geographic North Pole is 90 degrees N 
and it is the point where all the meridians of longitude and 
all 24 of the world’s time zones converge.
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z  Graph 2.1  Northern Hemisphere sea ice extent.  Source: J. Walsh, W. Chapman
North Atlantic extending into the Barents Sea, the other over the 
Gulf of Alaska in the North Pacific. In contrast, high pressure areas 
are established over Siberia and the Yukon in Canada. The pres-
sure differences bring about frequent and intense cyclonic storms 
moving generally from west to east. In summer, the lows weaken, 
the Siberian high disappears and the Canadian high shifts north 
over the Canadian Archipelago. As a result, pressure gradients 
are less and cyclonic activity declines, providing a fairly benign 
Arctic marine environment for voyages and regional operations. By 
October, the winter configuration begins to take effect and stormi-
ness increases with declining temperatures. Again, the seasonality 
of the polar environment, in this case the overall annual weather 
patterns over the Arctic Ocean, is a critical, strategic aspect for 
planning current and future marine transport systems throughout 
the Arctic basin.
Arctic Sea Ice: Changing Operating  
Conditions in the Arctic Ocean
Introduction
The Arctic sea ice cover is undergoing an extraordinary trans-
formation that has significant implications for marine access and 
shipping throughout the Arctic basin. The Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, released by the Arctic Council at the Iceland Ministerial 
meeting in November 2004, documented that Arctic sea ice extent 
has been declining for the past five decades. Research has also 
indicated that sea ice thickness has been decreasing during the same 
period, and the area of multi-year ice has also been declining in the 
central Arctic Ocean. 
Global Climate Models used in the ACIA and the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC AR4 released 
in 2007) simulate a continuous decline in sea ice coverage through the 
21st century. One ACIA model showed it is plausible that during mid-
century, the entire Arctic Ocean could be ice-free for a short period in 
the summer, a finding that garnered significant media attention. 
Recent research (2006-2008) has indicated this plausible ice-free 
state of the Arctic sea ice cover may occur as early as 2040, if not 
sooner. It is important to note that despite the remarkable, ongo-
ing changes in Arctic sea ice and some uncertainty surrounding the 
output of the GCMs, no research and none of the GCM simulations 
have indicated that the winter sea ice cover of the Arctic Ocean will 
disappear during this century. 
This fact alone - that there will always be an Arctic sea ice cover 
to contend with - has important implications for all future Arctic 
marine activity and for the development of ship standards and mea-
sures to enhance Arctic marine safety and environmental protection. 
The resulting sea ice conditions for future Arctic marine operations 
will be challenging and will require substantial monitoring and 
improved regional observations. This new Arctic Ocean of increasing 
marine access, potentially longer seasons of navigation and increas-
ing ship traffic requires greater attention and stewardship by the 
Arctic states and all marine users. 
In assessments of ongoing and projected climate change, Arctic 
sea ice is a critical and highly visible element. Observed sea ice 
extents derived from satellite passive microwave data for 1979-2006 
indicate a decrease or annual loss of 45,000 km2 of ice (3.7 per-
cent decrease per decade). The same data analysis shows negative 
ice extent trends for each of the four seasons and each of the 12 
months; the decline in summer extent (6.2 percent decrease per 
decade) is larger than in winter (2.6 percent decrease per decade). 
Future Arctic navigation and 
all marine activity will depend 
on more frequent, reliable and 
near real-time sea ice thickness 
measurements.
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Interestingly, the five smallest September ice-covered areas for 
the Arctic Ocean during the modern satellite record (1979-2008) 
have occurred in the five most recent seasons (2004-2008). Map 
2.2 shows the sea ice coverage derived from satellite at the time of 
minimum extent of Arctic sea ice on September 16, 2007. 
This snapshot represents the minimum coverage of Arctic sea 
ice in the satellite era of observations. Striking are several notable 
features: the largely ice-free areas across the Russian Arctic coastal 
seas (north of the Eurasian coast), except for a small region in the 
western Laptev Sea; an ice edge that has retreated north of Svalbard 
and well north in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas; several ice-free 
passages through the Canadian Archipelago; and a large area of the 
central Arctic Ocean that previously has not been observed open or 
without even a thin ice cover. 
These extraordinary changes in the summer ice cover of the Arctic 
Ocean, represented by a single, iconic satellite image for September 
16, 2007, are major factors in the potential lengthening of the navi-
gation season in regional Arctic seas, particularly in the summer. It 
should be noted though that during the same timeframe, the Fram 
Strait contained more ice than normal, underscoring the regional 
variability of sea ice extent.
Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
The ACIA, approved by the eight Arctic countries, was called 
for by the Arctic Council and the International Arctic Science 
Committee. The assessment found that the Arctic is extremely vul-
nerable to observed and projected climate change and its impacts. 
The Arctic is now experiencing some of the most rapid and severe 
climate change on earth. During the 21st century, climate change is 
expected to accelerate, contributing to major physical, ecological, 
social and economic changes, many of which have already begun. 
Changes in Arctic climate will also affect the rest of the planet 
through increased global warming and rising sea levels. Of direct 
relevance to future Arctic marine activity, and to the AMSA, is that 
potentially accelerating Arctic sea ice retreat improves marine access 
throughout the Arctic Ocean.
The assessment confirmed, using a wealth of current Arctic 
research, that declining Arctic sea ice is a key climate change indi-
cator. During the past five decades the observed extent of Arctic sea 
ice has declined in all seasons, with the most prominent retreat in 
summer. While the ACIA models have now been surpassed by more 
capable GCMs, each of the five GCMs used in the ACIA did project a 
continuous decline in Arctic sea ice coverage throughout the 21st 
z  Map 2.2  Satellite images of summer sea ice cover.  Source: University of Illinois – The Cryosphere Today
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z  Map 2.3  Arctic sea ice simulations for the 21st century.  
Source: Arctic Climate Impact Assesment
century (Map 2.3). From a strategic planning perspective, this is a 
key factor for evaluating future Arctic marine transport systems. As 
noted previously, one of the models simulates a summer ice-free 
Arctic Ocean by 2050, a future scenario of great significance for 
Arctic shipping and offshore development. Such a physical occur-
rence would mean that multi-year ice could possibly disappear in 
the Arctic Ocean. All of the next winter’s ice would be first-year: no 
ice will have survived a winter season (and be able to gain strength 
and thickness). 
GCM projections to 2100 suggest that in the summer the Arctic 
sea ice will retreat further and further away from most Arctic coasts, 
potentially increasing marine access and extending the season of 
navigation in nearly all Arctic regional seas. One critical limitation 
of the GCMs is that they are not useful for determining the state of 
sea ice in the Northwest Passage region. Their spatial resolution is 
much too coarse to be applied to the complicated geography of the 
Canadian Arctic Archipelago. 
In the ACIA, the only reliable observed data for the region comes 
from the Canadian Ice Service and this information, archived since 
the late 1960s, shows a mean negative trend of sea ice coverage 
in the Canadian Arctic, but very high year-to-year variability. The 
ACIA models, however, could be applied very crudely to the more 
open coastal seas of the Russian Arctic. The ACIA sea ice projections 
for Russia’s Northern Sea Route indicated longer periods of ice-free 
conditions which could translate into a longer navigation season 
throughout the 21st century.
The ACIA confirms that the observed retreat of Arctic sea ice is a 
real phenomenon. The GCM projections to 2100 show extensive open 
water areas during the summer around the Arctic basin. Thus, it is 
highly plausible there will be increasing regional marine access in all 
the Arctic coastal seas. However, the projections show only a modest 
decrease in winter Arctic sea ice coverage; there will always be an 
ice-covered Arctic Ocean in winter although the ice may be thinner 
and may contain a smaller fraction of multi-year ice. The very high, 
inter-annual variability of observed sea ice in the Northwest Passage 
and non-applicability of the GCMs to the region prevent an adequate 
assessment of this complex region. 
Northern Pole of Inaccessibility 
Located at 84 degrees 3 minutes N, 174 degrees fifty-one min-
utes W, the Pole of Inaccessibility is the point farthest from any 
Arctic coastline, making it the most difficult to attain.
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Although the ACIA projections indicate an increasing length of 
the navigation season for the Northern Sea Route (20-30 days per 
year in 2004, to 90-100 days by 2080), detailed quantification of 
this changing marine access also tested the limitations of the ACIA 
GCMs. Since the work of the ACIA, advances and refinements in the 
models may allow them to provide more robust strategic informa-
tion on the length of time regions remain ice-free and year-to-year 
regional sea ice variabilities. There is a definite need for improved 
Arctic regional models to adequately assess future changes in sea 
ice extent and thickness, and their considerable implications for 
expanded marine use of the Arctic Ocean. And, there is a significant 
need for more sea ice observations to improve the calibration and 
validation of the GCMs.
The final ACIA report lists 10 major findings that are essentially 
the key impacts of climate change on Arctic people and the envi-
ronment. The ACIA key finding #6 states, “Reduced sea ice is very 
likely to increase marine transport and access to resources.” One of 
the follow-on Arctic Council activities addressing this ACIA finding 
is the AMSA. 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Fourth 
Assessment and Beyond 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was estab-
lished in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization of the United 
Nations Environment Programme. IPCC is an intergovernmental body 
that provides scientific and technical information to policy makers. 
The 2007 IPCC 4th Assessment report indicated the lack of compre-
hensive sea ice data prior to the satellite era. However, observed 
data analyses have been able to confirm a sustained decline in Arctic 
sea ice since the early 1970s, notably during the summer melt sea-
son. The report also comments that the accuracy of satellite-derived 
ice concentration is usually 5 percent or better; errors of up to 10-20 
percent can occur during the melt season as the passive microwave 
sensors measure the thin surface layers of melt water on the sea 
ice surface. Of critical importance to future navigation, the assess-
ment also summarizes the information on the remarkable decrease in 
multi-year ice throughout the Arctic Ocean. 
The possibility of an ice-free Arctic Ocean, even for a brief 
period, was advanced as an intriguing outcome of the ACIA. Recent 
analyses of GCM sea ice simulations using models from the IPCC 
AR4 (applying global warming scenarios) show near-complete loss of 
Arctic sea ice in September for 2040 to beyond 2100. However, addi-
tional research also indicates abrupt reductions in sea ice coverage 
during the 21st century are a common feature in many of the GCM 
simulations. Whether these periods of accelerated summer sea ice 
retreat might provide windows of opportunity for improved marine 
navigation is unknown. However, these research results and recent 
model inter-comparisons show the many uncertainties that remain in 
simulating the future ice cover of the Arctic Ocean.
North Magnetic Pole 
The North Magnetic Pole is a non-stationary pole in the 
Arctic to which compass needles point from any direction. 
The magnetic field at this point points straight down or is 
at right angles to the Earth’s surface. The position of the 
Pole continues to wander and is currently northwest of the 
Canadian Arctic.
It is important to note that despite 
the remarkable, ongoing changes 
in Arctic sea ice and some uncer-
tainty surrounding the output of 
the GCMs, no research and none of 
the GCM simulations have indicated 
that the winter sea ice cover of the 
Arctic Ocean will disappear during 
this century. 
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z  Map 2.4  Hadley Centre Arctic Sea Ice Simulations, 2050.  Source: IPCC4 - 2050
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Further research on the performance of the IPCC AR4 models (Map 
2.4) reveals that none of the GCMs have negative trends for sea ice 
as large as the observed sea ice coverage trend for the period 1953-
2006 (7.8 percent per decade reduction). The observed trend is three 
times larger than the multi-model mean of a 2.5 percent per decade 
loss. This is an extraordinary development that also means the current 
summer sea ice minima are as much as 30 years ahead of the mean 
of the model simulations. With continued greenhouse gas emissions, 
it is highly plausible that the Arctic Ocean could become completely 
ice-free for a short summer period much earlier than 2040. 
Just as important to ship navigation, these simulations indicate 
large areas of the coastal Arctic seas to be ice-free for longer periods 
in the spring and autumn months. Arctic marine access continues to 
increase in nearly all the scenarios posed by the ACIA and the more 
recent IPCC assessments.
Additional Sea Ice Trends and Research 
Earlier observations from aircraft and ships, and three decades 
of daily satellite observations, suggest that the September 2007 
minimum sea ice extent (Map 2.2) was the lowest since the early 
1950s; however, the September 2008 minimum extent indicated a 
slightly larger area of sea ice coverage. The Arctic sea ice cover is 
at a maximum extent in March and this maximum coverage has also 
been observed to decrease at approximately 2 percent per decade 
during the period 1979-2008. These extent reductions have been 
observed in all seasons of a year, but perhaps more significant have 
been observations of a rapid decline of thick, multi-year sea ice in 
the central Arctic Ocean. A study of satellite data for winter during 
1978-1998 revealed that the multi-year sea ice cover had declined 
by 7 percent per decade. A second trend analysis for 25 years of sum-
mer ice minima (1978 to 2003) reports a decline of multi-year sea 
z  Graph 2.2  Sea ice variability in the Canadian Arctic and Northwest Passage.  Source: Canadian Ice Service
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z  Map 2.5  Sea ice depictions for the AMSA shipping survey year of 2004. Source: AMSA
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ice as high as 9.2 percent per decade. One important result of these 
trends should be a decrease in the presence of multi-year ice in the 
Arctic’s coastal seas where seasonal navigation and marine activity 
are highest.
Arctic sea ice thicknesses have been much more difficult to moni-
tor and evaluate during recent decades. Direct measurements of first-
year sea ice in the Arctic coastal seas by the Arctic and Antarctic 
Research Institute in St. Petersburg, the Russian Federation, along 
the Russian Arctic, generally yield 1-2 meter thicknesses. For the 
central Arctic Ocean, thicknesses of multi-year sea ice can be as high 
as 4-5 meters. One pioneering study using sea ice draft data acquired 
on submarine cruises (data from 1958-1976 compared with cruise 
data for 1993-1996) indicated a decrease in thickness at the end of 
the melt season for the central Arctic Ocean from 3.1 to 1.8 meters. 
This represented a volume decrease of 40 percent and a widespread 
decrease in sea ice draft. This 40 percent reduction was adjusted to 
32 percent in a subsequent study once additional submarine tracks 
were added.  
One key issue is that future sampling of Arctic sea ice thick-
ness requires enhanced monitoring systems for more effective spatial 
and temporal measurements. Modern measurement systems such as 
electromagnetics, upward looking sonars and satellites have been 
developed that are improving thickness observations. Future Arctic 
navigation and all marine activity will depend on more frequent, reli-
able and near real-time sea ice thickness measurements. 
Sea Ice Regional Trends
Canadian Maritime Arctic and Northwest Passage 
The observed record of minimum sea ice extent for the eastern 
and western regions of the Canadian Arctic is illustrated in Graph 
2.2. Although the observations for both regions show negative 
trends for the period 1969-2008, the year-to-year variability in 
coverage is quite extreme. Both regions also exhibit large differ-
ences for a given year; for example, in 1991 the western Canadian 
Arctic showed one of the highest or largest ice coverage areas, 
while in the eastern region a more normal coverage area at the 
summer minimum was observed. These regional variabilities cre-
ate a challenge for seasonal operations. While these observations 
indicate an overall decrease in the ice cover of the waterways that 
comprise the Northwest Passage, the two key variabilities - year-
to-year and spatial - create challenges for planners judging risk 
and the reliability of an Arctic marine transportation system for 
the long-term.
The five models used in the ACIA revealed that the last regions 
of the Arctic Ocean with sea ice coverage in summer would be in 
the northern waterways of the Canadian Archipelago and along the 
northern coast of Greenland. The flow of more mobile multi-year ice 
through these waterways presents another potential challenge to 
marine operations. Enhanced satellite monitoring (with high resolu-
tion imagery) of this complex region will be a necessity if expanded 
marine operations beyond summer are to be realized.
The five models used in the ACIA revealed that the last regions of the Arctic 
Ocean with sea ice coverage in summer would be in the northern waterways 
of the Canadian Archipelago and along the northern coast of Greenland.
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Research Opportunities
q Research to improve regional models for increased under-
standing and enhanced forecasting of regional Arctic sea 
ice variability. New regional models should include ice 
thickness, snow cover and ice ridging, all key parameters 
of importance to Arctic navigation.
q Comprehensive analyses of current and future Global 
Climate Model simulations of Arctic sea ice extent to 
quantitatively assess the range of plausibly ice-free and 
partially ice-covered conditions.
q Considering the ongoing development of the Sustained 
Arctic Observing Network (SAON), develop and contribute 
a set of parameters to be observed and more observa-
tions that will be relevant to enhancing marine safety and 
marine environmental protection.
q Continued data analysis and updating of the International 
Bathymetric Chart of the Arctic Ocean (IBACO) with a 
long-term goal to create a comprehensive, integrated 
digital database of all bathymetric information for the 
Arctic Ocean.
Russian Maritime Arctic and Northern Sea Route 
Map 2.2 indicates that a nearly ice-free summer passage could 
have been made in 2007 and 2008 from Kara Gate through to the 
Bering Strait along the length of the Northern Sea Route except for 
sea ice in the western Laptev Sea. Passive microwave satellite obser-
vations of sea ice in the Russian Arctic seas from 1979 to the present 
show large reductions in sea ice extent in summer and reductions in 
winter extent in the Barents Sea. All of the ACIA model simulations 
and more recent IPCC AR4 model simulations confirm that large sum-
mer ice edge retreats should occur in the Laptev, East Siberian and 
western Chukchi seas. With a continued shrinkage of the fraction of 
multi-year sea ice in the central Arctic Ocean, it is plausible that 
fewer multi-year ice floes may be observed along the navigable east-
ern passages of the Northern Sea Route. 
The physical environment of the 
northern coast of Eurasia - the 
Russian maritime Arctic - presents 
unique challenges to the mariner 
and to modern ship technology 
and systems.
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Northeast Passage (NEP) 
The NEP is defined as the set of sea routes from northwest 
Europe around North Cape (Norway) and along the north 
coast of Eurasia and Siberia through the Bering Strait to 
the Pacific.
A global maritime trade route - the North Pacific’s Great Circle Route - intersects 
with the Aleutian Islands and thousands of large ships pass north and south 
of these islands on voyages between the west coast of North  
America and Asian ports each year.
Long-term fast ice thickness measurements of the four Russian 
marginal seas (Kara, Laptev, East Siberian and Chukchi seas) have 
been analyzed for trends using 65-year observational records (1930s 
to 1990s). Long-term trends are small and inconclusive: the trends 
are small (approximately 1 centimeter per decade); the trends for the 
Kara and Chukchi seas are positive and the trends for the Laptev and 
East Siberian seas negative.
A review of recent assessments, observations and studies indicate 
that there remains much to understand about the present and future 
trends in Arctic sea ice. The operating conditions for Arctic ships will 
remain challenging, particularly in winter. It is also highly plausible 
that Arctic sea ice will be more mobile, particularly in spring, summer 
and autumn, as the cover continues to retreat from Arctic coast-
lines. Arctic coastal seas may experience increased ridging of sea-
sonal sea ice, potentially creating more difficult operating conditions 
for marine navigation. The observed records of sea ice extent in the 
Canadian and Russian Arctic areas display high inter-annual variabili-
ties. Such year-to-year variability poses a serious challenge to risk 
and the overall reliability of Arctic marine transport systems. Three 
key conclusions with direct relevance to Arctic shipping include: 
•	 Arctic	 sea	 ice	 has	 been	 observed	 to	 be	 diminishing	 in	 extent	
and thinning for five decades. Also, model simulations indicate a 
continuing retreat of Arctic sea ice throughout the 21st century. 
However, no research indicates Arctic sea ice will disappear com-
pletely and a substantial winter sea ice cover will remain.
•	 Even	a	brief	ice-free	period	in	summer	for	the	Arctic	Ocean	would	
mean the disappearance of multi-year sea ice in the central Arctic 
Ocean. Such an occurrence would have significant implications 
for design, construction and operational standards of all future 
Arctic marine activities.
•	 Observed	sea	ice	trends	and	GCM	simulations	show	coastal	Arctic	
regions to be increasingly ice-free, or nearly ice-free, for lon-
ger summer and autumn seasons. Longer open water seasons 
increase the potential for greater coastal erosion, which can 
impact support infrastructure for Arctic development and marine 
transportation.
Regarding future needs, a key requirement is the development 
of high resolution, regional sea ice models that can provide more 
robust and realistic forecasting of marine operating conditions. 
There is also a critical requirement for more real-time sea ice obser-
vations, especially ice thickness measurements, to support all future 
Arctic marine uses. The national ice centers and ice services are criti-
cal providers of such sea ice information and greater international 
collaboration among the centers will enhance the development of 
more integrated products. New satellite sensors hold the promise of 
providing greater, near real-time ice thickness information for Arctic 
ships that are underway on future voyages. Z
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Findings
 1] Arctic sea ice coverage (extent) has been decreasing since the 1950s in all seasons. Observations of sea ice in the central 
Arctic Ocean have also indicated thinning during the past four decades. However, there remains a significant, year-to-year 
variability in regional sea ice coverage.
 2]  Global Climate Model simulations indicate a continuing “retreat” of Arctic sea ice through the 21st century. Observed sea 
ice trends and GCM simulations show coastal Arctic regions to be increasingly ice-free or nearly ice-free for longer summer 
and autumn seasons. Importantly, all simulations indicate that an Arctic sea ice cover remains in winter.
 3] Recent sea-ice model simulations indicate the possibility of an ice-free Arctic Ocean for a short period of time in summer by 
earlier than mid-century. The key implication for this physical change will be the near (or complete) disappearance of 
multi-year sea ice. 
 4] Future sea ice conditions remain uncertain. It is highly plausible that Arctic sea ice will be more mobile in partially ice-covered 
coastal seas, particularly in spring, summer and autumn. Coastal seas may experience an increase and greater frequency of ice 
ridging and shorter periods of coastal fast ice. 
 5] The resolutions of GCM simulations are much too coarse for adequate coverage of the complex geographies of the Canadian 
and Russian Arctic. GCM Arctic sea ice simulations also lack robustness to provide detailed information on future marine 
operating conditions such as the length of the navigation season, “residence time” of ice-free conditions, frequency of 
leads and ridges and more.
 6] Recent GCM Arctic sea ice simulations have not replicated the observed sea ice reductions from the 1950s to today. For 
example, the model simulations have not shown the drastic decrease of observed sea ice extent during recent years.
 7]  Climate change as indicated by Arctic sea ice retreat is a facilitator of marine access. It is highly plausible there will be 
greater marine access and longer seasons of navigation, except perhaps during winter, but not necessarily less difficult ice 
conditions for marine operations.
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 T
he Arctic Ocean and adjacent seas have been used by 
mariners since the beginning of time.  Historical Arctic 
marine transport activities reflect continuous indigenous 
marine use, expeditions and explorations, community sup-
ply/re-supply and expanding use by the global shipping community. 
The first Arctic explorers were the indigenous people. Though 
most of their journeys remain undocumented, indigenous people 
have been traveling and exploring Arctic waters for thousands of 
years in search of food, supplies and settlement areas. They remain 
the original explorers and founders of the region. 
Early Western marine transport in the Arctic was driven by 
searches for the Northwest Passage and Northeast Passage (Table 
3.1). With the passages discovered, the focus shifted from searching 
to improving marine routes. Many notable Arctic voyages occurred 
and the scope of Arctic marine shipping advanced such that ves-
sels even ventured to the then elusive North Pole. Advances in ship 
design, construction and operation, coupled with advancements in 
infrastructure, crew training and governance, have led to massive 
improvements in Arctic shipping.
This section will review briefly the rich history of the search 
and development of the Northwest Passage through the Canadian 
Archipelago, the Northeast Passage and later the Northern Sea Route 
along the northern coastline of Russia, as well as the history of 
Arctic tourism that can be found throughout the Arctic today.
History of Arctic
Marine Transport 
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Northwest Passage 
The first European Arctic explorer was the Greek navigator 
Pytheas who sailed northward in 325 B.C. and is credited with hav-
ing reached the vicinity of Iceland and perhaps even Greenland. In 
the late 9th century (aided by a period of worldwide climatic warm-
ing), the Norwegians found and colonized Iceland. Later Icelandic 
explorers found and colonized Greenland, and explored the northeast 
coast of North America.
It was not until the 1490s that Europeans began to investi-
gate the possibility of a Northwest Passage (NWP) in order to find 
a more direct route to the Orient and the lucrative trade with India, 
Southeast Asia and China. In 1497, John Cabot sailed from Bristol in 
Matthew in an unsuccessful search for the passage. 
Canadian place names reflect some of the many attempts that 
followed, with most via Hudson Bay, including Martin Frobisher, John 
Davis, Henry Hudson and Luke Foxe. In 1778, James Cook made the 
first attempt at locating the NWP from the west. In the 1800s, the 
Royal Navy explored the labyrinth of islands and channels that is 
now the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. In 1845, Sir John Franklin’s 
ships, the Erebus and Terror, sailed north into Baffin Bay and disap-
peared. The Royal Navy mounted a massive search during the follow-
ing decade for Franklin and his 129 men and as a result, the entire 
archipelago was explored.
It wasn’t until 1906 that Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen in 
his 47 ton sloop Gjoa emerged in the Pacific to become the first ves-
sel to complete the NWP. Amundsen took three winters to complete 
the voyage and credit for his survival through the harsh Canadian 
winters goes to the Inuit. The first complete transit from west to 
east was completed in 1942 by the Canadian ship St. Roch. Captain 
Henry Larsen made the return trip from east to west in only 86 
days and became the first vessel to transit the NWP in one season. 
Transits of the NWP after the St. Roch remained fairly sporadic until 
the 1970s. 
In the period from 1945 to 1969, national security was the pri-
mary driver for navigation in the passage: the Canadian icebreaker 
HMCS Labrador became the first ship after the St. Roch, as well as 
the first armed Canadian ship to successfully complete transit of the 
NWP. Three years later, the Labrador escorted three U.S. Coast Guard 
icebreakers - Storis, Spar and Bramble - on part of the journey from 
west to east through the NWP.
From the 1969 voyage of the American oil tanker Manhattan (dis-
cussed later in this section) to the end of the 1980s, more than 
30 complete transits of the passage were undertaken by a variety 
of vessels, as the focus shifted from national security to economic 
Date  Event
Since time immemorial Indigenous people are the original explorers, founders and settlers
325 B.C. Greek astronomer / geographer / navigator Pytheas sails northward  
to Iceland 
850 A.D. The Vikings of Scandinavia sail northward and colonize Iceland
981 Viking, Erik ‘the Red’ Thorvoldson, sails westward and discovers 
Greenland. Vikings colonize southeastern parts of Greenland
11th century Russian settlers and traders on the coasts of the White Sea, the 
Pomors, had been exploring routes in the region
1490 John Cabot first proposes existence of a NWP
1500’s Whalers explore from Baffin Island to Novoya Zemlya
1576 Martin Frobisher lands in what becomes known as Frobisher Bay
1596 William Barents discovers Spitsbergen and seeks NEP
1610-11 Henry Hudson expedition survives Arctic winter
1615 Robert Bylot, with William Baffin as pilot, explores Hudson and 
Baffin bays
1648 Cossack Semen Dezhnev sailed east from the mouth of Kolyma to 
the Pacific, thus proving that there was no land connection between 
Asia and North America
1726 First Northern Expedition, with Vitus Bering in command, discovers 
Bering Strait while seeking NEP
1733-43 The Great Northern Expedition takes place with Vitus Bering in 
command 
1778 James Cook makes the first serious attempt at locating the NWP 
from the west
1831 John Ross reaches magnetic North Pole
1845 John Franklin’s lost expedition proves existence of NWP
1854 Robert McClure receives the Admiralty’s prize for ‘discovering’ the 
NWP
1878-79 Nordenskjold in the Vega becomes the first known vessel to achieve 
a transit of the NEP
1893 Fridjof Nansen’s ship Fram proves the existence of Arctic current
1903-06 Roald Amundsen in the Gjoa successfully completes the first transit 
of the NWP by ship 
1932 Soviet expedition led by Otto Schmitt was the first to sail in one 
season transit the NSR
1940-42 Henry Larsen in the St. Roch was the second vessel to transit the 
NWP, the first to do so from west to east
1944 St. Roch is the first vessel to make a one-season transit (in only 86 
days going east to west)
1977 Arktika is the first surface vessel to reach the North Pole 
z  Table 3.1  Significant early history of Arctic marine transport.  Source AMSA
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development. The bulk of the transits were Canadian vessels involved 
in the search for hydrocarbon resources offshore in the Canadian 
shelf in the Beaufort Sea. Also included in the period were tankers 
carrying fuel for the various explorations and bulk carriers trans-
porting ore from the Nanisivik mine on Strathcona Sound. The year 
1993 saw the Government of Canada spearhead an initiative bringing 
together various international shipping companies and Arctic coastal 
states in an attempt to develop a shared set of international stan-
dards that could govern the operation and construction of vessels 
that would function in Arctic waters.
Growing population in the 21st century, together with increases 
in community re-supply and oil and gas development, has led to a 
greater demand for shipping in the region. The uncertainty of the 
NWP due to seasonality, ice conditions, complex archipelago, draft 
In terms of commercial shipping, the most impressive 
record of voyages in ice-infested waters, both in terms of 
length and its successes, is that of the annual voyages by the 
ships of the Hudson’s Bay Company.  For 243 years, fro m 1670 
to 1913, 600 voyages were made from London, England, to 
trading posts in Hudson Bay, Canada. Of the ships involved 
in the 600 voyages, 18 were wrecked (the majority of these 
was not sunk by ice; most either ran aground or foundered 
in open water). In 1912, the steel-hulled steamer Nascopie, 
which sailed out of Montreal, replaced the ships sailing annu-
ally from London. In her first year, the Nascopie ran aground 
in uncharted waters, underlining the achievements of the 
Hudson’s Bay Company’s earlier captains who safely made 
582 voyages from London through the icy waters of Hudson 
Strait to its various posts in the Bay, and back.
Hudson Bay  
Company Voyages
The first European Arctic explorer 
was the Greek navigator Pytheas 
who sailed northward in 325 B.C.
restrictions, choke points, lack of adequate charts, insurance and 
other costs prohibits the likelihood of regularly scheduled trans-
Arctic voyages; yet destinational shipping is anticipated to increase 
incrementally in the Canadian Arctic. Although community growth 
will drive a steady increase in the demand for seasonal re-supply 
activity, the primary areas of increased activity will be resource-
driven (See page 112).
Cold War Marine Activity: Construction of the DEW Line
The Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line was a linked chain of 63 
communication and radar systems, spanning 3,000 miles - from 
Alaska’s northwest coast to Baffin Island’s eastern shore opposite 
Greenland - set up to detect incoming Soviet bombers during the 
Cold War.  It was located entirely within the Arctic Circle, with 42 of 
the 63 sites situated on Canadian territory. 
Between 1954 and 1957, the DEW Line was constructed, and 
more than 300 ships plied Arctic waters during the two summer navi-
gation seasons carrying more than 300,000 tonnes of cargo. This ini-
tiative allowed access into the Canadian Arctic through three major 
sealifts: the West Coast Sea Lift, the East Coast Sea Lift and the 
Inland Sea Lift. 
38 ARC TIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT |  HISTORY OF ARC TIC MARINE TRANSPOR T
Undoubtedly the most massive, sus-
tained activity in terms of Arctic marine 
shipping was that of whaling. Between 
1610-1915, a little more than 39,000 
voyages were undertaken in the Arctic 
in pursuit of the bowhead whale. This 
activity focused on four main areas: 
the Svalbard/Greenland Sea area, Davis 
Strait and Baffin Bay, Hudson Bay, and 
the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort seas. 
The main participating nations were the 
Netherlands, Germany, Britain and the 
United States. 
This activity was pursued mainly in 
ice-infested waters and the number of 
ships and men lost was extremely high. 
At the same time, the whaling industry 
resulted in the accumulation of a vast 
amount of specialized knowledge of pat-
terns of ice distribution and of ship-han-
dling in ice; knowledge upon which the 
Royal Navy, for example, capitalized by 
appointing usually two whaling captains 
as ice-pilots on board each of the vessels 
engaged in the search for the missing 
Franklin expedition in 1848-1855.
Whaling
Many of the ships lacked ice-capability, a fact that often 
resulted in shorn propeller blades and hull punctures. Beyond 
retroactive measures, such as adding a nickel-aluminum-bronze 
alloy propeller or steel sheathing, the American Military Sea 
Transportation Service engaged in a construction program that 
saw the building of ships designed specifically for operation in 
an Arctic environment. A new class of tankers included con-
struction features that were standard for Arctic vessels, such as 
cargo booms and a secondary wheelhouse.
Largely as a result of American interest in the North, Canada 
was driven to acquire icebreakers and cultivate a greater navi-
gational ability in Arctic waters. Increases to Canada’s Arctic 
vessel capacity, in the early-to-mid 1950s, took the form of the 
CGS d’Iberville (1952) and the HMCS Labrador (1954). 
The U.S. fleet was split into two task forces. The first - 
with three icebreakers, a pair of tankers, 27 cargo ships and 
nearly two-dozen support craft - sailed east and around Point 
Barrow, bringing with it supplies that would be delivered to the 
Northern Transportation Company. The second and larger task 
force comprised seven icebreakers, a dozen tankers, 14 support 
vessels, four passenger ships and 31 cargo ships.  In 1957, the 
U.S. Coast Guard sent three icebreakers on a complete transit 
through the passage with partial Canadian icebreaker support, 
in a successful attempt to gauge whether ships could escape to 
the east when iced-in on the west.
Cold War operations, especially the creation of the DEW 
Line, played a unique role in Arctic shipping. Knowledge gained 
- from design modifications, crew competency, vessel maneu-
verability in ice, infrastructure and governance concerns - con-
tinues to be expanded upon. 
 
Manhattan
The SS Manhattan became the first commercial ship to break 
through the NWP.  Even though the Manhattan carried no cargo 
on the initial NWP voyage (the tanks were filled with water to 
simulate loading), the ship picked up a symbolic barrel of oil 
in Alaska, returning to New York a merchant hero. The voy-
age prompted passionate discussions in Canada about sover-
eignty, followed by the passage of the Arctic Waters Pollution 
Prevention Act (AWPPA). Information gleaned from the two 
Manhattan Arctic voyages - test trials in ice - proved extremely 
valuable to future icebreaking designs (See page 40).
The discovery of a major new oil field on Alaska’s North 
Slope at Prudhoe Bay in the spring of 1968 signaled the start 
of a new era of oil transportation technology. Two of the three 
1610-19 242
1620-29 149
1630-39 178
1640-49 246
1650-59 487
1660-69 1007
1670-79 1558
1680-89 2522
1690-99 1518
1700-09 2175
1710-19 1944
1720-29 3001
1730-39 2336
1740-49 1996
1750-59 2419
1760-69 2339
1770-79 2341
1780-89 2104
1790-99 1385
1800-09 865
1810-19 1255
1820-29 1155
1830-39 647
1840-49 401
1850-59 1654
1860-69 1532
1870-79 781
1880-89 390
1890-99 351
1900-09 229
1910-15 44
Total 39251
z  Table 3.2  Total Arctic 
Whaling Voyages  
39,251
Whaling voyages from 1610-1915.
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companies involved, ARCO and BP, intended to build a pipeline over 
Alaska’s Brooks Range to deliver the crude to an ice-free port in 
Valdez for tanker shipment south. But because of traditional tanker 
“flexibility credits” and the possibility of delivering crude direct to 
both U.S. west and east coasts, a small group in the third company, 
Humble Oil and Refining (now ExxonMobil) persuaded parent com-
pany Standard Oil of New Jersey, to make a study of icebreaking 
tankers. 
In 1969, four shipyards, an international team of maritime experts 
and three major oil companies pitted their considerable technical, 
creative and financial resources together to attain the goal of taking 
a tanker through the infamous NWP. For this voyage the Manhattan 
had to undergo extensive refit to convert this merchant vessel into 
an icebreaking tanker. The conversion, lasting eight months (from 
December 1968 to August 1969) with work being split among four 
shipyards, cost $US28 million (the entire experiment, with two test 
voyages originally estimated at $US10-15 million, eventually ended 
up, 21 months later, costing $US58 million).
The Manhattan set sail in August of 1969 with 126 on board 
(45 crew members, journalists, U.S. politicians, Canadian parliamen-
tarians, scientists, naval architects, marine engineers, etc.) for the 
4,400-mile journey. Of key importance and significance were the 
escorting icebreakers accompanying the Manhattan, especially the 
Canadian icebreakers John A. MacDonald and later the Louis S. St. 
Laurent. In this voyage the Manhattan was successful as a large 
model test ship, as the vessel broke thicker ice than any ship in 
history. 
In its second voyage the following April, the multi-year ice was 
so tough that the ship couldn’t enter the passage but went instead 
to Pond Inlet where further icebreaking tests were carried out. 
Following the two voyages, a model of the Manhattan was built and 
tested in Wartsilla’s new ice model basin in Finland. Built specifically 
to support the Manhattan voyage, the basin opened the door for ice 
technology exchange between Soviet and Finnish scientists, a lesser-
known part of the Manhattan legacy. 
The Manhattan was successful as a 
large model test ship, as the vessel 
broke thicker ice than any ship in 
history.  
What had clearly been learned in the 1969 voyage were 
several basic Arctic icebreaking truths:
•	 A	large	mass	moving	at	decent	speed	(our	“model”)	could	
break very tough multi-year ice and ridges, but it would 
need real backing power to prevent getting stuck, an 
absolute “must” if un-escorted tankers were to succeed.
•	 Maneuverability	in	ice	is	very	difficult	for	a	“parallel	body”	
merchant ship shape even with bow bulges.
•	 Geared	 steam	 turbine	 machinery	 with	 new	 propellers	
and shafts could withstand the severe shocks that bro-
ken ice floes going through the propellers often caused.
•	 In	 near	 “open”	 water	 conditions,	 growlers	 and	 bergy	 
bits were able to cause major structural damage in non-
reinforced parts of the ship’s hull.
•	 Success	of	 icebreaking	 tankers	would	be	 very	much	 in	
the hands of a ship’s crew, even with reconnaissance by 
aircraft and side-looking radar, to find preferable routes 
though the ice.
Most important was the conclusion supported by all who 
participated in the Manhattan voyage was that it is techni-
cally and economically feasible to use non-escorted large 
icebreaking merchant ships for the routes explored, and 
most likely also for the Northern Sea Route.
Lessons Learned from the 
Manhattan Voyage
SS Manhattan Route
United States 
of America
Canada
Greenland
Arctic Circle 
Prudhoe Bay
Alaska
z  Map 2.1  The route followed by the SS Manhattan.  Source: AMSA  
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deeply immersed, single ducted CPP propulsion system was unal-
tered. These modifications allowed M/V Arctic to extend its operating 
field and season. The ship serviced the Nanisivik and Polaris mines in 
the high Arctic for nearly 20 years until 2002, and then the Raglan 
mine in northern Quebec and Voisey’s Bay mine in Labrador. The 
ship also transported the first Arctic oil to market from Bent Horn 
on Cameron Island in 1985 and continued that operation until 1996. 
Research and development has been constant through many proj-
ects over the years, and for three decades the ship has provided 
valuable ship performance data on vessel design, hull strength and 
trafficability. Of particular importance to future Arctic transporta-
tion, M/V Arctic has always been a test platform for the development 
of advanced ice navigation systems that have integrated the latest 
remote sensing technologies with bridge navigation equipment. 
M/V Arctic 
Within the same time period as Beaufort Sea activity, another 
important Arctic marine story, that of M/V Arctic, was taking place. 
The M/V Arctic was built in 1978 at a shipyard on the Great Lakes, 
and subsequently has a relatively narrow maximum allowable beam 
of 22.9 meters as required for passage through the Great Lakes lock 
system. Coupled with a required deadweight and draft limitation, 
this resulted in a 38,500 ton vessel having a rather high length to 
beam ratio of 9.2. This is far from ideal for an Arctic vessel, since 
it limits maneuverability in close ice. However, the ship is still a 
workhorse in the Canadian Arctic, more than 30 years later. The M/V 
Arctic’s operations have mostly been stand-alone, with no dedicated 
icebreaker support, as is the commercial Canadian Arctic marine tra-
dition. The ship was upgraded extensively in 1986 with a new flat 
Melville bow and increased hull strength. The original geared diesel, 
©
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The Great Northern Expedition
In Russian history, the Great Northern 
Expedition refers to a wide enterprise ini-
tially conceived by tsar Peter I the Great. The 
tsar had a vision for the 18th century Russian 
navy to map the Northern Sea Route to the 
East. This vast and far-reaching endeavor 
was sponsored by the Admiralty College in 
St. Petersburg. In 1725, Russian explorers 
under the leadership of Captain Vitus Bering, 
a Dane serving in the Russian navy, made 
the first expedition voyage on Sviatoy Gavriil 
starting in Kamchatka and going north to 
the strait that now bears his name.
The major sailing of the Great Northern 
Expedition was undertaken between 1733 
and 1743 through a series of voyages led by 
Aleksei Chirikov. The goal of the expedition 
was to find and map the eastern reaches of 
Siberia, and to hopefully continue on to the 
western shores of North America to map 
them as well.
The important achievements of the expedition included the discovery of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, the Commander Islands 
and Bering Island; as well as a detailed cartographic assessment of the northern and northeastern coast of Russia and the Kuril 
Islands. The expedition also refuted definitively the legend of a land mass in the north Pacific. It also included ethnographic, historic 
and scientific research into Siberia and Kamchatka. When the expedition failed to round the northeast tip of Asia, the dream of find-
ing an economically viable Northeast Passage, alive since the 16th century, was at an end.
With more than 3,000 people directly and indirectly involved, the Second Kamchatka expedition was one of the largest expedi-
tion projects in history. The total cost of the undertaking, completely financed by the Russian state, reached the estimated sum of 
1.5 million rubles, an enormous amount for the period. This corresponded to one-sixth of the income of the Russian state for the 
year 1724. Because of its complexity and scale, the voyages became known as the Great Northern Expedition.
Despite the extreme hardships and numerous deaths, mainly from scurvy, the Great Northern Expedition represented a remark-
able accomplishment in terms of organization, perseverance and courage. More so, it resulted in an outstanding compilation of 
knowledge. In tangible terms, the expedition resulted in 62 maps and charts of the Arctic coast and Kamchatka. It is interesting to 
contrast the general chart of the Russian Arctic resulting from the Great Northern Expedition with what was known of the Arctic 
coast of North America at the same date (by then William Baffin’s voyage round Baffin Bay had largely been forgotten or discredited 
and the only part of the Arctic coast reliably known and charted was that of the Hudson Bay and Strait). 
The quest for a new route to reach China and India from the Atlantic via north 
of the Russian coastline spanned more than five centuries, beginning in the 
15th century with English, Dutch and Russian navigators.
©
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Northeast Passage 
The quest for a new route to reach China and India from the 
Atlantic via north of the Russian coastline spanned more than five 
centuries, beginning in the 15th century with English, Dutch and 
Russian navigators sailing along the northern coast of Russia and far 
into the Arctic seas.
 Early explorers of the area included Willem Barents and Olivier 
Brunel. Under the auspices of the Russian tsar Peter I the Great, 
Semyon Dezhnyov is likely to have sailed the region in 1648 and 
Vitus Bering is known to have sailed northward through the Bering 
Strait in 1728.
In Russia, the idea of a possible seaway connecting the Atlantic 
and the Pacific was first put forward by the diplomat Gerasimov in 
1525. However, Russian settlers and traders on the coasts of the 
White Sea, the Pomors, had been exploring parts of the route as early 
as the 11th century. By the 17th century they established a continu-
ous sea route from Arkhangelsk as far east as the mouth of Yenisei.
In 1648, the most famous expedition, led by Fedor Alekseev and 
Semyon Dezhnev, sailed east from the mouth of Kolyma to the Pacific 
and doubled the Chukchi Peninsula, thus proving that there was no 
land connection between Asia and North America.
Eighty years after Dezhnev, in 1725, another Russian explorer, 
Danish-born Vitus Bering on Sviatoy Gavriil made a similar voyage 
z  The crew of the Fram. Source: The National Library of Norway, Picture Collection
in reverse, starting in Kamchatka and going north to the strait that 
now bears his name. It was Bering who gave their current names 
to the Diomede Islands, discovered and first described by Dezhnev. 
Bering’s explorations in 1725–30 were part of a larger scheme ini-
tially devised by Peter the Great and known as the Great Northern 
(or Kamchatka) expedition. The Second Great Northern Expedition 
took place between 1735-42. The Northeast Passage (NEP) was not 
traversed by anyone until Baron Adolf Erik Nordenskjöld of Sweden 
accomplished the feat in 1878-79 aboard the Vega.
Coupled with the ongoing search for a NEP, voyages using the Kara 
Sea route to Western Siberia played a pivotal role in Arctic marine 
transport. Two expeditions achieved transits of a substantial part of 
the NEP, including Fridjof Nansen’s Fram (1893-1896) and the Baron 
Eduard Toll expedition on board Zarya (1900-1903). Maud, commanded 
by Roald Amundsen (1918-1920), was the fourth ship to complete a 
transit of the NEP and, as a result, Amundsen achieved the distinction 
of being the first person to circumnavigate the Arctic Ocean, since he 
had now linked up with the track of his voyage in the Gjoa.
The first one-season transit route was not accomplished until 
1934, when Glavsevmorput (Glavnoye Upravleniye Severnogo 
Morskogo Puti or GUSMP - Chief Administration of the NSR) mounted 
a successful attempt with the icebreaker Fedor Litke.
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In 1953 CANSR became a department under the Ministry of 
Merchant Marine in Moscow and for 17 years the infrastructure was 
improved to provide the capability for both summer and autumn 
shipping. In 1959, the Soviets launched the world’s first nuclear-
powered surface ship, the icebreaker Lenin, extremely significant as 
it expanded the range of travel in isolated regions. 
After CANSR became the Administration of the Northern Sea Route 
(ANSR) in 1970, the emphasis became year-round trafficability. By the 
1978-79 season, the western end of the NSR achieved year-round nav-
igation with ships sailing between Murmansk and Dudinka on a regular 
basis. Other landmark voyages during this era of Russian Arctic marine 
transport history include the 1977 voyage of the Arktika to the geo-
graphic North Pole and the first complete high latitude passage by the 
surface vessel Sibir in 1978. By the mid-80s, the total volume of traffic 
passages through the NSR amounted to 6.6 million tons annually.
The NSR was formally opened to non-Russian vessels in the 
summer of 1991, only a few months before the Soviet Union was 
dissolved. Several developments have occurred during this modern 
period of Arctic marine transport history: the creation of the NSR 
Administration, the commissioning of the International Northern Sea 
Route Programme, the formation of the Noncommercial Partnership 
for the Cooperation of the Northern Sea Route Usages, leasing cargo 
space aboard Soviet SA-15 icebreaker cargo carriers, great strides in 
developing fleet and port infrastructure, and the establishment of 
year-round navigation in the western part of the Arctic.
The NSR is a substantially shorter passage (35-60 percent savings 
in distance) for shipping between northern European ports and those 
of the Far East and Alaska than routes through the Suez or Panama 
Canals. The ANSR, responsible for the overall planning, coordina-
tion and execution of organizational and regulatory activities for 
marine operations, is working to strengthen the competitiveness of 
the NSR. The Russian fleet of the world’s most powerful icebreaking 
ships and special ice-strengthened ships for moving most types of 
cargo, highly developed infrastructure along the NSR and specialized 
ice navigation skills demonstrate that navigation along the NSR is 
technically feasible and that there is a cargo base for import, export 
and conceivably transit. 
The Northern Sea Route 
The Northern Sea Route, or NSR, stretching from the Kara Gate 
in the west to the Bering Strait in the east, was highly developed 
by the Soviet Union as an important national waterway, peaking in 
1987 with 331 vessels on 1,306 voyages. The western end of the 
NSR (Kara Sea) has been maintained for year-round navigation since 
1978-79 with ships sailing between Murmansk and Dudinka on a 
regular basis.
The history of commercial use of the NSR can be distinguished 
by four distinct stages: exploration and settlement (1917-1932); 
organization of regular navigation coupled with the development 
of fleet and ports (1932-early 1950s); transformation of the newly 
developed NSR into a regular operating transportation line during 
the summer-autumn periods (early 1950s-late 1970s); and finally, 
efforts to establish year-round shipping (late 1970s-present).  
During the first stage, 1917-1932, the NSR was utilized for 
community re-supply, in addition to sporadic attempts at regional 
exploitation of resources such as furs, wood, fish, salt, coal, whal-
ing and sealing. In 1932, a Soviet expedition led by Otto Yulievich 
Schmidt was the first to sail from Arkhangelsk to the Bering Strait 
in the same summer without wintering en route. The Northern Sea 
Route was officially open and exploitation began in 1935. Advanced 
Soviet navigational skills, technological capability and experience in 
ice navigation were unrivaled and traffic in the Arctic continued to 
grow. From 1917-1934 there were only two sinkings out of the 178 
round-trip voyages across the Kara Sea to import finished goods to, 
and export timber from Igarka, along the Yenisei River in central 
Russia.
From 1932-1953, administration of the Russian Arctic marine 
activity rested with the Chief Administration of the Northern Sea 
Route (CANSR), a direct arm of the Council of Peoples Commissars of 
the Soviet Union, with its goal “to develop the NSR from the White 
Sea to the Bering Strait, to equip it, to keep it in good order, and to 
secure the safety of shipping along it.” Major additions were made 
to the Arctic fleet, which carried 100,000 to 300,000 tons of cargo 
annually and employed 40-150 ships per year. 
In 1940, the German vessel Komet, an armed raider disguised as 
a merchant ship, was the first foreign ship in more than 20 years to 
be granted passage, and it was the last foreign transit for another 
50 years. When the Soviet Union entered the war in 1941, the route 
became important for bringing Allied supplies into the country. In 
the four seasons of 1942-1945, 120 ships transported approximately 
450,000 tons of relief supplies, which amounted to half the freight 
turnover for the NSR during this period.
1991
The year the Northern Sea Route  
was open to non-Russian ships.
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Given these widely 
publicized descriptions of 
a bleak Arctic environment 
and the fatal demise of Arctic 
expeditions, it is remarkable 
that such a place would be 
attractive to tourists.
Arctic Tourism
For most of European and American history, the many attempts 
to explore and occupy high latitudes were characterized by peril 
and tragedy. From 1576 onwards, numerous ventures into these cold, 
remote and icy places were conducted to obtain economic benefits 
and expand empires. All of the expeditions experienced hardships 
and many ships foundered and men perished in their attempts to 
penetrate these unknown seas and lands. By the 1800s, newspaper 
and book publications describing both the heroic and tragic aspects 
of polar exploits were immensely popular. Given these widely publi-
cized descriptions of a bleak Arctic environment and the fatal demise 
of Arctic expeditions, it is remarkable that such a place would be 
attractive to tourists. But, in fact, tourists began visiting the Arctic 
in the early 1800s and their attraction to this unlikely destination 
has grown steadily for more than two centuries.  
Arctic Tourism for the Masses 
By the mid-1850s, the Industrial Revolution was far more than 
an economic phenomenon; it had transformed societies by creating 
personal wealth for greater numbers of people, increasing leisure 
time and improving public education. It introduced new technolo-
gies, especially transportation and communication, which facilitated 
convenient access to the remote parts of the world. One result of 
these transformations was the extraordinary expansion of tourism. 
The combination of widely distributed personal wealth, the inven-
tion of railroads and steamships with enormous passenger capacities 
and progressively affordable transport costs suddenly allowed thou-
sands of people to travel for pleasure. By the late 1800s, tourism 
had become a viable leisure activity for the masses, rather than the 
indulgence of a privileged few.
By the late 1800s, steamship and railroad companies had 
achieved the capacity to transport large numbers of passengers. 
Given intense competition between those companies, travel costs 
were progressively lowered to attract customers and successfully 
compete.  Simultaneously, companies aggressively expanded their 
transport networks to previously inaccessible regions, including the 
Arctic. All of those business decisions enabled more people to travel 
to more destinations.  
In 1850, Arctic marine tourism by commercial steamship was ini-
tiated in Norway. By the 1880s, Arctic marine tourism was a boom-
ing business. Arctic destinations included Norway’s fjords and North 
Cape, transits to Spitsbergen, Alaska’s Glacier Bay and the gold rush 
sites as far north as Homer, riverboat cruises in the Canadian Yukon, 
and cruises to Greenland, Baffin Bay and Iceland.  The tourist experi-
ence aboard the steamships was a mixture of exploration and luxury. 
Little known or recently discovered glaciers, bays, wildlife and indig-
enous communities attracted curious tourists led by Arctic explorers 
and naturalists. Shipboard life emphasized lavish meals, concerts 
© Hapag-Lloyd Kruzfahrten GmbH
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provided by orchestras, beauty parlors and barbershops, photogra-
phy studios and lectures presented within library settings. All of the 
19th century Arctic destinations were commercially successful and 
cruise ship companies have continued to operate and expand their 
itineraries throughout those and other Arctic regions for more than a 
century. In addition, the combined themes of expedition and luxury 
cruising have also persisted to the present time.  
By 1900, Arctic tourism was a flourishing commercial activity. 
Its diversity included independent travelers pursuing a variety of 
adventurous recreation activities in marine and land environments, 
as well as groups touring natural, wildlife, historical and cultural 
attractions. All of these Arctic tourism activities were extensively 
promoted in guidebooks and the popular press. Companies special-
izing in guidebooks, such as John Murray and Baedeker, came into 
existence at this time. And travel literature encouraging mass travel 
regularly appeared in widely distributed periodicals such as Harper’s 
Weekly, The Century Magazine and the National Geographic Society 
Magazine. From the mid-1800s onward numerous editions of Arctic 
guidebooks would regale the splendors of the Land of the Midnight 
Sun.  
The economic benefits of the Arctic tourism industry were imme-
diately evident to both private companies and Arctic governments. 
Tourism provided jobs, personal income, revenues and financial capi-
tal for infrastructure. It also represented a new way to use the Arctic’s 
natural resources. It was a departure from the resource extraction 
and depletion industries such as hydraulic mining, rampant timber 
harvesting, and the exploitive commercial fishing and whaling prac-
tices of the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
Major Arctic Marine Transport Programs, 
Studies and Workshops
Previous Arctic marine transport studies, workshops and reports 
contain a wealth of findings, recommendations and research agen-
das of significant importance to the AMSA and to any policy and 
regulatory framework for the future. Broad Arctic navigation studies, 
such as the 1993-1999 International Northern Sea Route Programme 
(INSROP), the 2001-2005 Arctic Operational Platform (ARCOP) and 
the 2002-2005 Japan Northern Sea Route-Geographic Information 
System (JANSROP-GIS) form a knowledge base on Arctic navigation 
in addition to localized findings such as the Alaskan trafficability 
studies. A summary of the 2004 Cambridge Workshop provides an 
intellectual synthesis of Arctic marine transport. 
International Northern Sea Route Programme
The International Northern Sea Route Programme was the most 
comprehensive marine transport study ever undertaken prior to the 
AMSA, with the aim to create a research-based knowledge bank of 
commercial, international shipping on Russia’s Northern Sea Route 
across the top of Eurasia in the Arctic Ocean. 
The program was led and coordinated by three principal partners: 
the Ship and Ocean Foundation (SOF) of Tokyo, Japan; the Central 
Marine Research and Design Institute (CNIIMF) of St. Petersburg, 
Russia; and the Fridtjof Nansen Institute (FNI) in Oslo, Norway. The 
numbers involved are impressive: 468 researchers and experts from 
more than 100 institutions in 14 countries; 104 projects; an experi-
mental voyage through the NSR; two large international conferences. 
468
Researchers and experts from more than 100 institutions in 14 countries –  
the numbers involved in the International Northern Sea Route Programme.
Historic photo
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This work produced 167 peer reviewed working papers and a large 
number of articles and books governing almost every relevant 
aspect of shipping on the NSR. Funding was provided by the Nippon 
Foundation, Ship and Ocean Foundation, both from Japan, as well as 
various Norwegian sponsors and the Soviet Union. 
It was acknowledged that the international shipping industry 
would need information and analysis before committing investments 
or vessels to the previously unknown route. On the initiative of the 
Soviet Ministry of Merchant Marine, contact was made with FNI to 
create an international research project, with St. Petersburg-based 
CNIIMF coordinating on the Soviet side. A pilot study was produced 
in 1990-1991. In 1992, SOF joined the partnership, and in May 1993 
the three organizations signed an agreement establishing a secre-
tariat at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Norway to coordinate the 
effort.
 INSROP was designed as a multi-national, five-year effort, to be 
executed in two phases with a review conducted after three years. 
Four sub-programs were identified: 1) Natural conditions and ice 
navigation; 2) Environmental aspects; 3) Trade and commercial ship-
ping factors; and 4) Political, legal and strategic aspects. In August 
1995, a successful experimental transit voyage was conducted from 
Yokohama, Japan to Kirkenes, Norway onboard the Russian ice-
strengthened carrier Kandalaksha, demonstrating the NSR’s technical 
feasibility. 
In 1999, final findings of INSROP were presented at an NSR user 
conference in Oslo, Norway, bringing to a close the massive research 
project. It took years of diplomatic networking, negotiations and 
lobbying to shape the program and to obtain funding. It was often 
difficult to bridge language and cultural gaps between the three prin-
cipal partners - the Japanese, the Norwegians and the Russians - who 
often maintained different priorities and varying business practices.
INSROP demonstrated that navigation along the NSR was techni-
cally feasible, with a cargo base for export, import and conceivably 
transit. INSROP also noted challenges to overcome.  INSROP did not 
include research on climate change and how ice conditions might 
eventually enable large scale shipping.
A wealth of new and unique knowledge on the Russian Arctic 
was produced and made available to the international community. 
INSROP also pioneered cooperation between Russian and foreign 
researchers in Arctic-related fields, and created a platform for further 
Arctic multidisciplinary studies.
U.S. Trafficability Studies of 1979-86
With the advent of offshore oil and gas leases in the 1970s, 
studies were required to assess the feasibility of year-round marine 
transportation in ice-covered waters of the Alaska Arctic, yet no 
amount of analytical modeling or studies without actual field data 
could provide the information and insight needed. Therefore, the 
U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) embarked on a multi-year 
program (1979-1986) to:
•	 Demonstrate	the	operational	feasibility	of	commercial	icebreak-
ing ships along possible future Arctic routes;
•	 Define	 environmental	 conditions	 along	 routes	 in	 the	 Bering,	
Chukchi and Beaufort seas; and,
•	 Obtain	data	to	improve	design	criteria	for	ice-capable	ships	and	
offshore structures.
Research Opportunities
q Extraction of sea ice data from historical journals and log 
books from Arctic exploring and whaling ships.
q Comprehensive study of the history, design evolution and 
use of icebreakers.
q Regional and local studies with mapping of the multiple 
uses (indigenous, commercial & government) in Arctic 
waterways.
q Develop a comprehensive database of damages to ships 
operating throughout the Arctic Ocean for use in risk as-
sessments; develop, where possible in the historic record, 
detailed cause & effect reviews of each damage case.
q Comprehensive review of changes in Arctic marine tech-
nology during the past six decades, specifically for Arctic 
commercial ships, and how these changes may influence 
the future of Arctic marine transport systems.
Growing population in the 21st century, together with increases in community re-supply and oil and gas  
development, has led to a greater demand for shipping in the region.
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To assess the feasibility of commercial icebreaking ships along 
possible future Arctic routes, two U.S. Coast Guard Polar Class ice-
breakers, the Polar Star and Polar Sea, the world’s most powerful 
non-nuclear icebreakers and the only U.S. ships capable of mid-
winter Arctic operations, were utilized as data collection platforms. 
During the eight-year research program, 15 icebreaker deployments 
occurred aboard the icebreakers and 14 of those were in the Alaska 
Arctic. General ship performance of trafficability data was continu-
ously collected and summarized in 30-minute increments whenever 
the icebreakers changed locations. 
Two dedicated transits (1981, 1983) from the south Bering Sea 
to the north Chukchi Sea were designed to simulate, as best as pos-
sible, a non-stop transit from the ice edge to northern Alaska. These 
voyages indicated that routing in the future could be around both 
ends of St. Lawrence Island and refuted the views of some experts 
that transit through the Bering Strait was not feasible in winter.
Thousands of ice thickness measurements were made, resulting 
in the formulation of a representative set of ice conditions for an 
Alaska route; supplemented with tables that offer suggestions on 
changes to reflect mild and severe ice conditions and possible voy-
age delays due to pressured ice conditions. In addition, zones of ice 
severity for the Bering, Chukchi and Beaufort seas were developed 
to provide designers and operators with a strategic perspective on 
year-round Arctic marine transportation systems. 
Several major projects were performed onboard the icebreakers to 
aid in the development of advanced icebreaking hull forms and Arctic 
commercial vessels capable of year-round operations. The resulting 
analysis from eight years of data collection made a significant con-
tribution to the knowledge of ice loads and the structural design of 
all icebreaking ships.
With 15 voyages of data, the U.S. Arctic Marine Transportation 
Program of 1979-86 was one of the most extensive field tests of ice-
breakers in history and has provided a valuable knowledge base for 
future considerations and a model for future cross-border research 
initiatives. Briefly, key findings from the operational, environmental 
and technical data can be summarized as follows:
•	 Field	data	can	provide	the	at-sea	ground	truthing	of	ship	mod-
eling/studies, which may help to reduce the perceived risks of 
year-round marine transportation in the Arctic.
•	 The	 offshore	 Bering,	 Chukchi	 and	 Beaufort	 seas	 are	 extremely	
dynamic and ship icebreaking activities must be able to cope 
with the ever-changing ice environment. The most critical ele-
ments for successful ice navigation are crew skills and applied 
technology. 
Arctic Marine Transport Workshop:  
Cambridge University
Amid growing interest and concern over the rapid climate 
changes occurring in the Arctic, experts in Arctic marine transport 
and international marine safety, as well as researchers of sea ice 
and climate change, met at the Scott Polar Research Institute at 
Cambridge University in October 2004 to create a research agenda 
and identify critical issues related to the future of Arctic shipping.
Co-sponsored by the Institute of the North, the United States 
Arctic Research Commission and the International Arctic Science 
Committee, the international gathering included 54 maritime experts 
and representatives from 11 countries (United States, Canada, 
Russian Federation, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark, Norway, the United 
Kingdom, Finland, Germany and Japan).
The three-day workshop provided the opportunity to study the 
extraordinary retreat of Arctic sea ice and what that means to the 
Arctic Ocean as a potential waterway for marine operations. While 
each area of discussion produced suggested topics for scientific 
research and questions on policy issues that were incorporated in 
the conference report, a few crosscutting conclusions emerged:
1. An inter-disciplinary research agenda needs to include economic 
analysis, assessments, Law of the Sea, indigenous Arctic commu-
nities, core issues of conflict, marine safety and environmental 
protection, and climate change impacts on future marine access. 
2. The magnitude of sea ice variability creates difficult challenges 
for Arctic marine transport planning and adequate risk assessment. 
3. Arctic marine charts and aids to navigation need to be updated 
and airborne ice information enhanced with satellite coverage. 
4. Two key factors are needed to expand and develop the use of the 
Arctic Ocean as a shipping corridor: route reliability and security. 
Increased Arctic shipping will require an increase in the monitor-
ing and enforcement of national and international laws govern-
ing ship security. 
5. Multiple economic drivers could fuel expanded use of Arctic 
marine transportation. Incremental expansion would result in an 
incremental growth in regional traffic. However, a decision by 
world shippers to use the Arctic Ocean as an alternate route 
would require large scale global investments of escort vessels, 
aids to navigation and staging ports to transfer cargo between 
ice-strengthened and non ice-strengthened ships.  
The workshop identified that the retreat of Arctic sea ice may lead 
to several plausible futures for the Northern Sea Route, Northwest 
Passage and central Arctic Ocean, requiring further research, plan-
ning and cooperation, as well as consideration of future develop-
ment of transshipment and port infrastructure. Z
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Findings
 1] Despite attempts through history to make the Northwest Passage (NWP) a viable route between the east and west, the 
passage has not become the global trade route it was originally envisioned.
 2]  The Northern Sea Route (NSR) was highly developed during the Soviet Union era as an important national waterway 
facilitating Arctic marine transport. Notably, year-round navigation on the western NSR (i.e., from the port of Dudinka on 
the Yenisei River to Kara Gate) has been maintained since the 1978-79 winter season. 
 3] Field data can provide the at-sea ground truthing of ship modeling/studies, which may help to reduce the perceived risks 
of year-round marine transportation in the Arctic.
 4] Icebreaking technology has been key to the development of Arctic marine transport in all regions of the Arctic Ocean.
 5] Previous Arctic marine transport studies, workshops and reports contain a wealth of findings, recommendations and 
research agendas of significant relevance to AMSA and to any regulatory framework for the future.
 6] Joint agency/ministerial research, public-private partnerships and international cooperation have been beneficial to 
tackling the many challenges of future Arctic marine transport systems.
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 Governance of shipping is characterized by efforts to promote 
safety, security, protection of the environment from damage by 
accident, as well as harmonization and uniformity in international 
maritime law and standards. The International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), a specialized agency in the United Nations system, addresses 
a broad range of issues pertaining to international shipping, includ-
ing maritime safety, security and environmental protection. Other 
intergovernmental organizations work closely with the IMO in the 
governance of international shipping. For example, the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) has played a seminal role in the establish-
ment of minimum basic standards for seafarers’ rights. 
The IMO acts as secretariat for most international maritime con-
ventions and facilitates their implementation through the adoption 
of numerous codes and guidelines aimed at operationalizing and 
facilitating the implementation of international rules and standards. 
International conventions and related protocols become binding 
only on those states that choose to become parties. Upon ratifica-
tion of a convention, states must formally implement it into their 
national maritime regulatory regime. States can, however, legislate 
 
T
he governance of shipping activities in the Arctic might 
be described as a complicated mosaic. The Law of the 
Sea, as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), sets out the legal frame-
work for the regulation of shipping according to maritime zones of 
jurisdiction. Other international agreements address specific ele-
ments of shipping such as marine pollution prevention standards, 
ship safety, seafarer rights and qualifications and liability and com-
pensation for spills. In addition, Canada and the Russian Federation 
have adopted special national legislation for ships operating in ice-
covered waters within their EEZs. Descriptions of international law, 
including as reflected in the UNCLOS, are included for the benefit of 
the reader and are not intended to constitute interpretations.
A wide range of actors affect the law, policy and practice appli-
cable to shipping in the Arctic. In addition to governments, ship-
owners, cargo owners, insurers, port authorities, trade and labor 
union associations, among others, may be involved in determining 
when and where shipping in the Arctic should occur and under what 
conditions. 
Governance  
of Arctic Shipping 
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the provisions of a convention or protocol without necessarily 
becoming a party.
An explanation of the governance of shipping would not be 
complete without noting the critical role played by standard form 
contracting and related “good practices” developed by industry. For 
example, in contracts for carriage by sea the carrier must prepare 
against foreseeable risks and provide a seaworthy ship for the voy-
age, which must be pursued without deviation or delay and with due 
care for the cargo or passengers. These standard forms have been 
recognized and applied by courts around the world. 
 
Law of the Sea, as reflected in UNCLOS:  
The Overarching Legal Framework
The Law of the Sea, as reflected in UNCLOS, has struck a balance 
among the powers of coastal states, flag states and port states to 
exercise jurisdiction and control over shipping. The jurisdictional 
status of some Arctic waters, in particular internal waters and straits 
used (or potentially to be used) for international navigation, remains 
controversial and could give rise to future disputes concerning 
the exercise of national jurisdiction over international navigation 
through those waters.
Coastal State Jurisdiction and Control
For coastal states to claim maritime zones in the Arctic in accor-
dance with UNCLOS, they must have coastal frontage in the region. 
Of the eight Arctic states, Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, the 
Russian Federation and the United States have coastal frontage in 
the Arctic Ocean. Iceland has coastal frontage on the Norwegian Sea 
and Finland and Sweden in the Baltic Sea. 
The extent of legislative and enforcement control over foreign 
ships by the coastal states of the Arctic Ocean varies according to 
the different maritime zones set out in UNCLOS, namely: internal 
waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive eco-
nomic zone and the continental shelf (Table 4.1). 
The seaward limit of the maritime zones and jurisdictions is 
based primarily on distance from a combination of the low-water 
marks along the coast, straight baselines and closing lines for bays. 
With the exception of the United States, the Arctic Ocean states 
have proclaimed straight baselines along most or all of their Arctic 
coasts. Table 4.1 sets out the limits of jurisdictional claims by Arctic 
Ocean coastal states.
For internal waters, coastal states are entitled to exercise full 
sovereignty and maximum jurisdiction over ships and can, pursuant 
to that authority, set conditions for entry into its ports. For example, 
coastal states might prohibit entry of certain “risky ships”, such 
as substandard ships or those carrying radioactive wastes or other 
hazardous cargoes, or they might impose “zero discharge” limits on 
particular ship-source pollutants. The only likely constraint on the 
exercise of this power is the traditional and customary duty to grant 
refuge in sheltered waters to a ship in need of assistance. 
Internal waters include marine areas on the landward side of 
closing lines for bays, ports and harbors and historically recognized 
internal waters. A coastal state may also choose to draw straight base-
lines around a deeply indented coastline or where there is a fringe of 
islands in the immediate vicinity of the coast. Waters enclosed would 
be internal.  UNCLOS sets forth the rules on setting baselines.
Exactly which Arctic waters may be claimed validly as internal 
has been contentious. For example, Canada enclosed its Arctic archi-
pelago with straight baselines, effective January 1, 1986, but the 
United States and other states protested against the internal waters 
status claim.
Within the limit of the 12 nautical miles that may be claimed 
for the territorial sea, Arctic coastal states have full sovereignty, 
but foreign ships retain the right to innocent passage; that is, pas-
sage which is continuous and expeditious, and is not prejudicial to 
the peace, good order or security of the coastal state. For example, 
undertaking research or surveys or fishing without the coastal state’s 
z  Table 4.1  Arctic coastal state maritime jurisdictional zone claims.  Source: AMSA
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consent, or engaging in an act of serious and willful pollution in 
contravention of UNCLOS would be considered prejudicial to the 
interests of the coastal state. 
UNCLOS allows coastal states the authority to adopt laws and 
regulations applicable to foreign ships transiting through the ter-
ritorial sea. Domestic laws can be applied in relation to such things 
as safety of navigation, preservation of the marine environment and 
marine pollution control.  There are two limits on this authority; 
namely, that coastal states cannot impose design, construction, 
crewing or equipment standards on foreign ships unless giving effect 
to generally accepted international rules or standards; and that such 
laws may not have the practical effect of denying or impairing the 
right of innocent passage. Coastal states may also, having regard 
to the safety of navigation, designate sea lanes and traffic separa-
tion schemes for foreign ships. However, the coastal state must take 
into account IMO recommendations and any channels customarily 
used for international navigation. They may not impose a charge on 
the passage itself; only specific fees for services rendered may be 
charged and without discrimination. 
Coastal states may also claim a 12 nautical mile contiguous zone 
adjacent to the territorial sea (i.e., up to a seaward limit of 24 
nautical miles). In this zone, coastal states may exercise necessary 
control over foreign ships to prevent infringement and to enforce 
violations of customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regu-
lations in their territory or territorial sea.
In a 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), measured 
from the territorial sea baselines, coastal states have sovereign rights 
to explore, exploit, conserve and manage their natural resources, and 
jurisdiction over such things as protection of the marine environ-
ment.  In part XII of UNCLOS, the issue of coastal states’ ability to 
regulate shipping for the purposes of pollution prevention and con-
trol laws is addressed, which is that laws and regulations applicable 
to foreign ships must conform or give effect to international rules 
and standards established through the IMO. 
A coastal state has limited enforcement powers in the EEZ against 
transiting foreign ships violating applicable international rules and 
standards for preventing and controlling pollution. A coastal state 
may only undertake physical inspection of a foreign ship where a 
violation has resulted in a substantial discharge causing or threat-
ening significant pollution of the marine environment. Actual arrest 
and detention of a foreign ship is only allowed if a violation causes 
major damage or a threat of major damage to the coastline, interests 
or resources of the coastal state. In such a case, the coastal state 
may only impose monetary penalties.
UNCLOS defines the continental shelf of a coastal state as com-
prising the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas beyond the 
z  Illustration 4.1  Illustration of maritime zones (for illustrative purposes only). Source: Geoscience Australia
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territorial sea to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to at 
least 200 nautical miles from coastal baselines where the outer edge 
of the continental margin does not extend to that distance. A coastal 
state with a continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles 
has 10 years from the time the convention enters into force for that 
state to make a submission to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf. The limits of the continental shelf established by 
a coastal state on the basis of the recommendations of the commis-
sion shall be final and binding. While the coastal state’s rights to the 
resources of the extended continental shelf are exclusive, the waters 
above the extended continental shelf are high seas. Therefore, the 
coastal state has no jurisdiction over foreign ships in those waters 
with very few exceptions (for example, where a foreign ship is under-
taking exploration activities on the continental shelf without its 
consent.) The coastal state may locate artificial islands, installations 
or structures on an extended continental shelf and include safety 
zones that are consistent with international standards. However, it 
may not establish them where interference may be caused to the use 
of recognized sea lanes essential to international navigation.
Coastal states bordering a strait used for international navigation 
retain very limited powers over foreign ships because of their right 
to transit passage. States bordering straits cannot suspend passage 
and may only adopt ship-source pollution laws applicable to foreign 
ships if in accordance with international standards. Sea lanes and 
traffic separation schemes may be designated, but only with IMO 
approval. A ship exercising transit passage may do so in its “normal 
mode,” a phrase taken to mean that a submarine may remain sub-
merged, whereas in innocent passage it must navigate on the surface 
and show its flag. 
UNCLOS does not specify the extent of international navigation 
required to transform navigable waters into a strait used for interna-
tional navigation. National opinions have differed over the application 
of the straits used for an international navigation regime in the Arctic. 
Article 234 of UNCLOS bolsters coastal state powers to regulate 
foreign shipping in order to prevent, reduce, and control marine pol-
lution in the Arctic. It recognizes the coastal state’s right to adopt 
and enforce special non-discriminatory pollution prevention, reduc-
tion and control laws in areas within the limits of the EEZ that are 
covered by ice for most of the year, when certain conditions are met. 
Additionally, the coastal state’s laws and regulations must have due 
regard to navigation, protection and preservation of the marine envi-
ronment and be based on the best available scientific evidence. 
Article 234 raises various questions of interpretation. What is 
required to meet the litmus of “ice covering such areas for most of 
the year?” For example, will even partial ice cover suffice if there is 
an exceptional hazard to navigation? What is the significance of giv-
ing special coastal state powers only in the EEZ? One interpretation 
is that coastal states are given no greater powers than those appli-
cable in the territorial sea. Another is that coastal states are granted 
broader powers, in particular the right to unilaterally adopt special 
ship construction, crewing and equipment requirements. Application 
of Article 234 to straits used for international navigation may also be 
questioned. Since UNCLOS does not exempt straits from the applica-
tion of Article 234, questions of interpretation may again rise over 
the geographical scope of coverage and the breadth of coastal state 
regulatory powers.
Flag State Jurisdiction and Control
Flag states play a vital role in the governance of shipping. UNCLOS 
permits a state to fix conditions for granting its nationality (i.e., fly-
ing its flag) to ships so long as there exists a “genuine link.” Ships can 
only sail under the flag of one state at a time. The flag state’s domestic 
laws, for example, criminal law, apply to those aboard its ships. A flag 
state must also ensure that its ships conform to international rules 
and standards concerning matters such as safety at sea, pollution con-
trol and communication regulations. On the high seas, the flag state is 
granted exclusive jurisdiction with only limited exceptions. 
It should be noted that the provisions of UNCLOS regarding the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment do not apply to 
any warship or other vessel owned or operated by a state and used, for 
the time being, only on government non-commercial service. However, 
each state must ensure, by the adoption of appropriate measures not 
impairing operations or operational capabilities of such vessels owned 
or operated by it, that such vessels act in a manner consistent, so far 
as is reasonable and practicable, with UNCLOS.
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seas and EEZs is of potential concern for future shipping in the 
Arctic. Ship operators may face uncertainty over which national 
shipping laws are applicable in a disputed zone, particularly with 
reference to laws and regulations adopted pursuant to Article 234 of 
UNCLOS and with regard to penalties and compensation for damage 
caused by ship-source spills. Unresolved maritime boundaries may 
also reduce opportunities to develop marine resources and expand 
shipping in the Arctic. This situation is, however, no different than 
in other maritime areas where maritime boundaries are not agreed.
High Seas
Trans-Arctic shipping across the high seas of the Arctic (i.e., 
beyond EEZs) raises other governance issues. Because a coastal 
state’s authority to regulate foreign shipping does not extend to 
the high seas, transiting ships would only be subject to global ship-
ping safety, environmental and security rules and standards adopted 
through the IMO and as may be applied by the flag states. Thus the 
adequacy of international shipping standards for Arctic conditions 
and the need to provide special protective measures for the Arctic 
high seas must be considered. 
Port State Control
Under general international law, the port state has the authority 
to impose conditions for the entry of foreign ships into its ports. 
Under UNCLOS, when foreign ships are voluntarily in the port of 
another state, the host state has broad inspection and enforcement 
powers for pollution violations occurring not only in the port and 
internal waters, but also in the territorial seas and the EEZs of other 
coastal states when those states request the port state’s assistance 
in enforcement. A flag state may also request the port state’s assis-
tance in relation to enforcement of pollution offenses on the high 
seas. A port state must comply with requests from other states for 
investigation of discharge violations. If a port state determines that 
a foreign ship is unseaworthy and threatens marine environmental 
damage, it may prevent the ship from sailing until the deficiencies 
are corrected. 
Maritime Boundaries in the Arctic
To date, there are eight bilateral agreements delimiting maritime 
zone and continental shelf boundaries between the five countries 
that border the Arctic Ocean, in addition to unresolved boundary 
issues. Lack of clearly delimited maritime boundaries for territorial 
© Fednav, Ltd.
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International Public Maritime  
Law Framework
Ships and their crews operating in the Arctic environment face 
unique risks. A significant body of international public maritime law 
has established safety, environmental and security rules and stan-
dards for international shipping and seafarers. Generally, the con-
tents of IMO safety conventions are not specific to Arctic shipping. 
Nonetheless, many of the requirements, for example, double hulls for 
tankers and increased safety and communications equipment systems 
for passenger ships and cargo ships, will affect ships trading into or 
transiting Arctic waters. Not all applicable standards are mandatory. 
Whereas the provisions of the International Convention on Safety 
of Life at Sea, 1974 (SOLAS), for example, are mandatory, the 2002 
IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters (Arctic 
Guidelines) only provide internationally accepted recommendatory 
guidelines. These guidelines, however, are under review by the IMO.
Maritime Safety Rules and Standards
For the most part, international safety standards for merchant 
shipping are formulated in the rules, codes and procedures adopted 
within the framework of SOLAS (Table 4.2). The convention specifies 
minimum safety standards for the construction, machinery, equip-
ment and operation of ships. Flag states are responsible for ensuring 
compliance of their ships with SOLAS requirements, and certificates 
are prescribed as proof that this has been done. Using port state 
control, contracting states can inspect ships of other states on a 
non-discriminatory basis. Chapter V of SOLAS sets forth provisions of 
an operational nature including the maintenance of meteorological 
services for ships, the ice patrol service, routing of ships and the 
maintenance of search and rescue services. Chapter VII of SOLAS 
regulates the carriage and care of dangerous goods through the In-
ternational Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code and the carriage 
of liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the International Code for the 
Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk 
Code (International Gas Carrier Code). The IMDG Code may need to 
be reviewed for the purpose of identifying any dangerous goods that 
may be affected by extremely low temperature during transportation 
in the Arctic.  
The American Bureau of Shipping and the Russian Maritime 
Register of Shipping recently announced they are jointly developing 
classification rules for Arctic LNG carriers. Ice-strengthening for LNG 
carriers focuses on hull, containment system, propulsion and propel-
ler requirements.
SOLAS also includes specifications for passenger ships. However, 
at this time there are no international construction requirements 
specific for cruise ships in polar operations. Cruise ships, which are 
not classed as ice-strengthened, may operate in the Arctic at certain 
times of the year and in areas of open water. The international cruise 
ship industry has initiated a Cruise Ship Safety Forum to develop 
design and construction criteria for new vessels and to consider 
other safety issues.
Additional non-mandatory industry standards for passenger ships 
have been adopted by the IMO. In January 2008, the IMO adopted 
Guidelines on Voyage Planning for Passenger Ships Operating in Remote 
Areas, also called the Arctic Guidelines. The Guidelines call for ships 
to develop detailed voyage and passage plans that include contin-
gency plans for emergencies. Emergency contingency plans should be 
developed with reference to the IMO MSC/Circular 1184, Enhanced 
Contingency Planning Guidance for Passenger Ships Operating in Areas 
Remote from SAR [Search and Rescue] Facilities. This guidance docu-
ment outlines extra steps that should be taken when passenger ships 
operate remote from SAR facilities, including keeping the appropriate 
authorities informed of the ship’s position and intentions while the 
ship is operating in the remote area. Consideration should also be 
given to voyage “pairing” (i.e., coordinating travel with another vessel 
z  Table 4.2  Ratification of International Maritime Safety Agreements and Instruments. 
Source: AMSA  
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to ensure emergency assistance), the carriage of enhanced life-saving 
appliances and the provision of additional life-saving resources.
The 1994 International Safety Management Code (ISM Code), 
adopted under Chapter IX of SOLAS, provides an international stan-
dard for safe management and operation of ships and for pollution 
prevention. The code calls on shipping companies to establish a 
safety and environmental protection policy (“safety management 
system”) that is both ship-based and shore-based. The safety man-
agement system should ensure compliance with mandatory rules and 
regulations, as well as industry standards, and is subject to certifica-
tion by national maritime authorities and verification by both flag 
and port states. The ISM Code is applicable to ships operating in 
Arctic waters although its provisions do not deal with the special 
circumstances and operational hazards of Arctic navigation. As ship-
ping activity increases in the region, express provision for safety 
management for ice navigation might need to be considered.
The voluntary Arctic Guidelines apply to ships covered by SOLAS, 
including passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage or 
more engaged in international voyages in ice-covered waters (Map 
4.1). The Arctic Guidelines are additional provisions deemed nec-
essary for consideration beyond existing SOLAS requirements. They 
provide the most comprehensive standards for ships in ice-covered 
waters, including construction, equipment and operational matters. 
The Arctic Guidelines are structured in four parts. Part A provides 
construction, subdivision and stability in damaged condition rec-
ommendations for new Polar Class ships. The guidelines suggest a 
harmonized classification of Polar Class ships into seven categories 
according to intended ship operations and the level of ice in the area 
(Table 4.3). Ships should be able to withstand flooding resulting from 
hull penetration due to ice damage. No pollutants should be carried 
directly against the hull in areas of significant risk of ice impact. 
Operational pollution of the environment should be minimized by 
equipment selection and operational practice. Navigational, commu-
nications, safety-related survival and pollution control equipment 
should be appropriate for Arctic conditions. 
Part B applies to Polar Class and non-Polar Class ships and includes 
recommendations on fire safety, fire detection and extinguishing sys-
tems, life-saving appliances and arrangements and navigation equip-
ment in conformance with SOLAS, Chapter V. All Polar Class ships 
should be provided with an Automatic Identification System. Polar 
Class ships are encouraged to carry fully enclosed lifeboats. Other 
ships are urged to carry lifeboats having tarpaulins of sufficient size 
to provide complete coverage from environmental conditions.
Part C concerns ship operations, crewing and emergencies. Ships 
should carry operating manuals, as well as training manuals with 
relevant information concerning operations in ice-covered waters, 
including emergency procedures. Qualifications and training for crew 
and ice navigators are suggested.
Polar Class General Description
PC 1 Year-round operation in all Arctic ice-covered waters
PC 2 Year-round operation in moderate multi-year ice conditions
PC 3 Year-round operation in second-year ice which may include multi-year ice 
inclusions
PC 4 Year-round operation in thick first-year ice which may include old ice inclusions
PC 5 Year-round operation in medium first-year ice which may include old ice 
inclusions
PC 6 Summer/autumn operation in medium first-year ice which may include old ice 
inclusions
PC 7 Summer/autumn operation in thin first-year ice which may include old ice inclusions
z  Table 4.3  The Arctic Guidelines and the Unified Requirements, adopted by the 
International Association of Classification Societies, designate a system of Polar 
Classes for ships with different levels of capability and construction, structural and 
equipment requirements under various ice conditions. The Unified Requirements 
apply to ships of member associations constructed on or after March 1, 2008. 
Source: IMO Arctic Guidelines
z  Map 4.1  Geographical scope of the 2002 IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in 
Arctic Ice-covered Waters (Arctic Guidelines) (shaded area).  Source: IMO Arctic Guidelines
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Part D provides for environmental protection and damage control 
equipment, recognizing the navigational and environmental hazards 
and limited response capabilities for assistance in Arctic ice-covered 
waters. All ships navigating in Arctic ice-covered waters should be 
adequately equipped and their crews properly trained to provide 
effective damage control and minor hull repair, as well as contain-
ment and cleanup of minor spills.
 The Arctic Guidelines have been criticized 
for various deficiencies. Criticisms include the 
lack of details or uniform international stan-
dards on training, failure to require actual ice 
navigational experience for ice navigators and 
limited provisions on prevention and miti-
gation of sea-spray icing of ships. Guidance 
about towage in ice-covered waters is also 
limited. The IMO recently agreed to revise the 
Arctic Guidelines and to extend their applica-
tion to the Antarctic.
The Convention on the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
1972 (COLREGS) sets out technical and sea-
manship rules for ships on the high seas and 
in all other waters navigable by seagoing 
vessels connected thereto, including bays, 
straits, territorial seas and EEZs. COLREGS 
applies to navigation in the Arctic, but it does 
not contain specific rules for ships navigat-
ing in ice-covered waters. COLREGS covers a 
situation where a ship is constrained in its 
ability to maneuver due to size, draft or other 
reason such as ice. However, the application 
of some rules may need to be considered with 
reference to ice navigation. With an extended 
Arctic shipping season and increased ship 
traffic, COLREGS can be expected to assume greater importance.
The remoteness and harsh conditions present special search and 
rescue challenges in the Arctic. The International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (SAR Convention) provides for res-
cue coordination centers, ship position reporting systems and expe-
dited entry of rescue units into the territorial waters of other states. 
Arctic state parties to the SAR convention shall coordinate SAR-
incidents in their respective areas of responsibility and cooperate 
The increased use of Arctic waters for tourism, shipping, research and resource development also increases the 
risk of accidents and, therefore, the need to further strengthen search and rescue capabilities and capacity around 
the Arctic Ocean to ensure an appropriate response from states to any accident. Cooperation, including on the shar-
ing of information, is a prerequisite for addressing these challenges. We will work to promote safety of life at sea  
in the Arctic Ocean, including through bilateral and multilateral arrangements between or among relevant states.   
~ Ilulissat Declaration, May 2008
z Table 4.4  Ratification of International Marine Labor Agreements and Instruments.  Source: AMSA
Abbreviations: (√) = Ratification; (--) = Not Party; * = In Force; C188 = Work in Fishing Convention; C180 = Seafarers’ Hours of Work and the Manning of Ships  
Convention; C166 = Repatriation of Seafarers Convention; C164 = Health Protection and Medical Care (Seafarers) Convention; C163 = Seafarers’ Welfare  
Convention; P147 = Protocol of 1996 to the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention; C147 = Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention  
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with each other as required. The IMO has established 13 major search 
and rescue areas around the world, within which coastal states have 
designated search and rescue regions. 
The Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) facili-
tates maritime safety communications for merchant and passenger 
ships. The Arctic is “Sea Area A4” and extends to 90˚N for GMDSS 
purposes. Canada, Norway and the Russian Federation plan to coordi-
nate navigational and related maritime safety information in one or 
more designated navigational areas (NAVAREAs) by 2011. 
Representatives from the five Arctic coastal states meeting in 
Ilulissat, Greenland, recently adopted a declaration reaffirming their 
commitment to work together through the IMO to strengthen exist-
ing measures and to develop new measures to improve the safety 
of maritime navigation and prevent or reduce the risk of ship-based 
pollution in Arctic waters. The Ilulissat Declaration recognizes the 
need to further strengthen search and rescue capabilities and capac-
ity around the Arctic Ocean.
As international shipping increases in the Arctic, it should be 
expected that ships will be more frequently in need of assistance. 
There are, however, practical difficulties in finding and supporting 
suitable places of refuge for ships in the Arctic, even during the sum-
mer navigation months. The 2003 IMO Guidelines on Places of Refuge 
for Ships in Need of Assistance provide a risk assessment and deci-
sion-making framework for coastal state decision-makers, masters 
of ships and salvors when a ship needs refuge in sheltered coastal 
waters such as a port or a bay. The guidelines are not mandatory. 
Many states have adopted places of refuge policies and/or desig-
nated such places, with the European Union requiring member states 
to designate places of refuge. 
When a ship becomes a casualty and eventually sinks, it may con-
tinue to pose a hazard for navigation. Shipwrecks within and beyond 
the territorial sea will eventually be covered by the 2007 Nairobi 
International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, which is not 
yet in force. Shipowners are responsible for locating, marking and 
removing ships, and must carry suitable insurance for this purpose.
Standards for Seafarers in the Arctic and 
Maritime Labor Law Issues
The Arctic presents a particularly hazardous work setting for those 
who must live and work under its extreme conditions. Both the IMO 
and the ILO set international standards for seafarers’ competence 
and their working and living conditions (Table 4.4). In addition, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) sets standards for seafarers’ 
health issues such as medical fitness for duties and requirements for 
on-board medical supplies. Most international standards are directed 
to flag states and apply to ships undertaking international voyages, 
although some requirements are directed to countries in their capac-
ity as maritime labor supply states.
The IMO addresses seafarer competency and training and other 
safety matters for both ship and crew through the International 
Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
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for Seafarers, 1978 (STCW) and SOLAS. The STCW is again being 
revised, including standards for medical fitness for duty and hours 
of work and rest. 
Since 1920, the ILO has adopted more than 70 international con-
ventions and recommendations addressing maritime labor conditions 
and standards for decent working and living conditions for seafarers, 
for example, hours of rest and work, accommodations, occupational 
safety and health, wages, food and medical care. More than 35 of 
these maritime labor conventions and related recommendations 
were consolidated in the 2006 Maritime Labour Convention, which is 
expected to enter into force by 2011.
IMO, ILO and WHO have not adopted specific mandatory instru-
ments addressing Arctic or Antarctic shipping as distinct from the 
general requirements. Existing minimum standards apply to ships fly-
ing the flag of states party to these conventions, and flag states are 
responsible for enforcing them on their ships. However, they would 
also be enforced on non-party ships under the regime of port state 
control inspection. Outside STCW or the ILO standards, there do not 
appear to be any special requirements for minimum hours of rest or 
maximum hours of work and safe manning despite navigation under 
what could be regarded as especially hazardous conditions.
The Arctic Guidelines also 
make recommendations on 
labor issues not dealt with 
under SOLAS or STCW. The inte-
grated approach adopted by 
the guidelines recognizes that 
safe operation in ice-covered 
conditions “requires specific 
attention to human factors 
including training and opera-
tional procedures.” The guide-
lines recommend that crew 
have ice navigation and simu-
lator training prior to entering 
Arctic waters, as well as expo-
sure to ice-breaking opera-
tions and cold weather cargo 
handling; and that all ships 
operating in Arctic ice-covered 
waters should have at least one 
qualified ice navigator avail-
able to continuously monitor 
ice conditions when the ship 
is underway and making way in 
the presence of ice. The guidelines recommend that the ice navigator 
provide documentary evidence of having satisfactorily completed an 
approved training program in ice navigation. Currently, most ice nav-
igation programs are ad hoc and there are no uniform international 
training standards. Although the Arctic Guidelines are not compre-
hensive with respect to seafarer training for the Arctic, they are the 
first international instrument to emphasize the need for specialized 
training in ice navigation.
Marine Environmental Rules and Standards 
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships, 1973 as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto 
(MARPOL 73/78) establishes international standards for pollutant 
discharges from ships.  The standards are applicable in some Arctic 
waters (Table 4.5). Six annexes set out technical rules and proce-
dures dealing with the prevention and control of pollution from ships 
by oil (I), noxious liquid substances (II), harmful substances in 
packaged form (III), sewage (IV), garbage (V) and air emissions (VI). 
MARPOL does not totally prohibit the discharge of wastes in the 
marine environment. Establishing oily ballast and bilge water dis-
charge limits, Annex I is an important annex for the protection of 
z  Table 4.5  Ratification of International Environmental Protection Agreements and Instruments.  Source: AMSA
Abbreviations: (√) = Ratification; (--) = Not Party; * = In Force; ** In Force September 17, 2008 (data as of October 10, 2008)
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the Arctic marine environment. Oily ballast water from tankers may 
be discharged at a rate of 30 liters per nautical mile while en route 
and over 50 nautical miles offshore. Annex I also establishes a 15 ppm 
discharge limitation on oily bilge water from oil tankers, as well as 
from other ships. Amendments to MARPOL in 1992 and 2003 intro-
duced a mandatory requirement of double hulls for new oil tankers 
and an accelerated phase-out period for existing single-hull tankers, 
as well as prohibition of operation of single-hull oil tankers carrying 
heavy grade oil as cargo accordingly. A proposal is before IMO to pro-
hibit the use and carriage of heavy grade oil in the Antarctic Special 
Area, which may be considered in the future whether it should also 
apply to the Arctic.
Annex IV sets out sewage regulations that apply to ships of 
400 gross tonnage or more, or ships that are certified to carry more 
than 15 persons. Sewage may be discharged at a distance of more 
than three nautical miles from the nearest land when a ship has an 
approved treatment system and the sewage discharged is commi-
nuted and disinfected. Sewage that is not treated may be discharged 
at a distance of more than 12 nautical miles from the nearest land if 
the ship is proceeding at not less than four knots and the discharge 
is not instantaneous but at a moderate rate. 
Annex V, while prohibiting the disposal of plastics into sea, still 
allows ships to discharge some garbage generated by normal opera-
tions of a ship and depending on the distance from land. For exam-
ple, ships are allowed to dispose of packing materials more than 25 
nautical miles from the nearest land.  
Annex VI allows special sulfur oxide (SOx) emission control areas 
to be declared, where sulfur content of ship fuels would be low-
ered for designated regions (1.5 percent m/m) from the global stan-
dard of 4.5 percent m/m. Amendments to MARPOL 2008 introduced 
increasingly stringent regulations, including gradually decreasing 
the global cap for SOx (from 4.5 percent m/m to 0.5 percent m/m) 
and decreasing SOx and particulate matter in Emission Control Areas 
from 1.5 percent m/m to 0.1 percent m/m.  Stringent controls were 
also placed on nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions and the ability to 
create Emission Control Areas for such emissions is now also avail-
able. These amendments enter into force on July 1, 2010.  However, 
neither polar region has been proposed for special treatment. 
Where the discharge standards under MARPOL Annexes I, II and 
V are not sufficient for protecting sensitive areas of the marine envi-
ronment, IMO may designate special areas based on oceanographic 
and ecological as well as ship traffic conditions. For example, the 
Antarctic area (south of 60˚ latitude) is designated as a special area 
under all three annexes and a very high standard for discharges under 
Annex I has been established, namely a prohibition on any discharge 
of oil or oily mixtures from any ship. The Arctic may satisfy at least 
the oceanographic and ecological conditions for special area desig-
nation, if not also ship traffic conditions, as set out in the 2002 IMO 
Guidelines for the Designation of Special Areas under MARPOL 73/78. 
Before a special area becomes effective, regional coastal states must 
undertake to provide port reception facilities, an important consid-
eration in the Arctic with its limited port infrastructure.
Marine areas can also receive special protection from the IMO 
because of their particular sensitivity to international shipping 
through designation as particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSAs). The 
IMO has developed Guidelines for the Identification and Designation 
of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas, most recently revised in 2005. To 
be eligible for designation as a PSSA, there must be three elements: 
(1) the area must have certain attributes as set forth in the Revised 
PSSA Guidelines, (2) there must be an identified vulnerability from 
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international ship traffic and (3) there must be an IMO measure to 
address the identified vulnerability. These IMO measures are called 
associated protective measures and include such things as areas to 
be avoided, traffic re-routing and separation schemes, mandatory 
ship reporting, discharges, restrictions and designation as a special 
area.  If the conditions and criteria set out above are satisfied in 
a given area of the Arctic, that area may be eligible for PSSA 
designation.  
There is also the option of obtaining protective measures under 
SOLAS without necessarily involving the designation of a PSSA. 
Routing and reporting measures under SOLAS Chapter V (Regulations 
10 and 11) normally associated with safe passage (such as recom-
mended routes, precautionary area and area to be avoided) may 
be obtained through the IMO to protect the marine environment. 
Measures of this sort have already been obtained and applied in 
northern waters, such as Alaska’s Prince William Sound, the Baltic 
Sea and waters off the coast of Norway, Iceland and Greenland.
The Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping 
of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972 and its 1996 Protocol govern ocean 
dumping from ships (excluding wastes from normal ship operations) 
and the dumping (intentional sinking) of ships in the Arctic (Table 
4.5). The convention permits dumping except for those wastes listed 
on a “black list” pursuant to a national ocean dumping permit. The 
1996 Protocol adopts a precautionary approach, and only wastes 
listed on a global “safe list,” for example, dredged material and 
organic wastes of natural origin, may be disposed of subject to a 
waste assessment audit and a national permit.
Seven Arctic states are parties to the 1990 International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 
(OPRC), which sets out a framework for cooperative measures in rela-
tion to pollution incidents involving oil (Table 4.5). The 2000 OPRC-
Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) Protocol provides a similar 
framework for cooperation in preparedness and response measures 
for dealing with HNS incidents, but not all Arctic states are parties. 
State parties are required to establish measures for dealing with oil 
and HNS pollution incidents, either nationally or in cooperation with 
other countries, and the conclusion of further bilateral or multilat-
eral agreements is encouraged. The OPRC envisages an ongoing need 
to assess the adequacy of pre-positioned equipment for responding 
to pollution incidents in light of changing risks, such as an increase 
in shipping levels.
Under OPRC, trained crew and appropriate damage control mate-
rials must be on board ships and offshore installations to implement 
their ship oil pollution emergency plans to effect damage repair and 
mitigate pollution, including responding to ice damage. OPRC calls 
for the establishment of stockpiles of oil spill combating equipment, 
the holding of oil spill combating exercises and the development 
of detailed plans for dealing with pollution incidents. State parties 
have a duty to provide assistance to other states in pollution emer-
gency situations.
Regional and bilateral arrangements are in place that provide a 
framework for cooperation among some Arctic states under OPRC in 
the Arctic. For example, the Arctic Council’s Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group has noted the need 
to increase communication and to share information with the IMO 
in such areas as dispersant application, waste removal and treat-
ment, in-situ burn up and spill response in ice and snow conditions. 
Several Arctic states have joint contingency planning arrangements. 
They include, among others, the Canada/United States Joint Marine 
Pollution Contingency Plan for the Beaufort Sea area, the Russia/USA 
Joint Marine Pollution Contingency Plan, the joint Russian/Norwegian 
Plan for the Combating of Oil Pollution in the Barents Sea and the 
Canada/Denmark Agreement for Marine Environmental Cooperation, 
which includes annexes for responding to shipping and offshore 
hydrocarbon spills.
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The International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-
Fouling Systems on Ships addresses the use of anti-fouling systems, 
including paints containing toxic substances such as tributyltin 
(TBT). The convention, which entered into force on September 17, 
2008, requires ships to either not use organotin compounds on their 
hulls by January 1, 2008 or to have a protective coating to prevent 
leaching of organotin compounds. Although several Arctic Council 
states regulate TBT use and the European Union has introduced 
a complete ban on TBT-based paints, only Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden are parties to the convention.
An additional vessel-source environmental concern is ballast 
water, whereby ships take up sea water in order to maintain ship 
stability and structural integrity. When ballast water is discharged, 
pathogens and alien living organisms may be released that can dis-
rupt local marine species and ecosystems. 
The 2004 IMO International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments is intended to pre-
vent, minimize and ultimately eliminate the risks of introduction of 
harmful aquatic organisms and pathogens via ships’ ballast water, but 
it is not yet in force. The convention details technical standards for 
the control and management of ships’ ballast water and sediments 
with the goal of shifting ballast water management from exchange to 
treatment for all ships by 2016. Among the Arctic states, only Norway 
has consented to be bound by the convention. 
The Ballast Water Convention encourages enhancement of regional 
cooperation, including the conclusion of regional agreements. The 
2007 non-binding IMO Guidelines for Ballast Water Exchange in the 
Antarctic Treaty Area provide an example of a regional approach. 
Various measures are recommended, including the exchange of bal-
last water before arrival in Antarctic waters. The specific impact of 
ballast discharges in the Arctic marine environment remains largely 
unknown. These issues require further research.
The Role of Ports in International Maritime Law
Port state control could play an important role in promoting mar-
itime safety and marine environmental protection in the Arctic. A 
global network of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on port state 
control among national maritime authorities provides a systemic 
ship inspection approach to ensure compliance with international 
standards on ship safety, labor, training and pollution prevention 
such as SOLAS, COLREGS, MARPOL 73/78 and STCW. The inspection 
data is centralized in databases to which member authorities have 
access, and is used to track the compliance of a particular ship and 
the record of violations by flag. The Paris MOU among European mari-
time authorities is potentially relevant for ships navigating within 
the Arctic Circle. The maritime authorities of the Arctic Council 
states, except for the United States, are parties to the Paris MOU. 
The United States administers its own port state control system, but 
has cooperating observer status with the Paris MOU.
Regional maritime authorities in the Arctic may wish to consider 
whether existing MOUs are sufficient to enforce higher regulatory 
safety and environmental standards applicable to the Arctic or to 
coordinate port state control enforcement efforts through a new 
dedicated MOU. Arctic states would need to consider what uniform 
standards would be enforced through port state control. Currently, 
only Canada and the Russian Federation have designated national 
safety and environmental standards for navigation in their Arctic 
waters separately from international standards adopted under the 
auspices of the IMO, including the Arctic Guidelines. The Russian 
Federation employs a ship inspection system for passage through 
the Northern Sea Route. Canada requires that ships comply with the 
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and regulates construction and 
other standards before navigating in Arctic waters, and inspects for 
this purpose.
Ports and maritime authorities also play a role in the interna-
tional maritime security regime. In 2002, the IMO introduced the 
mandatory International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS 
Code), which is linked to chapter XI-2 of the SOLAS Convention, for 
all commercial vessels over 500 gross tonnage engaged in interna-
tional trade, as well as mobile offshore drilling units. Public and pri-
vate ports and terminals must be secure, and ships may be required 
to provide notice and information to the maritime authorities of the 
host state. For example, Canada and the United States have advance 
notice of arrival requirements for ships that vary with the duration of 
the voyage. Certificates are issued to ships, companies and ports and 
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security plans are subject to periodic 
audit. Arctic ports and terminals require 
a risk assessment followed by adop-
tion of security plans to comply with 
the ISPS Code. Ships engaged in cargo 
operations, support services or cruises 
in the Arctic have to comply with the 
ISPS Code and cooperate with port and 
terminal security. In areas under their 
jurisdiction and in accordance with 
UNCLOS, Arctic coastal states should 
have ship control procedures in place, 
as well as a secure system of assessing 
threats and sharing intelligence among 
law enforcement agencies.
International  
Private Maritime  
Law Framework
The international customs and prac-
tices of the shipping, cruise and mer-
chant communities are likely to govern 
the Arctic movement of goods and pas-
sengers in addition to international 
maritime law. Since ships move between different countries, their 
owners’ contracts can be subjected to a variety of different national 
jurisdictions and laws. To reduce confusion, the international com-
munity has concluded international private law conventions that 
establish uniform contractual regimes for the carriage of passengers 
and the carriage of goods under bills of lading (Table 4.6). 
Shipowners interact with commercial parties, such as cargo own-
ers and cruise passengers, or the suppliers of essential shipping 
services, like insurers and salvors, through private contracts. The 
essence of a contract of sea carriage is an agreement for safe trans-
port and delivery by ship in exchange for payment of freight, hire or 
passage and the allocation of risks and responsibilities of the tran-
sit between the parties. These contracts also take into account the 
relevant international maritime law, with the carrier ensuring that 
its ship meets international standards for human safety and environ-
mental protection (e.g., SOLAS, the 1972 International Convention 
for Safe Containers (CSC), MARPOL 73/78 and STCW). International 
shipping organizations and traders’ associations have also developed 
standardized clauses for particular trades, cargoes and routes and 
organized them into blank forms of contracts. 
z  Table 4.6  Ratification of International Carriage of Goods and Passengers Agreements and Instruments.  Source: AMSA
Abbreviations: (√) = Ratification; (--) = Not Party; (D) = Denounced; (R) = Revoked; (a) = Accession; * = In Force (data as of October 10, 2008)
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The international customs and  
practices of the shipping, cruise  
and merchant communities are  
likely to govern the Arctic move-
ment of goods and passengers  
in addition to international  
maritime law.
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Contracts of carriage for the movement of petroleum, liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) and minerals moved in bulk in tankers and ore 
carriers that tramp (sail) around the world from port to port are 
known as charter parties. Industry bodies like the Baltic and the 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) and International Association 
of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) have devised generally 
accepted standard terms of trade for inclusion in individual charter 
parties. For example, BIMCO’s voluntary “ice clauses” allow a car-
rier to deviate from the contracted carriage to prevent a ship from 
becoming icebound. 
Packaged, crated and containerized items, including hazardous 
goods, are carried under contracts represented by bills of lading and 
sea waybills that are regulated under competing international rules 
with similar modes of operation and regulatory function. These rules 
differ in the standards of conduct expected of the carrier, the scope 
of application of the rules and the limits of liability for their breach. 
The 1924 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules 
of Law Relating to Bills of Lading as amended by the Protocols of 
1968 and 1979 (Hague-Visby Rules), or some variant of them, are 
the most widely applied international regulations. The other rules 
are the 1978 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea (Hamburg Rules) and the 1980 United Nations Convention on 
International Multimodal Transport of Goods (Multimodal Rules). The 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law has prepared 
a wholly new uniform set of rules, the Draft Convention on Contracts 
for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, pre-
sented to the General Assembly in October 2008. States that are 
not party to a particular convention may choose to legislate the 
rules into carriage contracts, for example, Canada implements the 
Hague-Visby Rules through the Marine Liability Act. Each set of rules 
applies to marine transportation in the Arctic just the same as in any 
other ocean area. 
Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations also 
influence the standard of care set out in a carriage contract. Since 
2006, a number of classification societies have introduced winteriza-
tion guidelines for navigation in cold climates that establish stan-
dards of ship preparedness for Arctic shipping, thereby indirectly 
establishing the expected minimum standard of reasonable care for 
cargo. 
The commercial carriage of passengers by sea, whether on fer-
ries or cruise ships, is internationally regulated by the 1974 Athens 
Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage 
by Sea and its protocols of 1976 and 1990 not yet in force. A further 
protocol concluded in 2002 is also not yet in force: the consolidated 
treaty will be known as the Athens Convention, 2002. The carrier 
is responsible for the safety of everyone on board, whether crew, 
cruise company employees or fare paying passengers. The Athens 
Convention establishes liability rules and limitations for personal 
injuries to passengers and loss or damage to their luggage. The safety 
criteria to be followed in order to negate a finding of negligence are 
established by the international shipping practices of operators, for 
example, Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators Guidelines, 
as well as by SOLAS and other binding IMO shipping safety rules.
Marine Insurance
Arctic shipping will not be sustainable without the availability 
of marine insurance at reasonable commercial rates. Unlike most 
other areas of shipping, the practice of marine insurance is not 
regulated in an international convention. A business and private 
law matter, marine insurance is legislated at the national level, for 
example, Canada and the Russian Federation; and occasionally at a 
sub-national level, for example, the United States. Insurance prac-
tices are driven by international insurance markets. Of particular 
significance for Arctic shipping is protection and indemnity insur-
ance, offered through P & I Clubs. Until recently, Russian Federation 
shipping in the Arctic tended to be insured under state schemes, and 
now P & I coverage is a requirement for trading on the Northern Sea 
Route. 
Although most of the risks associated with shipping are well 
known and understood by insurers and assureds alike, the risks asso-
ciated with polar navigation are still not fully known or understood. 
With the exception of the Northern Sea Route, the Arctic is per-
ceived as an unknown quantity or a marine frontier. As a result, the 
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provision of insurance for Arctic shipping tends to be on a case-by-
case basis and expensive, with seasonal additional premiums. The 
availability and cost of marine insurance is a major constraint on 
Arctic marine shipping. 
Salvage
The availability of salvage services can be expected to be vital for 
the future of commercial shipping in the Arctic. The 1989 International 
Convention on Salvage establishes the general legal principles for 
salvors and salvage operations. All Arctic Council states are parties 
to the convention. Salvage refers to the actual service provided to 
a ship in need of assistance, the body of law that exists to govern 
this maritime institution, and the reward due to the salvors for their 
services. Essentially, salvors are entitled to a reward (a percentage of 
the value of the salved property) for successful salving of the vessel 
or cargo, such as, “no cure, no pay”. Most commonly, private firms 
of professional salvors respond to shipping casualties, although the 
Russian Federation has a fleet of polar vessels that provide salvage 
services. In general, the rights and obligations of the parties to a sal-
vage operation are legislated and subject to industry standard form 
agreements, the best known being the Lloyd’s Open Form of Salvage 
Agreement. If there is no contract, the 
parties will turn to domestic courts to 
obtain a salvage award. The convention 
provides for an enhanced salvage award 
for salvors preventing or minimizing 
damage to the marine environment. 
Generally, there is limited infrastruc-
ture for ship repair and/or salvage and 
pollution countermeasures capability in 
the Arctic basin or companies with sig-
nificant Arctic salvage experience. This 
lack of salvage capability is a concern 
to marine insurers.
Liability and Compensation
Should there be incidents result-
ing in oil or other hazardous substance 
spills that cause damage to the Arctic 
marine environment, property or eco-
nomic loss, national and international 
systems of financial compensation 
for cleanup and losses sustained will 
become important. The current inter-
national system for compensation for 
pollution damage caused by ship-source pollution is fragmented and 
limited. Separate conventions address oil pollution liability and com-
pensation from tankers; damages from the spill of bunker fuel car-
ried in ships other than tankers, such as cargo ships; and hazardous 
and noxious substance spills from ships (Table 4.7). Compensation is 
only available to state parties to the respective conventions and to 
private bodies or individuals who have suffered damage as a result of 
the pollution. None of the conventions address damage to the high 
seas beyond national jurisdiction. In general, under the conventions, 
the shipowner is strictly liable for the loss or damage up to a certain 
amount. A supplementary fund may provide additional compensation 
when the victims do not obtain full compensation from the ship-
owner or the insurer. 
The compensation regime for damage caused by persistent cargo 
and fuel (bunker) oil pollution from oil tankers is the 1992 Civil Liability 
Convention (1992 CLC) and the 1992 Fund Convention, as well as the 
2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol. These conventions do not apply 
to spills of bunker oil from ships other than tankers. In the Arctic 
context, it is unclear if the conventions apply to floating production, 
storage and offloading units and permanently and semi-permanently 
anchored ships engaged in ship-to-ship oil transfer operations. 
z  Table 4.7  Ratification of International Maritime Liability and Compensation Agreements and Instruments.  Source: AMSA
Abbreviations: (√) = Ratification; (--) = Not Party; (D) = Denounced;  * = In Force; ** In Force November 21, 2008 (data as of October 10, 2008)
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While seven Arctic states have adopted the 1992 Civil Liability 
and Fund conventions, the United States has established a separate 
regime under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. The international regime 
limits compensation for environmental damage to actual restoration 
costs; U.S. regulations provide compensation for both diminution in 
value of natural resources and the cost of assessing such damages.
The International Convention on Liability and Compensation for 
Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious 
Substances by Sea, 1996 (HNS Convention) also establishes a two-
tier international compensation regime for bulk solids (excluding 
coal and iron ore and radioactive materials), liquids including non-
persistent oils, liquid gases such as LNG and liquefied petroleum 
gases (LPG) and packaged substances. Individual receivers of HNS 
by sea in state parties to the convention would contribute to the 
International Hazardous and Noxious Substances Fund. The HNS 
Convention is not yet in force. Among the Arctic states, only the 
Russian Federation is a party.
The 2001 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil 
Pollution Damage, which entered into force on November 21, 2008, 
applies to pollution damage caused by the spill of bunker oil from a 
ship other than a tanker and makes the shipowner strictly liable. The 
Bunkers Convention preserves the right of the shipowner and insurer 
to limit liability under any applicable national or international 
regime. The convention is accompanied by a Resolution (Annex 1) 
that urges all states to ratify or accede to the 1996 Protocol to 
the 1976 Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 
(LLMC 1976) thus increasing the funds available for bunker pollution 
claims. Among the Arctic states, the Russian Federation, Denmark, 
Finland and Norway are parties. 
Selected National Legal Frameworks: 
Canada and the Russian Federation 
Canada and the Russian Federation regulate shipping in the Arctic 
under UNCLOS Article 234, as well as under other authorities. 
Canada has established special ship construction, equipment and 
crewing requirements and near zero oil pollution discharge standards 
through the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) and its 
regulations. The legislation applies to a 100 nautical mile pollution 
prevention area, but recent amendments will extend this to the 200 
nautical mile EEZ. 
Pollution standards for discharges are stricter in Canadian Arctic 
waters than MARPOL, with only untreated sewage or emergency 
discharges permitted. The Canada Shipping Act, 2001 authorizes reg-
ulations to be passed establishing vessel traffic services (VTS) zones 
in an Arctic shipping safety control zone whereby vessel reporting 
and clearance would be mandatory. To date, only a voluntary non-
regulatory VTS zone known as NORDREG has been adopted for the 
Canadian Arctic. Currently, Canada effectively has a routing require-
ment in that the Shipping Safety Control Zones (adopted under the 
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AWPPA) stipulate when and where ships of certain ice strength can 
operate. Recently, the Canadian federal government announced plans 
to extend the application of the AWPPA to 200 nautical miles and to 
move NORDREG to a mandatory reporting system for ships entering 
Canadian Arctic waters.
The Russian Federation has opened the Northern Sea Route for 
foreign shipping under certain conditions and has increased the 
number of ports in the Arctic region. 
Regulations adopted in 1990 and 1996 allow navigation in 
the Northern Sea Route on a non-discriminatory basis for ships 
of all states based on Regulation for Navigation on the Seaways of 
the NSR, 1991; Guide for Navigation through the NSR, 1995; and 
Regulation for Design, Equipment and Supply of Vessels Navigation 
the NSR, 1995. In these documents, priority is given to prevailing 
international legal standards and appropriate rights of the coastal 
states to ensure maritime safety and to take measures for prevent-
ing the pollution of the marine environment. Pollution standards 
are stricter than MARPOL. For example, no garbage deposits or oily 
ballast water discharges from tankers are permitted. The regula-
tions impose various conditions for using the Northern Sea Route. 
An application to Russian maritime authorities has to be made 
and they would give careful consideration to navigational safety 
and environmental concerns. A ship inspection (at the shipowner’s 
expense) is required and at least two pilots need to be taken on 
board. Crew size must be sufficient to allow for a three-shift watch 
and the master should at least have a 15-day experience of steering 
ships under ice conditions along the Northern Sea Route. The NSR 
fee system is continuously improving. The existing fee system is in 
place to necessitate financial support for icebreaker assistance and 
NSR infrastructure throughout the year. In the case of future growth 
in cargo volumes, the charge for each individual vessel passing by 
the NSR is expected to decrease as the overall volume increases. 
The estimated volumes of maritime traffic are about 40 million tons 
of oil and gas per year by 2020, which may improve the economic 
effectiveness of cargo transportation through the NSR.
In Summary 
Governance in shipping is characterized by efforts to promote 
harmonization and uniformity in international maritime law. The rea-
son for the global approach to shipping governance is that by defini-
tion and function, shipping is essentially an international tool in the 
service of global trade. The term governance highlights the complex 
range of actors that affect shipping law, policy and practice in the 
Arctic. Indeed, the largest flag states and suppliers of marine labor 
do not border the Arctic Ocean. 
Natural resource, cruise and maritime trade related shipping in 
the Arctic is on the increase. As marine insurance at reasonable 
rates becomes available and an appropriate infrastructure is put in 
place to service Arctic navigation routes, a concomitant increase in 
international shipping can be expected. This will raise, among oth-
ers, safety and marine environment protection concerns. There are 
complex global and national legal regimes that establish standards 
for navigation and protection of the marine environment that are 
applicable in the Arctic, however, for those to be effective, a com-
mon understanding of those regimes, along with enhanced regional 
cooperation in ocean management and greater participation by 
Arctic states in the global international maritime conventions will 
be needed. If the Arctic marine environment is to be protected, 
existing regimes will need to be strengthened by Arctic states and 
the international community. 
Not all Arctic states are parties to important conventions, and 
indeed not all relevant conventions are in force. There is a dearth of 
mandatory international standards specifically designed for naviga-
tion in the Arctic, as well as voluntary guidelines. Arctic states will 
need to work closely with global and regional international orga-
nizations, the people of the North and the international maritime 
community in regime-building to facilitate governance of Arctic 
shipping. Z
   
Research Opportunities
q Comparative investigation of national construction and 
equipment standards for ships and their consistency with 
IACS Unified Requirements for Polar Class ships.
q Comparative examination of the extent to which states 
have followed the IMO Arctic Guidelines.
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Findings
 1] Differing national viewpoints over what waters may legitimately be claimed as internal and what waters consti-
tute straits used for international navigation have yet to be fully resolved and could give rise to future disputes 
concerning the exercise of jurisdiction over shipping activities.
 2] Coastal state authority to regulate foreign shipping in the Arctic Ocean in order to prevent, reduce and control 
marine pollution was bolstered by Article 234 of UNCLOS. However, the precise geographic scope of coverage 
(waters covered by ice most of the year within the limits of the Exclusive Economic Zone) and the breadth of 
regulatory powers, in particular the extent to which a coastal state may unilaterally impose special construction, 
crewing and equipment standards, given the requirements that such standards must give due regard to navigation 
and the protection and preservation of the marine environment based on the best available scientific evidence 
could give rise to differing interpretations.
 3] The IMO international voluntary Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters for the safety of ships 
and seafarers in the Arctic are currently under review. This review provides an opportunity to assess and strengthen 
guidance in the area of ship construction, equipment and operations and to consider the need for a legally-binding 
code in the future.
 4] Safe navigation in ice-covered waters depends much on the experience, knowledge and skill of the ice naviga-
tor. Currently, most ice navigator training programs are ad hoc and there are no uniform international training 
standards. For example, this could be addressed by developing training standards for navigation in polar condi-
tions and in Arctic safety and survival for seafarers that could be incorporated into IMO’s Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping (STCW 78/95).
 5] The International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) has developed Unified Requirements for member 
societies addressing essential aspects of construction for ships of Polar Class. The IACS Unified Requirements for 
member societies are incorporated by reference into the IMO Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered 
Waters. If the application of the harmonized Polar Class were to be made mandatory, then it could be an effective 
way to strengthen safety and environmental protection in Arctic waters. 
 6] Specific international construction requirements for cruise ships operating in polar waters have not been adopted. 
The cruise ship industry has formed a Cruise Ship Safety Forum to further develop specific design and construction 
criteria for new vessels, but it remains to be seen how navigation in polar waters will be addressed. 
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 7] The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 as modified by the Protocol of 1978 
(MARPOL) sets out minimum international standards for operational discharges and emissions from ships which 
are also applicable to Arctic waters. Pursuant to Article 234 of UNCLOS, coastal states may unilaterally impose 
additional, non-discriminatory requirements within the limits of their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) when certain 
conditions are met. At this time, some national standards for regulating ship-source pollution in the Arctic are not 
consistent among Arctic states.
 8] Stricter environmental standards have neither been proposed nor established by Member States through the IMO 
for the Arctic. For example, under MARPOL the Arctic Ocean could be designated as a “special area” where more 
stringent than normal discharge standards would apply under MARPOL Annexes I and V. Such an area could also 
be considered for designation as an Emission Control Area under Annex VI. 
 9] Expanded international shipping in the Arctic Ocean increases the possibility of introduction of alien species and 
pathogens through the discharge of ballast water and through hull fouling. The Ballast Water Convention imposes 
management (i.e., exchange and treatment) requirements on party ships to protect marine areas from the hazards 
posed by ballast water from ships and encourages establishment of regional approaches such as the Guidelines for 
Ballast Water Exchange in the Antarctic.
 10] In the Arctic Ocean there is very little commercial or government salvage and ship repair response capacity. 
Salvage and ship repair are important to support commercial shipping and the lack of this capacity is of concern 
to the marine insurance industry.
 11] The availability and cost of marine insurance is a major restraint on shipping in many parts of the Arctic. The 
underwriting of present shipping activities takes place only on a case-by-case basis.
 12] The international liability and compensation regime is fragmented and limited, with separate conventions address-
ing pollution from oil tankers, bunker fuel from non-tankers, and hazardous and noxious substances from all ships. 
No convention or protocol addresses damage to the high seas beyond national jurisdiction.
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I
n order to better understand Arctic shipping today, a data-
base of Arctic marine activity for a given year was seen as 
essential. Since no comprehensive database existed, AMSA 
undertook the collection of shipping data from all Arctic 
states. The result is the first comprehensive Arctic vessel activity 
database for a given calendar year. It contains a range of informa-
tion on where and when different vessels are operating in the Arctic, 
what types of vessels, what activity they undertake and what cargo 
they may be carrying, among other information. The AMSA database 
is a flexible tool that can be built upon as additional information is 
obtained and can be used to further assess environmental impacts 
from vessel activity, locate areas of potential conflicting multiple 
use and provide a baseline for an analysis of future growth in vessel 
activity in the region. 
Methodology
Vessel activity data for the AMSA study was collected from all 
Arctic states with coastal waters through the use of a specially 
designed questionnaire distributed to the Arctic Council’s Senior 
Arctic Officials and PAME working group representatives in February 
2006. A number of state administrations responded directly and, in 
some cases, other organizations were engaged to develop responses 
on a state’s behalf. For the purposes of the study, 2004 was chosen 
to be the baseline year; where data was found to be insufficient for 
2004, data from later years was provided and used for those areas 
only. 
The data requested included such information as the number of 
vessels operating in the states’ waters, the type of vessels, cargo 
Current Marine Use and 
the AMSA Shipping Database 
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carried, operational routes, fuel used, engine size of the vessels, 
date of operations, etc. Response to the questionnaire varied. Some 
responses were submitted with very detailed information, while some 
were submitted with very basic information or, at times, incomplete. 
In order to make the database more usable for most types of analysis, 
some assumptions have been made and post-processing of the data 
has been undertaken. For example, where route data was unavail-
able or contained obvious errors, such as passages across land, the 
information has been adjusted to follow known shipping routes. In 
terms of data reporting, there is some inconsistency in how states 
defined vessel types, as some states reported oil carriers as tank-
ers, while others reported similar vessels as bulk carriers or tug and 
barge. There are also varying levels of certainty regarding the routes 
traveled, ranging from very complete records of course changes to 
records that provided only departure and arrival points.
Where limited vessel-specific information was provided, other 
data sources were integrated, including ferry and cargo vessel sailing 
schedules, to add additional parameters to the data set. To facilitate 
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analysis of the raw data, vessels were grouped into standardized ves-
sel categories by the country that reported it and by the season in 
which it operated (Table 5.2). A summary of total number of vessels 
per category per country is shown in Table 5.1. Seasons were defined 
as: Winter - December to February; Spring - March to May; Summer - 
June to August; Autumn - September to November. For the purposes 
of the AMSA, the Arctic has been defined according to the internal 
policies among Arctic Council member states. This has meant that 
some states reported vessel activity that is below 60 degrees north, 
the traditional definition of the Arctic.
To further enhance understanding and presentation of the data, 
the raw data was mapped into a Geographic Information System 
(GIS), which provided the tools required to manage and analyze 
the spatial as well as the attribute components. Incorporating the 
data into a GIS provided for the development of maps that create a 
visual presentation, allowing for further analysis of all Arctic ves-
sel activities, such as modeling vessel CO2 emissions and compar-
ing current vessel traffic and mapped ecologically sensitive areas. 
z  Table 5.1  Total number of vessels for each 
country by vessel type.  Source: AMSA
Vessels Reported in the Circumpolar North Region, 2004 
COUNTRY
Faroe Islands
Canada  
Greenland
Iceland
Norway
Russian Federation
USA
 VESSEL TYPE
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
Bulk Carrier
Container Ship
General Cargo Ship
Government Vessel
Oil/Gas Service & Supply
Passenger Ship
Pleasure Craft
Tanker Ship
Tug/Barge
Unknown
Fishing Vessel
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Using the GIS, the fishing data was defined by 
fishing vessel days per year, taking the number 
of fishing days times the number of fishing ves-
sels reported. This number was then assigned to 
the appropriate Large Marine Ecosystem (LME) 
based on where the fishing events took place. 
A bathymetry layer is also provided in GIS format 
and can be used to discern draft limits to naviga-
tion. Map 5.1 shows the map-based depiction of 
all of the vessel activity in the AMSA database, 
including fishing vessel activity by LME.
Results
In 2004, approximately 6,000 individual ves-
sels were reported operating in the Arctic, includ-
ing vessels traveling on the North Pacific’s Great 
Circle Route between Asia and North America 
through the Aleutian Island chain, defined by the 
U.S. as within the Arctic. Great Circle Route ves-
sels account for half of all the vessels reported. 
Excluding the vessels plying the Great Circle 
Route, the most vessels in one category were 
fishing boats, at slightly less than 50 percent of 
the total; with the next largest vessel category 
being bulk carriers at about 20 percent of all ves-
sels. The AMSA database contains information on 
individual voyages into or through Arctic waters. 
This means that the number of individual vessels 
is not necessarily proportionate to the total num-
ber of voyages, as many vessels made multiple 
trips within the region. Results are also poten-
tially an underestimation of total vessels and 
marine use for 2004, given probable underreport-
ing bias and obvious data gaps in many areas and 
vessel types. 
While 2004 provides a snapshot of current 
Arctic vessel traffic, clear trends emerged from 
the data to show what common types of vessels 
are operating in the Arctic, where and when most 
activity is typically taking place. The AMSA data-
base identified four types of vessel activities as 
most significant in the Arctic in 2004: community 
re-supply, bulk cargo, tourism and fishing vessel 
activity operations.
z  Table 5.2  AMSA vessel categories.  Source: AMSA
Ship Category General Description 
Government Vessels 
and Icebreakers
An icebreaker is a special purpose ship or boat designed to move and navigate 
through ice-covered waters. For a ship to be considered an icebreaker it requires 
three components: a strengthened hull, an ice-clearing shape and the power to 
push through ice, none of which are possessed by most normal ships.
Container Ships Container ships are cargo ships that carry all of their load in truck-size containers, 
in a technique called containerization. 
General Cargo Ships designed for the carriage of various types and forms of cargo and the combined 
carriages of general cargo and passengers with 12 or less fare paying passengers.
Bulk Carriers Ships specifically designed for bulk carriage of ore with additional faculties for 
alternative, but not simultaneous, carriage of oil or loose or dry cargo. Bulk car-
riers are segregated into the following major categories: handysize (10,000 to 
35,000 DWT), handymax (35,000 to 55,000 DWT), panamax (60,000 to 80,000 
DWT), capesize  (80,000 DWT and over). 
Tanker Ships Propelled ships designed and constructed for the bulk carriage of liquids or com-
pressed gas, as in the case of natural gas.
Passenger Ships Ships that carry passengers, whether for transport purposes only or where the 
voyage itself and the ship’s amenities are part of the experience.
Tug / Barge Tug: vessel designed for towing or pushing. Additional activities may include 
salvage, fire fighting and work duties of a general nature. Barge: non-propelled 
vessel for carriage of bulk or mixed cargoes on weather or protected decks. May 
carry liquid cargo in holds or tanks.  Some barges are modified for specific pur-
poses (for example, crane barge).
Fishing Vessels Fishing boats can be categorized by several criteria: the type of fish they catch, 
the fishing method used, geographical origin and technical features such as rig-
ging. Modern commercial fishing uses many methods: fishing by nets, such as 
purse seine, beach seine, lift nets, gillnets or entangling nets; trawling, including 
bottom trawl; hooks and lines, long-line fishing and hand-line fishing; fishing 
traps. Fishing boats are generally small, often little more than 30 meters (98 ft) 
but up to 100 meters (330 ft) for a large tuna or whaling ship and can feature 
holds large enough to keep a good-sized catch. 
Oil and Gas 
Exploration Vessels
There are many specialized vessels that are designed specifically for the explora-
tion and extraction of natural gas and oil.
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z  Map 5.1  Overview of all vessel activity for 2004, including fishing vessels.  Source:  AMSA
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Regional Distribution of Vessel Activities
 The overview map of vessel traffic shows that nearly all voy-
ages took place on the periphery of the Arctic Ocean. Regions of 
high concentrations of traffic include: along the Norwegian coast 
and into the Barents Sea off northwest Russia; around Iceland; near 
the Faroe Islands and southwest Greenland; and in the Bering Sea. 
Different factors determine this distribution of marine activity. In 
the Bering Sea, in addition to the ships along the North Pacific 
Great Circle Route (through the Aleutian Islands), most of the ship 
traffic is bulk cargo ships serving the Red Dog mine in northwest 
Alaska, fishing and coastal community (summer) resupply. Traffic 
around Iceland, the Faroe Islands and southwestern Greenland is a 
The AMSA database identified four 
types of vessel activities as most 
significant in the Arctic in 2004: 
community re-supply, bulk cargo, 
tourism and fishing vessel activity 
operations.
6,000
The approximate number of vessels in the Arctic marine area  
during 2004, including the North Pacific Great Circle Route.
*Note: Ship traffic off the  
coast of Norway much higher 
than legend indicates.
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One of the historic polar achievements at the end of the 20th cen-
tury and early in the 21st century has been the successful operation 
of icebreakers at the North Pole and across the central Arctic Ocean. 
Between 1977 and 2008 access in summer has been attained 
by capable icebreaking ships to all regions of the Arctic basin. 
Seventy-seven voyages have been made to the Geographic North 
Pole by the icebreakers of Russia (65), Sweden (five), USA (three), 
Germany (two), Canada (one) and Norway (one). 
Nineteen of the 77 voyages have been in support of scientific 
exploration and the remaining 58 have been for marine tourism, all 
but one of the tourism voyages conducted aboard nuclear icebreakers. 
Of the 76 icebreaker voyages that have been to the pole in 
summer, the earliest date of arrival has been July 2, 2007 and the 
latest September 12, 2005, a short 10-week navigation season for 
highly capable icebreaking ships.
The Soviet nuclear icebreaker Arktika, during a celebrated voy-
age, was the first surface ship to attain the North Pole on August 
17, 1977. Arktika departed from Murmansk on August 9 and sailed 
eastbound initially north of Novaya Zemlya and through Vilkitski 
Strait to the ice edge in the Laptev Sea. The ship sailed northward 
to the pole along longitude 125 degrees east and reached the pole 
on August 17. Arktika arrived back in Murmansk on August 23 hav-
ing sailed 3,852 nautical miles in 14 days at a speed of 11.5 knots.
The only voyage to the pole not to be conducted in summer 
was that of the Soviet nuclear icebreaker Sibir, which supported 
scientific operations during May 8 to June 19, 1987, reaching the 
North Pole on May 25. Sibir navigated in near-maximum thickness 
of Arctic sea ice while removing the personnel from Soviet North 
Pole Drift Station 27 and establishing a new scientific drift station 
(number 29) in the northern Laptev Sea. This successful voyage in 
the central Arctic Ocean could be considered the most demanding 
icebreaker operation to date.
No commercial ship has ever conducted a voyage across the 
central Arctic Ocean. However, seven trans-Arctic voyages, all in 
summer, have been accomplished by icebreakers in the central 
Arctic Ocean through the North Pole.
A voyage across the central Arctic Ocean with tourists was con-
ducted by the Soviet nuclear icebreaker Sovetskiy Soyuz  in August 
1991. The Arctic Ocean Section 1994 Expedition, conducted by 
Canada’s Louis S. St-Laurent and the Polar Sea of the United States, 
was the first scientific transect of the Arctic Ocean accomplished 
by surface ship. During July and August 1994 both ships sailed 
from the Bering Strait to the North Pole and to an exit between 
Greenland and Svalbard through Fram Strait. The expedition made 
extensive use of real-time satellite imagery (received aboard Polar 
Sea) for strategic navigation and scientific planning.
Two trans-Arctic voyages with tourists through the North Pole 
were accomplished by the Russian nuclear icebreaker Yamal in 
summer 1996. In summer 2005, Sweden’s icebreaker, the Oden, and 
the American icebreaker Healy also made trans-Arctic passages in a 
second and highly successful scientific expedition by surface ships 
across the central Arctic Ocean. 
Although not a trans-Arctic voyage, the operation of a three-
ship scientific expedition for Arctic seabed drilling during late sum-
mer 2004, mentioned earlier, is noteworthy. Included in the AMSA 
2004 database, the expedition was composed of Russia’s nuclear 
icebreaker Sovetskiy Soyuz and Sweden’s Oden, both used exten-
sively for ice management, and the Norwegian-flag icebreaker 
Vidar Viking outfitted for drilling. One of the key accomplishments 
was the return of a 400-meter sediment core from the seabed that 
is being used for scientific studies of past Arctic climates. 
A review of these historic polar voyages indicates that marine 
access in summer throughout the Arctic Ocean has been achieved 
by the 21st century by highly capable icebreakers. The nuclear 
icebreakers of the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation 
have clearly pioneered independent ship operations in the central 
Arctic Ocean, especially on voyages to the North Pole in summer. 
Conventionally powered icebreakers have also operated success-
fully on trans-Arctic voyages in summer, as well as on scientific 
expeditions to high-latitudes in all regions of the Arctic Ocean. Any 
planning for future navigation in the central Arctic Ocean would 
do well to understand the ship performance, environmental condi-
tions and ice navigation capabilities of these successful operations 
in the ice-covered central Arctic Ocean.
Icebreaker Navigation in the Central Arctic Ocean, 1977-2008
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mix of fishing, domestic cargo supply and cruise ships. The Barents 
Sea experiences the highest concentrations of marine activity in 
the Arctic region. Ships plying these waters include: bulk cargo 
carriers, oil tankers, LNG carriers, coastal ferries, fishing vessels, 
cruise ships and other smaller vessels. Many ships pass along the 
Norwegian coast and in Norwegian waters during bad weather en 
route to Murmansk and northwest Russia. There is tanker traffic in 
the region and ships servicing the Norilsk Nickel mining complex 
sail year-round from the port of Dudinka on the Yenisei River to 
Murmansk. 
Marine Use: Arctic Community Re-supply 
For 2004, community re-supply made up a significant portion 
of the ship traffic throughout the Arctic. In some areas of the 
region, this is also referred to as coastal Arctic shipping. In areas 
such as the Canadian Arctic, eastern Russia and Greenland, this 
activity was the basis for most ship traffic. Re-supply activities 
provide a lifeline to many communities that have no or very lim-
ited road access and no or limited capacity to handle heavy air-
craft. Most communities serviced - mainly in Canada, the Russian 
Federation, Greenland, the United States, Svalbard and Bear Island 
- are ice-locked for parts of the year and rely heavily on marine 
transportation during the summer months for their dry foods, fuel, 
building materials and other commodities. 
Community re-supply and coastal Arctic shipping involve a range 
of ship types, including tankers, general cargo and container ships 
and, in some areas, tug/barge combinations. Tug/barge operations 
are particularly common in the western Canadian and Alaska Arctic 
and are used in these regions for mostly community re-supply, as 
well as for supplying mining and other construction projects. Tug/
barge operations typically consist of a tug towing up to three barges. 
Depending on conditions, a tug/barge train can be a kilometer in 
length or more. Map 5.2 shows where the tug/barge activity took 
place, according to the data reported.
 Summer resupply is handled by barge traffic along the Alaska 
Arctic, and in the Canadian Arctic a lack of deepwater ports requires 
lightering from larger supply ships at select Arctic communities. 
Lightering (shuttling goods from the anchored main ship to shore) 
is used to bring cargo ashore and tanker ships transfer petroleum 
products ashore by way of pumps and floating fuel lines, at many 
Arctic locations without deepwater access. There are select ports 
in Greenland, Svalbard and along the Northern Sea Route for nor-
mal cargo handling in small ports. Along the coasts of Norway and 
Iceland, and in Murmansk (northwest Russian Federation), all of 
which are ice-free year-round, there are deepwater port facilities to 
handle volumes of cargo from global shipping.
Community re-supply is expected to expand in the coming years 
due both to population increases in Arctic communities and increas-
ing development in the region, stimulating demand for goods and 
construction materials. The 2004 AMSA data shows where this type 
of vessel traffic is occurring and can, therefore, serve as a good base-
line tool when projecting future activity under various scenarios for 
population and economic growth.
z Map 5.2 Tug/barge traffic. Source: AMSA
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portion of total Arctic vessel 
traffic in 2004.
 ARC TIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT |  C U R R E N T  M A R I N E  U S E  A N D  T H E  A M S A  S H I P P I N G  DATA B A S E  75
Marine Use: Bulk Transport  
of Ore, Oil and Gas
Bulk transport of commodities such as oil, gas and various types 
of ore is a significant portion of total Arctic vessel traffic in 2004 in 
volume of cargo transported. There are some very large mines in the 
Arctic producing commodities such as nickel, zinc and other ores, 
as well as oil and gas producing fields off the coast of Norway and 
in the Russian and U.S. Arctic. The Red Dog mine in Alaska is one 
of the world’s largest zinc mines. The Norilsk Nickel mine near the 
port of Dudinka in the Russian Federation is also the world’s largest 
producer of nickel and palladium. Nearly all bulk traffic in the Arctic 
is outbound, shipping extracted natural resources out of the region 
to the world’s markets. In 2004, there were no Arctic transits of bulk 
goods east, west or through the central Arctic Ocean.
Most bulk transport takes place during the ice-free season or 
in ice-free parts of the Arctic including the Norwegian Arctic and 
parts of the Russian Arctic such as Murmansk. The exceptions are 
high-value perishable cargoes such as the concentrates from the 
Dudinka region and the nickel from Deception Bay in northern 
Quebec, Canada, which must be shipped year-round because they 
degrade if left too long without processing. In 2004, these two 
operations were the only all-season operations recorded in sea-
sonally ice-covered parts of the Arctic, which demonstrates that 
given economic incentive, year-round operations may be possible 
in other areas where ice is a limiting factor. In other Arctic mining 
areas that are ice-locked throughout the winter, bulk cargoes are 
stored during winter and spring and are shipped out in the brief 
ice-free summer/autumn season. Because some of the mines, such 
as Red Dog, produce very large amounts of ore, the ice-free season 
means heavy traffic and carefully planned bulk shipments to ensure 
mines get all of the ore out before the fall ice forms. Large bulk 
carriers, Panamax and Handymax size up to 65,000 tons, visit Red 
Dog mine in Alaska during the short summer season. Many of the 
bulk carriers operating throughout the Arctic in the summer are not 
ice-strengthened or Polar Class. 
Development of the rich natural resources in the Arctic is a 
rapidly growing industry. Since 2004, several significant new bulk 
shipments have begun operations, such as the year-round oil ship-
ments out of Varandey in the Russian Arctic. In early 2008, an 
offshore lease sale conducted by the U.S. Minerals Management 
Service for the U.S. Arctic totaled nearly $US2.7 billion; offshore 
© ConocoPhillips
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gas appears to be the resource under consider-
ation for development in this Arctic region. In 
June 2008, the Government of Canada received 
record breaking bids for oil and gas exploration 
leases in the Beaufort Sea, including a $C1.2 bil-
lion bid for the rights to explore an offshore area 
of 611,000 hectares. In September 2008, a test 
shipment of some of the purest iron ore found 
on the planet was delivered to Europe from the 
Baffinland mine in Mary River on Baffin Island. 
Depending on the regulatory review, the mine 
could begin year-round operations in the next 
3-5 years. As planned resource development proj-
ects such as these become operational, bulk car-
rier traffic in the Arctic will continue to increase. 
This type of ship activity is likely where the most 
growth will be witnessed in the near future. 
Marine Use: Fishing 
Fishing vessel operations constitute a signifi-
cant portion of all vessel activity in the Arctic in 
2004, given that some of the world’s most produc-
tive fisheries are in the Arctic region. The amount 
of fishing activity reported in the AMSA database 
almost certainly underestimates the amount of 
activity actually taking place, as there are regions 
of the Arctic for which no data was submitted, but 
there is known to be commercial fishing occurring. 
Also, much fishing activity is likely to take place 
on smaller vessels, which are, for the most part, not captured in the 
AMSA database. The reported fishing vessel activity takes place in 
a few key areas, including the Bering and Barents seas; on the west 
coast of Greenland; and around Iceland and the Faroe Islands. Very 
limited fishing activity occurs in the Arctic Ocean and the Canadian 
Arctic Archipelago, mostly small-scale food fisheries. Since fishing 
in the Arctic takes place up to the ice edge, not in close ice pack 
conditions, operations are in completely or seasonally ice-free or 
low ice concentration areas and opportunistic in nature. Fishing ves-
sel activity in the database has been categorized according to the 
Large Marine Ecosystem in which the activity took place. LMEs are 
geographical entities defined as ecosystems based on a series of 
ecological criteria. Each comprises a fairly large sea area, typically 
200,000 km2 or larger, with distinct bathymetry, hydrography, pro-
ductivity and trophically dependent populations. 
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Map 5.3 shows general levels of activity in each of the LMEs 
within the AMSA area of study and highlights those for which data 
was not available. Fishing vessel data is presented in terms of days 
in an area rather than as routes, because fishing vessels typically 
meander in search of catch rather than follow a specific itinerary. 
Although further analysis of the impacts of fishing or its potential 
growth fall outside the scope of this report, it is important to appre-
ciate that fishing activity represents a significant proportion of all 
current vessel activity in the Arctic region in considering cumulative 
effects.
Marine Use: Passenger Vessels  
and Tourism
Passenger vessel activity represents a significant proportion of 
the vessel activity reported in the Arctic for 2004. The type of activ-
ity captured in the AMSA database includes 
ferry services, small and large cruise ves-
sels and any other vessels where people are 
transported, whether for tourism purposes or 
otherwise. The type of activity taking place 
varies depending on its location. In Norway, 
Greenland and Iceland, some of the passen-
ger vessel traffic consists of ferries, carrying 
people into and out of coastal communities. In 
other areas, such as Alaska and the Canadian 
Arctic, ferry services are non-existent and all 
passenger traffic would be vessels for marine 
tourism only. Some services, such as the 
Hurtigruten around Norway and ferry service to 
Iceland and Greenland from mainland Europe 
are hybrids, serving both as ferries and cruise 
ships. Map 5.4 presents the overall passenger 
vessel traffic in the Arctic for 2004. 
Nearly all passenger vessel activity in the 
Arctic takes place in ice-free waters, in the 
summer season and the vast majority of it is 
for marine tourism purposes. In 2004, the only 
passenger vessels that traveled in ice-covered 
waters were the Russian nuclear icebreakers 
that took tourists to the North Pole, voyages 
they have been making for tourism purposes 
since 1990. The heaviest passenger vessel traf-
fic in the AMSA 2004 ship activity database is 
seen along the Norwegian coast, off the coast 
of Greenland, Iceland and Svalbard. Though there was some passen-
ger vessel traffic in the Canadian Arctic and Alaska, those numbers 
were small in comparison to the higher traffic areas. 
Marine-based tourism is the largest segment of the Arctic tour-
ism industry in terms of numbers of persons, geographic range and 
types of recreation activities. The size and type of vessels that ser-
vice this industry range from relatively small expedition style vessels 
that hold less than 200 people, to large luxury cruise liners that can 
hold 1,000 or more. In the Arctic, marine tourism is highly diversi-
fied and is driven by five main types of tourists seeking out a range 
of activities. These include mass market tourists primarily attracted 
to sightseeing within the pleasurable surroundings of comfortable 
transport and accommodations; the sport fishing and hunting market 
driven by tourists who pursue unique fish and game species within 
wilderness settings; the nature market driven by tourists who seek to 
observe wildlife species in their natural habitats, and/or experience 
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the beauty and solitude of natural areas; the adventure tourism mar-
ket driven by tourists who seek personal achievement and exhilara-
tion from meeting challenges and potential perils of outdoor sport 
activities; and the culture and heritage tourism market driven by 
tourists who either want to experience personal interaction with the 
lives and traditions of indigenous people, or personally experience 
historic places and artifacts. 
While Arctic ship-based tours are booked well in advance, many of 
the itineraries are somewhat opportunistic. The precise route and the 
ports and communities visited depend on the ice conditions and the 
difficulty and risk of access. Cruise ships often intentionally travel 
close to the ice edge and shorelines for wildlife viewing opportuni-
ties, increasing the risk of interaction with ice and other hazards. 
Many Arctic cruise ships visit destinations that were once totally 
inaccessible to the public, such as the North Pole, Northwest Passage 
and the Northern Sea Route. Between 1984 and 2004, 23 commercial 
cruise ships accomplished transits of the Northwest Passage; seven 
commercial tours were planned for 2008 alone. 
According to the Cruise Lines International Organization, the 
number of passengers served worldwide has grown from about 
500,000 in 1970 to more than 12 million in 2006. Additional growth 
is now occurring in the number and passenger capacity of new cruise 
ships entering the market. The Royal Caribbean’s Freedom of the Seas 
entered the fleet in June 2007 with the largest passenger capac-
ity yet – 3,634 – twice the size of ships built a decade ago. From 
2000 to the end of 2008, 88 new cruise ships were introduced. The 
vast majority of these vessels were not constructed or designed to 
operate in Arctic conditions, yet as Arctic cruise tourism contin-
ues to grow, it is very likely that many of them may make trips to 
the region. The cruise ship industry considers Arctic voyages to be 
a vital and especially lucrative part of their international tourism 
product. This is apparent when considering the price that tourists 
pay to travel to this region. As of 2008, the prices for Arctic cruises 
range between $US2,900 and $US55,000 per person. The cruise ship 
industry has indicated that it not only intends to maintain an Arctic 
presence, but to expand in terms of ship passenger capacity, destina-
tions and extended seasons of operations. This will be encouraged by 
circumpolar nations that consider tourism important for growing and 
strengthening their economies. 
Cruise ship traffic in the Arctic region has increased significantly 
in the four years that have passed since the AMSA database was 
developed. An independent survey indicated more than 1.2 million 
passengers traveled in 2004 to Arctic destinations aboard cruise 
ships; however, by 2007 that number had more than doubled.
A specific example of where cruise ship traffic is increasing 
at a rapid rate is off the coast of Greenland. As Table 5.3 shows, 
cruise ship visits and the number of passengers visiting Greenland 
has increased significantly between 2003 and 2008. For example, 
between 2006 and 2007, port calls into Greenland increased from 
157 to 222 cruise ships. The number of port calls in 2006 combined 
for a total of 22,051 passengers, a number that represents nearly 
half of Greenland’s total 2006 population of 56,901.
In 2008, approximately 375 cruise ship port calls were scheduled 
for Greenland ports and harbors, more than double the number of 
port calls seen in 2006. The areas visited by the cruise vessels in 
Greenland are also changing. Likely driven by increased demand in 
adventure tourism, Tourism Greenland has reported that in the past 
few years there has been a marked increased interest in trips to the 
z  Table 5.3  Cruise ship arrivals in Greenland ports and harbors, 2003 – 2008.  
Source: Greenland Tourism (Grønlands Turist- og Erhvervsråd)  
Year Arrivals Number 
of cruise 
ships 
Average  
number of 
arrivals/ship 
Average passenger  
capacity/ship 
2003 164 14 13 490 
2004 195 24 8 468 
2005 115 25 5 714 
2006 157 28 6 546 
2007 222 35 6 671
2008 375* 39* 10* 641*
*= Estimates for 2008 (full data not available at time of printing)
157 to 222
The increase in cruise ships making port  
calls in Greenland between 2006 and 2007. 
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As passenger and cruise vessel traffic continues to increase in the Arctic, infrastructure and passenger safety needs will become 
of increasing concern. The large number of tourists already cruising Arctic waters now exceeds the emergency response capabilities 
of local communities (See page 172). The Arctic’s cold air and water temperatures require the quick and efficient rescue of capsized 
vessels and tourists aboard lifeboats and rafts. Even limited exposure to cold weather and seas quickly reduces human endurance 
and chances of survival. These hazardous environmental conditions prevail in a region that has very scarce emergency response 
resources and where long distances result in lengthy response times. Emergency protocols become increasingly difficult as both 
small and large cruise ships seek remote wilderness settings and wildlife habitats. The primary polar attractions sought by tourists 
are rarely close to emergency response services. This combination of hostile environmental conditions and scarce emergency infra-
structure is a serious threat to human life. 
When performing search and rescue in the polar regions, there is an urgent need to respond quickly, as the prevention of injury 
and loss of life depends on timely response, prompt evacuation and the application of medical and other emergency response ser-
vices. Effective responses can only be accomplished by the design and implementation of appropriate search and rescue manage-
ment policies and programs, supported by appropriate physical infrastructure and well-trained personnel. 
Ship evacuation produces a host of emergency response problems in the polar world. Passengers and crew must be shel-
tered from inclement weather, properly clothed, nourished and hydrated. The provision of these basic necessities in the polar 
environment, either sea or land, is formidable. The ability to successfully communicate a distress signal of any sort in the polar 
world can further exacerbate these threatening circumstances. 
Communications in the Arctic may be a challenge. However, 
ships equipped with adequate communication equipment (for 
example, digital selective calling-high frequency, or DSC-HF, 
and Electronic Position Indicating Radio Beacon, or EPRIB) are 
able to transmit distress messages.
It is not likely that communities located in the remote, high 
Arctic have sufficient medical resources to respond to illnesses 
involving hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of cruise ship pas-
sengers and crew. And given their histories, the indigenous 
people living in rural Arctic communities are understandably 
fearful of exposure to infectious diseases.
 A dangerous consequence of the growing popularity and 
number of cruise ships operating in and transiting through 
polar waters is the significant increase of marine incidents. 
Serious marine incidents include sinkings, groundings, pollu-
tion and other environmental violations, disabling by collision, 
fire and loss of propulsion. Rapid increase in the number of 
cruise ship voyages has led to a similar increase in the number 
of incidents.  
Given the large number of cruise ships and other recre-
ational boaters currently operating throughout the polar seas 
and the probable growth of those markets, marine operators, 
Arctic governments and local communities are faced with sig-
nificant management challenges. 
Arctic Marine Tourism: A New Challenge
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far North of Greenland, an area that has traditionally not been vis-
ited by many tourists. In 2008, 28 vessels were scheduled to travel 
as far north as Uummannaq, some continuing on to Qaanaaq, both 
destinations far north of the Arctic Circle and far from good infra-
structure or emergency response capabilities. Many of the cruise ves-
sels traveling to these destinations are likely not ice-strengthened. 
Though this area is classified as ice-free in the summer, this does 
not mean that ice is not present and, even in small amounts, ice can 
pose a serious hazard. The Greenland government is very conscious 
of the rapid growth in cruise ship traffic in their waters and Island 
Command Greenland, the naval service covering Greenland waters 
that organizes both rescue and emergency operations, has recently 
put an increased focus on cruise activities in Greenland waters. 
Passenger vessels, in particular cruise ships, is a sector that has 
experienced rapid growth in certain regions in the few years that 
have passed since the development of the AMSA database and is one 
which is expected to expand further in coming years. As this sector 
grows and more and larger ships begin to ply Arctic waters, it will 
become increasingly important to understand this type of activity 
so that Arctic states are prepared to meet the future needs of these 
vessels and their passengers. 
Marine Use: Icebreaker, Government  
and Research Vessel Operations
Icebreakers, government and research vessels represent a relatively 
small proportion of the total vessel traffic in the Arctic. However, 
they are invaluable for surveying, oceanographic research, vessel 
escort in ice, salvage, pollution response and search and rescue. 
For the AMSA database, these vessel types were grouped since they 
conduct similar missions and also often carry out multiple tasks on 
a voyage. In the AMSA 2004 database, 83 of this type of ship were 
reported; however, several Arctic states did not include government 
vessels in their submission so the total for this category is likely 
larger. In keeping with the scope of the Arctic Council, naval or mili-
tary vessels were not included in the AMSA database. 
The icebreaker fleets of Canada and the Russian Federation con-
duct a range of tasks in their respective regions; summer sealift 
icebreaking duties are an important mission for these ships. Though 
several icebreakers might be capable of operating in the winter, 
nearly all icebreaker operations reported in the AMSA are conducted 
in the spring, summer and autumn. During summer 2004, the AMSA 
database indicates that there were eight voyages that reached the 
Community re-supply is 
expected to expand in the 
coming years due both to 
population increases in 
Arctic communities and 
increasing development 
in the region, stimulating 
demand for goods and 
construction material.
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Since the winter of 1978-79, one of the most advanced Arctic 
marine transport systems in the Arctic has been the year-round 
operation comprised of rail traffic between the mines of the Mining 
and Metallurgical Company Norilsk Nickel to the port in Dudinka, 
on the Yenisei River and then the 231 nautical mile sailing to 
Murmansk, on the Kola Peninsula. 
MMC Norilsk Nickel is the world’s largest producer of nickel and 
palladium, and is among the top four platinum producers in the 
world, as well as among the top 10 copper producers. MMC Norilsk 
Nickel is also a large global enterprise with production facilities in 
the Russian Federation, Australia, Botswana, Finland, the United 
States and the Republic of South Africa. 
Mining in the Norilsk area began in the 1920s. The region quickly 
became a critical supplier of non-ferrous metals within the Soviet 
Union. During the 1950s, the Northern Sea Route Administration 
was tasked with building a year-round Arctic marine transport sys-
tem on the western end of the NSR and into the Yenisei. 
The development of large, nuclear icebreakers came first with 
the Lenin in 1959 (world’s first nuclear surface ship) followed by a 
small fleet of larger icebreakers of the Arktika class. These icebreak-
ers were designed to create tracks in the ice for lower-powered 
cargo ships to sail in convoy astern of a lead icebreaker. 
With unlimited endurance, the nuclear icebreakers could pro-
vide year-round services in the deeper waters along the major 
routes of the NSR. Ice-strengthened cargo ships and shallow-draft 
icebreakers came next. By the 1978-79 winter season there was 
enough icebreaking capacity to maintain year-round navigation by 
convoying ships from the Yenisei west across the Kara Sea and into 
the Barents Sea to Murmansk. A continuous flow of non-ferrous 
metal concentrates could be maintained to smelters on the Kola 
Peninsula and to other industries in the Soviet Union. 
During 1982-87 a new icebreaking cargo ship, the SA-15 or 
Norilsk class, was delivered by Finland’s former Valmet and Wartsila 
shipyards to the Soviet Union. Nineteen of these Arctic freighters 
(174 m length and 19,950 dwt) were built and several today remain 
in service on the route between Dudinka and Murmansk. 
In many respects, the Norilsk class multi-purpose carriers revo-
lutionized Arctic shipping in the same manner as the commercial 
carrier M/V Arctic developed for the Canadian Arctic during the 
same years. With high propulsion power (21,000 shp), the Norilsk 
class ships could operate under their own power as an icebreaker. 
These ships carried cargoes the length of the NSR in summer 
during the late 1980s; during the winter they were used effectively 
to support the Norilsk-Dudinka operation. 
Their proven capability for independent navigation through ice 
fields without icebreaker support was a significant technological 
achievement, as well as a notable advance in efficient (and cost-
effective) Arctic marine operations. The successful operation of 
these ships was a harbinger of the future for Arctic marine transport. 
In April 1988, a new, shallow-draft polar icebreaker named 
Taymyr was delivered to the Soviet Union by Wartsila’s Helsinki 
shipyard. A single nuclear reactor was installed at the Baltic ship-
yard in (then) Leningrad, and the ship was ready for service along 
the NSR and in the shallow Siberian rivers by 1989. A second 
ship of the class, Yaygach, was added to the Murmansk Shipping 
Company’s icebreaker fleet in 1990. 
The design of this class represents the apex in the development 
process for the Soviet polar icebreaker fleet. Coupled in its design 
are Finnish advances in shallow-draft ship design with nuclear pro-
pulsion developed in the Soviet Union. A draft of only 8 meters was 
attained with Taymyr, which compares favorably with the average 
11-meters draft of the largest Soviet icebreakers of the period. A 
power plant producing 44,000 shp provided a capability of con-
tinuously breaking 1.8 meters of level ice at a 2-knot speed. These 
capabilities fit perfectly with the requirements for icebreaking (level 
river ice) on the shallow Yenisei River to the port of Dudinka; these 
extraordinary nuclear ships could maintain an ice track out to the 
Kara Sea through the winter in nearly all conditions.
Year-round shipping to Dudinka functioned throughout the 
1990s and the early years of the new century despite the finan-
cial challenges facing the Russian Federation. MMC Norilsk Nickel 
was restructured several times and since 2001 the company has 
flourished, focusing on economic efficiencies, foreign marketing 
and potential investments. The marine transport component also 
received significant attention as the SA-15 Norilsk class ships sup-
porting the Dudinka run began to age. 
The company’s marine operations department worked closely 
with the Finnish shipbuilder Aker Yards to develop a new freighter 
class that would be owned and operated by MMC Norilsk Nickel. 
The vision was for a fleet of five icebreaking containerships 
designed for year-round operations. The first of the ships, Norilsk 
Nickel (168 meter length, 14,500 dwt, 650 TEU capacity), was com-
pleted in Helsinki early in 2006. The new ship is designed as a “dou-
ble-acting hull” and is fitted with an azimuthing pod for propulsion. 
Year-round Arctic Marine Transport to Dudinka in  
Support of Natural Resource Development and Production
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The Azipod concept, as it is called, allows the ship to move stern-
first efficiently in the ice; the ship is designed to break 1.5 meter 
thick ice unassisted. In light ice or open water, Norilsk Nickel turns 
180 degrees and moves bow first. Ice trials for the new ship were 
conducted in March 2006 in the Kara Sea and Yenisei River, and the 
vessel achieved a 3-knot speed continuously moving through 1.5 
meter thick ice.
Norilsk Nickel has performed well in operating unassisted (with-
out icebreaker escort or convoy) during its initial two years of 
service. With four more of the class being built in Germany, MMC 
Norilsk Nickel will have an operational fleet of five icebreaking car-
riers, all highly capable of operating independently through the 
winter season to serve the port of Dudinka. Safe and efficient, the 
Norilsk Nickel class ships represent a new concept of Arctic marine 
operations. They will enhance a regional, Arctic marine transport 
system in western Siberia and better link a key Russian commercial 
enterprise to world markets.
©
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shows that vessel activity in the Arctic is highly affected by sea-
sonal variability. 
The AMSA GIS database includes Arctic sea ice maps for each 
month in 2004, with information collected and compiled by national 
ice administrations working cooperatively to create an Arctic sea 
ice picture. When layered with 2004 seasonal vessel traffic this data 
demonstrates how vessel traffic patterns interacted with the mini-
mum sea ice extent at the time. 
Maps 5.5 and 5.6 show the differences in sea ice extent between 
winter (January) and summer (July) traffic levels. Map 5.5 shows vir-
tually no vessel activity in the central Arctic in the winter, although 
some takes place on the fringes in year-round ice-free zones. As 
mentioned earlier, the database indicates that only year-round com-
mercial operations in the Arctic in seasonally ice-covered areas were 
into Dudinka in the Russian Federation and Deception Bay in Canada. 
These two operations were the only commercial icebreaking activi-
ties taking place in 2004; government icebreakers and research ves-
sels conducted all other icebreaking that year. The data indicates 
that this was done only in the spring, summer and fall seasons. 
Map 5.6 demonstrates the surge in vessel activity in the sum-
mer season, when all of the community re-supply takes place and 
most bulk commodities are shipped out and supplies brought in 
for commercial operations. Summer is also the season when all of 
the passenger and cruise vessels travel to the region. Wildlife in 
the Arctic also follows this pattern: although most species migrate 
North Pole, including a three-ship scientific expedition designed to 
drill into the Arctic seabed. The expedition was composed of the 
Russian Federation’s nuclear icebreaker Sovetskiy Soyuz, Sweden’s 
icebreaker Oden and the Norwegian-flag icebreaking drill ship Viking 
Vidar. During 2004-2008, there were 33 icebreaker transits to the 
North Pole for science and tourism. An increasing number of icebreak-
ers and research vessels are conducting geological and geophysical 
research throughout the central Arctic Ocean related to establishing 
the limits of the extended continental shelf under UNCLOS.  
     
Seasonality of Operations  
and Sea Ice Extent 
The Arctic is defined by extreme seasonal variability, impact-
ing the behavior of the animals that live in and migrate to and 
from the region, as well as human activity. Generally, most of the 
central Arctic is ice-covered, dark and very cold throughout the 
winter months. There are some areas, such as the Aleutian Island 
chain, the northern coast of Norway, southern Iceland and the 
Murmansk region in northern Russia where, due to ocean currents 
and other factors, ice does not form in the Arctic in the winter. 
However, these areas still experience darkness, extreme cold and 
variable conditions. The Arctic summer is the opposite extreme, 
with 24 hours of light and temperatures that can be uncomfort-
ably warm. The pattern of vessel traffic in the AMSA database 
© American Seafoods Group
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Source: AMSA
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earlier in the spring before ice break-up, animals gather in large 
aggregations in the summer to feed and reproduce. This is important 
to consider when examining potential environmental and ecosystem 
impacts that may result from current or increased vessel activity in 
the region. 
Summer and fall are the safest and most economical seasons for 
marine activity; therefore, activities such as resource development, 
tourism or community re-supply will most likely increase in the sum-
mer months. There may be a few exceptions, where high value com-
modities may drive year-round operations, but that will be driven by 
economics, not climate. If ice conditions continue to change and 
sea-ice extent reduces as predicted in the near term, the summer 
and fall shipping seasons will most likely lengthen. Even as perennial 
sea ice is reduced, winter in the central Arctic will remain inhospi-
table to marine navigation; therefore, future Arctic vessel activity 
will continue to be highly seasonal in the region. 
Incidents and Accidents  
in the Arctic
The Arctic has always been and will continue to be a challeng-
ing environment for search and rescue and emergency response (See 
page 168). This is due to the very large geographic area involved 
and the relative low density of activity and response capabilities. 
In order to grasp potential threats to human safety and the marine 
environment as a result of potential incidents, it is important to 
understand what incidents may have occurred and where the areas 
are that have had the most incidents.  
As part of the AMSA database, a summary of the incidents and 
accidents occurring in the Arctic region between 1995-2004 was 
developed. No one source of data was found to be sufficient to 
cover the circumpolar region; therefore a compilation of a number 
of sources was necessary to create the summary. The main sources 
Vessel Type #
Bulk Carrier 37
Container Ship 8
Fishing Vessel 108
General Cargo Ship 72
Government Vessel 11
Oil/Gas Service & Supply 1
Passenger Ship 27
Pleasure Craft 0
Tanker Ship 12
Tug/Barge 15
Unknown 2
Primary Reason #
Collision 22
Damage to Vessel 54
Fire/Explosion 25
Grounded 68
Machinery Damage/Failure 71
Sunk/Submerged 43
Miscellaneous 10
Month #
JAN 16
FEB 35
MAR 30
APR 6
MAY 15
JUN 18
JUL 39
AUG 22
SEP 31
OCT 35
NOV 23
DEC 23
Year #
1995 35
1996 53
1997 23
1998 19
1999 21
2000 19
2001 31
2002 30
2003 28
2004 34
Accidents and Incidents
in the Arctic, 1995-2004
z  Table 5.4  Incident summary tables, 1995-2004.  Source: Lloyd’s Marine Intelligence Unit Sea Searcher Database, 
Canadian Transportation Safety Board (Marine), Canadian Hydraulics Centre - Arctic Ice Regime System Database.
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z  Map 5.7  Arctic shipping accidents and incidents causes, 1995-2004.  Source: Lloyd’s 
Marine Intelligence Unit Sea Searcher Database, Canadian Transportation Safety Board (Marine), Canadian Hydraulics 
Centre- Arctic Ice Regime System Database.
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Accidents/Incidents by Cause 
(1995–2004)
Collision
Damage to Vessel (54)
Fire/Explosion (25)
Grounded (68)
Machinery Damage/Failure (71)
Miscellaneous (10)
Sunk/Submerged (43) 
of information used were the Lloyds MIU Sea Searcher database, 
the Canadian Hydraulics Centre Arctic Ice Regime System database 
and the Canadian Transportation Safety Board (Marine.) Though this 
combined dataset is limited, it provides a basis for a very broad 
analysis of what type of incidents are occurring in the Arctic region 
and what areas may be more prone to incidents and therefore at a 
greater risk of further ones in the future. 
The incidents and accidents were categorized by the type of 
incident that occurred, where and when it occurred, whether there 
were fatalities as a result, whether there was a significant oil spill 
involved and whether the vessel involved was considered a total 
loss for insurance purposes. Incident types were grouped into the 
following categories:
•	 Grounding: where a vessel came in contact with the bottom 
and, therefore, required assistance or significant effort to be 
re-floated. In some cases, vessels could not be re-floated and 
were either abandoned or broken up for salvage. 
•	 Collision: where two vessels make contact resulting in minor to 
a serious damage to the vessel.
•	 Damage to Vessel: where damage to the vessel occurred, due to 
a variety of reasons ranging from contact with the pier, collision 
with ice, extreme weather or other factors.
•	 Fire/Explosion: where a fire or explosion occurred onboard a 
vessel, resulting in minor to very serious damage to the vessel 
and other consequences, such as fatalities.
•	 Sunk/Submerged: where a vessel was submerged in water for a 
period of time or sunk completely due to a range of causes.
•	 Machinery Damage/Failure: where a vessel sustained damage 
to machinery or complete machinery failure. 
It is important to note that the incidents captured as part of 
AMSA excluded onboard incidents that may have involved injury to 
passengers and crew, but where there was no damage to the vessel. 
For a summary of the number and type of accidents and incidents 
involving vessels see Table 5.4. 
Using the exact geographic locations for the different incidents 
and accidents, the data was entered into the GIS database, along 
with the different characteristics identified. The result was Map 5.7, 
which shows all of the reported incidents and accidents reported for 
the circumpolar region for the period of 1995-2004. 
When looking at the geographic distribution of the incidents 
for the defined period shown in Map 5.7 there are certain gaps 
and trends that emerge. There is a complete absence of incidents 
reported in the Russian Arctic and there are some areas where there 
appears to be a concentration of incidents during the years col-
lected. These areas are along the northern coast of Norway, around 
the Aleutian Island chain and in the Bering Sea, along the Labrador 
coast and in Hudson Strait in Canada and around Iceland and the 
Faroe Islands. These concentrations of incidents are consistent with 
the traffic patterns shown in the AMSA activity database – areas that 
show the concentrations of incidents are also those where the largest 
volume of vessel activity is occurring. This trend is even more appar-
ent when the vessel routes for 2004 are shown on the same map as 
the incidents. 
One of the most dramatic incidents in 2004 was the loss of life 
and sinking of the Selendang Ayu off the coast of Alaska. The inci-
dent is a graphic example of the key gaps in infrastructure, emer-
gency response and salvage services that are readily available in 
other parts of the world’s oceans. 
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On November 28, 2004, after loading 1,000 tonnes of fuel and 60,200 
tonnes of soybeans, the Selendang Ayu departed Seattle, Washington, 
with a crew of 26 along the North Pacific Great Circle Route bound for 
xiamen, China. Ten days later the 225-meter Malaysian-registered bulk 
carrier broke apart off the rugged coast of the Aleutian Islands of Alaska 
resulting in the deaths of six crew members, causing the crash of a U.S. 
Coast Guard helicopter and spilling an estimated 66 million metric tons 
of soybeans, 1.7 million liters of intermediate fuel oil, 55,564 liters of 
marine diesel and other contaminants into the environment further 
causing the deaths of seabirds and marine mammals (See page 151).
A U.S. National Transportation Safety Board marine accident brief is 
the basis for this report. Despite passing inspection by port authorities 
and U.S. Coast Guard officials prior to leaving Seattle, the seven-year 
old Panamax class vessel encountered engine problems approximately 
100 nautical miles from Dutch Harbor, the closest place of refuge, and 
about 46 nautical miles from the nearest point of land. After leaving 
port in Seattle, the ship had encountered heavy seas and between gale 
and strong gale force winds.
On his second transit of the Bering Sea, the vessel’s master, a citi-
zen of India and a 32-year seagoing veteran, notified the harbormaster 
in Dutch Harbor via the vessel’s satellite phone he was having difficul-
ties and needed assistance. The Coast Guard immediately dispatched 
the cutter Alex Haley but because of the rough seas could only reach 
a top speed of 10 knots. Nearly six hours later, the cutter reached the 
Selendang Ayu and attempted to slow its drift toward the coastline by 
attaching a tow line to the vessel until the tugboat Sidney Foss arrived, 
which was then approximately 11 nautical miles away. 
In the meantime, the wind and sea conditions continued to dete-
riorate. Arriving on scene, the tugboat master reported seeing the 
Selendang Ayu lying beam to the sea in 7.6-meter seas, hammered by 
45- to 55-knot winds. Some crew members were desperately strug-
gling to remain on the bow as the freighter rolled 25 to 35 degrees 
with waves crashing over the deck amid passing snow and ice squalls. 
The remainder of the crew, some who had been up for some  41 hours, 
worked frantically to restart the engines.
On the scene, the Sidney Foss was able to slow the drift but unable 
to turn the stricken ship’s bow into the wind as the vessel drifted closer 
to the shore. A second tug, the James Dunlap, arrived from Dutch Harbor 
with sunrise 5 ½ hours away, noted the NTSB report. “Because of the sea 
state and the darkness, the masters of the Sidney Foss and the James 
Dunlap decided to wait until daylight before attempting to swing the 
bow of the Selendang Ayu around by putting a line on the stern.”
Then, some three hours before sunrise, the towline parted and 
the stricken vessel continued its now unabated drift toward Unalaska 
Island. At sunrise, with the Selendang Ayu picking up speed toward the 
coastline, the ship’s master dropped anchor in hopes to slow or even 
stop the drift. It almost worked.
The port anchor immediately caught, slowing and almost stop-
ping the vessel’s drift. The feeling of relief was short-lived as some 15 
minutes later the ship began slipping its anchor under the unrelenting 
pounding of the growing storm and started to drift at 2 knots toward 
shore. The weather continued to worsen with steep seas of 6 to 7.6 
meters and periodic wind gusts of up to 65 knots, which occasionally 
pushed the waves to 9 to 10 meters. The Coast Guard suggested drop-
ping the starboard anchor, “but the Selendang Ayu master said the star-
board anchor might foul on the port anchor’s chain,” the report stated.
Several attempts to reestablish a towline failed and with now fad-
ing light and its proximity to shore, the Coast Guard recommended 
evacuating the crew. The master finally allowed a group of 18, those 
he considered the least essential for dealing with the emergency, to 
depart. Wearing lifejackets, but not the reddish-orange buoyant sur-
vival or immersion suit that protects against heat loss and ingress 
of water, they would be extracted in two groups. (At the time of the 
accident, the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, SOLAS, 
required a cargo vessel to carry at least three immersion suits for each 
lifeboat, unless the vessel had a totally enclosed lifeboat on each side. 
The Selendang Ayu carried two fully enclosed lifeboats, one port and 
one starboard and was equipped with three immersion suits. In an 
amendment effective July 1, 2006 the SOLAS regulation was changed 
to require one immersion suit for each person onboard a cargo ship. An 
exemption from this requirement for ships that voyage “constantly” in 
warm climates is not allowed for bulk carriers.)
Using a USCG HH-60 Jayhawk helicopter that had arrived from 
Cold Bay, Alaska, the first group of nine Selendang Ayu crew members 
were hoisted from the rolling deck. Then only a mile from shore, the 
ship’s port anchor was dropped. It caught. Shortly thereafter, a second 
Jayhawk helicopter hoisted the second group of nine sailors from the 
ship. Eight crew members remained on board and continued to work 
frantically on the engines. As darkness began to close in, the Coast 
Guard radioed the master and said they wanted to remove the remain-
der of the crew before sunset. Then came the first of several shud-
ders as the vessel ran aground on a small underwater shelf about 130 
meters offshore. Knowing the ship’s fate, the master radioed the Alex 
Haley and requested immediate extraction. 
The eight remaining crew members gathered on the port bow, 
where the two previous evacuations had taken place. The vessel 
was rolling badly in the shallow water and increasing groundswell. 
Another HH-60 Jayhawk helicopter was dispatched from Dutch 
Harbor to the scene and a short time later the Alex Haley launched the 
smaller HH-65 Dolphin helicopter. Both aircraft reached the freighter 
around 6 pm with the larger Jayhawk helicopter performing the res-
cue. Fifteen minutes later all of the ship’s crew, save the master and 
the USCG rescue swimmer, had been hoisted onboard when a huge 
rogue wave struck the bow of the freighter, sprayed up and engulfed 
the Jayhawk. The helicopter’s engines stalled, spun around causing 
its tail and mail rotor blades to slam into the side of the crippled ship 
and crashed into the sea next to the Selendang Ayu’s forward port side.
The Dolphin helicopter, which had been hovering close by, immedi-
ately went into rescue mode and quickly recovered the three-member 
flight crew and the one Selendang Ayu crew member who survived the 
The Selendang Ayu Disaster in the Alaska Arctic
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crash. With no other sign of survivors, the helicopter headed to Dutch 
Harbor. While the master and the Coast Guard swimmer were awaiting 
rescue, the ship broke in two on the rocks. After three hours of being 
bombarded by crashing waves, howling winds in total darkness, the 
ship’s master and the USCG rescue swimmer were hoisted on board the 
Dolphin, which had returned from its trip to Dutch Harbor. It was 10:35 
pm on December 8, nearly 60 hours since the Selendang Ayu engines 
failed.
z  Map 5.8  Accident location in Bering Sea. Inset shows route of Selendang Ayu 
through Unimak Pass, approximate point at which engine failed, path of vessel’s 
drift without power, and site on Unalaska Island where it grounded.   
Source: National Transportation Safety Board
Summary Discussion:  
Current Arctic Marine Use  
As noted earlier, Arctic shipping has existed since the 
late 1400s, mostly on the periphery of the region. As in the 
past, most commercial activity today is generally linked to 
supplying communities or exporting raw goods out of the 
Arctic. The number of ships operating today in the Arctic is 
significant in the context of both the unique aspects of the 
Arctic environment and the insufficient infrastructure and 
emergency response in many parts of the region, relative to 
southern waters. However, from the outlook of the global 
maritime industry, the level of vessel activity found to occur 
in the 2004 baseline year is still relatively low. To put it into 
perspective, the total number of vessels reported as operat-
ing in the Arctic region (not including fishing vessels and 
the Great Circle Route traffic) represents less than 2 percent 
of the world’s registered fleet of oceangoing vessels over 
100 gross tonnage. Although the total vessels operating in 
the Arctic may represent a small proportion of the world’s 
fleet, they can still have significant impacts on the environ-
ment in which they operate. At current shipping activity 
levels, it will not take many more ships operating in the 
Arctic in future years to double or triple the 2004 numbers. 
Most shipping traffic in the Arctic is in waters that are 
either permanently or seasonally ice-free, an important dis-
tinction. Permanently ice-free waters include those in the 
Aleutian island chain, the northern coast of Norway, south-
ern Iceland and the Murmansk region in northwest Russia. In 
other areas of the Arctic, which are seasonally ice-covered, 
nearly all the vessel activity occurring in 2004 took place in 
waters where the ice had melted or was melting and where 
icebreakers are not required for access. However, an area 
can be determined to be ice-free and still have ice-related 
dangers, such as bergy bits and pan ice, which are hard to 
detect and can damage a vessel. 
In recent years, given the changing ice conditions in the 
Arctic, much attention has been paid to possible trans-Arctic 
shipping via the central Arctic Ocean, Northwest Passage 
or the Northern Sea Route. In the AMSA 2004 database, it 
was found that vessels operated on sections of both the 
NSR and NWP; however, there were no full transits by com-
mercial vessels on any of three routes. The vessels reported 
as operating in the Northwest Passage were either commu-
nity re-supply or Canadian Coast Guard. On the Northern 
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Research Opportunities
q Develop a consistent and accurate circumpolar database 
of Arctic ship activity, as well as ship accidents and inci-
dents to date.
q Trend analysis of shipping activity, using the 2004 AMSA 
database as the baseline.
Sea Route, the only vessels reported were bulk carriers and tankers 
for community re-supply. None sailed the full route, and the only 
Russian traffic through the Bering Strait were bulk carriers servicing 
communities on the far northeast of Russia coming from the Bering 
Sea. In 2004, no ships transited the entire Arctic Ocean from the 
Pacific to the Atlantic or vice versa.
The only vessels that went into the central Arctic Ocean in 2004 
were the eight trips made to the North Pole, three of which were 
research vessels carrying out a core drilling expedition and five 
Russian nuclear icebreakers for tourism purposes. Apart from those 
trips, all the vessel activity in 2004 took place around its periphery 
and largely in coastal waters.
In the four years that have passed since the AMSA 2004 baseline 
year for shipping activity, there has already been an increase in 
vessel activity in certain sectors. As discussed earlier, cruise ves-
sels have been traveling to the Arctic in rapidly increasing numbers. 
There has also been new activity in other types of vessel traffic, par-
ticularly in the Barents, Kara and Norwegian seas. An Arctic tanker 
shuttle system has been established to support a route from a new 
Russian terminal in Varandey in the Pechora Sea to Murmansk and 
direct to global markets. The first 70,000 dwt tanker for this ser-
vice, Vasily Dinkov, delivered its initial cargo to eastern Canada in 
June 2008; two additional icebreaking tankers for this operation 
have been built in South Korean shipyards. Two similar icebreaking 
tankers, under construction in St. Petersburg, will be used to ship 
oil from the Prirazlomnoye oil field in the northern Pechora Sea to 
a floating terminal in Murmansk. Again, year-round operations are 
envisioned in seasonally ice-covered waters, in this case to provide 
a continuous supply of oil to Murmansk for subsequent export by 
supertanker. 
Off the coast of the Norwegian Arctic, the Snohvit (“Snow White”) 
gas complex is now operational and its first shipment of gas arrived 
in Spain via an LNG carrier in October 2007; another shipment of 
Snohvit LNG was delivered to the U.S. East Coast in February 2008. 
LNG carrier operations out of northern Norway to world markets are 
poised to increase during the next decade and Norwegian Arctic off-
shore production is forecast through 2035. 
In early 2008, an offshore lease sale conducted by the U.S. 
Minerals Management Service for the U.S. Arctic totaled nearly 
$US2.7 billion; offshore gas appears to be the resource under con-
sideration for development in this Arctic region. Increasing Arctic 
marine operations off Alaska in the Chukchi and Beaufort seas to 
support oil and gas exploration are envisioned for the next decade.
While the AMSA database only looks at the year 2004, it is 
apparent, based on anecdotal information, that Arctic marine vessel 
activity is in a state of transition. The current types of vessel activi-
ties seen today are in support of community re-supply, bulk natural 
resource shipments, fishing and tourism. It appears there will be a 
growth in all Arctic shipping sectors, as well as the possible emer-
gence of new opportunities. Z
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Findings
 1] There were approximately 6,000 vessels in the Arctic in 2004: nearly half the vessels were operating on the Pacific 
Great Circle Route, which crosses the Aleutian Islands and the southern Bering Sea. Of the remaining vessels, 
about 50 percent, or 1,600, were fishing vessels. The availability of data and reporting on Arctic marine activity 
varied greatly between Arctic states; several states could not provide comprehensive data for 2004. As a result, 
the AMSA database likely underestimates the levels of activity throughout the reporting year.
 2]  Marine activity took place throughout the Arctic in 2004 and in recent years icebreaking ships voyaged in 
the central Arctic Ocean in the summer. However, operations were primarily in areas that were ice-free, either 
seasonally or year-round. 
 3] The AMSA database indicates that no commercial vessels conducted trans-Arctic voyages on the Northwest Passage, 
Northern Sea Route or in the central Arctic Ocean in 2004.
 4] Early in the 21st century there are only a few Arctic regions with year-round shipping in seasonal sea ice. These 
year-round operations are driven largely by natural resource development such as in the Canadian Arctic and 
northwest Russia. 
 5] Most shipping in the Arctic today is destinational, moving goods into the Arctic for community re-supply or moving 
natural resources out of the Arctic to world markets. Nearly all marine tourist voyages are destinational, as well. 
 6] Regions of high concentration of Arctic shipping activity occur along the coasts of northwest Russia, and in ice-
free water offshore Norway, Greenland, Iceland and the Bering Sea.
 7]  Most of the Arctic fishing took place in the Bering and Barents seas, on the west coast of Greenland and around 
Iceland and the Faroe Islands.
 8]  The Arctic states do not generally collect and share Arctic marine activity data in any systematic manner.
 9]  Information about vessel incidents and accidents in the Arctic is not shared among Arctic states, other than 
through IMO processes. Knowing such information is an important step toward understanding and assessing future 
risks.
 10]  Cruise ship traffic into and around Greenland has increased exponentially in recent years. The majority of cruise 
ships observed recently in Arctic waters are not purpose-built for Arctic operations. Many are built for voyaging in 
open water in lower latitudes and warmer climates.
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Plausible Futures for  
Arctic Marine Navigation
M
arine use of the Arctic Ocean is expanding in 
unforeseen ways early in the 21st century. The con-
tinued depletion of natural resources in the world 
has led to an increase in interest in developing 
Arctic natural resources, and this interest has fostered a transfor-
mation of marine activity in the Arctic. In addition, regional cli-
mate change and the resulting Arctic sea ice retreat are providing for 
increased marine access in all seasons throughout the Arctic basin 
and its coastal seas. The AMSA takes a circumpolar view, but has 
also considered many regional and local issues where the impacts 
of expanded marine use may be greatest. The AMSA has also sought 
the views of the Arctic states, indigenous residents of the Arctic 
and many non-Arctic stakeholders and participants within the global 
maritime industry, so as to involve multiple perspectives.  
The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) documented the 
recent changes in the Arctic sea ice cover: sea ice thinning, extent 
reduction and a reduction in the area of multi-year ice in the cen-
tral Arctic Ocean. In addition, model simulations for the 21st cen-
tury (using Global Climate Models) indicate increasing ice-free areas 
in all coastal Arctic seas, suggesting plausible increases in marine 
access and longer seasons of navigation. The AMSA has used the 
Arctic sea ice information from the ACIA and the 4th Assessment of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as guides to what 
marine access could be in future decades. The key task for the AMSA 
has been to understand more clearly the uncertainties that might 
shed light on the determinants of future Arctic marine operations. 
One way to do this is through the creation of a set of scenarios that 
are plausible, relevant and diverse.
Scenarios, Futures and 
Regional Futures to 2020
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AMSA Scenario Workshops 
During 2007, scenario workshops were held in San Francisco 
(April) and Helsinki (July) to create a framework of plausible futures 
for Arctic marine navigation to 2050. The workshops were facilitated 
by Global Business Network, a pioneer in the application and evolu-
tion of scenario thinking, and drew some 60 maritime experts and 
stakeholders. The purpose of these strategic conversations was to 
identify the major uncertainties that would be critical to shaping the 
future of Arctic marine activity to 2020 and 2050. The use of differ-
ent stories of future marine activity can indicate how critical uncer-
tainties might play in ways that can challenge the Arctic states to 
make timely and effective decisions. The scenario narratives provide 
a rich source of material for strategic discussions about the future of 
marine safety and marine environmental protection among a diverse 
group of Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders and decision makers. 
Uncertainties from the Workshops
Participants in the AMSA scenario workshops identified nearly 
120 factors and forces that could shape the future of Arctic marine 
activity by 2050. Among those factors deemed most important were: 
global trade dynamics and world trade patterns; climate change 
severity; global oil prices; the marine insurance industry; legal sta-
bility (governance) of marine use in the Arctic Ocean; the safety of 
other global trade routes (for example, the Suez and Panama canals); 
agreements on Arctic ship construction rules and global operational 
standards (International Maritime Organization); a major Arctic ship-
ping disaster; limited windows of operation for Arctic shipping (the 
economics of seasonal versus year-round Arctic operations); the 
emergence of China, Japan and Korea as Arctic maritime nations; 
transit fees; conflicts between indigenous and commercial uses of 
Arctic waterways; new resource discoveries; an escalation of Arctic 
maritime disputes; a global shift to nuclear energy; and socio-eco-
nomic impacts of global weather changes. This list of critical factors 
illustrates the great complexity and range of global connections sur-
rounding future use of the Arctic Ocean (Table 6.1).
Key Uncertainties from  
the AMSA Scenarios Effort
Influences on the Future of Arctic Navigation
•	 Stable legal climate
•	 Radical change in global trade dynamics
•	 Climate change is more disruptive sooner
•	 Safety of other routes
•	 Socio-economic impact of global weather changes
•	 Oil prices ($US55-60 to $US100-150)
•	 Major Arctic shipping disaster
•	 Limited windows of  operation (economics)
•	 Global agreements on construction rules and standards
•	 Rapid climate change
•	 China, Japan and Korea become Arctic maritime nations
•	 Transit fees
•	 Conflict between indigenous and commercial use
•	 Arctic maritime enforcement
•	 Escalation of Arctic maritime disputes
•	 Shift to nuclear energy
•	 New resource discoveries
•	 World trade patterns
•	 Catastrophic loss of Suez or Panama canals
•	 Maritime insurance industry engagement
z Table 6.1  Key uncertainties from the AMSA scenarios effort.  Source: AMSA
© Aker Arctic Technology
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z  Illustration 6.1 Scenarios matrix. Source: AMSA
Resource and Trade: the level of demand for Arctic natural 
resources and trade. This factor exposes the scenarios to a broad 
range of potential market developments, such as the rise of Asia or 
regional political instabilities. More demand implies higher demand 
from more players and markets around the world for Arctic resources, 
including increased access for trade in the Arctic Ocean. Less demand 
implies fewer players interested in fewer resources. 
Governance: the degree of relative stability of rules for marine 
use both within the Arctic and internationally. Less stability implies 
shortfalls in transparency and a rules-based structure, and an atmo-
sphere where actors and stakeholders tend to work on a unilateral 
basis. More stability implies a stable, efficiently operating system of 
legal and regulatory structures, and an atmosphere of international 
collaboration. 
AMSA Scenarios Framework 
The AMSA scenarios work created six potential matrices for fram-
ing a set of scenarios. Pairs of critical factors or uncertainties were 
chosen and crossed to produce candidate frameworks:
•	 Indigenous	Welfare	crossed with Resource Exploitation
•	 New	Resource	Development	crossed with Maritime Disasters
•	 Climate	Change	crossed with Level of Trade
•	 Indigenous	People	crossed with Rise of Asia
•	 Legal	Regime	crossed with Value of Natural Resources
•	 New	Resource	Development	crossed with Legal Regime 
The strengths, weaknesses and applicability to the Arctic of each 
of these matrices were discussed. Through brainstorming and plenary 
discussions, two primary drivers and key uncertainties were selected 
as the axes of uncertainty for the final AMSA matrix:
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Arctic Race Polar Lows Polar Preserve Arctic Saga
p  More Demand for 
 Resources and Trade
t  Less Stable Governance
q Less Demand for Resources 
and Trade
t  Less Stable Governance
q Less Demand for Resources 
and Trade
u More Stable Governance 
p More Demand for Resources 
and Trade
u More Stable Governance
High demand and unstable 
governance set the stage for 
an economic rush for Arctic 
wealth and resources.
This is a world in which 
many international players 
anxiously move to outwit com-
petitors and secure tomorrow’s 
resources today. Intense inter-
est in Arctic natural resources.
Low demand and unstable 
governance bring a murky and un-
derdeveloped future for the Arctic.
This is a world in which domes-
tic disturbances divert attention 
from global issues, and simmering 
frictions cause prolonged divisive-
ness.  Global financial tensions are 
prevalent. 
Low demand and stable gov-
ernance slow Arctic development 
while introducing an extensive 
eco-preserve with stringent “no-
shipping zones.”
This is a world where concern 
about the environment, coupled 
with geopolitical and economic 
interests elsewhere, drives a 
movement toward a systematic 
preservation of the Arctic Ocean.
High demand and stable gov-
ernance lead to a healthy rate 
of development that includes 
concern for the preservation of 
Arctic ecosystems and cultures.
This is a world largely driven 
by business pragmatism that 
balances global collaboration 
and compromise with successful 
development of the resources of 
the Arctic. 
•	 Global	competition	among	
many nations for future 
rights to resources intensi-
fied by rise of Asia; new oil 
& gas discoveries
•	 Acute	demand	for	water	
worldwide; continuing 
Middle East tensions
•	 Climate	warms	faster	than	
models predicted; tourism 
expands
	•	 Global	economic	downturn	 
and increasing national  
protectionism
•	 Increased	domestic	troubles	
worldwide, including regional 
outbreaks of new-generation 
Avian flu
•	 Recession	of	Arctic	ice	slower	
than models projected
•	 Arctic	oil	and	gas	reserves	
disappointing
•	 Alternative	energy	emerges	
as viable source for global 
growth
•	 Public	concern	about	climate	
change and conservation,  
especially impacts to the 
Arctic
•	 Expanded	global	economic	
prosperity
•	 Systematic	development	of	
oil, gas and hard mineral 
resources
•	 Shared	economic	and	politi-
cal interests of Arctic states
•	 Climate	warms	as	expected
•	 Much	activity	dominated	
by destinational traffic 
supporting resource devel-
opment
•	 Unilateral	governance	
regimes lead to inconsis-
tent infrastructure with 
incompatible standards
•	 Seasonal	trans-Arctic	
passage possible, but not  
economical  
•	 Minimal	Arctic	marine	traffic,	
consisting of government 
re-supply and research, with 
periodic disruptions
•	 Market	for	ice-class	ships	
cools, reducing R&D and  
shipbuilding
•	 Low	attention	to	regulations,	
with unenforced and mis-
matched standards,  
and no new infrastructure
•	 Harmonized	rules	for	Arctic	
ship design and mariner  
training
•	 Seasonal	trans-Arctic	ship-
ping possible but proves 
prohibitively expensive due 
to environmental restrictions, 
frequent patrols and aggres-
sive enforcement
•	 Growth	of	Arctic	marine	tour-
ism allowed through limited 
number of “use permits”
•	 Wide	range	and	variety	of	 
marine activity
•	 Navigational	infrastructure	
and aids expanded, making 
marine transport safer and 
more efficient
•	 Comprehensive	international	
Arctic ship rules
•	 New	technologies	make	 
seasonal trans-Arctic ship-
ping a possibility
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The chosen axes met three key criteria: degree of plausibility, 
relevance to the Arctic and maritime affairs and being at the right 
level or threshold of external factors. The roles of global climate 
change and continued Arctic sea ice retreat are fully considered in 
the AMSA scenarios. Retreating Arctic sea ice acts as a facilitator 
and is assumed to provide opportunities for improved marine access 
and potentially longer seasons of navigation. For the AMSA, global-
ization of the Arctic and development of natural resources are the 
primary drivers for increased marine use in the region. Greater access 
facilitates that use, but economic drivers are considered paramount.
Table 6.2 illustrates the crossed uncertainties (Resources & Trade 
and Governance) and outlines four resulting scenarios central to the 
message of the AMSA. The Arctic Race scenario, with high commod-
ity prices and demand for Arctic natural resources, implies an “eco-
nomic rush” for development, based in part on global markets, not 
a geopolitical “race” for sovereign rights or new territory. This is a 
region where the international maritime community has moved into 
the Arctic Ocean for resource extraction and marine tourism at a 
time when there is lack of an integrated set of maritime rules and 
regulations, and insufficient infrastructure to support such a high 
level of marine activity.  
Polar Lows is a future of low demand for resources and unstable 
governance: a murky and undeveloped future for the Arctic. There is 
minimal marine traffic in the Arctic Ocean in this scenario and low 
attention is given to regulations and standards that remain weak and 
undeveloped.  
Polar Preserve is a future of low demand, but with a stable and 
developed governance of marine use. This also is a world where 
environmental concerns, with geopolitical and economic interests 
focused elsewhere, drive a movement toward a systematic preser-
vation of the Arctic. In this scenario, Arctic oil and gas reserves 
are disappointing, and there is strong public concern about climate 
change (environmental awareness is high) and conservation impacts 
on Arctic affairs.  
Arctic Saga is a future of high demand for resources and trade 
coupled with a stable governance of marine use. This world leads to 
a healthy rate of Arctic development that includes concern for the 
preservation of Arctic ecosystems and cultures, and shared economic 
Scenarios
Scenarios are tools for ordering one’s perceptions about alternative 
future environments in which today’s decisions might be played out. In 
practice, scenarios resemble a set of stories, written or spoken, built around 
carefully constructed plots. Stories are an old way of organizing knowledge; 
when used as strategic tools, they confront denial by encouraging - in fact, 
requiring - the willing suspension of disbelief. Stories can express multiple 
perspectives on complex events; scenarios give meaning to these events.
Scenarios are powerful planning tools precisely because the future is 
unpredictable. Unlike traditional forecasting or market research, scenarios 
present alternative images instead of extrapolating current trends from the 
present. Scenarios also embrace qualitative perspectives and the potential 
for sharp discontinuities that econometric models exclude. Consequently, 
creating scenarios requires decision-makers to question their broadest 
assumptions about the way the world works so they can foresee decisions that might be missed or denied.
Within an organization, scenarios provide a common vocabulary and an effective basis for communicating complex - and sometimes 
paradoxical - conditions and options. Good scenarios are plausible and surprising; they have the power to break old stereotypes, and their 
creators assume ownership and put them to work. Using scenarios is rehearsing the future. By recognizing the warning signs and the drama 
that is unfolding, one can avoid surprises, adapt and act effectively. Decisions that have been pre-tested against a range of what fate may 
offer are more likely to stand the test of time, produce robust and resilient strategies and create distinct competitive advantage. Ultimately, 
the result of scenario planning is not a more accurate picture of tomorrow but better thinking and an ongoing strategic conversation about 
the future.
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and political interests of the Arctic states. There is improved marine 
infrastructure making marine transportation safer and more efficient, 
supporting systematic and safe development of oil, gas and hard 
minerals. 
Arctic State Challenges from the Scenarios
A significant challenge facing the Arctic states is to recognize 
the international nature of shipping in the Arctic Ocean and to effec-
tively engage with a very broad range of non-Arctic actors, stake-
holders and decision-makers. Recognition of this global reach of 
the maritime industry also includes a responsibility to work toward 
balancing historic navigation rights under UNCLOS with regimes and 
mechanisms designed to enhance marine safety and to protect the 
Arctic marine environment. A major task will be for the Arctic states 
to convince the IMO membership to take into account the unique-
ness of marine operations in the Arctic and work within the IMO and 
other global organizations for international standards. The Arctic 
states must also recognize there may be a host of new maritime play-
ers at the table with a stake in the future use of the Arctic Ocean.  
If the retreat of Arctic sea ice continues, marine access should 
improve throughout the Arctic basin. Complementing this change will 
be new Arctic ship designs that will also allow greater access and 
independent operations (without icebreaker escort) during potentially 
longer seasons of navigation. Such extended marine operations will 
require greatly expanded search and rescue cooperation and expanded 
regional environmental response networks. Information and data 
sharing may also be a key to the future of the maritime Arctic.  
Expanded surveillance and monitoring of marine operations, par-
ticularly in the central Arctic Ocean, will require agreements among 
the Arctic states (and other interested parties such as flag states) for 
the rapid transfer of ship transit information. Monitoring of the envi-
ronment could be enhanced by the establishment of a Sustainable 
Arctic Observing Network (SAON), an activity that was promoted 
during the International Polar Year. Expanded traffic in the central 
Arctic Ocean will provide new and unique challenges to the Arctic 
states and the global maritime community, since there will be a lack 
of communications, salvage and other critical infrastructure.
The AMSA scenarios effort has identified three key issues, among 
many, for the Arctic states: the ongoing globalization of the Arctic 
through natural resource development and resulting destinational 
marine traffic; arrival of the global maritime industry in the Arctic 
Ocean with Arctic voyages of large tankers, cruise ships and bulk 
carriers on regional and destinational voyages; and the lack of inter-
national policies, until now, in the form of maritime governance to 
meet this arrival. 
The Arctic states will continue to be challenged by a widespread 
lack of adequate maritime infrastructure to cope with current and 
future levels of Arctic marine operations. In order to better enhance 
marine safety and environmental protection, the Arctic states work-
ing within the IMO could develop an integrated, or complementary, 
system of rules and regulations governing Arctic marine activity. The 
Arctic states must continue to engage non-Arctic states and global 
institutions that will influence the future of Arctic marine opera-
tions. More cooperation in Arctic maritime affairs among the eight 
Arctic states will be an imperative to address complex marine use 
issues in an uncertain future.
Future Natural Resource Development
          
A U.S. Geological Survey report, issued in July 2008, indicates 
the Arctic may contain as much as one-fifth of the world’s undiscov-
ered oil and natural gas. More specifically, the assessment found the 
Arctic to potentially contain 90 billion barrels of undiscovered oil 
and 1,670 trillion cubic feet (47 trillion cubic meters) of undiscov-
ered natural gas, representing 13 percent of the undiscovered oil and 
30 percent undiscovered natural gas. Of the total for undiscovered oil 
reserves, more than half are estimated to occur in geologic provinces 
in the Alaska Arctic (offshore and onshore), the Amerasian Basin 
(offshore north of the Beaufort Sea) and in West and East Greenland 
(offshore). More than 70 percent of the undiscovered natural gas 
is estimated to be located in three areas: the West Siberian Basin 
(Yamal Peninsula and offshore in the Kara Sea), the East Barents 
Basin (location of the Russian Federation’s giant offshore Shtokman 
field) and the Alaska Arctic (offshore and onshore). Each of these 
regions would require vastly expanded Arctic marine operations to 
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support future exploration and development. Several regions, such 
as offshore Greenland, would require fully developed Arctic marine 
transport systems to carry hydrocarbons to global markets.
 Despite the recent global recession, two Arctic nations, Norway 
and the Russian Federation, have already made significant invest-
ments during recent decades in developing Arctic hydrocarbons in 
offshore Arctic Norway and northwest Russia’s offshore systems in 
the Pechora Sea. Arctic marine transport systems support each of 
these developments, and oil and LNG tanker traffic from the Barents 
Sea to world markets is expected to continue for several decades.
 For the Russian Federation, future investments in developing 
the Shtokman gas field west of Novaya Zemlya in the east Barents 
Sea are evolving. This field, understood to be one of the world’s larg-
est gas fields, lies 600 kilometers offshore and in depths of water 
to 2,000 meters. Exploration and development of this large, off-
shore region will require extraordinary levels of Arctic marine opera-
tions, most conducted in waters that are not ice-covered, but under 
extreme cold temperatures. Natural gas from Shtokman would be 
transported by sub-sea pipeline or a marine tanker system, either of 
which would increase marine operations in this region of the Arctic. 
For the United States (Alaska) and Canada, where offshore Arctic 
lease sales were held for the Chukchi (U.S.) and Beaufort (Canada) 
seas in 2008, the future remains uncertain. The leases represent 
long-term, strategic investments. Marine exploration of the Arctic 
offshore should continue during the next decade.  
One of the key factors in future Arctic offshore developments 
is that a majority of the seabed oil and gas resources are located 
within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of the Arctic states 
(i.e., Arctic offshore regions of Alaska, Canada, Norway, Greenland 
and the Russian Federation). While there remain several, regional 
boundary disputes where potential resources may overlap, the gen-
eral jurisdictional issues are clear and do not appear to be significant 
obstacles to future Arctic hydrocarbon development.
 Hard minerals development in the Arctic will continue to be 
influenced by global commodities markets and prices. However, the 
largest zinc mine in the world (Red Dog in the Alaska Arctic) and 
the largest nickel mine (Norilsk in Siberia) will continue to be solely 
dependent on marine transport systems - seasonal in the case of Red 
Dog and year-round operations for Norilsk Nickel. It is plausible that 
the summer, ice-free season for support to the Red Dog mine could 
be extended as Arctic sea ice continues to retreat in the Chukchi Sea. 
The Mary River iron ore deposits on Baffin Island, Nunavut in the 
Canadian Arctic represent a highly valuable mineral resource (high 
grade iron ore of 67 percent iron). Plans have been underway for 
some time to develop a mining operation and ship to European mar-
kets 18 million tons of ore each year, estimated to last for a mini-
mum of 25 years. This is a large Arctic project that would involve a 
fleet of ice-capable cargo carriers operating on a year-round basis 
between Baffin Island and Europe. Ice navigation would be required 
for operations in the winter and early spring.  
Greenland geology records more than four billion years of earth 
history, preserving significant mineral deposits. For example, the 
Kvanefjeld Project near the southwest tip of Greenland represents 
a multi-element deposit containing rare elements, uranium and 
sodium fluoride. Potentially world class and multi-commodity ore 
deposits exist in other regions of coastal Greenland. The exploration 
and development of these mines will require Arctic marine transport 
systems to carry these scarce commodities to global markets.
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Future Arctic Marine Tourism
Tourists now represent the single largest human presence in 
the Arctic and the overwhelming majority of these visitors travel 
aboard ships. The Arctic’s once forbidding marine environment now 
attracts growing numbers of tourists aboard more and larger ships to 
a greater diversity of Arctic destinations. The future of Arctic marine 
tourism represents serious challenges to public authorities and busi-
nesses seeking to address the issues of safe passage and resource 
management.  
Managing Future Marine Tourism 
The growing popularity of polar marine tourism and the cruise 
industry’s intentions to expand and diversify its polar market are 
creating significant management challenges.  Foremost among 
those challenges are ice and weather conditions, lack of reliable 
hydrographic information, insufficient capacity of infrastructure to 
respond to emergencies, remoteness of tourist transits and destina-
tions and the sheer size of vessels serving the polar cruise market. 
The legal and regulatory context defining appropriate ship and tour-
ism operations consists of international treaty conventions, national 
laws, adopted regulations, industry guidelines and consensus-based 
guidelines brokered by non-governmental 
organizations. Governments, the tourism 
industry and non-governmental organiza-
tions are all determining the operational 
parameters for polar marine tourism 
through a variety of mechanisms.
National Laws and Regulations 
The eight Arctic nations have enacted and 
enforce numerous laws and regulations 
governing marine operations and pollu-
tion. Based on international regulations, 
the national laws provide a framework to 
protect the Arctic environment, promote 
human safety and provide for a coordi-
nated response to marine incidents, as 
well as enabling cooperation among the 
Arctic states. National attempts to regulate 
marine tourism extend from exceedingly 
stringent controls to considerably more 
flexible management techniques. Norway’s 
government, for example, plans to signifi-
cantly restrict cruise ship traffic around the 
Arctic archipelago of Svalbard and prohibit the use of heavy fuel oil. 
The new rules will limit to 200 the number of passengers allowed on 
board each ship that enters nature preserves on East Svalbard, and 
those tourists who are allowed entry are paying a special environ-
mental tax. Another approach to the management of marine tour-
ism, currently implemented by the U.S. government and the State 
of Alaska, is the use of onboard rangers who perform monitoring 
and pollution enforcement responsibilities. Some Arctic governments 
find themselves with the challenge of simultaneously trying to pro-
tect the environment while also promoting tourism.  
Self-Imposed Industry Guidelines and NGO Codes of Conduct
Expedition cruise ship companies operating in both the Arctic and 
Antarctic are utilizing self-imposed guidelines to enhance marine 
operations, visitor safety and provide environmental and cultural 
resource protection. The creation and application of self-imposed 
industry guidelines for the conduct of environmentally responsible 
and safe polar tourism began with the formation of the International 
Association of Antarctic Tour Operators (IAATO) in 1990. The guide-
lines specifically address the management issues of ship operations, 
visitor behavior ashore, emergency response plans, the protection 
of Antarctica’s marine and land resources and the preservation of 
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The Importance of Infrastructure 
Infrastructure, defined for the purpose of marine tourism man-
agement, includes both the physical and human resources needed to 
prevent harm potentially arising from ship operations. Polar tourism 
currently operates in regions of the world that have either few or 
no infrastructure resources (See page 154). In many regions of the 
Arctic, the capacity to prevent loss of human life, protect property, 
contain environmental contamination, monitor sensitive resources 
and enforce laws is greatly diminished by remoteness, lack of capac-
ity and severe environmental conditions.   
Arctic nations, both individually and collectively, are legally 
responsible for providing infrastructure in order to prevent loss of 
life, property and environmental damage. These responsibilities are 
clearly within their sovereign domain of providing for the health, 
safety and welfare of their citizens, visitors and their environmen-
tal resources. The amount of information, facilities, equipment and 
human resources is not sufficient to meet the Arctic’s current and 
anticipated volume of vessel traffic. For example, the number of pas-
sengers aboard polar cruise ships far exceeds the capacity of search 
and rescue assets, medical facilities and shelters needed to protect 
evacuees from the cold.
Factors Influencing the Future 
A plausible future for Arctic marine tourism is that it will con-
tinue to grow, diversify and geographically expand as current obsta-
cles are overcome. The most significant barriers influencing Arctic 
tourism include physical access, the ability of tourists to pay, the 
time and cost associated with traveling to remote destinations, the 
availability and capacity of infrastructure, environmental conditions 
and jurisdictional restraints that prohibit or restrict entry.  
Arctic marine tourism’s most likely future is that larger num-
bers of tourists, traveling aboard increased numbers of ships of all 
types, will be spending more time at more locations. The Arctic’s 
environment, community infrastructure, social institutions and 
cultural values will be increasingly vulnerable to tourism-caused 
the southern continent’s heritage resources. IAATO’s Emergency 
Contingency Plan has been successfully implemented on several 
occasions and is constantly updated to improve emergency response 
capabilities. Given the fact that these guidelines are directly relevant 
to polar conditions, marine tourism operations and the management 
of tourists when ashore, Arctic governments, communities and tour 
operators should benefit from their application to Arctic tourism.
The Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators (AECO) was 
founded in 2003 for the purpose of “managing respectable, envi-
ronmentally friendly and safe expeditions in the Arctic. The mem-
bers agree that expedition cruises and tourism in the Arctic must be 
carried out with the utmost consideration for the vulnerable natu-
ral environment, local cultures and cultural remains, as well as the 
challenging safety hazards at sea and on land. AECO members are 
obligated to operate in accordance with national and international 
laws and regulations and agreed upon AECO by-laws and guidelines.” 
AECO’s offices are located in Longyearbyen, Svalbard, Norway and its 
geographical range in 2008 was Svalbard, Jan Mayen and Greenland. 
AECO developed its guidelines with considerable input from the 
Governor of Svalbard, Norwegian Polar Institute, World Wildlife Fund 
for Nature’s Arctic Program, as well as Greenland Tourism, Greenland 
Home Rule, The Environmental and Nature Agency, and others. 
Participation by all Arctic coastal states would strengthen the asso-
ciation and its goals.
The WWF’s program, in cooperation with tour operators, con-
servation organizations, managers, researchers and representatives 
from indigenous communities, has created the Principles and Codes 
for Arctic Tourism. The 10 principles encourage tourism development 
that protects the environment as much as possible, educates tour-
ists about the Arctic’s environment and peoples, respects the rights 
and cultures of Arctic residents and increases the share of tourism 
revenues that go to northern communities.
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Using the most modern container vessel design for the Arctic, 
it is technically feasible to establish a container traffic link between 
North America and Europe via the Northern Sea Route, a 2005 
study concluded.
The evaluation, funded by the Institute of the North and 
executed by Finnish-based Aker Arctic Technology, used ice oper-
ational simulations and only evaluated the feasibility of vessel 
design, not the economic feasibility of the concept. Such economic 
analysis is still needed before a trans-Arctic shuttle operation can 
be considered as a serious alternative to today’s route via the 
Panama Canal.
Assuming twin trans-shipment ports in Alaska and Iceland, the 
study evaluated vessels that were 750 TEU and 5,000 TEU. The sim-
ulations were based on two different kinds of years, average winter 
ice conditions and severe winter ice conditions, for both vessels. 
The evaluation used the double-acting operation design which 
allows the vessel to travel the traditional bow ahead in open water 
and, by using a propeller system that turns 180 degrees, to go stern 
ahead in ice-covered waters.
The 750 TEU Arctic container vessel for the study was a modi-
fied version of the Norlisk Nickel’s Arctic Express, which moves 
nickel plate year-round and without icebreaker assistance between 
the ports of Dudinka and Murmansk in the Russian Federation (See 
page 82). The theoretical study vessel was modified from carrying 
nickel plate to container storage both below and above deck. The 
design also doubled the size of the fuel storage due to the lon-
ger sailing required. The ship could ply the shallow waters near 
the coastline of northern Russia, but simulation runs indicated it 
would need some traditional icebreaker assistance in severe winter 
conditions. 
The 5,000 TEU vessel used the same icebreaking design, just 
on a larger scale. While the larger vessel will accommodate more 
containers, the size and especially the draft of 13.5 meters would 
prohibit it for use along the traditionally shallow-draft route of the 
NSR.
While the study does not look at the cost of fairway fees in 
this scenario, it does note that the current fee structure along the 
NSR is based on the paradigm of using icebreakers and “paying 
potential.” Therefore, today the movement of natural resources 
along the NSR pays high fees whether using icebreaker assistance 
or not. This type of fee policy is not suitable for cargo vessels that 
are capable of independent operations, as the fee should be paid 
if the icebreaker assistance is needed, according to the study. 
Trans-Arctic Container Vessel Shuttle Option
As noted, it is anticipated that the smaller study vessel would 
need icebreaker support some of the year, while the larger ves-
sel would not. However, if the 5,000 TEU ship needed assistance 
it would require two icebreakers due to the width of the vessel. 
Another issue the larger study vessel poses is the ability to travel 
outside the traditional NSR routes. 
Using only economic input related to the cost of the vessel, the 
operational costs, the amount of cargo that could be delivered and 
other related issues, the transport cost from the Aleutian Islands 
in Alaska to a port in Iceland via the NSR for the larger study ves-
sel would be between $US354 TEU and $US526 TEU, and between 
$US1,244 TEU and $US1,887 TEU for the smaller container ship. It 
needs to be noted again that these figures do not include all of 
the economic considerations that are needed to make an accu-
rate evaluation, such as fairway/icebreaker fees, port infrastructure 
costs, terminal and harbor costs and the cost to offload cargo onto 
the shuttle vessel, as well as transferring it back to an open-ocean 
vessel after reaching the twin port. 
“All of these factors are unclear, uncertain and difficult to esti-
mate,” the study concludes. “Most adverse of them might be the 
fairway fees, of which a current estimate of $US900 to $US1,000 
TEU can be given for traffic” in 2005. “The second could be the cost 
for building and running the terminals which could be in the same 
category as the cost of the vessels. Of course, the terminals for the 
large and effective 5,000 TEU vessel are much more expensive than 
those for the 750 TEU vessel, but cost per container may be lower 
for the larger traffic volume. Of less importance and even more dif-
ficult to clarify and estimate may be the feeder link cost. Even the 
existing system using the southern route includes feeder links to 
the container hub ports and how this picture would be changed for 
the Arctic Shuttle Container Link remains to be clarified. However, 
it is expected that extra costs compared to the prevalent system 
could be created.”
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economic viability of any potential Arctic trade route, whether des-
tinational or regional, intra-Arctic or trans-Arctic using the NSR, 
NWP or the central Arctic Ocean. For the purposes of the AMSA, the 
marine safety and environmental protection measures to be devel-
oped and implemented in accordance with international laws are 
essentially independent of the mode of Arctic marine transport. It 
is the global maritime industry that will decide if and when the 
potentially shorter Arctic routes can be safe, efficient, reliable and 
economically viable in comparison to other routes across the world’s 
oceans. The marine insurance industry and ship classification societ-
ies will have significant influence in these route determinations, as 
will a host of other stakeholders and actors including investors and 
shipbuilders.
The AMSA has indicated, using a scenario-based strategic 
approach, that the primary mode of marine transport throughout 
the Arctic Ocean is destinational traffic related to natural resource 
development and regional trade. New economic linkages in the Arctic 
to global markets are influenced by commodities prices for scarce 
natural resources such as oil and gas, nickel, zinc, palladium, cop-
per, platinum and high grade ore. Current and new Arctic marine 
transport systems and commercial ship traffic are primarily tied to 
the global demand for these resources. 
The international media and proponents continue to provide 
broad visibility to the possibility of trans-Arctic navigation, pos-
tulating that commercial routes will be viable and fully functional 
in the near future. This premise is based in large measure on the 
recent and extraordinary retreat of Arctic sea ice that has garnered 
worldwide attention. Touted are the large distance savings on global 
trade routes by using the Arctic Ocean; one example is the nominal 
11,200 nautical mile route between Rotterdam and Yokohama (using 
the Suez Canal), versus a 6,500 nautical route across the top of the 
world. Many maps are shown promoting these potential marine trade 
routes without indicating a key factor - that the Arctic’s sea ice cover 
will be present for a majority of the year during the century. Just 
how plausible is trans-Arctic shipping given that the Arctic sea ice 
cover remains, but is a less imposing physical barrier?
impacts. Simultaneously, Arctic governments, communities and busi-
nesses increasingly promote tourism and invest their resources to 
expand this type of economic development. The cruise ship industry, 
responding to the popularity of polar tourism and clear evidence of 
profitability, is committed to send more ships with larger passenger 
capacities to Arctic destinations. All of these significant investments 
and aggressive promotion by industry, governments and communi-
ties insures that Arctic marine tourism will continue to grow and 
that its management is essential.
Challenges of Trans-Arctic Navigation
          
For more than three centuries explorers and entrepreneurs have 
envisioned a direct route across the top of the world between the 
Pacific and Atlantic oceans. However, the Arctic sea ice cover - more 
than 2,100 nautical miles of sea ice present except in summer - has 
always been a significant physical barrier to developing such a global 
trade route. Although no commercial cargo ship has yet to cross 
the central Arctic Ocean, there have been trans-Arctic voyages dur-
ing the summer season along the Russian Federation’s Northern Sea 
Route and the Northwest Passage in the Canadian Arctic. Support 
was normally required by modern icebreakers leading ice-strength-
ened merchant ships in convoy. This system of transport was par-
ticularly the norm during the era of the Soviet Union when cargoes 
were carried during a short summer navigation season across the 
length of the NSR.  In recent years, there were no cargo ships under-
taking trans-Arctic voyages along either the NSR or NWP. Several 
ice-strengthened cruise ships and icebreakers have carried tourists 
on recent trans-Arctic voyages in summer. The fact remains that only 
six, high-powered polar icebreakers (nuclear and diesel-powered) 
have successfully navigated across the central Arctic Ocean and each 
of these voyages was conducted in summer.
The AMSA is focused on marine safety and environmental protec-
tion consistent with the Arctic Council’s mandates of environmental 
protection and sustainable development. Neither the Arctic Council 
nor this assessment are the appropriate vehicles to determine the 
Arctic nations, both individually and collectively, are legally responsible for 
providing infrastructure in order to prevent loss of life, property and environ-
mental damage.
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The Presence of Arctic Sea Ice
The observed record of Arctic sea ice noted in Section 2 indicates 
decreases in both extent and thickness during the past five decades. 
Global climate model simulations of Arctic sea ice indicate trends of 
increasing areas of the coastal Arctic Ocean that may be partially ice-
covered or even open water. No credible scientific source, though, is 
arguing that there will be a complete disappearance of the Arctic sea 
ice cover. The models do indicate a strong possibility of an ice-free 
Arctic Ocean for a short period of time in September sometime in the 
future. Again, the significance of this physical change is that multi-
year ice would disappear - no sea ice would survive the summer 
melt season and only new ice would grow through the autumn and 
winter months during the long polar night. It is uncertain how long 
the ice-free period will be during the late summer or exactly when 
it will occur in any given year. It could be a window of time as brief 
as a few days or several weeks, or nearly ice-free conditions could 
last longer in the central Arctic Ocean. However, most of the poten-
tially navigable spring, summer and autumn months should remain 
ice-covered with ice that may be thinner, but more mobile, than in 
previous decades. The year-to-year variability of sea ice in coastal 
seas and straits, such as those along the NSR and NWP, will surely 
remain a challenge in evaluating risk for insurance purposes and 
determining the overall reliability of Arctic marine routes. The length 
of the navigation season in all Arctic regions remains uncertain from 
a sea ice perspective, before other factors such as ship performance 
and icebreaker support systems are applied.
Key Questions for Trans-Arctic Shipping
The complexity of the trans-Arctic navigation can be viewed 
through the lens of a range of key questions and issues:
Q From the previous discussion, if all or some regions of the Arctic 
Ocean will remain ice-covered for much of the year, the need for 
polar ships designed for at least limited ice operations is obvious. 
The question of whether these ships will be icebreaking carriers 
in their own right and capable of independent ice operations is 
important. Will such ships require icebreaker convoy support and 
who will pay for the escorting icebreakers? Both are significant 
economic and safety issues. Relevant is the issue of whether polar 
icebreakers in support of navigation would be funded by commer-
cial interests or Arctic state governments. Such commercial polar 
ships will also be more expensive to build and operate, and many 
questions remain as to their utilization beyond the Arctic Ocean on 
potentially long marine routes in the open ocean. Shorter routes 
in the Arctic imply that there is a potential for lower stack emis-
sions into the lower Arctic atmosphere during transits. However, 
the presence of sea ice may require higher propulsion levels and 
ultimately similar or greater emissions during voyages compared 
with open ocean routes.  
Q Can the trans-Arctic routes be used year-round in a reliable and 
safe manner? This is a significant question as many global fleets 
would wish to integrate seamlessly the new route with established 
marine routes. If an Arctic route is only viable for part of the year, 
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will it be economically viable to use Polar Class ships on other 
routes? How viable and competitive would be a two to three month 
Arctic navigation season? How will shippers change and adapt their 
global shipping flows to a potentially seasonal operation along 
new and shorter Arctic routes? And what might be the response by 
the Suez and Panama canals to a seasonal route across the Arctic? 
Might they adjust their fee structures to accommodate this new 
competition?
Q Are Arctic routes economically viable today or in the near future? 
For nearly two decades the NSR has been open for international 
business under a fee structure. However, a limited navigation sea-
son presents the most significant challenge to the global maritime 
industry. The economic viability of all trans-Arctic options will be 
based in part on what ship speeds can be maintained in both ice-free 
and ice-covered waters to take full advantage of the shorter transit 
distances involved.
Q What are the risks assumed with using Arctic routes? For the 
marine insurers the risks could be higher if ships confront voyages 
of hundreds of nautical miles in ice. Higher risks for ice damage to 
ships and potential damage to cargoes in extreme cold temperatures, 
and the insufficient maritime infrastructure in the Arctic (such as 
salvage, ports and emergency response) will most likely be factors 
in determining future insurance rates. Navigation risks may also be 
compounded by operations in the polar night or during the spring/
autumn seasons where night operations in ice will be required. 
Shippers may also face risks with the possibility of schedule disrup-
tion and other reliability issues due to the inherent uncertainty of 
Arctic ship navigation. Many of these risk factors can be mitigated 
with the use of highly capable polar ships with experienced Arctic 
mariners.
Q Trans-shipment of cargoes may be a plausible option for using 
the Arctic Ocean for trans-Arctic shipments (See page 101). Which 
ports would be likely termination points at the ends of the Arctic 
voyages is a key question. The investment in terminals and in 
a fleet of Arctic ships that would operate year-round across the 
Arctic Ocean would be sizable. However, a key factor would be 
that the Arctic ships would be fully and solely employed on Arctic 
voyages. The addition of trans-shipment ports in the northern 
latitudes could add a new dimension to global trade routes and 
might add options for select cargoes to be carried from the Pacific 
to European ports, depending on the time delays associated with 
cargo transfers.
Potential Operators on Trans-Arctic Trades
The variability of Arctic sea ice and the uncertainties associ-
ated with sailing times make predictions for use by marine operators 
and certain vessel types (and trades) highly speculative. During the 
assessment’s scenarios creation effort, it was identified that large 
LNG carriers and oil tankers would not likely use trans-Arctic routes 
for trading. Today, all such ships sail from western Siberian ports 
and northern Norwegian ports westbound for North America and 
European ports. Future pipelines across Eurasia and additional pipe-
lines to central Europe appear to be strong competitors to oil and 
gas carriers potentially sailing eastbound along the NSR.  
The challenges for container traffic and carriers using trans-Arctic 
routes are many, including schedule reliability and the need to sat-
isfy very tight customer supply chains. The potential safety of the 
ships and cargoes, and the actual fuel costs and time savings (with 
ice navigation required on portions of the routes) are significant 
considerations that are not well understood. The investment in ice 
class ships would also be a major issue since their operation would 
be sub-optimal in non-Arctic trades if year-round Arctic operations 
could not be achieved.
It is plausible that several types of dry bulk and break-bulk car-
riers could conceivably use seasonal trans-Arctic routes. Bulk metal 
ores and concentrates (many can be stockpiled at the mine or the 
destination port) could be shipped along the NSR and even across 
the central Arctic Ocean if spot charters could be arranged on an 
opportunistic basis. However, suitable ice class ships would have 
to be built or be readily available for charter. Break-bulk carriers 
of forest products and pulp might use the Northern Sea Route to 
trade from northern Europe to Pacific and North American ports. It 
is reasonable to assume that experimental voyages of a commercial 
icebreaking carrier could take place within the decade to test the 
operational and technical challenges associated with trans-Arctic 
navigation.
The Need for Economic, Comparative 
and Technical Studies
There is a dearth of rigorous economic studies related to the 
evaluation of trans-Arctic shipping routes. Comprehensive economic 
studies using cost-benefit-risk analyses are needed for all three 
potential routes of trans-Arctic shipping (central Arctic Ocean, NWP 
and NSR). Such studies need to fully identify the global demands 
and key economic needs for use of these polar routes. Additional 
related studies are necessary to determine the economic benchmarks 
and indicators for viable seasonal and year-round trans-Arctic traf-
fic. What might be the key commodities suitable and economically 
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Research Opportunities
q Comprehensive economic research including cost-benefit-
risk analyses for all potential routes of trans-Arctic 
shipping.
q Comparative analysis of using Arctic marine transport 
in Polar Class ships versus pipelines for the carriage of 
Arctic oil and gas to world markets. Summarize the exist-
ing regional studies conducted for these comparisons.
q Comprehensive, comparative analysis of ice-assisted 
convoys versus independently-operated, icebreaking 
carriers for all modes of Arctic marine transport.
q Continued marine research on the changing nature of 
Arctic marine ecosystems related to climate change 
and the retreat of Arctic sea ice to determine the 
future level and operational impacts of fishing vessels 
in higher latitudes.
 
q Research on the socio-economic responses to global 
climate change (for example, ship emissions controls) 
and their potential impacts on Arctic natural resource 
development and Arctic marine transport.
viable for trading during even a partial or summer navigation season? 
Further economic research should be conducted on the potential for 
trans-shipment of cargoes across the Arctic Ocean in icebreaking 
carriers. An important component of such an analysis would be the 
economics of trans-shipment terminals/ports in Alaska, Iceland, 
northwest Russia and northern European sites.  
Operational and technical studies are also lacking. A compara-
tive analysis of icebreaker-assisted convoys versus independently-
operated, icebreaking carriers for all trans-Arctic options is required 
as new Arctic ship technologies emerge. Risk assessments related 
to Arctic ship operational challenges, the general lack of marine 
infrastructure throughout the Arctic Ocean and the potential for ice 
damages would be useful to the marine insurance industry and all 
ship owners contemplating trans-Arctic navigation. Cost effective-
ness studies for different icebreaking propulsion systems, including 
nuclear propulsion, should also include analyses of future emissions 
controls that are socio-economic responses to global climate change. 
The increasing size of ships (on global trade routes) may also have 
significant implications for all modes of Arctic marine transport 
including the trans-Arctic option. Studies should identify any maxi-
mum limitations, technical challenges and operational constraints 
for these very large ships on Arctic trade routes.
The uncertainties and complex interactions of many driving forces 
of trans-Arctic navigation require significant research. While it may 
be technically feasible to cross the Arctic Ocean today by modern 
icebreaker or even using an advanced icebreaking carrier, the opera-
tional, environmental and economic implications and challenges for 
routine trans-Arctic voyages are not yet fully understood.
 
© Aker Arctic Technology
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Regional Futures to 2020:
Bering Strait Region 
 
The Bering Strait is a narrow international strait that connects 
the North Pacific Ocean to the Arctic Ocean and forms the only corri-
dor between northern and east-west transportation routes (Map 6.1). 
At the strait’s narrowest point, the continents of North America and 
Asia are just 90 km apart. With diminishing summer sea ice in the 
Arctic Ocean, the Bering Strait region may experience increased des-
tinational traffic to the oil and gas exploration areas in the Beaufort 
and Chukchi seas, and to the Red Dog Mine in northwest Alaska.
Sea Ice
Seasonally dynamic sea ice conditions are found in this natural 
bottleneck. Typically, sea ice develops along the coasts in October 
and November. During May-July the ice edge retreats northward 
through the region. First-year sea ice can develop to more than 
1.2 meters thick during the winter. Except for shorefast ice, sea 
ice movement in the Bering Strait region is dynamic and forced by 
winds and currents. Ice has been observed to move through the 
region at speeds as high as 27 nautical miles per day. The seasonal 
ice field does not contain icebergs from land-based glaciers; how-
ever, multi-year ice from the Arctic ice pack has been observed to 
flow southward through the strait and into the Bering Sea. The 
future sea ice extent in the vicinity of the Bering Strait is projected 
to change only slightly in spring (April and May); however, a sig-
nificant reduction (later freeze-up) is projected for the future in 
November and December.
Ecosystem and Bio-resource Considerations
The Bering Strait region is a highly productive area extensively 
used by many species, including several species listed under the 
U.S. Endangered Species Act. The prolific continental shelf season-
ally supports a rich array of benthic feeders, such as gray whales, 
Pacific walruses and seabirds. Ice-dependent marine mammals sea-
sonally move through the region as sea ice retreats in the summer 
and advances in the fall. 
Many species depend upon primary productivity associated with 
sea ice, and the juxtaposition of the seasonal ice, shallow depth and 
productive benthos serves to support a unique diversity and high 
density of marine life. It is a dynamic region, and the physical con-
straints of the Bering Strait serve to seasonally concentrate species 
associated with the ice edge. The region is the only migration cor-
ridor for many species of fish, birds and marine mammals. Potential 
conflicts between increased ship traffic and large marine pinnipeds 
and cetaceans in the region are associated with increases in ambi-
ent and underwater ship noise, ship strikes, entanglement in marine 
debris and pollution (including oil spills). 
 
Indigenous Marine Use
The Bering Strait region is home to three distinct linguistic and 
cultural groups of Eskimo people in Alaska: the Inupiaq, Central Yupik 
and Siberian Yupik on Saint Lawrence Island. The coastline of the 
Bering Strait region has been continually occupied by indigenous peo-
ple for several thousand years. Human populations in this region have 
been dependent on marine resources, including mammals, fish, birds, 
macro algae, shellfish and other invertebrates. The hunting of large 
marine mammals has been the primary adaptive subsistence strategy 
of Bering Strait human populations for more than 1,000 years.  
Currently, the population of the Bering Strait region is greater 
than 10,000 people, with Alaska Natives comprising more than 
three-fourths of the population. There are 15 year-round villages 
along the U.S. coast that range in population from approximately 
150 to more than 750 residents.  
The use of different marine resources occurs throughout the year. 
However, use strategies change seasonally with the animal migra-
tions and life history stages. Regions where marine resources are 
gathered include beaches, coastal waters and/or nearshore waters, 
and may include offshore waters. For example, to adapt to the rap-
idly changing accessibility and availability of sea ice, hunting of 
large marine mammals (i.e., walruses) can take place up to 50 to 80 
nautical miles offshore. Travel to these offshore locations is typically 
conducted in small open boats and a hunt can span several days 
before a vessel returns to its port of origin.
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z Map 6.1  Vessel traffic in the Bering Strait during the summer of 2004.  Source: AMSA
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Marine resources are of vital importance to peoples of this 
region. Not surprisingly, today’s U.S. communities in this region, 
except White Mountain, are situated on the shores of the Bering 
or Chukchi seas and are strongly tied to subsistence lifestyles. This 
maritime reliance for subsistence in the Bering Strait region is very 
significant and, for marine mammal species such as walruses, whales 
and seals, comprises a significant portion of the total U.S. harvest. 
Additional marine-based resources are obtained through beachcomb-
ing, clamming, gathering seabird eggs, fishing, birding, gathering 
greens and other activities.
While Bering Strait region communities exhibit unique socio-
economic, cultural and political differences, they all use the marine 
resources for nutritional reliance, cultural customs and economic 
dependence (for example, clothing, equipment, handicrafts, commer-
cial fishing and hunting and limited ecotourism). The general pat-
terns of large marine mammal hunting and reliance on other marine 
resources (i.e., fish, crabs, birds, beachcast invertebrates, macro 
algae) persist to the present time, despite technological changes.
  Table 6.3 graphically demonstrates the maritime reliance for 
subsistence in the Bering Strait region with more than 85 percent of 
the harvested resources being marine-derived. The regional reliance 
on marine mammals is very significant.  
The communities closest to proposed vessel traffic in the Bering 
Strait region (Gambell, Savoonga, Shishmaref and Wales) have a high 
Number of Trips
1 - 10
11 - 20
21 - 50
51 - 100
101 - 150
151 - 200
Greater  than 200
September 2004 Sea Ice Extent
Twelve Communiti es Combined
Marine Mammals 68%
Moose 2%
Non–Salmon Fish 6%
Other Land Mammals 1%
Plants & Berries 3%
Reindeer 1%
Salmon 10%
Birds & Eggs 3%
Caribou 6%
Source: Kawerak, Inc., North Pacific Research Board, Alaska Department of Fish and Game, 2005-2006 Comprehensive 
Subsistence Harvest Survey, Bering Strait/Norton Sound Region
z  Table 6.3  Harvest composition 
of resources, 2005-2006.  
Note: Twelve communities 
combined.
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reliance on ocean-based resources. The St. 
Lawrence Island communities of Gambell 
and Savoonga are most dependent on 
marine resources, with the marine mammal 
harvest totaling over one million kilograms. 
More than 95 percent of their total subsis-
tence harvests are marine-based resources 
(i.e., seabirds, eggs, fish and marine mam-
mals). Shishmaref, on Sarichef Island, and 
Wales, on the mainland, demonstrate a high 
reliance on marine resources with more than 
75 percent of their total harvest derived 
from the sea. In contrast, the coastal com-
munities of southern Norton Sound, espe-
cially Stebbins and Unalakleet, demonstrate 
a higher reliance on fish, especially salmon, 
which is indicative of the highly productive 
river influences.
 Though current environmental patterns 
and predictions indicate a profound and 
long-term ecosystem change to the Bering 
Strait region, human reliance on marine 
resources for subsistence remains essential. 
The importance of the cooperative hunting of large marine mammals 
and the use of all available marine resources for nutritional, cultural 
and economic needs will persist in the region.
In 2001, Russia and the U.S. signed the Agreement between 
Government of the Russian Federation and United States of America 
on Cooperation in Combating Pollution in the Bering and Chukchi Seas 
in Emergency Situations. This agreement establishes cooperation in 
oil spill preparedness and response in the Bering Strait region. 
Potential conflicts between increased ship traffic and indigenous 
marine resource use in the Bering Strait region include but are not 
limited to an increased amount of:
•	 Ambient	and	underwater	ship	noise	-	recognized	as	one	of	the	
primary concerns to marine mammal populations, especially 
within the narrow and shallow migration corridor;
•	 Ship	strikes	on	large	marine	mammals;
•	 Entanglement	of	large	marine	mammals	in	commercial	fishing	gear;	
•	 Potential	 for	 collision	between	 coastal	 and	offshore	 large	 ship	
traffic and small open boats using marine resources;
•	 Pollution	affecting	the	availability	and	quality	of	offshore,	coastal	
and beachcast marine resources, due in part, but not limited to:
 ; lack of navigational and rescue infrastructure in an extremely
 challenging physical and marine environment;
	 ; concern for infrastructure to secure a large vessel in distress; 
 ; concern for infrastructure to assess and respond to an oil
 and/or chemical spill; and
 ; language (for example, English, Russian, Siberian Yupik) and 
 cultural communication barriers. 
In spite of the intensive subsistence use of resources, dynamic 
ice conditions and biological richness, there are currently no opera-
tional ocean-observing platforms in this region. Map 6.2 describes 
a potential observing system for the Bering Strait region, building 
upon existing (mostly research) assets. 
Commercial Marine Uses: Fishing, Oil and Gas,  
Minerals, Tourism and Shipping
In the Bering Strait region, there are three primary U.S. ports: 
Nome, Kotzebue and the DeLong Mountain Transportation System 
(DMTS) port serving the Red Dog mine. The main ports on the Russian 
side are just south of the Bering Strait, as they are on the U.S. side. 
The three largest ports are Provideniya, Anadyr and Egvekinot. The 
water depth in most U.S. and Russian ports in this region is about 
10 meters or less.
z Map 6.2  A potential observing system for the Bering Strait region. Source: Alaska Ocean Observing System (AOOS)
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Overall, approximately 150 large commercial vessels pass through 
the Bering Strait during the July-October open water period, with 
transits of these vessels most frequent at the beginning (spring) and 
end of the period (autumn). This estimate excludes fishing vessels, 
which are generally smaller, as well as fuel barges serving coastal 
mining activities and coastal communities.
Potential offshore development north of the Bering Strait region 
in the Chukchi and Beaufort lease sale areas could plausibly increase 
the numbers of support and supply ships transiting the region. There 
is no indication or information in support of ships transiting the 
Bering Strait on trans-Arctic voyages by 2020.
Infrastructure, Navigation and Communication 
There are currently no established vessel routing measures in the 
Bering Strait region. A Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS) may need to be 
established in the region as vessel traffic increases. There is currently 
no active Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) or other traffic management sys-
tem in place in the waters of the Bering Strait. Shipboard Automated 
Identification System (AIS) capability is currently limited. Presently 
the Marine Exchange of Alaska has established and is expanding AIS 
reception capability throughout portions of the Bering Sea.  
There are no shore-based very high frequency (VHF) FM commu-
nication services available in the Bering Strait region. The U.S. Coast 
Guard does maintain VHF-FM sites in the Bering Sea, and maintains a 
HF radio guard for emergency and distress calling, but HF coverage of 
the Arctic region is poor. There are only three U.S. Coast Guard main-
tained navigational aids at the Bering Strait along the north side of 
the Seward Peninsula into Kotzebue Sound. There are no navigational 
aids north of Kotzebue Sound.  
There is 100 percent coverage of the Bering Strait region from 
the Global Positioning System-Standard Positioning Service (GPS-SPS). 
However, the GPS constellation is not configured for optimal position-
ing in high latitudes, resulting in a potential degradation of position 
accuracy. There is currently no Differential GPS (DGPS) coverage of the 
area.
In the Bering Strait region, limited capabilities exist to respond 
to an incident, whether it is for lifesaving or oil recovery.  Weather 
and oceanographic observations necessary to support search and res-
cue and oil recovery operations are also minimal. Even if a U.S. Coast 
Guard operating team were seasonally deployed to an Arctic coastal 
community, weather and distance to an incident site would remain 
huge challenges. Under present circumstances, vessels in distress 
must depend on other vessels or local communities in the area for 
assistance or wait until aid arrives. Few viable salvage vessels are 
available north of the Aleutian Islands.
Findings 
Regional Futures to 2020 
Bering Strait Region 
1] The Bering Strait region is an international strait for navigation and a natural 
chokepoint for marine traffic in and out of the Arctic Ocean from the Pacific 
Ocean.
2]  The region, seasonally ice-covered, is a highly productive area exten-
sively used by many species of seabirds, marine mammals and fish. 
The highly productive continental shelf supports a rich array of benthic 
feeders; ice-dependent species also move through the region as sea ice 
retreats and advances. The Bering Strait serves to concentrate species as-
sociated with the ice edge and is the only migration corridor for many 
species.
3] The Bering Strait region is a prolific location for nesting seabird colonies, 
making it a vulnerable location for ecological disruptions. 
4] Indigenous people have continually inhabited the coastline of the Bering 
Strait region for several thousand years. Marine resources today are of vital 
importance to coastal American and Russian populations throughout the 
Bering Strait region. They are dependent on marine resources including 
marine mammals, fish, birds, macro algae, shellfish and other invertebrates. 
Hunting of large marine mammals can take place 50-80 nautical miles off-
shore. 
5] Ships related to a spectrum of uses are found in the Bering Strait region: 
fishing, hard minerals/mining, science and exploration, tourism and 
offshore oil and gas development. Approximately 25 large commercial 
ships (bulk carriers) annually sail north through the Bering Strait region 
(in the ice-free season) to the DeLong Mountain Terminal off Kivalina in 
northwest Alaska.
6] There are no formally established vessel routing measures in the Bering 
Strait region and there are very few visual aids to navigation in the re-
gion. Any future voluntary set of traffic routes, or a vessel traffic system, 
could be proposed by the United States and the Russian Federation to 
the International Maritime Organization.
7]  Offshore oil and gas development may lead to increased marine traffic 
in the Bering Strait region during the next several decades. Multiple 
use management practices and measures to mitigate potential impacts 
(noise, emissions, ship strikes, discharges, etc.) from these new uses 
would be useful.
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Hosted by Iceland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 
2007, the “Breaking the Ice: Arctic Development and Maritime 
Transportation” conference provided the first opportunity under 
the International Polar Year banner for marine specialists and 
stakeholders to exchange information on Arctic shipping and the 
prospects of a trans-Arctic route between the North Atlantic and 
the Pacific oceans.
Designed as a contribution to the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment, 90 delegates from all the Arctic countries, the United 
Kingdom, China and the European Commission discussed and 
debated issues on three key policy issues: the future of research 
and monitoring in the Arctic, the status of emergency prevention 
and response and the viability of trans-Arctic shipping.
The following are some of the observations made at the 
seminar:
•	 The	extraordinary	retreat	of	Arctic	sea	ice	and	the	rapid	decrease	
in multi-year ice has increased marine access throughout the 
Arctic basin and coastal seas.
•	 The	development	of	“double	acting	Arctic	ships,”	equally	fit	for	
open ocean and navigation through ice without icebreaker 
assistance, opens the possibility of year-round trans-Arctic con-
tainer traffic between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific 
oceans. A number of double acting tankers and containerships 
are already operating in the Arctic. The economics and ice-
breaking capacity of such ships improve with larger size.
•	 Improved	remote	sensing	technologies	will	make	it	possible	to	
provide information on ice thickness and ice ridges. The emer-
gence of ice forecast services can be used for plotting sailing 
routes through the ice.
•	 The	globalization	of	world	economy	and	rapid	growth	in	inter-
national trade has led to capacity constraints of the Panama 
and Suez canals, hampering the integration of North Atlantic 
economies with fast growing economies in East and Southeast 
Asia. Trans-Arctic shipping would supplement present trans-
portation routes and spur economic development.
•	 The	opening	of	a	trans-Arctic	route	would	enhance	economic	
security of the world. Present transportation links between 
Breaking the Ice: Arctic Development  
and Maritime Transportation
Organized by the Icelandic Government, March 2007
the North Atlantic and emerging economies in the Far East are 
precarious. They are subject to delays because of accidents, 
mechanical breakdowns and maintenance, and they are vul-
nerable to disruption because of terrorist activities, regional 
conflicts and piracy.
•	 The	 high	 cost	 of	 technical	 development	 and	 infrastructure	
make it unlikely for private stakeholders to commence regular 
trans-Arctic transportation without governmental support. 
•	 International	cooperation	for	the	development	of	trans-Arctic	
shipping should include stakeholders outside of the Arctic. 
Chinese delegates at the conference expressed a willingness to 
cooperate with the Arctic states in the research and develop-
ment of Arctic shipping.
•	 Changing	ice	conditions	may	make	it	challenging	to	maintain	
tight transportation schedules and ensure the punctuality of 
certain cargoes. Enhanced monitoring, improved sea ice infor-
mation and more efficient icebreaking carriers would signifi-
cantly improve the situation.
•	 A	 comprehensive	 feasibility	 study	 is	 needed	 to	 estimate	 the	
commercial viability of trans-Arctic shipping, taking into 
account a wide range of economic and natural variables, 
including vessel cost, ice conditions, sailing speed on different 
routes, etc. New shipping routes and technologies should be 
pioneered with experimental voyages in order to gather bet-
ter information on the shipping conditions and viability of new 
shipping routes. 
•	 Care	 must	 be	 taken	 to	 minimize	 environmental	 effects	 of	
increased shipping activity in the Arctic. The capacity of the 
Arctic states for emergency response must be increased with 
appropriate equipment, materials and sufficient towing capac-
ity, made available for various situations close to development 
sites and shipping routes. The Arctic Council can play a role in 
coordinating response to emergencies related to the shipping 
through the EPPR working group.
•	 While	 voluntary	 or	 recommended	 guidelines	 for	 Arctic	 ship-
ping have been adopted by IMO, the movement toward man-
datory rules for Arctic shipping must be accelerated.
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•	 One	 presenter	 proposed	 the	 use	 of	 nuclear	 ships	 for	 trans-
Arctic shipping to decrease the release of greenhouse gases 
and prevent the “graying” of the ice. Furthermore, nuclear ships 
would be relatively cheaper to operate in view of high and ris-
ing fuel costs.
•	 The	 participants	 agreed	 in	 general	 that	 Iceland	 could	 play	 a	
role in the opening of a trans-Arctic sea route because of its 
location in the middle of the Northern Atlantic. The new ship-
ping routes that pass near Iceland (routes of commercial ships 
from Northwest Russia and northern Norway sailing to North 
America) could be linked by Iceland serving as a hub for con-
tainer traffic in the northern Atlantic region.
The participants in the seminar concluded that experimental 
and limited trans-Arctic commercial voyages through the central 
Arctic Ocean could start during the summer navigation season 
within a decade; and that a year-round trans-Arctic marine trans-
portation route between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific 
oceans could plausibly open in one or two decades, considering 
security, economic and environmental factors.
©
 Aker Arctic Technology
 ARC TIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT |  S C E N A R I O S ,  F U T U R E S  A N D  R E g I O N A L  F U T U R E S  TO  2020 111
Regional Futures to 2020:
Canadian Arctic and
Northwest Passage
General Description of the Region
The Canadian maritime Arctic is located across the north of Can-
ada from the Beaufort Sea in the west to Hudson Strait in the east, 
covering approximately 2.1 million km². The Arctic Archipelago com-
prises approximately 36,000 islands, including three of the world’s 
10 largest islands. The coastal area is sparsely populated with fewer 
than 30,000 people. The Canadian Arctic also provides important 
habitat for a range of permanent and migratory species of marine 
mammals, seabirds and terrestrial animals such as caribou. Through-
out this region there are many ecologically sensitive areas where 
animals gather in large numbers at certain times and may be vulner-
able to impacts from shipping.
The Canadian Arctic has a long and rich history of marine use, 
beginning with its indigenous residents many thousands of years 
ago. Shipping in the Canadian Arctic has always been the safest 
and most economically effective means of moving goods to, from 
and within the region. It is a vast area with virtually no roads, no 
rail lines and where air services are both infrequent and very costly. 
There are also unique geographic and climatic conditions that make 
the region challenging for maritime navigation, including the pres-
ence of ice for most of the year, as well as the many narrow and 
shallow, often uncharted, areas through the archipelago. Canada has 
for many years strived to achieve a balance between development 
and environmental protection in its Arctic areas and for this purpose 
has a unique and extensive regulatory scheme in place to enhance 
marine safety and environmental protection in its Arctic waters. This 
regulatory scheme was ahead of its time when it was first established 
in the 1970s and is now in need of updating in order to bring it in 
line with recently developed international standards.
Sea Ice Conditions
Sea ice observations for the past three decades from the Canadi-
an Ice Service show negative trends in coverage for the eastern and 
western regions of the Canadian maritime Arctic. The observations 
also show a very high, year-to-year variability of sea ice coverage 
in all regions, an important factor of uncertainty when considering 
marine insurance, investment, ship construction standards and other 
aspects of Arctic marine transport. Due to the unique geographic 
characteristics of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (with many chan-
nels oriented north-south), the region is also expected to be one of 
the last areas of the Arctic Ocean to have a significant summer ice 
cover.  It is plausible that if sea ice melt in the central Arctic Ocean 
continues, as many climate models indicate, there is a potential for 
more mobile multi-year sea ice to be swept southward through many 
of the northern passages of the archipelago.  For the whole of the 
Arctic Ocean, including the Canadian maritime Arctic and Northwest 
z Table 6.4  Canadian Arctic shipping activity expectations to 2020.   Source: AMSA
Canadian Arctic  
Shipping Activity  
Expectations to 2020 may be summarized as follows:
•	 Dry	 bulk	 carriage stimulated by resource development: 
definitive forecasts of substantive marine transportation 
projects are, for now, Mary River and High Lake developments.
•	 Liquid	bulk	carriage stimulated by resource development: 
minimal forecasts due to expectations that any substan-
tive products in the Beaufort Sea will move out by pipeline.
•	 Supply/resupply:	some important but manageable expan-
sion in shipping activity is forecast, related to growing 
populations and for movement of supplies and equipment 
in support of exploration projects.
•	 Cruise	shipping: projections of modest but largely unpre-
dictable growth.
•	 Container,	bulk	transit	traffic: no substantive activity seen 
in this sector in the timeframe under examination.
•	 Other: unknown activity for fishing, seismic, etc.
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Passage, global climate models indicate that sea ice will be present 
throughout the winter and for approximately nine months during 
each year.  The Canadian maritime Arctic will have a generally more 
favorable sea ice situation in a short, summer period, but will be 
ice-covered for a majority of the year, a significant factor for Arctic 
transport regulation and protection of the marine environment.
Indigenous Use
The sea is very important to the way of life and culture. Inuit do 
not distinguish the water from the land in terms of their hunting and 
culture. All of the communities in the Canadian Arctic are coastal or 
situated on major waterways. Whether traveling in a boat or over 
the ice, the water provides a means of transportation, a connection 
between communities and a source of food. Though their technolo-
gies and style of living may have changed dramatically in the past 
hundred years, the Inuit are still by and large hunters who rely on 
country foods for a large portion of their diet. Some of the most 
important country foods are seal, walrus and whale, all of which are 
harvested on the ice edge or by boat. Any disruption of the ecosys-
tem, such as an oil spill, dumping of waste or noise from machinery 
or ships could have effects on the animals and, therefore, the health 
and well-being of the Inuit. Despite the benefits of increased com-
munity re-supply, general shipping is a cause for concern to the 
Inuit. Vessels may scare away mammals needed for subsistence; they 
break ice tracks, disrupting travel on the ice via snowmobile and 
ships may affect wildlife in harbors and elsewhere.
Current Commercial Use 
The types of commercial shipping activity currently taking place 
in the Canadian Arctic consist of community re-supply; bulk ship-
ments of raw materials, supplies and exploration activity for resource 
development operations; and tourism. Commercial re-supply activi-
ties are serviced by southern points of origin, one in the west and 
several in the east. In the western Arctic, most cargo is moved by 
tugs and barges from Hay River down the Mackenzie River to Tuk-
toyaktuk for transfer and consolidation. Conventional ocean-going 
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general cargo vessels typically handle cargo in the eastern Arctic. 
Cargo is lightered ashore using small tugs and barges that are car-
ried with the ships. Currently, there are no commercial vessels that 
regularly transit the Northwest Passage, aside from a few small spe-
cialty cruise operators. Other commercial shipping activities in the 
Canadian Arctic include a single-base metal operation in Deception 
Bay that ships nickel concentrates to Quebec, and grain shipments 
from Churchill to international markets. Exploration and resource 
development is ongoing. Recently, there has been heavy demand 
for logistics and supplies in both the eastern and western Arctic, 
particularly in the Beaufort Sea and at the Mary River iron ore mine, 
which shipped 120,000 tonnes of bulk cargo to European mills dur-
ing the 2008 season.
Future Use
Destinational shipping is anticipated to increase in the Canadian 
Arctic. This will be driven largely by the demand for goods by grow-
ing communities, expanding resource development projects, as well 
as increasing tourism. The changing climate will result in increased 
accessibility and a longer shipping season, which will in turn also 
affect future activity levels. By 2020, it is projected that annual re-
supply demand will increase enough that the current fleet will not be 
sufficient to meet the needs, despite the likelihood of a longer ship-
ping season. In addition, the current fleet is aging and most ships 
would likely need to be replaced within that timeframe. 
It is anticipated that the primary areas of increased marine ac-
tivity will be resource driven. The lack of infrastructure and high 
operational costs have, until recently, made this region uneconomi-
cal for large-scale resource development. However, during the next 
20 years, new bulk exports are expected to include: Mary River iron 
ore from a port at Steensby Inlet in the Foxe Basin, with possible 
commencement in 2010; Roche Bay magnetite from a port near Ig-
loolik in the Foxe Basin, possibly beginning in 2015; and High/Izok 
Lake lead/zinc/copper concentrate shipping from either Gray’s Bay 
or Bathurst Inlet, possibly starting in the same year. Imports will 
likely include logistics and fuel for the primary resource operations 
noted above; logistics and fuel, as well as barge-mounted produc-
tion modules for the proposed Mackenzie pipeline; and delivery of 
production modules to the Alberta Oil Sands, among others. High 
operational costs in the Canadian Arctic are a limiting factor in this 
region.  As a result, it may be many years before the Canadian Arctic 
matches the volume of resources extracted from Alaska or the Rus-
sian Arctic regions. 
While the summer climate in the Canadian Arctic region is 
changing, ice will be present during most of the year and especially 
during the long, cold polar nights each winter. As a result, access to 
the Northwest Passage will continue to be controlled by ice condi-
tions.  Despite widespread speculation, the uncertainty of condi-
tions in the Northwest Passage due to seasonal variability, chang-
ing ice conditions, complexity of routes, depth restrictions, lack of 
adequate charts and other infrastructure, high insurance and other 
costs, will diminish the likelihood of regular scheduled services. With 
the exception of nuclear icebreakers, very few ships have been built 
that could safely carry out year-round commercial navigation in the 
Canadian Arctic. The continued presence of ice even in open water 
will mean that operational costs will continue to be high. 
      
Findings
Regional Futures to 2020
Canadian Arctic & Northwest Passage
1] The Northwest Passage is not expected to become a viable trans-Arctic 
route through 2020 due to seasonality, ice conditions, a complex archi-
pelago, draft restrictions, chokepoints, lack of adequate charts, insur-
ance limitations and other costs, which diminish the likelihood of regu-
larly scheduled services from the Pacific to the Atlantic.
2]  Destinational shipping is anticipated to increase in the Canadian Arctic, 
driven by increasing demand for seasonal re-supply activity, expanding 
resource development and tourism.
3] In the Canadian Arctic, ice conditions and high operational costs will con-
tinue to be a factor into the future. Irrespective of the warming climate, 
ice will remain throughout the winter, making viable year-round opera-
tions expensive. 
4] Canada has a specific regulatory system for shipping in Arctic waters 
that is in need of an update in line with recently developed international 
standards.
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Regional Futures to 2020: 
Northern Sea Route  
and Adjacent Areas 
In 2003, participants representing the shipping industry, 
research community from five EU countries, Russia and Norway 
began a three-year research project: the Arctic Operational Platform 
(ARCOP). ARCOP was not to be re-negotiated by PAME, did not have 
a direct linkage to the AMSA objectives and did not express the 
views of the Russian Federation.
During the same period “JANSROP Phase II” in 2002 began a 
three-year program. In conjunction with INSROP (1993-1999), 
JANSROP II, funded by Japan’s Nippon Foundation, emphasized the 
eastern part of the Northern Sea Route (Siberia, Far East Russia 
and the Sea of Okhotsk). INSROP (See page 46) was supported by 
the Russian Federation and funded by a consortium of Norwegian, 
Japanese and Russian sources. Four hundred and sixty experts par-
ticipated in INSROP in economics, navigation, meteorology, hydrog-
raphy, military operations and environmental protection from: 
Russian Federation, Norway, Japan, United States, United Kingdom, 
Denmark, Sweden, Germany and Finland. INSROP results included an 
experimental Arctic voyage from Yokohama to Rotterdam, interna-
tional conference, three books and 167 peer-reviewed papers.
ARCOP, funded by the EU Commission and European shipping 
interests, examined the different elements of oil and gas transporta-
tion between northwest Russia and Europe. ARCOP included six sep-
arate work packages, each concentrating on a specific topic but also 
using one selected transportation task as a focus of the research. 
Fifty-seven research reports were produced by ARCOP and all reports 
can be found on the ARCOP website, www.ARCOP.fi. The contents of 
this section represent the views of the experts who worked within 
ARCOP and is presented as one of the assessments in the field.
Work Package 1, The Ice Information System, was started in 
early 2005. The research part of this work package was performed 
jointly with the Ice Ridging Information for Decision Making in 
Shipping Operations (IRIS) project, which is a separate EU-funded 
project coordinated by the Helsinki University of Technology (HUT). 
It developed methods to acquire online ice information and cre-
ate accurate ice condition forecasts in a short time span. Kaeverner 
Masa Yards participated in this project and the results from IRIS were 
applied to ARCOP. Within ARCOP, the information from IRIS was com-
pared to the experience within the Russian Arctic. The potential of 
the enhanced ice information system was demonstrated by economic 
analyses in the NSR conditions. 
Work Package 2, Administrative Measures for Marine Transport, cov-
ered a large number of topics, varying from international law to rules 
and fees applicable in the Russian Arctic. Within international law, 
the regime in force in the Russian Arctic is in line with UNCLOS Article 
234 and thus the situation regarding commercial shipping is more or 
less clear. It was also considered that UNCLOS Article 76, dealing with 
the extended continental shelves, does not really affect commercial 
shipping, since sailing in the central Arctic Ocean means passing 
through areas covered by Article 234. 
Within the World Trade Organization and the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS), there are a number of issues that are 
not yet clear. But since the whole GATS regime covering shipping is 
still open, this is not a specific Arctic problem. Of interest to the 
Arctic shipping community is the question of icebreaker services. In 
some countries, this is considered a service that should be open for 
competition within the WTO. In the Russian Federation, as well as in 
Sweden, this is considered to be part of the infrastructure that the 
coastal state provides. A potential solution to this question will be 
realized only when large-scale transportation is in place.
The question of ice rules caused much discussion during the 
ARCOP workshops, and it appears the current system of rules is 
not consistent. When dealing with hull strength, the IMO recom-
mendations refer to Polar Classes. But these Polar Classes in fact do 
not exist, since IACS has not published their Unified Requirements. 
Additionally, the Unified Requirements do not say anything about 
propulsion power. Among the national authorities like in Finland and 
the Russian Federation, there are, and obviously will be, requirements 
for minimum power. This puts the shipowners and ship designers in a 
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Formed in 2001, the Non-commercial Partnership of the Co-
ordination of the Northern Sea Route Usages is a Moscow-based 
organization comprising federal and regional government officials, 
Russian shipping companies and international research and/or ed-
ucational institutions.
Arthur Chilingarov, deputy chairman of the State Duma, is 
president of the Partnership with Mikhail Nikolaev, deputy chair-
man of the Council of Federation, as the vice-president. Captain 
Vladimir Mikhailichenko, former head of the Northern Sea Route 
Administration, is the managing director.
The organization has 32 members whose aim is to expand the 
use of the NSR, assist in safe navigation of Russian and internation-
al commercial use along the route, ensure adequate environmen-
tal protection in the region, stimulate research and development 
activities associated with the route; as well as addressing issues 
such as tariffs, taxation, insurance and other economic factors in 
the Arctic zone and the NSR.
 In order to incorporate the thoughts of the partnership mem-
bers into the AMSA, partnership member Institute of the North, in 
conjunction with the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, held a facili-
tated discussion during the organization’s quarterly meeting in St. 
Petersburg, Russia in February 2008.
The participants were asked what opportunities and challeng-
es they anticipated for the Northern Sea Route in the next 20 years, 
or longer. The following ideas were captured during the 2 ½ hour 
discussion and placed into seven topic areas: Emerging Routes, 
Infrastructure, Technological Considerations, Development and 
Shipping Economics, International Cooperation and Marine En-
vironmental Safety, Training and Education and Arctic Ocean Ob-
serving Network/Monitoring.
Concerning emerging routes, participants generally agreed 
that the intermodal transportation system (rail and shipping) 
within Russia is poised to make “colossal” changes and that all 
Arctic shipping will be influenced by the developing intermodal 
transportation systems. There was agreement that there will be a 
greater increase in the shipment of oil and gas of western Russia 
through the Barents and Norwegian seas, and that regional devel-
opment in the Russian Far East could reasonably tie rail and ship-
ping in the Lena River with Chinese products going into the Rus-
sian Far East and possibly natural resources going out. All of the 
participants agreed that economics, not Arctic climate change, will 
drive increased shipping in the NSR.
Non-commercial Partnership of the Coordination of the  
Northern Sea Route Usages: Facilitated Discussion
When talking about infrastructure, the group agreed there 
is a need for better ice forecasting because ice is very difficult to 
predict. They envisage the icebreaker fleet in the future will be a 
mixture of a few large federal icebreakers and smaller commercial 
multi-purpose icebreakers to support offshore oil and gas develop-
ment. They noted that shallow draft along the NSR coast and inland 
rivers made access difficult and challenging; however, the Europe-
an Union ARCOP project indicated winter marine access along the 
Ob’ River. The lack of major ports along NSR is one limiting factor 
in increased shipping and is compounded by the need for port im-
provements throughout the North. The members were adamant 
there is a need for better search and rescue resources deployed, 
as well as places of refuge identified. In addition, the capability of 
ships to provide assistance should be considered of prime impor-
tance, having due regard to the lack of repair facilities, the limited 
number of dedicated towing ships available and the response time.
As to technology, the group said the likely future for shipping in 
the NSR will occur with independent icebreaking cargo ships and a 
small number of federal icebreakers used to facilitate traffic, if nec-
essary. Some members of the partnership believe there continues 
to be a need to maintain a federal icebreaker fleet, with the lead 
icebreakers of 100,000 shaft horsepower; while others see a differ-
ent role for a smaller icebreaker fleet that are used to assist, when 
needed, independent icebreaking cargo ships.
Concerning development and shipping economics, some 
members suggested the NSR tariff structure needs to be evalu-
ated with the goal of making it more competitive within the global 
maritime industry and economically sustainable. All operations, 
whether they are from within the Russian Federation or outside the 
country, should be subject to the same tariff structure. The group 
said redundancy of critical systems should be incorporated into 
ships operating in the NSR. government should work closely with 
and be supportive of regional commercial icebreaking systems and 
regional relationships in the Barents Sea region (between nations 
and regional organizations) are important linkages for the future 
of the NSR. 
When discussing international cooperation and marine envi-
ronmental safety, the partnership members agreed there is a need 
to address the key challenges in combating oil spills in ice-covered 
waters. They called for the International Maritime Organization to 
create mandatory, not voluntary, regulations for all ships plying the 
waters of the Arctic and Antarctica. The partnership plans to work 
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with the noncommercial organization, Association Northwest, 
which includes 11 independent regions. They believe it is impor-
tant that all ships in the NSR meet or exceed the voluntary Guide-
lines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters. They also said 
that the Arctic environment imposes additional demands on ship 
systems, including navigation, communications, life-saving, main 
and auxiliary machinery, etc. They emphasize the need to ensure 
that all ships systems are capable of functioning effectively under 
anticipated operating conditions and providing adequate levels of 
safety in accident and emergency situations. 
In the training and educational area, they suggested ice naviga-
tion simulators are needed to improve ice navigation and enhance 
marine safety. They emphasized the human factor is very impor-
tant in all of these issues, but especially true when recruiting and 
training crew. Such training should include knowledge of cold wa-
ter survival gear and other unique issues crew may be exposed to 
while navigating in ice-covered waters.
As to the Arctic monitoring, the partnership urged support for a 
future Arctic Ocean Observing System, recognizing that a robust and 
effective Arctic Ocean Observing System is essential to enhancing 
marine safety and environmental protection in the NSR and through-
out the Arctic Ocean. They also supported obtaining reliable and de-
tailed hydrometeorological and sea ice information in the near-real 
time as necessary for supporting safe ship navigation.
difficult situation since there is no generally approved basis for the 
requirements. A great deal of work is still required to unify and make 
the requirements consistent.
The issue of fees seems also to be a difficult one. Generally, it is 
considered that the current level of fees in the Russian Federation - 
for example, $US16 per ton of oil cargo - is far too high. The problem 
is that the fees are set based on the current cargo flow, which is less 
than two million tons per year. If the cargo flow should increase to 
40 million tons or more per year, the fees could decrease to a level 
of $US1 per ton. This fee would be consistent with fees collected in 
Finland on the Baltic Sea. 
The other issue is that the system defining the fee level in the 
Russian Arctic is not as transparent as it is in Finland. It is impossi-
ble to track how the funds collected as fees are used. Also criticized 
was that the fee system does not encourage the use of improved ship 
technology. A simple calculation shows that using a more expensive 
vessel, which requires less icebreaker assistance, is not beneficial to 
the shipowner since he is forced to pay for the icebreaker service 
that is not needed. Hopefully, this issue will be reconsidered in the 
future.
Work Package 3, Integrated Transportation System, was the actual 
core of the ARCOP project. This work package looked at the different 
elements that are needed, from tankers and icebreakers to loading 
systems, traffic management and crew training; and the economics 
of transportation were analyzed. The scenario for which the develop-
ment work was done was selected to be realistic, but not yet com-
mercially in operation. 
The task was to transport 330,000 barrels per day of oil pro-
duction from Varandey in northwest Russia to Rotterdam in Europe. 
Two different operational tanker modes were used, independent and 
assisted. There were three alternative designs of icebreakers, each 
capable to assist the tankers up to 120,000 DWT. The route alterna-
tives used were either direct transportation to Rotterdam, or shuttle 
service to Murmansk and trans-shipment from there to open water 
tankers to Rotterdam. The result was that assuming a fee level of 
1.2 Euros per ton, a cost level can be achieved of 12 Euros per ton. 
This is considered feasible when compared with the pipeline costs 
for similar routes that are approximately 20 Euros per ton. What 
is important to notice is that the difference between the best and 
worst alternative is nearly 100 percent. This means that with opti-
mization, a savings of more than 100 million Euros per year can be 
achieved. Over the lifetime of the project, this would amount to 
more than 2.5 billion Euros.
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The work with the Vessel and Traffic Monitoring and Information 
System (VTMIS) showed that there are a number of information ser-
vices that could be combined in a system for the Arctic. In the future, 
ice information must be part of any VTMIS system.
The lack of crew training was an issue that was strongly iden-
tified in ARCOP. Although many international codes including IMO 
recognize the issue, there is no international standard or even train-
ing service available. The need for trained crews for ice operations 
is increasing: an estimated 3,000 positions require Arctic training 
in future years. The subject of adequate Arctic crew training is also 
strongly related to the issue of Arctic marine safety.
Work Package 4, Environmental Issues, primarily looked at the risk 
levels of Arctic marine transportation. With the scenarios that were 
created, it seems that the risk levels were quite low when compared 
to experience from other sea areas. It must be noted, however, that 
there is no existing experience with large-scale transportation in the 
Arctic conditions. The experience on ice damages is mainly based 
on Baltic conditions. This is an issue that needs to be thoroughly 
studied in the future. The second issue studied was oil drift after an 
accident. The several scenarios produced showed that depending on 
the accident location, either high capacity or quick response time 
is important. This means that the response strategy must take both 
of these into account. What was satisfactory was that the differ-
ent simulation methods gave consistent results and thus at least 
the experts are confident that the methods are reliable. The third 
issue was the actual oil spill countermeasures. Knowing that the 
use of in-situ burning and dispersants is efficient, but their use 
limited due to other reasons, the project concentrated on bioreme-
diation and mechanical oil recovery. In bioremediation, the problem 
still exists that the type of bacteria available today is not efficient 
in temperatures below freezing. This means that the development 
of more specific PAH-degrading cold-adapted bacteria needs to be 
continued. Within mechanical oil spill recovery several options were 
studied. It seems that none of them is proven in a large-scale oil 
spill. There are efficient methods like the LAMOR Arctic Skimmer, 
but they have been designed for a limited size of oil spills and need 
further development.
The original idea within ARCOP was to arrange a large-scale 
validation voyage with a large-size tanker to the Russian Arctic. 
Unfortunately, no commercial cargo was available for a large tanker 
by the time the voyage was planned. What was done instead was that 
the Russian participants in the project analyzed some of the ongoing 
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activities in areas that can be considered relevant. The current cargo 
operations at the Varandey terminal show that the downtime esti-
mates used in the ARCOP economic analyses were quite close to those 
that are experienced today. Also, the time that is needed to perform 
the customs and other administrative formalities were realistic.
The analyses related to the operation of icebreakers with large 
tankers were done from experience in the Baltic. These analyses show 
that, at least in Baltic conditions, one icebreaker is often enough to 
assist one large tanker through the ice. Thus, the assumption that 
was used in ARCOP calculations may be slightly pessimistic.
During the project, eight workshops were arranged within the 
Work Package 6. The workshops gathered 401 specialists, represent-
ing 89 different organizations from 12 different countries during the 
whole project.
The workshops were an efficient tool to bring together different 
interest groups from industry, science and authorities. And although 
ARCOP was an EU-project, the workshops brought a circumpolar 
dimension into the work. 
In general ARCOP managed to achieve most of its strategic 
objectives:
•	 The	workshops	formed	a	forum	for	continuous	discussion	between	
the EU and Russia with some circumpolar dimension toward the 
end. 
•	 The	review	of	the	legal	aspects	resulted	in	a	common	understand-
ing of the legal status of the Arctic sea routes, while raising a 
number of issues that need to be taken into consideration as the 
GATS regime for shipping is developed.
•	 The	research	of	the	rules,	regulations	and	requirements	brought	
some clarity to the consistency of the regulatory basis of Arctic 
shipping in the Russian Federation, while noting current IMO and 
IACS regulations were not fully satisfactory.
•	 The	 economic	 analysis	 of	 transportation	 showed	 how	 different	
factors, such as technology, fees, efficiency of the border for-
malities and the way of operating the icebreakers, were critical 
influences in decision-making. 
•	 The	studies	on	environmental	 issues	gave	a	clear	warning	that	
readiness for accidents must be further developed and that all 
the safety-related factors have to be taken seriously.
•	 The	work	between	the	EU	and	Russian	researchers	improved	the	
understanding between the cultures and led to the development 
of common recommendations on a number of topics.
ARCOP was considered a part of the EU-Russia energy dialogue. The 
results of the project will be of help when developing energy transporta-
tion policies from Arctic Russia to global markets. Z
Findings
Regional Futures to 2020
Northern Sea Route  
and Adjacent Areas
1] The marine transportation of oil from the Pechora Sea to Europe is con-
sidered to be both technically and economically feasible. Today cargo 
flow is more than 1.5 million tons per year. With future increases in 
cargo, the charge for every passing ship along the NSR will be decreased 
accordingly.
2]  Russian rules and requirements are mostly consistent with international 
law and requirements (for example, UNCLOS and IMO Conventions). 
However, taking into account Russia’s experience with navigation in the 
Arctic, it has adopted rules pertaining to vessels operating in the NSR 
that contain certain provisions that go beyond international rules and 
standards (for example, inspections, requirements for ice pilots and 
transit fees).
3] The estimated volumes of maritime traffic on the NSR are expected to 
be about 40 million tons of oil and gas per year by 2020, which may 
contribute to improved economic effectiveness of cargo transportation 
via the NSR. 
4] New Arctic marine technologies can help solve some of the problems 
related to transportation economics. With proper technologies, marine 
transportation costs in the region will be lower than those of pipeline 
transportation of oil and gas. 
5] The probability for major accidents is considered to be low even with 
the increased traffic volumes; however, the consequences of a major 
accident would be serious due to the sensitivity of the fragile Arctic envi-
ronment, remoteness of the area, harsh environmental conditions and 
difficulties in conducting oil spill cleanup operations.
6] There are several, key infrastructure challenges for the region: the ice 
information services require support; adequate hydrographic services 
may become an issue and lack of adequate search and rescue capabilities 
along the NSR. Regional SAR agreements between Norway and Russia, 
and the U.S. and Russia, have improved response and coordination in the 
Barents Sea and Bering Sea accordingly.
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Findings
 1] Natural resource development and regional trade are the key drivers of increased Arctic marine activity. Global 
commodities prices for oil, gas, hard minerals, coal, etc., are driving the search for Arctic natural wealth. New 
Arctic resource discoveries are highly probable and most new developments will require marine transport and 
operational support.
 2]  Exploration and development of new Arctic natural resources take place in continually changing and hugely com-
plex physical, economic, social and political environments. Few (if any) predictive/forecast capabilities of this 
broad scope and magnitude are available to provide quantitative information on these global sectors interacting 
together (and their relationships to Arctic marine transport requirements).
 3] A large number of uncertainties define the future of Arctic marine activity. These uncertainties include: the legal 
and governance situation, degree of Arctic state cooperation, climate change variability, radical changes in global 
trade, insurance industry roles, an Arctic maritime disaster, new resource discoveries, oil prices and other resource 
commodity pricing, multiple use conflict (indigenous and commercial) and future marine technologies. 
 4] It is anticipated there will be a slow movement of Arctic marine ecosystems northward with retreating seasonal sea ice, 
which may open new fishing grounds in higher latitudes in the future. 
 5] Plausible longer seasons of navigation will have significant implications for multiple uses in regional Arctic water-
ways. The overlap and/or competing indigenous and new marine uses will provide many challenges for the Arctic 
coastal states.
 6] There is anticipation that new Arctic ship technologies will set a norm for more independently operated, icebreak-
ing commercial ships; however, icebreaker assistance will remain the principle element of Arctic infrastructure.
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 7]  Increased marine traffic in the central Arctic Ocean is a reality - for scientific exploration and tourism. The future 
holds increasing exploration voyages, plausible increases in tourism and fishing and plausible trans-Arctic voyages 
in summer on an experimental basis.
 8]  Arctic voyages through 2020 will be overwhelmingly destinational (regional trade), not trans-Arctic. These destina-
tional voyages are driven by natural resource development, marine tourism and supply/import of materials/goods.
 9]  Most ships built today for Arctic operations are purpose-built, such as bulk ore carriers, tankers and LNG carriers. 
There is an economic penalty to use these same ships in long, open ocean voyages since their higher construction 
standards and thicker steel plating for sailing in the Arctic adds considerable weight.
 10]  Arctic offshore leases in the Beaufort and Chukchi seas and large investments already made in offshore Arctic 
Norway and northwest Russia (Barents Sea) may stimulate decadal increases in coastal Arctic marine activity.
 11]  A lack of major ports and other maritime infrastructure, except for those along the Norwegian coast and Northwest 
Russia, is a significant factor (limitation) in evolving and future Arctic marine operations. There are significant 
linkages between infrastructure and to most environmental protection and marine safety measures and strategies.
12]  Many non-Arctic stakeholders, such as non-Arctic states, marine shippers, insurers, shipbuilders, tour ship opera-
tors and more, will become actively involved in the future use of the Arctic Ocean.
13]  It is highly probable that socio-economic responses to global climate change (for example, emission controls) will 
impact all elements of future Arctic marine activity.
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which will make the Arctic more accessible to marine shipping, will 
affect most aspects of the lives of Arctic residents, from traditional 
livelihoods to infrastructure to the spread of disease. Social and eco-
nomic change will come from national and global trends in trade and 
communication. Impacts to the environment and society are most 
likely to stem from the interactions of human and environmental 
change, particularly as human choices influence the trajectories of 
change. In this context, shipping may play a significant role not only 
on its own, but also, and perhaps even more likely, through combin-
ing with other drivers of change.
Arctic marine shipping involves several distinct activities, each 
with different interactions with local residents and thus different 
implications and likely impacts. Trans-Arctic shipping of cargo, 
using the Arctic merely as a corridor between distant ports, has 
some potential for environmental impact, depending on cargo car-
ried and volume, and thus for affecting local societies that depend 
on a healthy marine environment. The infrastructure required to sup-
port such shipping may include port facilities, search and rescue 
or emergency response capability, and mechanisms of governance 
H
uman dimensions refer to the interrelationships 
of people and the environment, particularly with 
respect to environmental change. Often, human 
dimensions concern broad issues such as govern-
ment policies or institutional responses to change. In the Arctic, 
human dimensions research has typically looked at local or regional 
cases. For marine shipping in the Arctic, both the broad and the local 
approaches are important to consider. Shipping will occur across the 
entire region, requiring national and international policies to provide 
effective management and regulation. Because trans-Arctic shipping 
will be driven largely by global economic factors, as will more local 
shipping for resource development, the role of institutions such as 
shipping companies, regulatory agencies and local or regional orga-
nizations who may be affected will all be pertinent. 
This chapter addresses primarily the local aspects of human 
dimensions of Arctic marine shipping, with a particular focus on 
indigenous communities and traditional activities in the marine 
environment. Arctic marine shipping will occur in the context of 
many other changes affecting Arctic residents. Climate change, 
Human Dimensions 
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or enforcement, which may include military presence to preserve 
sovereign claims over certain waters. Such facilities may provide 
employment and other economic opportunity for local communities, 
but could also lead to social disruption if many people move to 
small communities to take new jobs. Local shipping, to and from 
Arctic ports, is likely to have more direct influence on communities. 
Indeed, local shipping today provides for substantial shipments of 
cargo and fuel to remote communities, allowing for a higher standard 
of living and lower prices than would be possible by air or land ship-
ment alone. Longer shipping seasons could reduce prices further, or 
allow greater access by visitors.
Another form of local shipping is that in support of resource 
development in the Arctic. Supplying mines, oil and gas installa-
tions, and other development sites, and transporting the materials 
that are produced there, is the dominant form of marine shipping in 
the region today. While it is not clear whether reduced sea ice will 
have a major influence on development trends, increased shipping is 
unlikely to constrain development. If indeed development increases, 
it will have far-reaching economic consequences for the regions in 
which it occurs, and will likely have environmental impacts as well.
In addition to mineral and petroleum extraction, fishing in Arctic 
waters is likely to increase as a result of greater access to ice-free 
waters. In Greenland in particular, the development of a shrimp 
fishery has had major impacts on coastal communities and indeed 
on the national economy, as shrimp constitute a major export from 
Greenland. In Alaska, participation in commercial fisheries has sub-
stantial social and economic impacts on communities, implying that 
increased involvement in fisheries by more northern communities 
could have major impacts both positive and negative.
One non-extractive industry likely to benefit from increased 
shipping access is tourism. For local communities, tourism can be 
a source of revenue but also a disruption, both from direct (though 
z  Map 7.1  Circumpolar coastal human population distribution.  Source: AMSA
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Bering Island, one of the Commander Islands, lies east of the 
coast of Kamchatka and west of the U.S. territories in the Aleutians. 
The only Aleut community on Russian soil and the only inhabited 
village on the Commander Islands is the village of Nikolskoye 
with about 750 residents, 300 of them Aleuts. The following is an 
account of an accident that should serve as a warning sign and 
an opportunity to examine the Achilles heel in shipping regula-
tion and disaster preparedness, pointing the way toward policy 
changes to prevent worse disasters. 
In July 2003, a 20-ton container filled with a hazardous chemi-
cal used in cement (tetratethylene glycol diheptanoate) washed up 
off the western coast of Bering Island, near the northwestern fur 
seal rookery and 15 kilometers from the local fishing grounds. The 
container, owned by the DuPont Corporation, was being shipped 
from South Africa to Korea and was lost at sea in March 2003. 
When the container was discovered on the beach, there was 
no disaster response plan in place. Individuals who got close to the 
A Container of Hazardous Materials Washes Ashore 
in the Commander Islands, Russian Federation
container to examine it did not have any training in the handling of 
hazardous materials or the necessary equipment and clothes. They 
were poisoned and needed medical assistance. 
The first attempt to move the container away from the area 
where tidal waves could throw it on the rocks and break it was 
unsuccessful. The container cracked and approximately 15 tonnes 
of the chemical leaked, creating a 400 square-meter oily spill. 
A later survey counted 46 dead birds and one dead seal. 
The Anchorage office of the Aleut International Association, 
after receiving first news of the accident, made a round of calls to 
maritime attorneys in an attempt to find legal counsel for the vil-
lage of Nikolskoye. Finally a firm with appropriate expertise was 
located in Juneau, Alaska. A telephone conversation, however, was 
abruptly interrupted by the news that the firm had been hired to 
represent DuPont. 
DuPont provided funds for clean up, environmental assess-
ment and some emergency response equipment. The nature and 
size of this work was mostly 
determined by DuPont itself. 
This particular accident was 
small, but it exposed potential 
problems. governments may 
want to identify measures that 
can help prevent accidents and 
address response, especially in 
light of expected increases in 
shipping.© Aleut International Association, from
 the N
ikolskoye Adm
inistration
z The container of tetraethylene 
glycol diheptanoate that washed 
ashore on Bering Island.
124 ARC TIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT |  HUMAN DIMENSIONS
likely inadvertent) interference with traditional and other activities, 
and also from greater attention to some local practices that may 
not conform with the values or expectations of non-Arctic societies. 
The presence of large cruise ships and their visits to communities 
that may have a fraction of the population of the ship itself can-
not be ignored. An emergency involving such a ship could easily 
overwhelm local response capacity. Tourism, like fishing but unlike 
other forms of shipping, is likely to be focused on some of the same 
living resources (seabird colonies, marine mammals) that sustain 
local communities, thus increasing the potential for disruption and 
conflict.
The local human dimensions of Arctic marine shipping appear to 
be extensive, but there have been relatively few studies that have 
considered the implications either of current shipping activities or 
projections of what is likely to occur in the next few decades. The 
AMSA’s description of human dimensions of Arctic marine shipping 
is neither comprehensive nor exhaustive, but is intended to dem-
onstrate how and why marine shipping matters to Arctic communi-
ties and to consider what additional work is needed to be able to 
prevent, mitigate, or otherwise manage shipping to reduce negative 
impacts and maximize potential positive benefits.
In recent decades and today, Arctic coastal people travel far on 
sea ice and water, both along coastlines and also out to sea. A com-
prehensive, up-to-date catalog of indigenous use of the Arctic marine 
environment does not exist. Compilations of data from Canada and 
Alaska are two to three decades old. Some more recent studies have 
examined use patterns near individual communities, but even these 
are few and dispersed. It is thus impossible to present an overall 
map or description for the entire Arctic. This section provides instead 
a few examples of various uses of the Arctic marine environment and 
Shipping is but one of the many aspects of the history of 
northwestern Russia, one of the many factors shaping today 
and tomorrow. Murmansk was a bustling seaport during the 
Soviet era, when at the height of the Cold War it was the fish-
ing capital of Northern Russia. The Murmansk Region is home 
to about 2,000 Saami, who continue their traditional culture in 
the inland parts of the Peninsula.
In the Murmansk Region, history has been witnessed, lived, 
forgotten, suppressed, remembered and altered. Kola Bay, with 
its nuclear fleets, is poised to be the jumping off point for Arctic 
opportunities of shipping and mineral development. The Kola 
coast is a smaller version of the multi-faceted, complex and lay-
ered coastal landscape and seascape that is the Russian Arctic 
coast today. 
As a part of the time of transformation, the Kola Saami are 
witnessing a painful rebirth of their culture and nation. Since the formation of the Russian Federation, they can collaborate with the 
Saami in neighboring countries. They can participate in the Arctic Council and influence, for example, the development of marine 
and ocean policies. Even though the seasonal salmon harvest along the fjords of Kola is over and seals are no longer harvested by 
the Kola Saami, many elders still remember the sites, places and songs of the Kola coast. They remember the yearly cycle of the 
ocean, birds, fish and other beings. 
The Kola Saami are afraid that the increased shipping and construction of new pipelines will ruin the remaining wilderness areas 
of the Kola. Atlantic salmon spawning rivers, such as the Ponoi, are vital traditional fishing areas for the Saami and their productivity 
is directly related to the ecological status of the Russian sector of the Arctic Ocean. The Kola Saami are engaging in planning and 
decision-making to make sure that the people of the Sun Deer will be here now and forever.
Reflections from the Kola Coast
©
 Arctic Council
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Within Canada, Inuit view the Arctic as the places where Inuit 
have traditionally lived: Nunatsiavut along the coast of Labrador, 
Nunavik in Northern Quebec, the entire territory of Nunavut, and 
the Inuvialuit settlement region along the northern coast and 
around the northern islands of the Northwest Territories. 
Life in the Arctic is dependent on movement, and sea ice is inte-
gral to this movement. The Inuit have been a nomadic people living 
in the Arctic since ancient times. As such, our entire culture and iden-
tity is based on free movement on the land and sea. Much of the tra-
ditional knowledge passed down from generation to generation is 
meant to hone the skills necessary for hunting and fishing. In order to 
hunt and fish safely and effectively in the Arctic, we train our young 
people to recognize different types of ice and to know the dangers 
associated with different seasons. Inuit hunters spend much of their 
time out on the ice, mostly in small groups or even alone; therefore, 
reliable knowledge of the ice can be a matter of life and death.
Interviews conducted by ICC Canada in March 2008 indicate 
that despite the increased difficulty in finding and harvesting big 
game and sea mammals due to thinning and less predictable sea 
ice, Inuit communities are persistent in maintaining their tradi-
tional diets. When asked whether changes in ice conditions were 
affecting their traditional diets, respondents spoke of having to 
travel further or in a different month than usual; they spoke of 
dietary substitutions such as hunting more musk-oxen when the 
caribou migration shifted away from their area; or they explained 
how melting permafrost has made the natural ice cellars used to 
age and store meat less effective. Not one of them said anything to 
suggest they were giving up on hunting despite the considerable 
challenges some were facing in getting out on the ice and land.
When asked how his life might change because of poorer 
ice conditions in the future, Tommy Qaqqasiq from Pangnirtung, 
Nunavut said: “Then we’ll use other equipment. People will still hunt. 
It’s part of our life. When things change, you just have to go with it.”
After describing in detail how climate change is forcing his com-
munity to deal with new challenges, John Keogak of Sachs Harbour 
shared this idea on how he can continue his harvesting practices:
“A buddy of mine is into making little sleds out of aluminum, 
which you can use as a little kayak or boat. If you’re out on the ice 
and you have to cross an open lead or something you can use that. 
It’s one of the things that can help. I’m going to get one of those. 
It’s combined as a little sleigh and, if you have to, you can use it as 
a boat. That’s one way I can adapt.”
“The Sea Ice Is Our Highway”
Canadian Inuit Perspective on Transportation in the Arctic
With few exceptions, Inuit settlements are located on sea 
coasts or on major waterways with easy access to the sea. This 
clearly reflects the importance of the sea to our Inuit way of life. 
Whether thickly frozen or open for the summer, the sea is our pri-
mary means of transportation. The usually ice-covered sea is our 
highway, the only physical connection between many of our com-
munities and the only way we can access many of the animals we 
depend on for food (Table 7.1). 
As climate change and reductions in sea ice affect the migra-
tion routes of the land and sea animals we rely upon, it may be 
necessary for us to travel even further than before in order to reach 
them. Inuit hunters are reporting many changes in the locations 
and times that our traditional animals can be found. In some com-
munities this is reducing the territory that hunters need to cover, 
while in others they have to travel much further than before in 
order to harvest enough food for the communities. This is why we 
are very concerned that sea ice routes remain passable for hunt-
ers, as well as the migratory game they follow, and that the entire 
Arctic environment be kept free from contamination – both in the 
areas we are now using regularly and in those areas where we may 
need to hunt in the future. 
The primary resource for Inuit is the animals. Our people have 
always known how to care for this resource. We live in harmony 
with the land. When we hunt, we only take what we need and make 
sure to leave enough of the herd so that it can replenish itself. When 
we talk about the future, we are not talking about a five-year plan 
or even a 10-year plan. We are talking about our children and our 
children’s children. We are talking about living in the same commu-
nities where we can see the evidence of our ancestors. We are talk-
ing about preserving our way of life and the natural environment it 
depends upon for hundreds and thousands of years.
Ships coming through our seas are a cause for concern. On 
the one hand, they can be used to supply our communities with 
building materials and goods for our stores, which might bring a 
welcome reduction in the high cost of living in the Arctic. However, 
ships have also caused a lot of damage, as hunter Tommy Qaqqasiq 
of Pangnirtung explains:
 “In recent years, all kinds of cruise ships are coming in to our 
area. Last year alone, there were maybe five or six cruise ships that 
came into town. More are coming every year. There’s a national 
park here in Pangnirtung, further inside the fjord, that’s what they 
are coming to see. The tourists come into town and buy all kinds of 
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art, like carvings, craft work, soapstone, whatever they can afford 
to buy. They help the artists. But hunters have been complaining 
about those ships because they go all over Cumberland Sound, 
even to the campsites. People are saying they are scaring away 
the animals, the mammals and whales. We are really noticing this 
because in the past couple of summers we hardly saw any narwhals 
around. Usually we catch our quota, but not in these past years.”
Another example of the difficulties related to shipping comes 
from the community of Tuktoyaktuk on the Beaufort Sea coast. 
Tuktoyaktuk has long been a key hub for supply ships servicing 
many of the Inuit communities in Canada. Because the harbor is 
also teeming with various species of fish, Tuktoyaktuk is an instruc-
tive example of colliding interests between economic activities 
and Inuit use of the sea. Inuit hunter, trapper and fisherman Chucky 
gruben describes the issues:
“We have a hunters and trappers committee here, we take care 
of the wildlife. We deal with the people, we deal with the shipping 
companies. We have done some things where, after freeze-up, the 
ships are not allowed to come into the harbor. But this past year, 
because of late shipping to other communities, we had to keep our 
harbor open longer than usual because the supplies hadn’t gone 
out to the other communities. 
Region Demographics Transportation Economy
Nunavut • 2006 population: 29,500
• Growth rate 1.8% in 2005 to 2020
•  No all-weather roads or rail links between communities
•  Most communities receive 2 re-supply calls per year
• Dominance of public sector for economic output and jobs
• Significant non-wage and subsistence activity
• >100 active resource exploration sites
• Limited tourism
• Growth at 4.7% to 2010, slowing thereafter
Northwest Territories (NWT) • 2006 population: 41,861
• Most communities not expected to grow by 
2020
• Mackenzie River communities served by all-weather or 
   winter roads
• High unemployment in coastal communities
• Presently no resource projects for river communities
• Any shipping impact centred on Mackenzie Gas Project
• High Arctic oil and gas potential, but not before 2020
• Some diamond mine development opportunities
Nunavik • 2006 population: 10,783
• Population younger than Canadian average
• Growth rate of 2.4% to 2010, to slow thereafter
•  Community port programme receives fed/prov support
•  No all-weather road links to the 14 communities
• Significant non-wage and subsistence activity
• Like Nunavut, wage economy is growing through govt., fishing 
   and sealing, tourism, construction and resources
• Resource development slow due to lack of road infrastructure
Coastal Cree Communities  
(in Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba) 
• 2006 population: 18,654
• Young population
• Declining or levelling growth rates expected 
   post-2010
• Port of Churchill
• Limited all-year road access
• Largely subsistence economies
• Some benefiting from hydro-electric developments
• Resources on the horizon (diamond, gold, uranium)
• Churchill – a viable link to Russia?
“The community of Tuktoyaktuk is right in a harbor where a lot 
of fishing takes place. … The east entrance is a place where a lot of 
people here that do their fishing set their nets right in the channel. 
Because the ships had made a ship track through the east entrance, 
they kept it open up right until November sometime, and the peo-
ple couldn’t set their nets there because of the ships going back 
and forth. That is one of the impacts of shipping on our harvest. 
“Usually with that kind of thing, we do have a say on whether 
the ships can use the area, but times are changing and every year 
we get applications to come into the harbor later and later. They 
wanted to do that the year before last, too, but we had to say no. 
Last fall we didn’t really have a choice because there was still fuel 
and a lot of supplies that needed to go out to the other communi-
ties, so we had no choice. “
The point to emphasize through these accounts from various 
Inuit communities is that the environment is vital to our entire way 
of life as Inuit. If something were to happen to our fragile Arctic 
ecosystem, our way of life would be lost and we as a people would 
be lost. Therefore, any activity in the Arctic, whether it is resource 
extraction, tourism or military-related, must be undertaken 
according to the Inuit definition of sustainability – it must sup-
port the continuation of the Inuit way of life for thousands of years 
to come.
z  Table 7.1  Socio-economic projections for the Canadian North from the 2007 Canadian Arctic Shipping Assessment.  Source: Transport Canada
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kind presented in this section can be used to identify areas of poten-
tial conflict or interaction between local uses and marine shipping, 
but further studies should be done of specific areas where shipping 
activities are planned, in which the details of shipping and current 
local uses can be compared and evaluated for potential impacts and 
mitigation strategies.
In the face of uncertainty about what activities will take place, 
what effects those activities will have and what other factors will be 
involved, a collaborative management approach and careful planning 
are required to identify and respond to negative impacts and to iden-
tify and harness positive benefits. One hallmark of the collaborative 
resulting interactions with marine shipping activities in different 
forms. These examples are intended to illustrate some of the range 
of potential interactions and effects.
Arctic marine shipping is one of many factors affecting, or with 
the potential to affect, the lives of Arctic residents. Predicting exactly 
how various developments in shipping will affect Arctic communities 
is difficult at best. For example, there is insufficient information to 
describe current local human uses of the Arctic marine environment 
adequately enough to assess the range of likely effects of marine 
shipping, and researchers cannot anticipate all potential information 
needs when conducting studies in advance. Rather, findings of the 
The marine environment is vital for coastal Arctic communities. 
This is especially true in the Aleut region, where communities are 
on islands or along the Alaska Peninsula, providing excellent access 
to the sea but relatively few options on land. As with other data on 
the extent of marine use by Arctic indigenous communities, the 
information from the Aleut region is not consistent, comprehen-
sive, and up to date for all communities. Instead, some reports are 
over a quarter century old, and more recent information does not 
cover all communities or all species. Nonetheless, tribal representa-
tives confirm that the general pattern of marine use continues today.
Table 7.2 shows the results of surveys concerning traditional 
harvests in three predominantly Aleut communities in Alaska. 
Other studies have found that the overwhelming majority of 
households in Aleut communities use birds and eggs. In Nelson 
Lagoon, 92.3 percent of households used at least one bird or egg 
during the study period. In Akutan, the figure was 92.9 percent, 
compared with 88.9 percent in Nikolski and 73 percent in False 
Pass. Sharing of harvested birds and eggs was considered to have 
great cultural importance in all four communities.
Extent of Use of the Marine Environment  
by Aleut Communities
Zenia Borenin, president of the Tribal Council for the Native 
Village of Akutan, described local use of the marine environment:
“The northeast near coastal waters of Akutan Island are impor-
tant for black bass, chitons, halibut, salmon, razor clams, and sea 
lions. The southeastern-most near coastal waters is a vital cod and 
salmon fishing area. There is a sea lion haul out area on the eastern 
coast of Cape Morgan. A cod and halibut fishing area is located in 
the near coastal waters northeast of Talus Point.
“Akutan utilizes the coastal waters around Akun Island as well. 
Seagull eggs are harvested on the northwest shore of the island 
(Akun Head), and on the small islands southeast of Akun. Salmon 
and halibut are taken in the area of Lost Harbor. Halibut is harvest-
ed in the near coastal waters southwest of the island, and in sev-
eral areas east of the island. Salmon are taken in Surf Bay, Trident 
Bay, and in Akun Bay in the area of Helianthus Cove. Akun Bay is an 
important area for halibut, crab, cod, octopus, and sea bass.”
Community Per capita harvest (kg)
% from 
salmon
% from  
other fishes
% from marine 
invertebrates
% from birds  
and eggs
% from marine  
mammals
Sand Point 115.9 54 21 7 2 2
King Cove 116.0 53 17 7 4 1
False Pass 186.9 47 15 6 4 6
z  Table 7.2  Per capita harvests of wild 
resources from three Aleut communities,  
with percent contribution from various  
classes of marine resources.   
Source: Fall et al. 1993a, b, 1996
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approach is that it is adaptive in the sense that it allows for adjust-
ments and alterations based on experience and evaluation as changes 
take place, rather than creating a fixed system for addressing antici-
pated issues that may turn out to be ineffective when unanticipated 
events occur. 
An advantage of substantive local involvement is that local resi-
dents are often best positioned to weigh the many factors affect-
ing them. The example of the container that washed ashore in the 
Commander Islands describes the consequences when local capacity 
for addressing a problem is lacking, a situation exacerbated in that 
case by the lack of any larger precedent or system for response or 
accountability. In cases where local involvement in planning or car-
rying out shipping-related activities was higher, communities gener-
ally experienced better results. 
One component of local involvement is communication. Many 
of the participants in the AMSA town hall meetings asked for bet-
ter information about cruise visits and trans-Arctic shipping plans. 
Effective communication and continued interaction has been found 
to be important in oil and gas activities and in tourism in the Arctic. 
Communication can help reduce the number of surprises for all 
involved, and early identification of problems can allow more time 
for resolution. 
As noted earlier, projection of shipping activities and their 
impacts is difficult due to the interactions of numerous factors in 
the environment and in human society. To some extent, research-
ers need to develop better methods for studying combined effects 
of these kinds, just as regulators need to develop better methods 
for balancing multiple management objectives. Just as importantly, 
those involved in marine shipping in any capacity need to recognize 
that flexibility and adaptiveness will be required to recognize and 
address challenges, problems and opportunities that arise. 
Marine shipping encompasses a wide range of activities, taking 
place in different locations and seasons and with differing degrees 
of local involvement and effects. The quantity of shipping, likewise, 
may determine whether effects are largely beneficial or otherwise, 
and also who is most affected. For example, limited tourist traffic 
may provide a modest economic opportunity for local artists and 
handicraft makers, whereas higher levels of traffic may have environ-
mental or other impacts that offset any benefits. As noted earlier, 
the details of effects will depend greatly on the details of shipping 
and the characteristics of specific times and places. Nonetheless, the 
case studies in this section and studies of other types of activities, 
such as mineral and petroleum development, suggest some observa-
tions about what can be expected from increases in Arctic marine 
shipping.
The Beaufort Sea population of beluga whales, number-
ing in the tens of thousands, migrates from the Bering Sea 
through the Bering Strait into the Chukchi Sea and then east-
wards into the Beaufort Sea. The animals pass through the 
Mackenzie Delta region and into the waters among the west-
ern islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. This migra-
tory path takes them through the waters of Russia, Alaska 
and Canada. The belugas are hunted in all three regions. 
During their migration, Beaufort Sea belugas traverse 
several areas where shipping may be a major presence. The 
Bering Strait is a crucial chokepoint for any trans-Arctic ship-
ping. The Mackenzie Delta area already sees extensive tug 
and barge traffic. Shipping through the Northwest Passage 
will pass through narrow waterways where belugas gather in 
summer. Offshore oil and gas activities, including shipping, 
may affect belugas throughout much of their range. 
Shipping may also interfere with hunting activities 
and opportunity, compounding any effects at the level of 
the beluga population. Further work is needed to examine 
exactly where and when shipping will overlap with hunting 
and with key stages of the beluga migration. This informa-
tion can be used to develop specific management and miti-
gation plans, perhaps including limitations on shipping to 
protect belugas and those who hunt them. 
In addition to local initiatives, a broader management 
plan is required to address impacts in one region that may 
affect other regions. For example, a disaster in the Bering 
Strait could affect hunters in the Mackenzie Delta region, 
2,000 kilometers away, undermining any conservation 
efforts they have made in their area.
Beaufort Sea Beluga Whales
Local and Distant Effects of Shipping
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Town hall meetings were held in various locations in the 
Arctic as part of the outreach effort of the Arctic Marine Shipping 
Assessment. The intent of these meetings was two-fold. First, the 
organizers presented the plans for the assessment and the expec-
tation of increased marine shipping that was driving the study. 
Second, the organizers sought input from participants regarding 
their observations, concerns and questions related to marine ship-
ping. This section presents a summary of the main themes that 
emerged from these meetings.
Arctic  residents think about shipping, not by itself, but in a 
broader context of economic, environmental, political and social 
change. In the town hall meetings, shipping did not appear to be a 
cause of great hope or fear, but rather as an additional factor that 
would influence the future of Arctic communities in various ways. 
In addition, discussing the future of Arctic marine shipping raised 
concerns about the ability of small indigenous communities to 
influence large-scale economic activities.
Environmentally, shipping is seen as a potential source of 
disruption to marine species. Marine mammals, in particular, are 
seen as vulnerable to disturbance. In Resolute, Nunavut, a period 
of increased shipping in the 1990s pushed walrus away from the 
community, too far for hunters to reach them. Saami fishermen in 
northern Norway are concerned about impacts to fisheries and fish 
stocks, particularly from pollution or oil spills. Oil spills are, in fact, 
one of the largest concerns, especially with the lack of response 
capability in nearly all areas of the Arctic. Ship traffic also raises the 
possibility of introductions of invasive species.
Hunters are concerned about impacts to the animals and to 
their practices. Too much ship traffic could be dangerous for hunt-
ers in small boats. In many cases, hunters traveling over sea ice have 
been cut off by icebreakers, an impact that remains a big concern, 
especially when travelers’ lives could be at risk from unexpected 
open water. In some areas of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, 
caribou migrate over sea ice and could be affected by icebreaker 
traffic. On the other hand, hunters in Resolute and Iqaluit noted 
that some marine mammals follow ships. In Iqaluit, the arrival of 
a ship was often a signal to beluga hunters to look for whales that 
may have come into the bay. As one hunter in Cambridge Bay, 
Nunavut, said, hunters are going to adapt, but they cannot survive 
without healthy animals to hunt.
Economically, shipping offers many benefits. Participants in 
many communities spoke of the prospect of lower shipping costs 
if cargo ships can come more frequently or if larger ships can be 
used. Increased shipping and port activity can also provide jobs. In 
Town Hall Meetings
Canada, ports for mines have often been located away from com-
munities at the communities’ request, to avoid social impacts from 
the influx of workers. Communities may reconsider that approach 
or seek other ways to gain economic benefits from port activities. 
On a smaller scale, cruise ships provide an opportunity for carvers 
to sell their artwork, making their visits welcome to at least some 
Arctic residents. 
The relative costs and benefits of shipping depend greatly on 
volume. Modest amounts of traffic, or a few visits by cruise ships, 
may be seen as largely positive. Increasing numbers of ships and 
visits, however, pose the threat of greater disruption and little time 
in between to recover. Culturally and socially, shipping can be a cat-
alyst for disturbance if many newcomers arrive in the Arctic, as has 
been seen with other forms of development. The Arctic is already 
experiencing rapid social and cultural change, and additional pres-
sures will only make adjustment harder. 
In this context, many participants expressed concern over 
having little voice in shipping, development and other activities 
that have so much effect on their lives. In Norway, development 
of onshore mineral resources and offshore oil and gas are seen as 
major threats to the Saami way of life. With the extent of global 
environment, economic and social change, many Arctic people feel 
they have little ability to influence major developments like Arctic 
marine shipping. When shipping companies ignore local residents, 
the feeling of powerlessness is compounded. By contrast, when 
shipping companies or cruise lines communicate with local resi-
dents, the effort is well received and makes people better informed 
and thus better able to make any adjustments they need to in order 
to minimize the impacts of ship traffic. 
An additional insight from the town hall meetings is that few 
Arctic residents are aware of the scope of activities that may be 
coming to their region soon. The meetings were able to provide 
some information, but many additional questions were raised 
about the scale of environmental change, the prospects of mineral 
development and other changes that can be expected in the near 
future. For Arctic residents, these influences are not separate things 
that can be treated one by one. Instead, each new factor merely 
joins the others in shaping people’s lives. The degree to which 
Arctic people retain the ability to determine their own futures 
remains to be seen. Communication and the ability to exercise at 
least local influence are seen as key components of sustaining tra-
ditional ways and practices.
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First, the impacts of shipping depend greatly on the type of 
shipping, the season(s) in which it occurs and the locations. Trans-
Arctic shipping done in ice-free conditions and largely offshore may 
have few or no local effects, barring an accident. Nonetheless, as 
the Aleutian region has experienced, accidents can and should be 
expected, prepared for and responded to promptly and effectively. 
This is especially true in narrow waterways of the Arctic. In these 
places, ships must travel close to land and may well encounter local 
hunters or travelers out in boats. In addition, proximity to communi-
ties means proximity to hunting areas and the animals that people 
depend upon, so the potential for environmental impacts is corre-
spondingly higher in these areas. Tourism, too, is likely to take place 
largely or exclusively in the ice-free season (with the exception of 
icebreaker voyages to the North Pole), though cruise ships are likely 
to visit communities or areas of high biological activity such as bird 
colonies or marine mammal haul-outs.
Shipping to and from destinations within the Arctic is also largely 
done during the ice-free season, with important exceptions in the 
Russian Arctic as well as occasional icebreaker transits throughout 
the region. Ice-breaking can interfere with over-ice travel by hunters 
and others and so is potentially a more significant impact than are 
open-water transits. Icebreaker activity may increase as mineral and 
petroleum resources are developed in the region, which might make 
interactions with local travelers more common. Here, too, the poten-
tial for environmental impacts is high, both from accidents and from 
destruction to key habitats such as areas where seals or polar bears 
make ice dens for bearing young. As with trans-Arctic shipping, the 
potential for local impacts is greatest near shore, particularly in nar-
row passages and straits.
Effects, too, come in several forms. Economically, more ship-
ping may increase trade or lower costs for Arctic communities, while 
increased resource development can provide employment and income 
for Arctic residents and regions. As has been noted with regard to oil 
and gas activities in the Arctic, economic benefits may be consider-
able and can have a number of secondary effects, such as increased 
local capacity to provide social, cultural and health services as well 
as construct and maintain infrastructure. 
Socially, increased economic activity and resource development 
can, but does not necessarily, lead to population growth through 
immigration, which can create social tension between newcomers 
and indigenous or other long-time residents. Often, those moving to 
the Arctic for employment are young men, creating a gender imbal-
ance in the local population, which can exacerbate tensions and 
social problems. Changes in income, too, are often associated with 
increases in drug and alcohol abuse, as well as domestic violence and 
other crime. Many of these negative impacts can be addressed largely 
or in part, by establishing rotational work schedules, with workers 
traveling to the region for work shifts of one to several weeks and 
returning to their home communities during the periods they are off 
or by physical separation between a community and a development 
site. 
Environmental effects are often the greatest concern from 
increased industrial activity of any kind, whether resource devel-
opment or shipping. The environmental effects of Arctic marine 
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Research Opportunities
q Regional analyses of traditional marine use patterns 
(spatial and seasonal) for application in the development 
of strategies and measures to reduce potential conflicts 
and impacts of multiple users of Arctic waterways.
q Research on the impacts of noise/sound on marine 
mammals in regions where current and future marine 
operations overlap with indigenous hunting (examples: 
bowhead whale hunting off Alaska’s northern coast and 
beluga hunting in the Canadian Arctic).
q Detailed, interdisciplinary analyses of the interactions 
and impacts of marine shipping with Arctic communities. 
Further assessment of the social, cultural, economic and 
environmental impacts from shipping to provide insights 
for planning future Arctic marine systems and operations.
q Mapping and study of changing indigenous use of 
Arctic sea ice as a transport medium in the face of climate 
change and sea ice retreat.
q Comprehensive review of changes in Arctic marine tech-
nology during the past six decades, specifically for Arctic 
commercial ships, and how these changes may influence 
the future of Arctic marine transport systems.
shipping are addressed in other sections of this assessment, but it 
is important to note that loss of hunting opportunities and degrada-
tion of the environment can have substantial impacts on local com-
munities. Concern about these types of impacts can by itself cause 
stress, especially when hunting and other traditional activities are 
seen as pillars of cultural continuity but also under threat from other 
social and environmental changes.
The cultural effects of shipping and development may, therefore, 
be generally anticipated to be negative, but this is not necessar-
ily the case. Environmental impacts and greater assimilation from 
exposure to outside influences can cause cultural loss, but tourism 
can boost local cultural awareness and pride and greater economic 
well-being can allow investments in cultural programs. 
As noted earlier, the difference between negative impacts and 
positive or neutral ones is often a question of planning and prepara-
tion. A large influx of cash into a community can create a boom-and-
bust atmosphere, with minimal investment for the long-term and a 
host of social problems in the short-term. The same economic boom 
can also be harnessed to produce lasting benefits. Doing so success-
fully requires extensive local involvement in the planning process, 
so that local concerns and ideas can be fully incorporated. Not all 
marine shipping activities will be beneficial for Arctic residents, and 
some are likely to have negative impacts. Nonetheless, careful atten-
tion to good communication and collaborative approaches to man-
agement can help keep increases in shipping activity from causing 
undue stress and harm to Arctic people and may result in benefits to 
many areas. Z
While it is not clear whether  
reduced sea ice will have a major 
influence on development trends, 
increased shipping is unlikely to 
constrain development.
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Findings
1]  Marine shipping is one of many factors affecting Arctic communities, directly and indirectly. The variety of shipping activi-
ties and the range of social, cultural and economic conditions in Arctic communities mean that shipping can have many 
effects, both positive and negative.
2]  While economic effects of marine shipping may be positive, there are many concerns expressed by Arctic coastal communi-
ties about social, cultural and environmental effects. 
3]  There is insufficient information to identify with any precision the likely effects of marine shipping for most Arctic coastal 
communities. No current database exists for indigenous use in local Arctic waterways that could be used to develop mul-
tiple use management measures and potential mitigation strategies. 
4]  The costs and benefits from marine shipping will be unevenly distributed among and within communities and regions. 
5]  Constructive engagement of local residents at the earliest time in a planned Arctic marine development project can help 
reduce negative impacts, assist in a smooth interaction and increase positive benefits from marine shipping.
6]  The marine environment and marine resources have long sustained Arctic communities. Thus, Arctic settlement patterns 
demonstrate a strong marine influence. Local Arctic residents today depend heavily on marine resources for subsistence and 
the local economy. A combination of over-the-ice travel (i.e., using ice as a platform and means of travel for hunting and 
fishing) and boat transport (i.e., for fishing, hunting and travel) allows the use of large Arctic marine areas during much of 
the year. Life in the Arctic is dependent on movement and sea ice is integral to this movement in the high Arctic. Remote 
indigenous coastal communities are especially vulnerable to marine accidents as they risk losing not only their vital marine 
resources, but the natural foundation of their cultures and way of life.
7]  AMSA town hall meetings revealed that Arctic residents think about shipping, not by itself, but in a broader context of 
economic, environmental, political and social change. Shipping did not appear to be a cause of great hope or fear; rather, 
as an additional factor that would influence the future of Arctic communities in various ways.
8]  AMSA town hall meetings indicated that from an environmental perspective, shipping is viewed as a potential disruption to 
marine species. Oil spills are one of the largest concerns. Hunters are also concerned about the impacts of ships on the animals 
and on their hunting practices.
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The extensive seasonal migrations of marine mammals and birds 
into and out of the Arctic are key features that determine the vulner-
ability of Arctic ecosystems. Seabirds, shorebirds and waterfowl move 
north to breed and feed during the short Arctic summer, exploiting 
the burst of productivity in the northern ecosystems. Whales and 
seals have similar migrations to northern feeding areas. Many spe-
cies aggregate throughout the circumpolar north in very large num-
bers to feed, mate, give birth, nurture their young and molt. During 
the periods when Arctic species gather and in the areas where they 
do so, they are particularly vulnerable to potential environmental 
stresses, such as accidental discharges from ships and various types 
of disturbances that ships can cause. 
Disturbance during critical stages could disrupt the short feeding 
season for Arctic species, causing some animals to not get enough 
food to provide the energy needed for the long migrations they face 
and for breeding and raising their young. Arctic species, which are 
reliant on feathers and fur to insulate against the cold, are especially 
M
arine shipping, if not properly managed, poses a 
threat to natural ecosystems. This is especially true 
for the Arctic. Whether it is the release of sub-
stances through emissions to air or discharges to 
water, accidental releases of oil or hazardous cargo, disturbances 
of wildlife through sound, sight, collisions or the introduction of 
invasive alien species, the Arctic marine environment is especially 
vulnerable to potential impacts from marine activity.
Vulnerability of Arctic Species and Ecosystems
Extreme cold temperatures, ice and strong seasonal variability 
characterize the Arctic. These extremes have resulted in a range 
of adaptations among Arctic animals including the ability to store 
energy when food is plentiful and fast when it is not; highly insulat-
ing outer layers such as feather, fur or blubber to keep warm; and a 
high degree of seasonal migration to and from the region, especially 
among marine mammals and birds. 
Environmental  
Considerations and Impacts 
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vulnerable to contamination from oil that will compromise their insu-
lating layers, leaving them exposed and at risk of hypothermia and 
death. It is the unique adaptations of the various species which live 
in and migrate to the Arctic that make them vulnerable to potential 
adverse impacts as a result of shipping and other vessel activities. 
The degree of oil pollution in the Arctic marine environment is 
low, according to the recent Arctic Council Assessment of Oil and Gas 
Activities, with natural seeps being the largest source of input of oil 
hydrocarbons. Accidental oil spills were seen as the largest threat. 
While the Arctic environment is still relatively clean for many types 
of contaminants, recent assessments by the Arctic Monitoring and 
Assessment Programme (AMAP) have shown that persistent organic 
pollutants (POPs) occur at high levels and pose a threat to top pred-
ators in marine food chains, including humans. Heavy metals such 
as mercury, cadmium and lead are also seen as issues of concern in 
some parts of the Arctic. 
Arctic Species: Interactions with Shipping 
Arctic marine mammals such as bowhead, beluga, narwhal, wal-
rus and several species of seals migrate south in fall to spend the 
winter in the southern areas of seasonal ice. In spring, they move 
north again, using systems of polynyas and leads, often before the 
break-up of the ice. At this time, these mammals reproduce and give 
birth to their young. Important wintering areas for marine mammals 
are in the broken pack ice in the northern Bering Sea, Hudson Strait, 
Davis Strait and southeastern Barents Sea. From these areas, the 
mammals follow leads and openings north through the Bering Strait 
and the Chukchi Sea; north through Baffin Bay into Lancaster Sound, 
into Hudson Bay and Foxe Basin; and north and east into the Kara 
and Laptev seas. The leads and openings in the ice are also used by 
seabirds, eiders and other marine birds on their spring migration to 
the northern breeding areas.
As climate and sea ice conditions continue to change, the timing 
and movements of the animals’ activity will also be modified, making 
predictions of the potential interactions between shipping and 
animals increasingly complex.
© United States Coast Guard
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 The migration corridors used by marine mammals and birds cor-
respond broadly with the main shipping routes into and out of the 
Arctic. Currently, there is limited overlap during the spring migra-
tions as all shipping activity will typically occur later in the spring 
than the animal migrations. In the fall, there is likely more oppor-
tunity for interaction between ships and migrating species, as both 
are leaving the Arctic ahead of the formation of the pack ice. As the 
Arctic climate continues to change, it is very likely that the shipping 
season could extend earlier in the spring and later into the fall. The 
spring migration corridors are particularly sensitive and vulnerable 
areas to oil spills, ship strikes and disturbances, and could be a time 
of vulnerability for marine mammals and birds. In the future there 
will be a need to consider the potential risk and interaction between 
ships and animals during this vulnerable period.
The geographic area covered by this assessment spans a wide 
range of environmental conditions, from pack ice in the Arctic Ocean 
to open subarctic waters in the Bering Sea and the Nordic seas in 
the northeastern Atlantic. The volume of current shipping traffic 
also varies considerably across the Arctic. Currently, there is signifi-
cant year-round traffic along the subarctic coast of Norway, around 
Iceland, on the southeast coast of Greenland and out of the Yenisei 
River and Pechora Sea to the port of Murmansk in northwest Russia. 
There is a moderate amount of seasonal shipping to and from desti-
nations in the North American Arctic, and no established trans-Arctic 
traffic. Risk of negative interaction between vessels and wildlife var-
ies across the region. The North Pacific Great Circle Route between 
western North America and eastern Asia is a high volume shipping 
lane that swings through the Unimak Pass in the Aleutian chain, 
passing in close proximity to important marine mammal haul-outs, 
rookeries and nesting sites of marine mammals and seabirds, close to 
active commercial fishing grounds and one of the largest protected 
essential fish habitats in the world.
The Arctic is Changing
The Arctic climate is warming. The effects of this are now being 
seen in the retreating sea ice, melting permafrost and the chang-
ing timing of the onset of fall and spring, as well as the increasing 
variability within each season. These changes are affecting Arctic 
species and ecosystems. Where caribou used to migrate across frozen 
rivers, they now have to wade. Polar bears swim farther to find food 
and wait longer in the fall for the pack ice to reform, extending their 
fasting. Pacific walrus are now hauling out on land in the Chukchi 
Sea, where they used to haul out mainly on sea ice. 
Arctic species and ecosystems are, by nature, highly evolved 
in function and finely tuned with the timing of seasonal events. 
Although some species will benefit from the changes, there are many 
that are now under stress as a result and, for some, at risk of steep 
decline. For many species, any potential impacts as a result of cur-
rent or future shipping activity will be in addition to the stress they 
are already under due to the changes occurring in their environment. 
It is beyond the scope of the current assessment to examine the 
interaction between effects from climate change and effects from 
future shipping activities. This is in part because of the intrinsic dif-
ficulties and the many uncertainties about the future. 
Climate experts are projecting that the main change in sea ice 
will be decreasing ice coverage in the summer along the coastal 
Arctic seas with the formation of first-year ice occurring later in the 
fall. Even with a warmer climate, the Arctic Ocean will still remain 
ice-covered for most of the year. As climate and sea ice conditions 
continue to change, the timing and movements of the animals’ activ-
ity will also be modified, making predictions of the potential interac-
tions between shipping and animals increasingly complex.
Ship Based Impacts
Accidental Discharge 
The accidental release of oil or toxic chemicals can be considered 
one of the most serious threats to Arctic ecosystems as a result of 
shipping. The release of oil into the Arctic environment could have 
immediate and long-term consequences. Some Arctic animals are 
particularly sensitive to oil because it reduces the insulating proper-
ties of feathers and fur and they can quickly die from hypothermia 
if affected. This is the case for seabirds, including eiders and other 
sea ducks, and also polar bear and seal pups. Concentrated aggrega-
tions of birds and mammals, often in confined spaces such as leads 
and polynyas, increase the risk to the animals in the case of an oil 
spill in the Arctic. Crude and refined oils, including fuel oils used by 
ships, vary much in their physical and chemical properties. This, in 
addition to other factors such as temperature, light, waves and ice, 
plays a major role in the behavior of oil in the environment and the 
extent of biological effects. 
Other potential problems from released oil include the transfer 
of oil to nests by sea birds landing on oil slicks and the ingestion 
of oil by animals while preening. This can lead to death or other 
biological effects both in the short and long term. Even small spills 
can have large consequences if they occur where marine birds are 
concentrated.
Chronic seepage of residual oil after a spill can affect the entire 
food chain in an area because hydrocarbons are taken up by bottom 
feeding invertebrates, which then end up as prey for sea birds and 
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The number of cruise ships operating in the Arctic is rapidly 
increasing. These ships are traveling to the region for the scenery 
and to actively seek out areas of special interest, including excep-
tional wildlife viewing opportunities. Wildlife is a primary attraction 
for polar tourists. Polar ecosystems, particularly in coastal envi-
ronments, and wildlife migratory events provide tourists with 
opportunities to view many species of land and marine mammals 
as well as a remarkable diversity of birds. However, because cruise 
ships are specifically seeking out such events and opportunities, 
the potential is created for significant impacts on concentrations 
of wildlife due to disturbance from the ship. 
There are numerous ways passenger ships can cause environ-
mental harm. Emission of substances to the local air and ocean, 
possible incidents including sinkings and groundings, ship oper-
ations unsuitable for polar conditions and the inappropriate 
behavior of passengers ashore are the most prominent impacts. 
The 2004 U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy reported that, while 
at sea, the average cruise-ship passenger generates about eight 
gallons of sewage per day and an average cruise ship can generate 
a total of 532,000 to 798,000 liters of sewage and 3.8 million liters 
of wastewater from sinks, showers and laundries each week, as 
well as large amounts of solid waste (gar-
bage). The average cruise ship will also 
produce more than 95,000 liters of oily 
bilge water from engines and machinery 
a week. 
Sewage, solid waste and oily bilge 
water release are regulated through 
MARPOL. There are no restrictions on the 
release of treated wastewater. MARPOL 
restrictions typically prescribe the allowed 
distance from shore and rate at which 
wastes can be released or requires ships 
to deposit them in shore-side recep-
tion facilities. However, the Arctic region 
lacks infrastructure to adequately dis-
pose of bilge water, sewage and solid 
waste. Many Arctic communities do not 
even have sufficient facilities to deal with 
the waste of their own communities, let 
alone that of tourist vessels. When ships 
are forced to stockpile wastes onboard 
where reception facilities are lacking, 
the risk of illegal or accidental release 
into sensitive areas is heightened. The 
Environmental Impacts and Disturbances from Cruise Ships
alternative to depositing waste into onshore facilities is onboard 
incineration, a practice that also brings with it concerns about 
localized air pollution.
The extent of the impacts on different Arctic species from 
cruise ships is difficult to assess due to the lack of Arctic-specific 
baseline information on wildlife and the relatively recent increase 
in cruise ship activity. The cruise ship industry has a vested inter-
est in maintaining healthy wildlife populations; however, there are 
currently no common best practices for the circumpolar Arctic as 
there is in the Antarctic through the International Association of 
Antarctica Tour Operators. The Arctic’s one cruise organization, 
the Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators, is limited 
in scope with its geographic range in the Svalbard, Jan Mayen 
and greenland area. Cooperation among cruise ship operators, in 
partnership with academic and regulatory bodies, is necessary to 
ensure more sustainable eco-tourism in the Arctic. 
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other animals, causing effects higher up the food web. Arctic ani-
mals are also particularly vulnerable to spills in certain areas and at 
certain times of the year when animals aggregate in large numbers 
to breed, nest, bear young and molt. 
The Arctic is an extreme environment with a range of weather, 
light, hazards and with little human infrastructure. Responding to 
oil spills in these conditions is a major challenge, especially where 
ice is present. There are currently limited methods for recovering 
spilled oil in an ice-covered environment. The options currently 
available for oil spill recovery in the Arctic include mechanical 
methods, bio-remediation, dispersants and/or in-situ burning. 
Consequently, strong prevention measures must be of primary con-
cern, while response measures, being both unreliable and untested, 
should be secondary. The risk of accidental release of oil and other 
contaminants increases with any increase in shipping activity that 
involves the use or transportation of oil or other chemicals.
Regular Discharges to Water
As a part of normal operations, ships produce a range of sub-
stances that must eventually be eliminated from the ship through 
discharge into the ocean, incineration or transfer to port-based 
reception facilities. Referred to as regular discharges these include 
oil, ballast water, bilge water, tank washings (oily water), oily 
sludge, sewage (black water), garbage and grey water. Regular ship 
discharges are regulated through the IMO’s International Convention 
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the 
Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto (MARPOL 73/78) and other IMO 
conventions, as well as through domestic regulation by coastal 
states (See page 59). MARPOL has effectively reduced pollution in 
the marine environment by regulating the release of regular dis-
charges. However, it has not eliminated discharges into the world’s 
oceans altogether.
Ship Category Ship Sub-category/ Use Ship Type–Specific Pollution Sources
Government Vessels and Icebreakers Coast guard vessels, research icebreakers, private 
icebreakers, government icebreakers, other research 
vessels
Accident/incident recovery-produced contaminants, emergency dumping oil/fuel, 
nuclear icebreaker radiation contamination, explosives/munitions, impacts due to 
icebreaking activity (disruption of ice formation, marine mammals, etc).
Container Ships Cargo transport Hazardous goods in transit, convoy collision hazard, grounding hazard (uncharted 
waters, lack of experienced ice navigation). 
General Cargo Community re-supply vessels, roll on/roll off cargo Hazardous goods in transit, accidental cargo release, contaminated cargo.
Bulk Carriers Timber, merchant, oil, ore, automobile carriers Release of metal contaminants, radiation contamination from cargo, hazardous goods 
in transit.
Tanker Ships Oil tankers, natural gas tankers, chemical tankers Liquid Nitrogen Gas contamination, chemicals and hazardous goods in transit, spills 
from oil transfer.
Passenger Ships Cruise ships, ocean liners, ferries Large volumes of black and grey water release, garbage disposal, cleaning contami-
nants, disturbance of wildlife through viewing activities, automotive contaminants w/ 
vehicles ferries .
Tug / Barge Re-supply vessels
Bulk cargo transport
Increased accident hazard (non-propelled), hazardous goods in transit, spills during oil 
transfer, heavy emitters of air contaminants (black carbon).
Fishing Vessels Small fishing boats, trawlers, whaling boats, fish 
processing boats
Increased fire hazard, introduction of pathogens and other contaminants from released 
fish offal, accidental release of invasive species/related biological contaminants, 
release of plastics, ghost nets and other fishing debris, seafloor damage from bottom 
trawlers, depletion of marine species (if not managed), accidental release of refrigerant 
contaminants.
Oil and Gas Exploration/Exploitation 
Vessels
Seismic exploratory vessels, oceanic and hydro-
graphic survey vessels, oil drilling vessels, oil and 
gas storage vessels, offshore re-supply, portable oil 
platform vessels, other oil and gas support vessels
Hazardous cargo, explosives, acoustic impacts from seismic activities, oil/hydrocarbon 
contamination, contamination from extraction chemicals, accidental loading/offload-
ing spillage, fire hazards.
z  Table 8.1  A range of potential environmental impacts linked to ship types operating in the Arctic. Note: All ships will have certain impacts linked to the release of grey water, 
sewage, ballast and bilge water; air emissions; regular and accidental discharge of fuel/oil; introduction of noise and other acoustics such as sonar; and possible strikes on animals. 
Those listed above are in addition to these  and specific to the vessel type.  Source: AMSA
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Oil is released with bilge water with a maximum allowed con-
centration of 15 parts per million (15 mg per m3) after treatment 
with an oil separator. Oil is also released with water used for tank 
washings after required treatment and with restrictions on amount 
and rate of release to avoid formation of oil film at the surface (i.e., 
blue shine). Oily sludge, consisting of high molecular hydrocarbon 
substances, accumulates in fuel tanks in fairly large amounts, con-
stituting typically 1-5 percent of the amount of fuel consumed. Oily 
sludge must not be released but stored on board and brought to 
reception facilities in ports. 
A comprehensive assessment of the oil and gas 
activities in the Arctic was carried out in 2007 by the 
Arctic Council under the leadership of the Arctic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme working 
group. This assessment summarized information 
on the history, current and projected oil and 
gas activities in the Arctic, and examined socio-
economic and environmental effects associated with 
these activities. The assessment included a detailed 
description of the main features and species of the 
Arctic ecosystems and their vulnerability to oil 
spills and disturbances from oil and gas activities. 
An illustrative circumpolar map of vulnerable areas 
based on aggregations of mammals, birds, and fish 
was produced as an outcome.
z  An illustrative map from the Arctic Oil and gas 2007 assessment 
of areas in the Arctic indicating where selected birds, mammals and 
fish form major aggregations to breed, stage, migrate or overwinter. 
When oil and gas activities including transportation occur in such 
areas, such aggregations are vulnerable to disturbances and oil 
spills. Source: AMAP
A recent study of regular discharges from ships in the Norwegian 
and Barents seas provides an example of the level of discharge 
expected to be released in an area that has some of the heaviest 
ship traffic in the Arctic or subarctic region. In this study it was 
estimated that the amount of oil released via bilge water and tank 
washings that the MARPOL allowed 15 ppm totaled about two tons 
of oil per year, a relatively small amount. However, the study found 
ship operations generate about 13,000 metric tons of oily sludge 
annually. 
Arctic Oil and gas Assessment
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oil and gas activities including transportation occur in such areas, 
such aggregations are vulnerable to disturbances and oil spills.
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Concentrations of polynyas
Areas in the Arctic where selected birds, mammals, and fish form
major aggregations to breed, stage, migrate, or overwinter. When
oil and gas activities including transportation occur in such areas, 
such ggregations are vulnerable to disturbances and oil spills.
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Ships are powered by engines and fuels that, like other trans-
portation modes, emit CO2 and water vapor, nitrogen oxides 
(NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO) and particu-
late matter (including black carbon [BC]). Most oceangoing ships 
burn low-quality residual fuels that tend to contain high amounts 
of particulates from soot (black carbon), sulfur aerosols, ash and 
heavy metals. 
These are pollutants specifically quantified in the inventory of 
emissions from Arctic shipping in this assessment. These pollut-
ants are linked with specific environmental effects, and complex 
interactions occur among these substances in the regional and 
global atmosphere. For example, NOx is a gaseous contributor to 
tropospheric ozone formation; SOx gases form particles that con-
tribute to acid rain and cloud effects on regional climate; and other 
fine particles like black carbon impact air quality, visibility and cli-
mate change. 
Shipping’s contribution to regional and global impacts from 
emissions such as CO2, NOx and SO2 have been evaluated by sci-
entists and shown to be significant enough to motivate policy 
action. However, environmental and climate effects of NOx and 
ozone, sulfur aerosols and clouds, and black carbon particles in 
the Arctic are only beginning to be understood. Black carbon has 
been proven to have significant climate forcing effects, in addition 
to its effects on snow and ice albedo, accelerating the retreat of 
Arctic sea ice. 
Background levels of NOx, the precursor to ozone, are very low 
in the Arctic and recent studies have found that seasonal increases 
in ozone are closely linked to seasonal increases in shipping activi-
ty. Surface ozone is known to have harmful effects on plant growth 
and human health and is the basis for photochemical smog.
Ship stack emissions in and near the Arctic will increase along 
with growth in shipping activity, except where regulations like 
MARPOL Annex VI require steep reductions in sulfur emissions 
through fuel sulfur limits or pollution reductions in specially des-
ignated regions. The specific benefits of reducing impacts in the 
Wild Card – Ship Stack Emissions – NOx, SOx,  
Black Carbon and Ozone
Arctic through control of ship emissions need to be further stud-
ied, and the AMSA inventory for 2004 provides a good baseline 
inventory to evaluate scenarios that may achieve these benefits. 
Based on AMSA findings, the report recommends continued 
study of ship-based emissions and trends. Climate change policy 
is currently focused on CO2 from ships and the potential climate 
response to lower ship sulfur emissions is becoming recognized. 
NOx emission controls may mitigate some of the Arctic regional 
ozone impacts suggested by one international study and the 
AMSA inventory provides an opportunity to update previous 
research findings. 
More recently, scientists are recognizing that black carbon par-
ticles have potentially significant impacts on the vulnerable Arctic 
environment and climate that need to be quantified. The AMSA 
contribution to further research may be very important, given that 
recent studies suggest that reduction of the positive climate forc-
ing due to BC would decrease both global warming and retreat of 
the sea ice and glaciers and would therefore provide an opportu-
nity for effective short term mitigation of global warming.
The release and deposition of black carbon in the Arctic region is of particular concern because of the 
effect it has on reducing the albedo (reflectivity) of sea ice and snow.
1.0% 
The 2004 Arctic shipping contribution of CO2 
emissions to the total from the global shipping fleet.
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The amount of legally discharged oil under MARPOL in the 
Norwegian study indicates that current amounts of legally discharged 
oil should not pose a significant threat to the local ecosystem so 
long as the laws are strictly followed. MARPOL requires oily sludge to 
be disposed of in port-based reception facilities. Norway is unusual 
in the Arctic region in that it has good port reception facilities in 
all of its Arctic ports, but that is not the case in many other areas of 
the Arctic. In some areas, limited port side infrastructure as well as 
the cost of disposing of waste using port reception facilities provide 
incentive for illegal dumping of wastes produced on board. 
Considering the sheer volume of oily sludge produced in Norwegian 
waters alone, it would take only a small percentage of the oily sludge 
produced to be illegally discharged for it to cause environmental 
damage. Illegal release of oil and oily sludge can cause oiling of 
animals and birds, can be toxic to marine and terrestrial ecosys-
tems and extremely difficult to clean up. Contamination can last for 
years in ocean sediment and other compartments of the marine envi-
ronment, sometimes presenting contaminated prey upward within 
marine and coastal food chains. Oily sludge is not the only regular 
discharge that can end up in the ocean. Under MARPOL it is legal 
to discharge garbage and raw sewage into the water once a ship is 
a certain distance from shore. The presence of significant amounts 
of garbage and other debris in the ocean can result in a number of 
environmental impacts. These range from damage to marine habitat, 
entanglement of wildlife, introduction of bacteria and disease (from 
untreated human sewage) and the ingestion of plastics and other 
unsuitable items by marine mammals and birds. As vessel activity 
increases in the Arctic, the management of regular discharges from 
all vessels will need to be seriously considered so that environmental 
impacts are minimized.
Ship Emissions to Air 
Studies assessing the potential impacts of international ship-
ping on climate and air pollution demonstrate that ships contribute 
significantly to global climate change and health impacts through 
emission of GHGs (for example, carbon dioxide [CO2], methane [CH4], 
chlorofluorocarbons [CFC]), aerosols, nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur 
oxides (SOx), carbon monoxide (CO) and particulate matter (PM). Air 
quality impacts may result from the chemical processing and atmo-
spheric transport of ship emissions. For example, NOx emissions from 
ships can combine with hydrocarbons in the presence of sunlight 
to produce ozone pollution, which can potentially affect visibility 
through haze, human and environmental health and has been associ-
ated with climate change effects.
The AMSA has developed the world’s first activity-based esti-
mate of Arctic marine shipping emissions using empirical data for 
shipping reported by Arctic Council member states. Emissions were 
calculated for each vessel-trip for which data was available for 
the base year 2004. The 515,000 trips analyzed represent about 
14.2 million km of distance traveled (or 7.7 million nautical miles) 
by transport vessels; fishing vessels represent over 15,000 fishing 
vessel days at sea for 2004. Some results could be an underestima-
tion of current emissions, given potential underreporting bias and 
anecdotal reports of recent growth in international shipping and 
Vessel Category Fuel Use (kt/y) CO2 (kt/y) BC (t/y) NOx (kt/y) PM (kt/y) SOx (kt/y) CO (kt/y) 
Bulk 354 1,120 122 26.9 17.9 18.6 2.57
Container 689 2,170 239 52.5 35.0 36.2 5.01
General Cargo1 590 1,860 202 44.9 29.9 31.0 4.29
Government Vessel 117 368 40.1 8.89 5.92 6.13 0.85
Other Service Vessel 3 11 1.19 0.26 0.18 0.18 0.03
Passenger Vessel 349 1,100 120 26.6 17.7 18.3 2.54
Tanker 269 848 92.5 20.5 13.7 14.1 1.96
Tug and Barge 17 54 3.38 1.32 0.88 0.91 0.13
Fishing2 1,020 3,230 363 78.0 52.0 53.8 7.4
Total 3,410 10,800 1,180 260 173 179 25
z  Table 8.2  Estimated emissions in the Arctic for 2004 by ship type.  Source: AMSA 
Emission amounts were calculated using the AMSA marine activity database (See page 70), which is based on information reported by Arctic Council member states. Baseline information was provided in different formats and to different 
degrees of detail between states.
1. A review and comparison of the AMSA estimated fuel use by general Cargo vessels with recent activity-based inventories completed by Norwegian researchers at DNV suggest that this category may be overestimated, due to 
the world fleet characteristics for general cargo ships reflecting larger vessels with more installed power than typical for Arctic operations.  
2. A review and comparison of the AMSA Fishing vessel data with more direct activity-based estimates completed by DNV for Norwegian fishing vessels suggests that this first estimate may be in the range of three to four times 
higher than what was found by DNV. This is likely because the AMSA fishing vessel estimates are based primarily on days at sea, which assumes the vessel engine runs at varying capacity for the entire period at sea and may overesti-
mate fishing vessel emissions and fuel use.
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trade through the Arctic. Researchers at DNV recently completed 
a similar activity based emissions inventory for Norwegian waters 
(Operational emissions to air and sea from shipping activities in 
Norwegian sea areas. DNV Report No. 2007-2030). A review and 
comparison of the DNV results with the Norwegian portion of the 
AMSA results showed good agreement for all vessel types, except 
for general cargo and fishing vessel estimates. The AMSA results for 
Norway were sometimes greater than, and sometime less than, the 
DNV results, generally falling within 10 percent to 30 percent con-
fidence. The AMSA evaluates ship emissions of greenhouse gases 
and air quality pollutants that may have regional or local impacts; 
however it does not directly conduct the detailed studies needed 
to determine the level of impact (Table 8.2).
Results show CO2 emissions from international shipping in the 
Arctic region to be approximately 10,800 kilo tons per year tons (kt) 
CO2 per year. Given that total CO2 emissions from international ship-
ping globally are about 1,000 MMT CO2 per year, Arctic contributions 
for 2004 amount to about 1 percent of total ship CO2 emissions, 
not an amount that would cause significant effects in the global 
context. However, pollutants such as black carbon (BC), particulate 
matter, nitrogen oxide (NOx), carbon monoxide (CO) and sulfur oxide 
(SOx), which may be small contributors to global inventories on a 
mass basis, may have regional effects even in small amounts. Current 
IMO regulations under MARPOL Annex VI that place requirements on 
the sulfur content of marine fuels, once implemented, will dramati-
cally reduce SOx emissions from global shipping. As a result, observ-
able impacts from SOx should decline and there may be indirect 
effects on the climate forcing properties of other air pollutants such 
as NOx and BC. 
Black carbon is a component of particulate matter produced by 
marine vessels through the incomplete oxidation of diesel fuel. The 
release and deposition of BC in the Arctic region is of particular 
concern because of the effect it has on reducing the albedo (reflec-
tivity) of sea ice and snow. When solar radiation is applied, reduced 
albedo increases the rate of ice and snow melt significantly, result-
ing in more open water, and thereby reducing the regional albedo 
further. In the Arctic region in 2004, approximately 1,180 metric 
tons of black carbon was released, representing a small proportion 
of the estimated 71,000 to 160,000 metric tons released around 
the globe annually. However, the region-specific effects of black 
carbon indicate that even small amounts could have a potentially 
disproportionate impact on ice melt and warming in the region. 
More research is needed to determine the level of impact this 
could have on ice melt acceleration in the Arctic and the poten-
tial benefits from limiting ships’ BC emissions when operating 
near to or in ice-covered regions. The potential impacts of black 
carbon should also be a point of consideration when weighing the 
costs and benefits of using in-situ burning of oil in spill response 
situations. 
As part of the AMSA emissions inventory, the amounts of carbon 
dioxide and black carbon emitted were mapped using the GIS data-
base of shipping routes and areas of fishing vessel activity reported 
by Arctic states (Map 8.1). 
The CO2 emitted by all vessels was mapped according to the 
location of activity; emissions from transport vessels (non-fish-
ing vessels) were assigned to reported routes and fishing vessel 
emissions were assigned to the Large Marine Ecosystem in which 
the fishing fleet operated. The map shows that the heaviest CO2 
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z  Map 8.1  Arctic shipping emissions map.  Source: AMSA
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Emission amounts were calculated using the AMSA marine activity 
database (See page 70), which is based on information reported by 
Arctic Council member states. Baseline information was provided in 
different formats and to different degrees of detail between states.
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Regional Environment Case Study
Aleutian Islands/Great Circle Route
The North Pacific’s great Circle Route is the most economic pathway for commerce between northern ports of the west coast 
of North America to ports in eastern Asia. The segment of this route considered in this analysis is the portion that extends from 
the western gulf of Alaska, westward offshore from the Alaska Peninsula and through the Aleutian Islands including the passes at 
Unimak Pass and the Rat Islands. This portion of the route traverses two Arctic Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs), the East Bering Sea 
LME and the West Bering Sea LME. 
The East and West Bering Sea LMEs are characterized by their subarctic climate and are strongly influenced by a persistent 
atmospheric low pressure system that produces intense storm activity and strong ocean currents, particularly through the  Aleutian 
Island passes. The marine and coastal environment in the region where the great Circle Route passes includes rocky shorelines, 
fjords and tidal wetlands. This region seasonally supports populations of shorebirds, nesting seabirds, herring and other marine 
resources as well as millions of salmon during their migrations to streams of origin. 
The route also passes through the U.S. Alaska Coastal Maritime Wildlife Refuge, which provides nesting and foraging habitat 
seasonally for millions of seabirds and year-round habitat for thousands of marine mammals. The populations of several marine 
species in this region are depressed, declining or otherwise considered particularly sensitive and in danger of potential extinction. 
Commercial fisheries in the region where the great Circle route passes provide a large proportion of the annual landings by the U.S. 
fishing industry. Salmon, halibut, herring, crab, groundfish and many other fisheries are pursued  annually in the region. In 2004, 
Alaska fish landings were 2.43 million metric tons, valued at $US 1.17 billion.
The AMSA estimates that approxi-
mately 2,800 vessels passed along this 
route in 2004. Environmental impacts 
due to shipping, which are of the most 
concern in the region of the Arctic where 
this route passes, include the potential 
for vessel strikes on marine mammals, 
particularly the Pacific right whale; the 
discharge of oil and other pollutants 
both from routine ship discharge and 
accidents; and the introduction of inva-
sive species into local ecosystems.
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z  Map 8.2  Aleutian Islands regional traffic and LME map. Source: AMSA
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There is a large volume of ship-
ping in the Barents Sea and con-
siderably less in the Kara Sea. The 
main shipping route into the area 
is along the coast of Norway. A 
main shipping lane goes through 
inshore waters, and much of the 
traffic to and from ports in north-
ern Norway follows this route. 
Traffic to and from Russia follows 
an offshore route in the open sea 
to ports in Murmansk, the White 
Sea and other areas. Transport of 
oil from Russia is from ports in the 
White Sea, Murmansk, Pechora 
Sea (i.e., Kolguev and Varandey), 
and Ob’ and Yenisei estuaries in 
the Kara Sea. There is also year-
round shipping of nickel ore by Norilsk Nickel from a port in the Yenisei estuary. In the western Barents Sea, there is a shipping route to Svalbard 
with seasonal traffic of cargo ships supplying the communities, bulk carriers transporting coal and cruise ships. There is also a substantial number 
of fishing vessels that operate year round in the ice-free part of the southern and central Barents Sea, while there is little fishing activity in the 
Kara Sea. 
In 2006, Norway adopted an integrated management plan for the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea and adjacent waters off the Lofoten 
Islands. In the preparatory work for this plan, an assessment of environmental impacts from shipping was carried out and valuable and vulnerable 
areas were identified. The plan established a forum on environmental risk management headed by the Norwegian Coastal Administration, which 
is tasked with providing better information on risk trends in the area, especially as regards acute oil pollution from ships and other sources. In July 
2007, the IMO established regulations that require larger cargo vessels and tankers transiting the Norwegian coast of the Barents Sea to operate 
further away from the coast than in the past. This requirement is intended to allow a longer response time in case of accidents that could impact 
the Norwegian coastal environment and resources.
Vulnerable areas in the Barents and Kara seas have been identified in relation to oil and gas activities, based on where there are aggregations 
of animals that could potentially be impacted by oil spills or disturbances from activities. The Barents Sea holds more than seven million pairs of 
breeding seabirds, with major colonies on Svalbard, the western section of Novaya Zemlya off the coast of northern Russia and along the coast of 
northern Norway. The oceanographic polar front and the ice edge in the western and central Barents Sea is a concentrated zone of life in spring 
and summer with aggregations of seabirds and seals. The polar front area is also the wintering area for the large Barents Sea capelin stock and for 
z  Map 8.3 Barents and Kara seas regional traffic and LME map.  Source: AMSA
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and black carbon emissions were found in the Bering Sea region, 
around Iceland, along the Norwegian coast and in the Barents 
Sea. There are also moderate emissions along the western coast 
of Greenland. 
 
 
Potential Disturbances from Ships  
and Shipping Activity in the Arctic
Sound and Noise Disturbance
All vessels produce sound as a by-product of their operation. 
Typically, vessels produce low frequency sound from the operation 
of machinery onboard, hydrodynamic flow noise around the hull and 
from propeller cavitation, which is typically the dominant source of 
noise. The sound a vessel produces relates to many factors including 
size, speed, load, condition, age and engine type. The larger the ves-
sel and/or the faster it is moving, the more noise it produces. Many 
vessels also employ hydroacoustic devices such as commercial sonar, 
echosounders, side scan sonar for navigation, depth finding, seafloor 
mapping or to detect biologics as a regular part of their operations. 
These types of devices produce short pulses and use frequencies 
ranging from low to high, depending on their utility.
For most marine vertebrates, making, hearing and processing 
sounds serve critical biological functions. These include communica-
tion, foraging, reproduction, navigation and predator-avoidance. In 
particular, toothed whales have developed sophisticated biosonar 
capabilities to help them feed and navigate; large baleen whales 
have developed long-range communication systems using sound in 
reproductive and social interaction; and pinnipeds (i.e., seals, sea 
lion, walrus, etc.) make and listen to sounds for critical communica-
tive functions. Many fish utilize sounds in mating and other social 
interactions.
The introduction of noise into the environment can adversely 
affect the ability of marine life to use sound in various ways and can 
induce alteration of behavior; reduction of communication ranges 
for social interactions, foraging, and predator avoidance; and tem-
porary or permanent compromise of the auditory or other systems. In 
extreme cases, too much noise can lead to habitat avoidance or even 
death. Noise can also affect physiological functions and cause more 
generalized stress. Determining when impacts of noise exposure from 
any source become biologically significant to a species is often diffi-
cult. Nevertheless, this is an area where additional research is ongo-
ing and needed in key areas.
seabirds such as thick-billed murre. Svalbard and Franz Josef Land 
in the northern Barents Sea are important breeding and feeding 
areas for seabirds, walrus and seals, and denning areas for polar 
bear. The southern and eastern Barents Sea is a wintering area for 
many seabirds and sea ducks that breed further east in the Russian 
Arctic. The Pechora Sea area and the southern Kara Sea lie adja-
cent to tundra and wetlands that are important breeding grounds 
for geese, ducks and shorebirds. Many of these use coastal habi-
tats for staging during spring migration and after breeding when 
they prepare for the fall migration out of the Arctic. 
The southern Barents Sea is a rich fisheries area with large 
stocks of cod, haddock, capelin, juvenile herring and shrimp. A 
major stock of polar cod spawns under ice in the Pechora Sea 
region, and this region is also the main wintering area for white 
whales of the Karskaya population that is migratory between the 
Barents, Kara and Laptev seas. The smaller White Sea beluga pop-
ulation has its wintering area in the Voronka and gorlo area at the 
entrance to the White Sea. The Barents Sea harp seal population 
has its whelping and molting areas on the ice also at the entrance 
to the White Sea. The Novaya Zemlya population of Atlantic wal-
rus has its wintering area in the pack ice in the Pechora Sea region. 
White whales and walrus migrate north in spring following lead 
systems west of Novaya Zemlya, and the white whales continue 
east through the northern Kara Sea and into the western Laptev 
Sea in early summer. There are two subpopulations of polar bears 
in the Barents and Kara seas with seasonal migrations following 
the ice. 
There are no documented negative impacts on animals in this 
area from shipping activities. Accidental oil spills have occurred 
and have been associated with high local mortality of seabirds. 
However, these incidents have not had material impacts at the 
population level for the affected species. Ship strikes of whales 
could occur in some areas but there are no reports to suggest that 
the level of impact is significant. The greatest concern is the threat 
from accidental oil spills that could have a large impact on sea-
birds and other marine birds, and also on marine mammals such 
as polar bear and on spawning polar cod. If shipping activities 
increase in the future, potential disturbance of wintering marine 
mammals and ship strikes of whales will become a concern.
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icebreaking, which involves ramming forward into the ice and then 
reversing to begin the process again. Some icebreakers are equipped 
with bubbler systems to aid in clearing ice from the vessel’s path and 
these can create an additional noise source. Noise from bubbler sys-
tems and propeller cavitation associated with icebreaker movement 
has the potential to alter animal behavior and to disrupt the hearing 
ability and vocalization of marine mammals.
Wildlife has been found to exhibit a range of behavior in the 
presence of icebreakers. For example, beluga whales were found to 
be aware of the icebreaker vessels presence at distances of more 
than 80 kilometers away, and exhibit strong avoidance response at 
35 to 50 km away. However, narwhal whales were found to display 
only subtle responses to the same disturbance. 
The opening of channels through the ice by icebreaking vessels 
can impact Arctic residents and alter animal behavior. Open water 
channels take time to freeze and this can disrupt the movements of 
animals and people over the ice. In many areas of the Arctic in win-
ter, the only naturally occurring ice openings are polynyas caused by 
winds or ocean currents. Artificially opened water channels can be 
problematic for marine mammals and other species, which confuse 
them for polynyas and can get trapped too far from the ice edge as 
the channel eventually refreezes.
Vessel Strikes on Marine Mammals
Vessel collisions, resulting in death or serious injury of marine 
mammals, are a threat to marine organisms worldwide. Vessel col-
lisions or ship strikes occur mainly with large whale species, small 
cetaceans (i.e., dolphins, narwhal, beluga), marine turtles and sire-
nians (i.e., manatees, dugongs). Records indicate that nearly all 
large whale species are vulnerable to ship strikes. Vessel collisions 
with marine mammals can result in death, massive trauma, hemor-
rhaging, broken bones and propeller wounds. 
Databases have been constructed which track the number of ship 
strikes occurring. These report more than 750 known cetacean vessel 
strikes through the world’s oceans, including nearly 300 incidents 
involving large whales. Virtually all motorized vessel types, sizes 
and classes are represented in these databases. It should be noted, 
however, that any database will likely underestimate the number 
Where there is an overlap between potential noise sources and 
the frequencies of sound used by marine life, there is particular con-
cern as to how sound sources can interfere with important biological 
functions. The predominately low frequency sounds associated with 
large vessels is similar to the general hearing sensitivity bandwidths 
of large whales and many fish species. The ambient noise environ-
ment in the Arctic is more complex and variable than in many other 
ocean areas due to the seasonal variability in ice cover. In addition 
to natural sources contributing to background levels, anthropogenic 
sources, like vessel traffic, can also have a profound impact on these 
levels. In most regions in the northern hemisphere, shipping noise is 
the dominant source of underwater noise below 300 hertz. 
Many environmental effects resulting from ship disturbances 
can be effectively mitigated through the use of best practices and 
the implementation of management measures. With regard to noise 
disturbances, such measures could include rerouting to avoid some 
areas in sensitive periods, lower speed, and alternative engine and 
hull designs to make ships more silent. There may be a need to plan 
potential future shipping lanes in the Arctic so as to avoid large 
seabird colonies, marine mammal haul-outs and other areas where 
animals are aggregated. In late 2008, the IMO’s Marine Environment 
Protection Committee (MEPC) formed a correspondence group that 
is now working to identify and address ways to minimize the intro-
duction of incidental noise into the marine environment from com-
mercial shipping in order to reduce the potential adverse impact 
on marine life. This group aims to develop non-mandatory techni-
cal guidelines for ship-quieting technologies, as well as potential 
navigation and operational practices for all IMO member states. This 
work will be aimed at the global shipping industry and is not likely 
to contain Arctic specific considerations.
Icebreakers and Disturbance 
All icebreaking operations, whether by independent commer-
cial icebreaking ships or government icebreaker escort, can poten-
tially cause disturbances to wildlife and local communities both 
through the noise they create and the trail of open water left 
astern. Compared to other vessels, icebreakers produce louder and 
more variable sounds. This is because of the episodic nature of the 
Many environmental effects resulting from ship disturbances can be effectively 
mitigated through the use of best practices and the implementation of
management measures.
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Current shipping activity in the Bering Strait 
and Chukchi Sea predominately comprises 
community re-supply and destinational traffic. 
Traffic plying the Bering Strait, one of the 
narrowest sea lanes in the world, also traverses 
remote areas with difficult access for incident 
response, rescue and contaminant or debris 
cleanup. The U.S. Beaufort Sea coast has no 
port facilities or harbors suitable for refuge for 
medium to deep draft vessels and there are 
also very limited facilities on the Russian side 
of the strait. given its restricted geographic 
nature, confounded by ice movement and 
strong ocean currents, the Bering Strait area is 
a major chokepoint for vessels transiting the 
region. The Aleutian Low creates persistent 
high winds and stormy conditions that elevate 
risk to vessels and cargo transiting the Aleutian 
and Commander islands area. These severe 
weather patterns may reduce the effective-
ness of response to spills or other incidents.
This region includes four of the Arctic Large Marine Ecosystems: the Beaufort Sea 
LME, the Chukchi Sea LME, and East and West Bering Sea LME. Increased vessel traffic in 
the Beaufort and Chukchi seas may result in greater incidents of damage to the environ-
ment from ships, including pollutant discharges, and an increase in the risk of disturbance 
effects such as ship noise and ship strikes on migrating and foraging bowheads or other 
marine mammals. Any vessel incidents in this region would also have the potential to 
adversely affect major populations of nesting shorebirds, waterfowl and other birds that 
utilize breeding, nesting and foraging habitat along the coastal Beaufort and Chukchi seas and along the coast of western Alaska. 
The eastern Bering Sea supports some of the largest commercial fisheries in the world. Increased vessel use of the eastern route 
that traverses the eastern Bering Sea may increase potentially adverse interactions with this region’s rich fishery resources, fishing 
communities and hundreds of fishing vessels and support vessels. Spills due to accidental or illegal discharge from vessels could 
drift ashore to western Alaska areas where seasonal herring and salmon fisheries occur.
The western Arctic stock of bowhead whales seasonally migrates through the Bering Strait, Chukchi and Beaufort seas. In the 
Bering Strait, they are physically constricted to a relatively small corridor, exposing them to increased interactions with vessels tran-
siting this area during spring and fall. Bowhead whale migration could also potentially be disrupted by icebreakers. Whales could 
move further offshore following the open leads created by icebreaking vessels, putting them out of reach of coastal whaling com-
munities. Any disruption of the spring and fall hunts, or any injury or mortality to bowheads would be considered a major issue to 
coastal Alaskan and Siberian communities. 
Ice-dependent marine mammals in this region, such as polar bear, walrus and seals, already stressed due to sea ice retreat, may 
be at increased risk from any additional ship-sourced stressors or contamination, as populations will become increasingly concen-
trated around retreating sea ice.
Regional Environment Case Study 
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z  Map 8.4  Bering Strait regional traffic and LME map. Source: AMSA
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and research activity, cargo and re-supply support for resource 
development operations, cargo shipments in and out of the Port 
of Churchill and tourism.
The Canadian Arctic remains one of the last frontiers for 
natural resources and one of the last areas of relatively pristine 
wilderness on earth. It is a region with virtually no roads, no rail 
lines and where air services are infrequent and very costly. The 
lack of infrastructure and the extreme climate have, until recently, 
made this region uneconomical for large-scale resource devel-
opment. Rising prices of oil, gas and other commodities and the 
changing climatic and geographic restraints may combine to 
allow significant and rapid increases in resource development 
For many years shipping has been the main link to the out-
side world for remote Arctic communities in Canada and yearly 
sealifts remain the key source of goods and necessities for many 
communities. Shipping in the Canadian Arctic has been occurring 
in a safe and relatively environmentally sustainable way for many 
years. This has been due to the historically low level of activity, 
as well as the regulatory restrictions that have been in place to 
protect Canadian Arctic waters from shipping since the 1970s in 
the form of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act. The types 
of shipping activity occurring in the Canadian Arctic during 2004 
can be grouped into the following activities: community re-sup-
ply (i.e., tug-barge, cargo, fuel tankers), Canadian Coast guard 
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of actual occurrences because many go either undetected or unre-
ported. In some cases carcasses are found, but because injuries are 
internal or due to advanced decomposition, it may be difficult to 
determine cause of death. When large vessels are involved, the mari-
ner may not be aware that a strike has occurred.
There are relatively few known incidents of Arctic or ice-adapted 
marine mammal species being involved in ship strikes. The relatively 
infrequent occurrence is a result of relatively lower vessel traffic 
in high latitudes as compared to major trading routes and human 
population centers in lower latitudes. However, of consideration is 
that certain Arctic species, such as the bowhead and Pacific right 
whale, have features that make them potentially vulnerable to ship 
strikes, particularly as vessel traffic increases in their waters. Arctic 
toothed whales, namely narwhals and beluga whales, are probably 
less vulnerable to ship strikes, given their greater maneuverability 
and social behavior that lends them to aggregating in large groups 
enhancing their detection. It should be noted, however, that records 
of roughly comparable mid-sized species such as pilot whales, killer 
whales and various species of beaked whales also appear in ship 
strike databases.
Vessel speed has been implicated as a key factor in the occur-
rence and severity of vessel strikes with large species. Several inde-
pendent studies indicate that vessel speeds of 10-14 knots increase 
by one-half or greater the probability that a whale will survive a 
collision with a ship. 
As vessel traffic increases in the Arctic, modifications to custom-
ary vessel operation in key cetacean aggregation areas or vessel 
speed restrictions can be an effective measure to mitigate potential 
impacts on vulnerable species such as bowhead whales and, to a 
lesser extent, narwhals, beluga whales and other Arctic marine organ-
isms. Where feasible, vessel routing measures may also be applied in 
order for ships to avoid known cetacean aggregation areas. A number 
of steps have been taken by some states outside the Arctic region 
to reduce the threat of ship strikes to endangered large whale spe-
cies, including shifting shipping lanes and applying to the IMO to 
establish a vessel “Area to be Avoided.” The IMO’s MEPC is currently 
working on development of a non-mandatory guidance document for 
minimizing the risk of ship strikes on cetaceans which will be aimed 
at the global maritime industry.
Light Disturbance
Birds of all species appear to be attracted to lights. This puts 
them at risk of collision with lighted structures. The attraction to 
light and resulting risk of collision varies depending on the weather, 
season and the age of the bird. The fall migration in the Arctic is 
activity in the Canadian Arctic, which would lead to increased des-
tinational shipping traffic in the region and intra-regional traffic. 
How this potential increase may impact the local environment is 
not known. However, any increase in activity brings with it a corre-
sponding increase in the risk of damage to the environment both 
from normal ship operations and accidents or emergencies. Due 
to the current relatively low levels of shipping activity occurring 
in the Canadian Arctic, any increase in activity in this region will 
be significant. 
Currently four of the Arctic’s 17 Large Marine Ecosystems 
occur in Canadian waters: Hudson Bay, Baffin Bay/Davis Strait, 
Arctic Archipelago and Beaufort Sea. The Canadian Arctic is home 
to a diverse range of wildlife that thrives across this variety of 
ecosystems. These populations are now under stress to varying 
degrees due to the changes occurring in the Arctic environment 
as a result of global climate change. 
Areas that are vulnerable to new developments include win-
tering areas of bowhead and beluga in Hudson and Davis straits, 
spring migration routes for those whales into Hudson Bay and 
Foxe Basin and north into Lancaster Sound. Seabird breeding col-
onies and staging areas for migratory waterfowl and shorebirds 
occur in several locations throughout the region. 
Specific adverse impacts associated with shipping activ-
ity that are of the most concern in the Canadian Arctic include 
the discharge of pollutants into the marine environment and 
the disruption or disturbance of migratory patterns of wild-
life that would, in turn, impact indigenous hunting activity. In 
this region, icebreakers leave behind open water channels that 
may disrupt the movements of wildlife and people traveling 
on the ice. Icebreakers or other ships traveling through ice-cov-
ered waters where seals are whelping can impact nearby seals 
through flooding dens and wetting baby seals with their wakes. 
Marine mammals are known to congregate in shallow bays and 
migrate through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. As shipping 
traffic increases in this region there will be increased potential for 
conflict between ships and marine mammals in narrow and geo-
graphically restrictive areas. Other ship impacts outlined in this 
section such as noise impacts, introduction of invasive species 
and ship emissions are also of concern.
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nocturnal species nest in the North Pacific, especially in the Aleutian 
Islands. Storm-petrels are vulnerable in late summer and early fall, 
when hundreds have been known to pitch on a vessel during foggy 
conditions. These problems are not unique to the smaller nocturnal 
species. Common and king eiders, both large ducks, have collided 
with large shrimp vessels in waters off western Greenland, causing 
injury or death. 
Introduction of Invasive Species
The introduction and spread of alien invasive species is a serious 
problem that has ecological, economic, health and environmental 
impacts, including the loss of native biological diversity worldwide. 
Although the introduction of invasive species into the Arctic envi-
ronment has been minimally studied, it is an issue that deserves 
further study in the context of a changing climate and potential 
increased shipping in the Arctic region. 
The risk of introduction of invasive species will increase as ship-
ping volume increases in this region. As with ship operations in 
non-Arctic areas, the threat of introduction comes from four sources: 
ballast water discharge, hull fouling, cargo operations and casualties 
or shipwrecks. 
•	 Ballast Water
 The IMO’s International Convention for the Control and 
Management of Ships Ballast Water & Sediments addresses bal-
last exchange and treatment. As of November 2008, 16 states 
including Norway, representing about 3.6 percent of the world’s 
merchant shipping, have ratified this convention. Under the IMO 
convention standard, a small percentage of viable organisms will 
still be discharged.
•	 Hull Fouling 
 In subarctic waters, transfer of aquatic invasive species on the 
hulls of ships has become a serious threat to the environment, 
rivaling ballast water discharge. However, hull coatings on ice-
capable vessels may be effective antifouling agents, as would the 
scouring effects of passage through ice. 
•	 Cargo 
 Most international movements of goods are regulated by fumiga-
tion and biosecurity provisions to prevent the movement of inva-
sive species in cargo. This is also applicable to the Arctic region. 
Much of the sealift and re-supply movements into the Arctic are 
palletized, increasing the potential for unwanted organisms to be 
entrained in the cargo.
when most bird attraction and collision issues emerge, as young 
birds are traveling for the first time and inclement weather becomes 
more frequent. Light attraction of marine birds is not yet a signifi-
cant issue in the Arctic. This is because most birds are in the Arctic 
in the summer months to breed, when there is little or no darkness; 
and most Arctic-breeding seabirds are diurnal and, therefore, less 
active at night. 
Despite these factors, there are still risks. During the non-breed-
ing period in ice-free waters and as the presence of lighted ships 
and structures increases, risks are heightened. A wide variety of 
Research Opportunities
q Investigate the effects of ship noise and physical pres-
ence, including avoidance behavior on Arctic marine ani-
mals at the individual and population level. Such research 
would contribute to determining distances at which 
animals are disturbed from ships, the potential for ship 
strikes and assessment of the need for mitigation strate-
gies if adverse effects are predicted.
q Complete regional modeling of ship emissions in order to 
investigate the current and potential impacts from these 
emissions along major routes and near key port regions in 
the Arctic. This will contribute to more accurate assess-
ment of regional impacts on air quality, pollution, haze 
and visibility, and climate forcing due to the release and 
deposition of black carbon and other aerosols.
q Conduct baseline surveys of aquatic species in major recip-
ient ports in the Arctic region and research the potential 
survival of species introduced through different vectors. 
Carry out a risk assessment of invasive species introduc-
tion under current international standards in order to 
determine the need for Arctic specific protections.
q Conduct further research on the transport, fate and 
effects of oil in ice-covered waters, and on technology, 
methods and procedures to clean-up and remove spilled 
oil to reduce environmental impacts.
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•	 Casualty 
 Ship accidents and sinkings can introduce invasive species 
into the local environment. As an example, shipwrecks in the 
Aleutians have caused significant ecological damage through the 
introduction of predatory rat species onto islands that have large 
aggregations of nesting seabirds. 
Due to climate change and the potential increase in shipping 
activity, the introduction of invasive species may require more atten-
tion than it has received in the past. In particular, trans-Arctic ship-
ping between the North Atlantic and North Pacific could potentially 
represent a vector for transfer of species in ballast water or on hulls 
to new areas where the environmental conditions resemble those in 
their home waters. Introduction of rodent species to islands harbor-
ing nesting seabirds, as evidenced in the Aleutian Islands, can be 
devastating. With limited baseline data on what species might actu-
ally be at risk from ship operations such as ballast water discharge, 
the use of the precautionary approach and proactive preventative 
actions are encouraged. 
Green Ship Technology in the Arctic 
Technology has a role to play in the mitigation of environmental 
impacts in the Arctic and elsewhere. Many of the potential impacts 
from shipping that have been discussed in this assessment can 
be effectively reduced or eliminated through the use of current or 
developing technologies, as well as best practices. Examples include 
stack scrubbers that remove harmful substances such as sulfur and 
black carbon from a ship’s emissions; water treatment systems for 
sewage, bilge water, ballast water and other discharges; technolo-
gies that harness wind or solar power to reduce fuel consumption; 
or the use of cleaner fuels that emit less harmful substances when 
burned. Given the sensitivity of the Arctic environment and the 
potential impacts from shipping, the development and application 
of green ship technologies should be a priority. These new technolo-
gies can be expedited through industry incentives, such as the green 
ship technology fund in Norway; or regulatory requirements, such as 
the IMO International Convention for the Control and Management of 
Ships Ballast Water & Sediments. Z
 
On December 8, 2004, the cargo ship M/V Selendang Ayu 
lost power as it was transiting the North Pacific’s great Circle 
Route and eventually came ashore near Dutch Harbor in the 
Aleutian Islands, where it broke into two sections (See page 
88). Operations to rescue the crew from the Selendang Ayu 
resulted in loss of life for both rescuers and crew, increas-
ing the adverse effects of this incident. Despite removal and 
recovery efforts, the ship eventually discharged its cargo of 
66 million metric tons of soybeans, an estimated 1.7 million 
liters of intermediate fuel oil, 55,564 liters of marine diesel 
and other contaminants into the environment. 
For three weeks the weather delayed response to the 
environmental hazards of the incident. Strong winds, rough 
seas and the remoteness of the spill stalled the clean-up and 
search for oiled animals.
To study the impact of the spill on shorebirds, the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service released 162 bird-size blocks of 
wood from the grounding site more than a month after the 
incident. The blocks helped determine where contaminated 
dead birds might have drifted. The exercise led to the immedi-
ate recovery of 29 oiled birds, 19 that were dead or dying and 
10 that were recovered and released. During the course of 
the clean-up, 1,603 bird carcasses and six sea otter carcasses 
were recovered. Because of the delay in the recovery efforts, 
it is likely the number of wildlife impacted was greater. By 
mid-February 2005, 38,000 bags of oily solid waste had been 
reclaimed. The clean-up effort was ongoing until June 2006, 
and the long term impacts on local populations are yet to be 
fully assessed. This information was drawn from a recent U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service report on the incident.
Selendang Ayu Impact
MARPOL 73/78 
Regular ship discharges are regulated through the IMO’s International Convention for 
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as Modified by the Protocol of 1978 Relating Thereto
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Findings
 1] From an environmental point of view, Arctic shipping poses a threat to the region’s unique ecosystems. This threat 
can be effectively mitigated through careful planning and effective regulation in areas of high risk.
 2] Release of oil into the Arctic marine environment, either through accidental release, or illegal discharge, is the 
most significant threat from shipping activity.
 3] Ship strikes of whales and other marine mammals are of concern in areas where shipping routes coincide with 
seasonal migration and areas of aggregation.
 4] The introduction of invasive species into the Arctic marine environment from shipping can occur and the risk may 
be enhanced due to changing climate, possibly making conditions more favorable to some species. The most risk 
exists where a transfer of organisms from ecosystems of similar latitudes and conditions can occur. Of particular 
future concern is the transfer of organisms across the Arctic Ocean from the North Pacific to the North Atlantic or 
vice versa.
 5] There are certain areas in the Arctic region that are of heightened ecological significance, many of which will be 
at risk from current and/or increased shipping. Many of these areas are located in geographically restrictive loca-
tions or chokepoints where much shipping activity also occurs, such as the Bering Strait, Hudson Strait, Lancaster 
Sound, Pechora Sea and the Kara Port. 
 6] Migratory marine mammals such as bowhead, beluga, narwhal and walrus have wintering areas in the southern 
extent of the sea ice and spring migration routes into the Arctic through systems of leads and polynyas also used 
by many seabirds, ducks and other marine birds during spring migration. These migration corridors correspond 
broadly to the current main shipping routes and travel through geographic chokepoints. 
 7] The black carbon emitted from shipping in the Arctic could have significant regional impacts by accelerating 
ice melt.
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 8] Ship emissions including greenhouse gases (GHGs), Nitrogen Oxides (NOx), Sulfur Oxides (SOx) and Particulate 
Matter (PM) may have negative effects on the Arctic environment and will increase in the Arctic region propor-
tionately with increased shipping activity. Effective reduction of ship emissions can be achieved through the 
application of feasible and best available technologies, through air emissions reduction techniques and, most 
importantly, through effective implementation of relevant IMO regulations. 
 9] Sound is of vital biological importance to marine mammals and anthropogenic noise produced through shipping 
and other vessel activity can have various adverse effects on Arctic species. 
 10] Subarctic seas support some of the richest fisheries in the world in the Bering Sea and the Barents Sea. These 
two areas are also the location of the heaviest shipping traffic now occurring in the Arctic region. A potential 
accidental spill of oil or other hazardous and noxious substances in these areas could have large economic, social 
and environmental impacts.   
 11] Environmental effects on marine mammals, seabirds and fisheries from ship sourced disturbances, noise, or poten-
tial accidental/illegal release of oil and other hazardous and noxious substances may impact culturally and eco-
nomically significant subsistence harvests of these animals.
 12] The most immediate impacts of climate change in the Arctic will be the reduction of summer sea ice, longer open 
water seasons in the fall and the reduction of the year-round presence of multi-year ice. These changes may have 
far reaching implications for Arctic ecosystems and will also result in the lengthening of the current shipping 
season. Shipping in the future may be occurring much later into the fall and possibly earlier in the spring, thereby 
increasing the possibility of interaction between migrating and calving species and ships.
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with emergency response to Arctic incidents. Workshop participants 
represented a broad spectrum of expertise including governmental 
agencies, industry, non-governmental organizations and indigenous 
people from the Arctic nations. The workshop, “Opening the Arctic 
Seas: Envisioning Disasters and Framing Solutions,” considered five 
realistic emergency scenarios in diverse locations throughout the 
Arctic. Incidents envisioned involved vessels caught in ice or in a 
collision, oil spills, search and rescue, environmental damage and 
disruption of indigenous communities. The workshop report provides 
a qualitative analysis of risk factors for Arctic marine incidents likely 
to happen as shipping, tourism, exploration and development of 
natural resources such as oil, gas and minerals increase with the 
retreating ice cover (See page 176). 
Major Arctic infrastructure themes emerged and are reflected 
throughout this section and its findings. Currently, vast areas of the 
Arctic have insufficient infrastructure to support safe marine ship-
ping and respond to marine incidents in the Arctic. This includes 
such critical infrastructure components as the accuracy and avail-
ability of timely information needed for safe navigation; availability 
W
hen compared with marine infrastructure in the 
world’s other oceans, the Arctic is significantly 
lacking throughout most of the circumpolar 
north. The current increase in human activity in 
the Arctic is placing new demands on Arctic infrastructure needed to 
support safe marine shipping, protect the environment and respond 
to emergencies. Anticipated increases in Arctic marine shipping dur-
ing the coming decades will place additional demands on infrastruc-
ture and require innovative, cooperative solutions that best use the 
limited resources available in this remote region.
The findings contained in this section are the result of exten-
sive input received across a wide spectrum of interests from those 
experienced in Arctic marine operations, including representatives 
from the Arctic states. The analysis of current Arctic infrastructure 
included surveys based on information from the Arctic states regard-
ing Arctic ports, capabilities for handling larger vessels, search 
and rescue assets and icebreaker capacity. In addition, an inter-
national workshop was held at the University of New Hampshire in 
March 2008 to consider infrastructure needs and gaps associated 
Arctic Marine
Infrastructure
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of search and rescue assets, pollution response assets and supporting 
shoreside infrastructure to respond appropriately to marine incidents; 
port reception facilities for ship-generated waste; and availability of 
deepwater ports, places of refuge and salvage resources for vessels 
in distress. While there are notable exceptions, where infrastructure 
is more developed, they are the exception rather than the rule. To 
assist with ship navigation, locating refuges, pollution response and 
other activities, adequate weather forecasting and warning capabili-
ties are essential and necessitate adequate observations, models and 
forecasts.
Emergency response is particularly challenging in the Arctic for a 
variety of reasons, including the remoteness and great distances that 
are often involved in responding; the impacts of cold, ice and a harsh 
operating environment on response personnel and equipment; and 
the lack of shoreside infrastructure and communications to support 
and sustain a response of any significant magnitude. Prevention of 
marine accidents, and actions designed to strengthen the effective-
ness of preventive measures, are especially critical for Arctic marine 
shipping given the difficulties of responding once an incident has 
occurred. Preventive measures include ensuring that vessels operat-
ing in the Arctic meet appropriate design, construction and equip-
ment standards; that vessel personnel have the specialized skills 
needed for operating in Arctic conditions, including operations in 
ice-infested waters where applicable; and that information needed 
for safe navigation is available, from accurate charts to timely infor-
mation on meteorological and ice conditions and on other vessel 
traffic and activities in the area.
While there are many challenges associated with strengthening 
Arctic marine shipping infrastructure, there are also opportunities to 
develop measures to improve safe marine shipping operations and 
protect the Arctic environment in anticipation of the continuing 
increase in Arctic marine activity, rather than responding after an 
incident has occurred. Considering the long lead time to put marine 
infrastructure in place, this should be considered early in the priori-
tization process.
Systems Related to Safe Navigation
 
To the mariner, there are several environmental factors that make 
the Arctic uniquely difficult to navigate compared to temperate 
waters. These include: presence and movement of sea ice, icebergs, 
cold air and water temperatures, variable and often unpredictable 
severe weather, magnetic variation, solar flare activity and extended 
daylight or nighttime conditions. These environmental conditions, 
combined with the remoteness of the region from commercial ship-
ping centers and shipping lanes, highlight the need for improved 
systems to support safe navigation in the Arctic region.
© ConocoPhillips
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Arctic Charting
Hydrography is the oldest science of the sea. The earliest explor-
ers were often hydrographers and cartographers who recorded their 
discoveries on marine charts, sometimes to claim new territory, and 
always to ensure safe passage. 
Modern marine charts are compiled from accurate hydrographic 
surveys conducted onboard specialized vessels equipped with echo 
sounders that measure water depths and satellite navigation sys-
tems, such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), that determine 
the geographic positions of these soundings. Numerous other sources 
of information are used in the creation of charts, such as shoreline 
location, details of navigational aids, place names, conspicuous 
land-based features, overhead cables and underwater pipelines. Data 
on navigational charts are also corrected for the movement of tides, 
such that the depth portrayed is normally the minimum the mari-
ner will find under the keel. Expert information specialists combine 
all these various sources of data into navigational charts, taking 
extreme care to ensure the information is clear and accurate for use 
by mariners. The collection of the hydrographic data required and the 
process to produce a new navigational chart can often take years.
In light of the limited amount of marine traffic, the historical 
survey methods (ship-based and ice-based) and the significant costs 
and the volatility of the weather conditions, hydrographic surveys in 
the Arctic have not achieved the same level of coverage and quality 
as surveys in southern latitudes. As a result, Arctic charting base 
hydrographic data is not adequate in most areas to support current 
and future marine activities. This situation could improve if collec-
tion methods and platforms were developed that would be minimally 
affected by the Arctic conditions of weather, ice and isolation.
For hundreds of years, navigation at sea has relied upon the man-
ual plotting of vessel location on traditional paper charts. Modern 
Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS), combined 
with satellite-based positioning, bring hydrographic data into onboard 
computers, greatly improving the navigation information available to 
the mariner and potentially reducing the reliance on traditional aids, 
such as floating buoys and fixed lights. Advances are also being made 
in consolidating information such as weather and ice conditions into 
electronic charting systems, further assisting mariners. 
Recognizing the benefits of electronic charts, the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) has proposed compulsory carriage of 
ECDIS and Electronic Navigational Charts (ENCs) on high speed craft 
from July 1, 2008 onward for all new craft and from July 1, 2010 
onward for existing craft. In addition, IMO’s Safety of Navigation 
Subcommittee has reached consensus to implement the mandatory 
carriage of ECDIS on new passenger ships above 500 gross tonnage 
by 2012, with a broadening of this requirement in subsequent years.
Arctic nations report various levels of ENC coverage for their north-
ern waters (Maps 9.1, 9.2, 9.3). The presence of an ENC does not guar-
antee adequate information for safe navigation, however, as they are 
normally created using the same information available on traditional 
charts. As previously mentioned, the hydrographic data in many Arctic 
locations is either non-existent or in serious need of improvement. 
 
Ship Name Country of Ownership Year Entered Service Propulsion Plant* Operations
ARKTIKA Russian Federation 1975 N:75,000 NSR
ROSSIYA Russian Federation 1985 N:75,000 NSR
SOVETSKIY SOYUZ Russian Federation 1990 N:75,000 NSR; Arctic tourism
YAMAL Russian Federation 1993 N:75,000 NSR; Arctic tourism
50 LET POBEDY Russian Federation 2006 N:75,000 NSR
POLAR STAR United States 1976 gT:60,000 DE:18,000 Arctic and Antarctic  
research and logistics
POLAR SEA United States 1977 gT:60,000 DE:18,000 Arctic and Antarctic 
research and logistics
TAYMYR Russian Federation 1989 N:47,600 NSR
VAYGACH Russian Federation 1990 N:47,600 NSR
KRASIN Russian Federation 1976 DE:36,000 NSR; Antarctic
z  Table 9.1  Ten most powerful icebreakers in the world. Note: DE = Diesel-Electric; GT= Gas Turbine; N= Nuclear; NSR = Northern Sea Route.  Source: AMSA
* shaft horse power
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Increased Arctic activity, coupled with the difficulties in deploying 
and maintaining navigational aids in the region, presents an opportu-
nity to implement ECDIS to improve navigation safety and save costs. 
The benefits of ECDIS, however, are wholly dependent on the under-
lying hydrographic navigational charts and consequently the hydro-
graphic data on which they are based. Coverage of GPS, or other means 
of positioning, is also crucial to take full advantage of the system.
Canada, the United States, the Russian Federation and Denmark 
are carrying out charting activities that include portions of the 
Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage. These countries, as 
well as Iceland and Norway, are all member states of the International 
Hydrographic Organization (IHO) whose mission “is to facilitate the 
provision of adequate and timely hydrographic information for world-
wide marine navigation.”
While there are published charts whose physical limits cover 
both the Canadian Northwest Passage and the Russian Northern Sea 
Route, the quality of the underlying data varies widely from modern, 
high resolution hydrographic surveys to no sounding information in 
some areas. 
The quality and accuracy of navigational charts is entirely 
dependent on the hydrographic data used to compile them. 
Hydrographic surveys in the Arctic are logistically very compli-
cated, expensive to undertake and highly dependent on weather 
and ice conditions. In addition, hydrographic offices normally 
prioritize their efforts based on a risk classification approach. 
Because the Arctic has traditionally seen smaller volumes of 
marine traffic, these risks have been perceived as low compared 
to other regions and progress in improving hydrographic coverage 
in the Arctic has been painstakingly slow.
IHO provides the current state of hydrographic surveys for 
member countries throughout the world. In Greenland, the limit 
for navigable waters has been set to 75 degrees northern latitude 
due to the permanent ice cover and the sparse population of its 
east coast. Within Canada, a high proportion of Arctic waters 
are inadequately surveyed or covered by frontier surveys only. 
A similar situation exists in the Russian Federation where ice 
conditions have precluded the systematic survey of the central 
parts of the Laptev and East Siberian seas. Only passage sounding 
10%
The portion of the Canadian Arctic that the Canadian Hydrographic 
Service says has been surveyed to modern standards.
 
For the purpose of this assessment, “infrastructure” is defined broadly to 
address all major aspects of marine shipping, including vessels and crews, the 
systems needed to gather and supply accurate and timely information for safe 
navigation and operations, the personnel and resources needed to respond to 
a variety of potential emergencies, port reception facilities for ship-generated 
waste and the shoreside facilities needed to provide supplies and logistics in 
support of marine shipping and emergency response. “Vessels” include tankers, 
passenger vessels (ferries, large and small cruise ships) and pleasure craft, bulk 
carriers, container ships, fishing vessels, tug and barge combinations, offshore 
supply vessels, research ships, icebreakers and other watercraft. “Officers and 
crew” includes vessel personnel with special expertise for operations in cold and 
ice-infested waters, such as ice navigators or ice pilots, and considers the train-
ing, experience and expertise required for all vessel personnel when confront-
ing the unique challenges of Arctic marine operations. “Emergency response 
resources” include response assets such as aircraft, vessels and specialized 
equipment; the logistics and supply chains needed to support these operations 
both at sea and ashore; and the availability of related shoreside facilities and 
resources such as port, medical, refueling facilities and living quarters to accom-
modate emergency responders. “Shoreside facilities” include ports and port 
facilities, particularly ports with adequate depth to accommodate larger ves-
sels, potential places of refuge, airports and shoreside transportation systems.
Arctic Marine Infrastructure Terminology
©
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z  Map 9.1  Canadian charting and survey status. Source: AMSA
conducted surveys since 1933. For the main areas of the Arctic 
shelf that cover 90 percent of the traditional navigation routes, 
detailed underwater topography is available (Map 9.3). Coastal 
surveys are completed for the Chukchi Sea, the East Siberian Sea, 
the Kara Sea, the navigable part of the Gulf of Ob’, the shipping 
channel of the Yenisei River up to the port of Igarka, the ship-
ping channel of the Khatanga and Kolyma rivers and the entrance 
of the Bykovsky waterway from the sea to the delta of the Lena 
River.
The SHD has set modern standards for Russian hydrographic sur-
veys that recommend survey methods to ensure the detection of all 
data is available for the deep water areas of the Sea of Okhotsk 
and the Bering Sea. The following figures illustrate the status of 
individual countries. 
The Canadian Hydrographic Service reports that 10 percent of the 
Canadian Arctic has been surveyed to modern standards (Map 9.1). 
Coverage is often minimal and collected using rudimentary equip-
ment and methods. 
Surveys of the U.S. Arctic have been predominately along the 
northern coast of Alaska (Map 9.2). 
The Russian Federal State Unitary “Hydrographic Enterprise” 
(SHD), formerly known as the Hydrographic Department, has 
1933
The year the Russian Federal State Unitary 
“Hydrographic Enterprise” began conducting surveys.
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z  Map 9.2  U.S. charting and status of surveys in the Arctic.  Source:  AMSA
underwater obstacles on routes of intense navigation. To meet these 
modern standards, charts will need to be updated and, in the near 
future, an appreciable amount of work will have to be done. This 
includes detailed surveys of recommended shipping routes, harbor-
ages and anchorages for cargo operations using an instrumental area 
survey by special hydrographic equipment; regular measurement in 
areas not yet surveyed or surveyed with poor accuracy and details; 
and regular measurements in regions that are difficult to access 
because of ice conditions.
As mariners traverse the waters of nations around the world, 
they must be able to reliably interpret hydrographic products, 
independent of the country of origin. By becoming members of 
the International Hydrographic Organization, hydrographic offices 
agree to achieve uniformity in data quality and presentation stan-
dards. The emergence of digital products, most importantly elec-
tronic charts, has introduced a new aspect to the dissemination of 
hydrographic data. While a convergence of data sharing approaches 
is underway, significant inconsistencies remain. The Arctic pro-
vides an excellent opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of an 
open approach to data sharing in the international hydrographic 
community.
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 Ice Information in the Arctic
Without sea ice, the needs for environmental information in the 
Arctic would be little different from the world’s other oceans - wind and 
weather, waves, tides, currents, etc. Sea ice is what sets the Arctic apart 
- what makes navigation in the Arctic especially unique and hazardous. 
Sea ice in the Arctic has an annual cycle of freeze and melting 
that will not change in the future. When the sun goes down in the 
autumn and the extreme cold arrives, the ocean freezes. March is the 
month of maximum ice coverage. Through the summer months, the 
ice melts and retreats to a minimum extent in September.
It is generally agreed that the reduction in the thickness and 
extent of Arctic sea ice will continue into the future until, eventu-
ally, the Arctic will become free of sea ice in summer - much like 
the Baltic Sea, Sea of Okhotsk or the waters off the east coast of 
Canada. However, this will not eliminate the hazard that ice presents 
to Arctic shipping. There will still be a winter ice cover and signifi-
cant inter-annual variability means that not all of the ice will melt 
every year, so scattered old ice floes will hide in the pack ice along 
with icebergs and ice island fragments. Moving ice driven by winds 
and currents will create a dynamic and hazardous operating environ-
ment. Variability in the onset of autumn freeze-up will present the 
risk of getting trapped in the Arctic over winter. Spring break-up to 
mark the start of summer navigation will vary and, as happens now 
in more southerly seas, shippers eager to start work will test the 
limits of their vessels in ice.
As more ships venture into the Arctic, the demand for ice 
information, as well as other ocean data, products and services, 
will continue to increase and the resources available to meet this 
increased demand will be stretched. The ice parameters needed in 
the future will not change significantly but will be required over 
larger geographic areas and longer periods of the year. Operators will 
still need to know where the ice is and isn’t; where it’s going to be, 
how closely packed it is and how thick and strong it is; generally, 
how difficult it will be to go around or, when necessary, go through. 
These parameters will be needed on a variety of space and time 
scales - from the hemispheric to the local, from months and weeks 
to daily or even hourly - to support tactical and strategic route plan-
ning for ships, scientific study and the development of policy and 
regulations to ensure safe marine practices. 
The needs of mariners for ice information are currently met by 
a number of organizations, including national ice services that pro-
duce information for the Arctic that is generally freely available as 
a public service funded by tax-payers; academic institutions that 
provide ice information as part of an ongoing research program or 
to support field research campaigns; and commercial ice information 
services that provide services that are specific to individual clients 
with particular needs. As more ships venture into the Arctic and the 
demand for ice information and related services increases, there will 
be increasing pressure on the resources of ice information providers.
The national ice services collaborate in the Joint WMO-IOC 
Technical Commission for Oceanography and Marine Meteorology 
Expert Team on Sea Ice, the body that establishes and main-
tains the standards for ice information internationally; and in the 
International Ice Charting Working Group (IICWG), an ad hoc group 
Sea ice is what  
sets the Arctic  
apart - what makes  
navigation in the  
Arctic especially  
unique and  
hazardous.
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that coordinates ice information services internationally and advises 
the Expert Team on Sea Ice. As a result of this collaboration, there 
is an internationally accepted nomenclature for ice in the ocean, 
common charting and coding practices and cooperative information 
sharing among the ice services. 
Ice information products include ice charts depicting the distri-
bution and characteristics of the sea ice in an area; satellite images 
of ice-infested waters, often with interpretative text added; and 
text messages describing ice conditions. There is a wide range of 
scales for these products - from hemispheric charts that are useful 
for long-range planning to the navigation scale to support tactical 
vessel movements.
It is certain that the needs for ice information will evolve as 
more Arctic shipping develops. It is impossible to predict exactly 
how that evolution will occur because it depends on many factors - 
how the ice distribution itself changes, where resources are found, 
what markets are developed, advances in ship design and improving 
technology to observe, produce and disseminate ice information. The 
following examples are intended to provide illustrations of the par-
ticular ice information needs for some probable scenarios.
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Potential shipping routes for extracting resources - principally 
oil, gas and minerals - will primarily be along shortest distance lines 
from the production sites to markets. It is likely the vessels used in 
this trade will be purpose-built for the trade in question and will 
operate year-round. They will be ice-strengthened and powered suf-
ficiently to handle the most severe ice conditions encountered along 
the route. Ice information of most importance to these vessels will 
be that which can help them reduce time and fuel consumption en 
route as well as minimize the risks and delays that can be caused by 
difficult ice conditions around loading docks and piers.
Arctic transit shipping, using the Arctic Ocean as a short cut 
between Atlantic and Pacific, is not expected to become common 
because of the seasonal nature of the ice cover. Vessels designed to 
reliably pass through the winter Arctic ice cover will be greatly dis-
advantaged economically during the ice-free season. If transit ship-
ping does occur in the Arctic, it will likely be limited to the summer 
season. These vessels will have some ice-strengthening to handle 
summer Arctic ice encounters but will not be able to deal with winter 
conditions. The most important ice information for this trade will be 
medium- and long-range forecasts of break-up and freeze-up to help 
companies decide when to head for the Arctic and when to get out 
in order to avoid being trapped over a winter. Close in the order of 
importance will be analyses and short-range forecasts of ice concen-
tration, strength and motion to allow masters en route to set courses 
that avoid ice as much as possible. 
Marine Weather Information for the Arctic 
Modern weather information, including information for shipping, 
is based on numerical models. Numerical weather prediction analy-
ses and forecasts are available for the Arctic from all of the major 
meteorological centers that run global models. States having the 
need for more detailed information for the Arctic areas have imple-
mented high resolution models covering the Arctic region according 
to their needs. 
In addition, Arctic coastal states provide marine weather informa-
tion for their coastal waters. In most cases information for shipping 
is issued for large areas extending well offshore. Within the coverage 
of INMARSAT Global Maritime Distress Safety System transmissions, 
marine safety information in the form of gale and storm warnings is in 
place consistent with all other high sea areas in the world. However, 
no responsibility has yet been assigned for the high seas regions of 
the Arctic outside the coverage of INMARSAT, although an initia-
tive is underway to do so by the World Meteorological Organization. 
Several states have offered to issue and/or prepare weather informa-
tion for the Arctic. Progress in this initiative is expected and routine 
weather bulletins for the high Arctic areas may be in place in a few 
years. Prediction of the development and paths of lows giving rise 
to high winds is of particular concern for Arctic shipping. Accurate 
© United States Coast Guard
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forecasts of sea ice, wave height, wind direction and speed, visibility, 
temperature and superstructure icing are the most important routine 
forecast parameters for shipping - with at least the same accuracy 
and timeliness requirements as on the other oceans. 
Although weather forecasts for the Arctic are based on the same 
tools using the same techniques as in other areas of the world, 
the scarcity of observations in the Arctic makes the monitoring of 
the weather more difficult than in areas with more observations. 
Meteorological observations in the Arctic rely on drifting buoys 
placed on top of the sea ice. A new generation of buoys that will 
withstand multiple freeze-thaw cycles is currently under develop-
ment and is urgently needed to provide surface observations in the 
Arctic Ocean. The ability to measure the conditions of the atmo-
sphere and ocean from satellites is, however, developing rapidly and, 
with adequate surface validation, the quality of weather forecasts 
will approach the quality used in other areas.
Wave Information for the Arctic 
Because of the ubiquitous presence of sea ice, waves have not 
been a major navigational hazard in the Arctic. However, with less 
sea ice to dampen the waves, this will no longer be the case in the 
future. Wave information is typically packaged along with marine 
weather information in sea ice-free areas. New operational model-
ing capability will be needed to deal with a partial ice cover and its 
effect on wave generation and transmission. Buoys that measure the 
wave heights and directions are essential for model validation but 
none of these exist in the Arctic for operational reporting. Because 
of the necessity to deal with winter ice, a new generation of buoys 
will have to be developed. 
 
Marine Aids to Navigation
The safe and effective use of northern waters by maritime ship-
ping relies heavily on such safety systems as fixed and floating aids 
to navigation, long-range aids to navigation (shore-based electronic 
or satellite-based), as well as safety and navigation information 
broadcasts. While southern waters and well-used maritime routes are 
well served by established systems, northern waters are served by a 
patchwork of these systems. Ships navigating in the Arctic encounter 
unique situations. Ships usually use a combination of satellite posi-
tioning and traditional navigation techniques.
Of the eight circumpolar countries, six have coastlines. Of these, 
Canada, Denmark, Norway, Iceland and the Russian Federation main-
tain active aids to navigation (ATON) networks. More specifically: 
The Canadian Coast Guard maintains a number of seasonal fixed 
and floating aids throughout the Canadian Arctic. These are placed 
The future increase in human 
activity in the Arctic, including  
Arctic marine shipping and the 
continued overflight of the Arctic 
region by commercial aircraft, will 
place increasing demands on the 
SAR infrastructure.
around the last week in June by icebreakers in Ungava Bay, Hudson 
Strait, Frobisher Bay and in the western Arctic by the third week 
in July. There is an active aids program along the Mackenzie River, 
serviced by two CCG shallow draft tenders. These aids are then picked 
up and the fixed aids deactivated as the icebreakers leave the Arctic, 
generally by the last week in October.
Norway maintains aids to navigation along its entire coast and 
at Svalbard along the coast and in fjords. Of note are a number of 
fixed and floating aids to navigation in Svalbard internal waters. It is 
expected that the requirement for aids to navigation in the Svalbard 
area will increase based on analyses of both the changing traffic pat-
terns and the utilization of better risk analysis methodology.
Denmark has a permanent system of radio communication and 
radar beacons (RACON) along the west coast of Greenland from 
Uummannarsuaq/Kap Farvel to Qeqertarsuup Tunual/Diskobugten, 
as well as a system of coastal fixed aids, such as daymarks, from 
Uummannarsuaq/Kap Farvel to Upernavik. 
Iceland maintains a number of fixed and floating aids to navi-
gation in its internal waters including a Digital Global Positioning 
System and RACON beacons and has a permanent system of radio 
communication for radio monitoring of its fishing fleet.
The Russian Federation has an extensive system of fixed and 
floating aids to navigation mainly in the harbors of the NSR, which 
also includes some lighted and unlighted beacons and daymarks 
along the coast between ports. 
The United States has no aids to navigation along the north 
coast of Alaska. The current U.S. short-range ATON footprint in the 
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Arctic extends a short distance north of the Bering Strait where 
the largest zinc mine in the world (Cominco’s Red Dog mine) near 
Kivalina receives ore carriers. North of the Aleutians along the coast 
of the Bering Sea, the U.S. has some floating and fixed ATON near the 
Pribilof Islands and Bristol Bay for tug, barge and fishing vessel traf-
fic. In the Aleutian chain, there are several areas where navigational 
aids are maintained for local traffic, as well as for the trans-Pacific 
shipping transiting this region.
Marine Communications, Traffic  
Monitoring and Control
The historical standard for communicating weather, wave and 
ice information to ships at sea is the radio facsimile broadcast. 
While its use is being eclipsed world-wide by digital communica-
tions, the analogue radio broadcast remains an important source 
of information in the Arctic. Radio stations in the United States, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and the Russian 
Federation broadcast analysis and forecast charts for sea ice, ice-
bergs, sea state and weather, as well as providing vessel traffic 
services and general marine communications.
Norway has established a very advanced system composed of 
Automatic Identification System (AIS) and Maritime Communications 
and Traffic Services along the Arctic coast. In January 2007, a Vessel 
Traffic Service (VTS) for the coast of northern Norway was established 
in Vardø, operated by the Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA). 
The service is designed to monitor and 
guide vessels, to promote safe and effi-
cient navigation, and to protect the 
marine environment against undesired 
events in the Barents Sea and along the 
Norwegian coast. The area of operation 
for Vardø VTS Center is the Norwegian 
Economic Zone (NEZ) outside the base-
line, the area around Svalbard and the 
area outside Tromsø and Finnmark in 
northern Norway. The VTS Center inter-
acts with vessels, other government 
agencies, the NCA duty team that is 
responsible for national response and 
with the Norwegian SAR for search and 
rescue services. The administration also 
coordinates, on a daily basis, the tug-
boat preparedness in North Norway in 
conjunction with Regional Headquarters 
North-Norway (Norwegian Armed Forces) 
and the NCA duty team.
The United States marine communications infrastructure in Alaska 
is concentrated where vessels operate the most. There is excellent very 
high frequency (VHF) coverage throughout southeast Alaska and into 
portions of the Bering Sea north to St. Paul and the Bristol Bay area. 
North of this region there is local VHF coverage at Nome, Kotzebue 
and Barrow. Barrow and Kotzebue, both north of the Bering Strait, 
also have high frequency (HF) NOAA radios. Mariners in these areas 
can speak directly to a weather expert via HF radio. Outside of VHF 
marine coverage, the U.S. Coast Guard relies on high frequency or sat-
ellite communications. Canada operates a seasonal system, while the 
Russian Federation is planning to augment their existing service during 
the next two years with further investment up to the 2020 timeframe. 
The Danish Navy operates a year-round high frequency radio station on 
the southwest coast of Greenland and maintains the IMO mandatory 
ship reporting system, GREENPOS, for all ships on voyage to or from 
Greenland ports and places of call. Furthermore, Denmark maintains a 
number of stations with limited communications capabilities in the 
south/southeast and lower western half of Greenland. Iceland has an 
advanced system of AIS along its coast with 23 base stations and 
repeaters with total coverage of the coastline. The maritime radio sys-
tem has recently been renewed in VHF, MF (medium frequency) and HF 
bands and two new NAVTEX stations have been established. The traffic 
monitoring is carried out by the Maritime Traffic Service in Reykjavik 
operated by the Icelandic Coast Guard.
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Communications using VHF, MF and HF as well as satellite are 
generally sufficient for the lower Arctic areas (Hudson Bay, Foxe 
Basin, southern Greenland waters and waters of the Northern Sea 
Route); however, once the high Arctic is reached, voice and data 
transmission become problematic.
Most modern ships are equipped with satellite digital com-
munications equipment - not only for safety reasons but for the 
management and navigation of the ship. This equipment relies on 
geostationary INMARSAT satellites that  do not provide service north-
ward of about 80º N latitude. Other systems, such as the IRIDIUM 
constellation of 66 polar orbiting satellites, provide worldwide cov-
erage including the Arctic. IRIDIUM is capable of providing a Ship 
Safety and Alerting System that meets IMO requirements but its data 
transfer rates are very low (less than 9.6 kb/s). The feasibility of 
communicating ice charts and satellite images to ships in the Arctic 
via the IRIDIUM system has been demonstrated but communica-
tions are limited and often interrupted. Other regional systems such 
as the Mobile Satellite System (MSAT) offer limited voice and data 
transfer capability only in North America including the Canadian 
Arctic Archipelago.
Improvements in capacity and reductions in cost are necessary 
for IRIDIUM and other regional systems to become a practical, wide-
spread solution for the Arctic not only for voice, but more impor-
tantly for data transmission. The Russian Federation has been using 
communication satellites in highly elliptical orbits that provide 
long residence time over the Arctic (“Molniya” orbits) for television 
and other communications needs for several decades and, in 2007, 
pledged to improve radio and telecommunications in the Arctic.
It should be noted that the Canadian government has initiated 
a “Polar Communications and Weather space mission for Canada’s 
North,” (PCW) which is planning to provide robust 24/7 two-way 
satellite communications capability to all of the Canadian north 
for rapid high rate data transmission and information products, as 
well as low-data rate communications capability and also near-real 
time meteorological information products about the north to users 
throughout Canada.
© Neste Shipping Oy
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Norway is in dialogue with the United Kingdom, Denmark 
(Greenland), Faroe Islands and Iceland with regard to establishing 
a regional North Atlantic AIS/VTMIS (Vessel and Traffic Monitoring 
and Information System). The system is planned to be in force in 
2009, and will facilitate the implementation of Article 9 of the 
Directive 2002/59 and the establishment of the SafeSeaNet Tracking 
Identification Relay and Exchange System (STIRES) as presented in 
the STIRES study (Saab AB, PM PM 374185). 
Satellites and aerial surveillance systems can improve monitoring 
capability and serve to improve compliance with state regulations 
such as those intended for pollution prevention, or traffic reporting 
schemes that consequently can help in protecting the environment. 
As shipping increases in the Arctic regions, the requirement for 
improved voice and data transmission coverage becomes paramount.
Personnel and Maritime Training
Considering the Arctic operational environment and the lack of 
infrastructure, safe navigation in the Arctic is often dependent on 
the skills of a limited number of seasoned northern mariners. The 
Arctic offers significant navigational challenges, especially to the 
uninitiated. For decades, safe navigation has rested in the hands 
of a small number of experienced officers in a few countries. Their 
training has mostly been on-the-job with relatively little in the way 
of formal ice navigation education except within the limited regular 
navigation curriculum. With increased shipping in the Arctic, the 
need for skilled mariners will increase. Earlier melt periods and later 
freeze-ups will allow a greater amount of multi-year ice and ice of 
land origin (iceberg fragments such as growlers and smaller pieces 
called bergy bits) into the shipping lanes of the Northern Sea Route 
and the Northwest Passage, as well as in Greenland waters. It should 
be noted that less ice does not mean less danger. Understanding of 
the special conditions influencing navigation in the Arctic is crucial 
to the maintenance of a safe shipping regime.
The IMO’s Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered 
Waters and the International Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping of Seafarers (STCW ’95) call for spe-
cialized training for mariners in Arctic waters. The guidelines define 
an ice navigator as “any individual who, in addition to being quali-
fied under the STCW Convention, is especially trained and otherwise 
qualified to direct the movement of a ship in ice-covered waters. It 
also states: “The Ice Navigator should have documentary evidence 
of having satisfactorily completed an approved training program in 
ice navigation. Such a training program should provide [the] knowl-
edge, [the] understanding and proficiency required for operating a 
ship in Arctic ice-covered waters, including recognition of ice for-
mation and characteristics; ice indications; ice maneuvering; use of 
ice forecasts, atlases and codes; hull stress caused by ice; ice escort 
operations; ice-breaking operations and effect of ice accretion on 
vessel stability.” It also provides guidelines for companies operating 
in Arctic ice-covered waters to develop a training manual, including 
the development and inclusion of drills and emergency instructions, 
emphasizing changes to standard procedures made necessary by 
operations in Arctic ice-covered waters. These drills and emergency 
instructions would be incorporated into the routine vessel opera-
tional training. 
The STCW includes mandatory training requirements for passage 
planning and ice navigation in ice-covered waters. This section also 
authorizes the use of approved training simulators to achieve the 
stated training requirements. The concept of an officer experienced 
in navigation in ice, as well as the qualifications required, forms part 
of various national legislation and rules among northern countries 
such as the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act and its 
associated regulations: the Joint Industry Coast Guard Guidelines for 
the control and operation of oil tankers and bulk chemical carriers in 
ice control zones of Eastern Canada.
The Russian Federation has a modern Arctic maritime training 
regime concentrated in the following marine educational centers: 
the Admiral Makarov State Maritime Academy in St. Petersburg; the 
Admiral Nevelskoy Far East State Maritime Academy in Vladivostok; 
the regional center of continuing professional education at the 
Captain Voronin Maritime College in Arkhangelsk; the “MARSTAR” 
Academy in St. Petersburg; and the Primorsk Shipping Corporation 
training Center in Nakhodka. 
These centers train prospective Arctic navigators using the 
“Preparation for Navigation in Ice Conditions” course developed by 
the Makharov Training Center. These courses are designed around 
three subdivisions: theoretical training, simulator training and prac-
tical training onboard a vessel. The courses follow the requirements 
Various maritime training institutions are developing, or have developed, ice 
navigation courses, employing full mission bridge simulators and associated 
software products.
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expressed in the IMO STCW 78/95 Requirements; the IMO’s Guidelines 
for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters and finally those 
specified by the Russian Rules of Navigation on the Seaways of the 
Northern Sea Route.
The course trains officers in all aspects of operations in ice-cov-
ered waters, through theoretical and simulator-based training includ-
ing: the preparation and planning for voyages in ice-covered waters; 
operating, navigating, maneuvering and escorting ships in Arctic ice-
covered waters, including recognition of ice formation and its char-
acteristics; features of maneuvering in ice of different density and 
thickness; communication between cargo vessels and icebreakers; and 
familiarization with emergency and search and rescue operations.
The prospective navigator must follow a practical regime com-
posed of two phases that reinforces the theoretical and simulated 
aspects of the training already received, as well as knowledge passed 
on from more experienced operational personnel. These include prac-
tical navigation training where the student is taken onboard as a 
bridge officer trainee and is supervised by the navigating officers; 
and practical deck training where the student is taken onboard as a 
regular member of the ship’s crew and studies features of ice opera-
tions from their point of view.
Certification of Ships’ Officers and Crew
Maritime administrations around the globe are tasked with the 
certification process, which is linked to the maritime licensing pro-
grams for most countries. Several areas, such as vessel security offi-
cers, radar navigation and pilotage, have been fully addressed with 
special endorsements on individual licenses. Certification for tanker 
operations, vessel classification, vessel design and equipment for 
vessels operating in ice-covered waters has been established. Several 
regulations address oil spill response and environmental issues. 
Various maritime training institutions are developing, or have 
developed, ice navigation courses, employing full mission bridge 
simulators and associated software products. The IMO has cre-
ated a program of model training to assist institutions develop-
ing ice navigation courses with an emphasis on meeting STCW 
requirements. Several countries have instituted courses, includ-
ing Finland and the Russian Federation, for the Baltic region, as 
well as Norway and Argentina. Canada has developed a model 
course using a simulator at the Marine Institute in St. John’s, 
Newfoundland. While these classes begin to address the deficit in 
standardized ice navigation training, international harmonization 
is still necessary in order to provide the next generation of quali-
fied northern navigators.
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As more ships venture into the Arctic, the demand for ice information, as well 
as other ocean data, products and services, will continue to increase and the 
resources available to meet this increased demand will be stretched.
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Incident Response and Capacity
 
As marine activity continues to expand in the Arctic, statisti-
cal trends indicate that the potential risk of vessel mishaps and 
marine pollution incidents also increases. The inherent navigational 
and environmental hazards and limited number of experienced per-
sonnel, combined with Arctic ecosystem sensitivity, heightens the 
need for greater incident response capacity and preparedness. It is 
important to learn, as soon as possible, what has been spilled, where 
and when in order to address it in an appropriate manner.
Protection of the Environment:  
Oil and Other Hazardous Spills Response
Marine incident prevention is based upon addressing four condi-
tions that may result in pollution incidents:
•	 human	error	or	failure	caused	by	fatigue,	malfeasance,	unfamil-
iarity or other conditions either exclusively or in conjunction 
with each other; 
•	 lack	of	operational	 readiness	and	preparedness	caused	by	mar-
ginal or unprepared ship or crews; 
•	 older	vessel	or	vessel	operating	outside	of	operation	parameters;	
and
•	 Arctic	climate	and	situational	unknowns	caused	by	less	predict-
able or rapidly changing weather, ice conditions, iceberg aware-
ness or failure of mechanical systems unprepared for the rigors of 
Arctic operations.
Alone, or in combination, these conditions contribute to a myr-
iad of scenarios for pollution and are the focus of the vast majority 
of preventive measures. 
In addition, the variety of pollutant types and sub-types threaten 
the environment in different ways depending upon their chemical 
nature and how they behave when released. This may include cir-
cumstances such as waterway type, time of year, weather (wind, 
temperature) and local geography. Further adding to these circum-
stances are the variables associated with the potential impacts or 
sensitivities related to shoreline ecosystems, marine ecosystems, 
socio-economic systems or, in general terms, the overall exposed 
environments that would be lost or degraded. 
Given the recognition that prevention may greatly diminish but 
not necessarily eliminate pollution threats, all maritime nations sup-
port preparedness and response activities. The challenge lies in the 
creation and sustainability of a preparedness and response regime 
that deals with the innumerable combinations and permutations 
possible. 
Internationally, the Arctic countries are all signatories to MARPOL 
73/78 (Annex I and II), COLREG Convention 72, STCW Convention 78 
and Load Lines Convention 1966 and Protocol 1988, all of which fun-
damentally support the domestic legal frameworks for limiting vessel 
casualty situations. While these conventions apply internationally, 
the unique Arctic conditions relating to ice cover, weather fluctua-
tion, limited basic infrastructure due to remoteness and particular 
biological susceptibilities increase the reliance on clear and robust 
prevention and preparedness regimes. 
The Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working 
group of the Arctic Council has created several products for dealing with 
oil spills in the Arctic. These products are available to the general public 
through http://eppr.arctic-council.org and include: 
•	 an	Arctic	Guide	referencing	emergency	systems	and	governmental	
contacts for all circumpolar nations that is updated annually;
•	 a	 Shoreline	 Cleanup	 and	Assessment	Manual	 (2004)	 for	 use	 in	
determining the most appropriate techniques for enhancing 
shoreline recovery; 
•	 a	series	of	Circumpolar	Maps	of	Resources	at	Risk	from	Oil	Spills	
in the Arctic (2002);
•	 a	Field	Guide	(1998)	for	oil	spills	response	referencing	all	manner	
of protection and recovery techniques; and
•	 an	Environmental	Risk	Analysis	(1998)	of	Arctic	activities	that	
indicates current potential spill sources.
Of particular note, the series of circumpolar maps, http://
eppr.akvaplan.com, provides a first order overview of informa-
tion for stakeholders to easily identify potential sources of spills 
and internationally important biological resources that could be 
at risk. The map catalogue includes thematic, regional and sea-
sonal views including fish, bird, mammal, human population and 
protected areas.
While there are exceptions, there 
are few Arctic-based resources to 
address oil spills, especially the 
ability to recover trapped oil in  
hulls and compartments in both 
shallow and deep water.
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A review of each Arctic state’s response profile reveals a rela-
tively consistent allocation of marine pollution interests from federal 
to local levels. In addition, there exists a number of longstand-
ing bilateral agreements between adjacent countries that encour-
age cooperative efforts and transfer of best practices. For example, 
Norway and the Russian Federation have a bilateral oil spill response 
agreement for the Barents Sea that is exercised annually. There is no 
multilateral oil spill response agreement for the Arctic, but it may 
warrant an umbrella or multilateral agreement and/or a contingency 
planning process. Because of the diverse nature of the areas and 
interest, there is no particular advantage or disadvantage to any one 
model provided that entities share their objectives and communicate 
effectively.
In terms of current and future marine traffic, the Arctic is an 
immense, seasonally variable waterway with very little develop-
ment along its shores. Despite the current disposition of resources 
and regimes, a more consistent country by country approach is 
required to address the pollution risk more effectively. Issues 
related to identifying risk areas, establishing timelines for response 
and ultimately designing a consistent response capacity remains 
a challenge.
Logistics - the procurement, maintenance and transportation 
of materials, facilities and personnel - are dependent upon exist-
ing Arctic infrastructure. This is a critical component of all Arctic 
operations. Sea-state and environmental exposure will place larger 
burdens on logistics supply lines. In the absence of shore-based 
infrastructure, longer range planning for refueling and replenish-
ment are required. Distances between ports, coupled with the 
unpredictability of weather, may complicate access and supply, as 
well as removal of recovered product and waste. With public expec-
tation of four season response capability for large or environmen-
tally disastrous spills, the logistics infrastructure may need to be 
modified.
The issue of logistics is not surprisingly a significant and mostly 
limiting factor in facilitating an effective response. In remote areas, 
two distinct situations exist in relation to the provision of logistics: 
incidents within reasonable distances from established communities 
and those in more remote settings. Pre-existing infrastructure or pre-
placement of response assets typically support this first scenario, 
while remote incident sites require the creation of infrastructure 
from the ground up. A mobile and relatively self-sustaining infra-
structure is called for currently and likely into the foreseeable future. 
Selecting a site for this type of infrastructure becomes the key logis-
tical issue facing a response and obtaining local knowledge of the 
areas is considered vital. 
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It is important to learn, as soon as 
possible, what has been spilled, 
where and when in order to address 
it in an appropriate manner.
z  Table 9.2  Summary of typical response countermeasures in various seasons and 
seas.  Source: First Responder's Guide for Arctic Oil Spills, EPPR
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Oil spills in ice are more complicated to address than oil spills in 
open waters and there are several challenges connected with oil spill 
response in ice and snow and cold water. Apart from the normally 
long distances from existing infrastructure, the oil is less accessible 
in ice-covered waters. The oil can be spilled on ice or snow, in open 
pools between ice floes, in open channels behind vessels or even 
under the ice from pipelines or other sources. 
There are some advantages in addressing oil spills in ice com-
pared to open water. The weathering rate is normally much slower 
for an oil spill in ice as the emulsification rate is slower, resulting in 
an increased window of opportunity for use of most response tech-
niques. The spreading of oil will be normally slower also, resulting in 
a large oil film thickness that may be favorable for oil spill response. 
The reduced weathering of oil in these conditions does, however, 
maintain the levels of its more toxic components for greater peri-
ods of time, thereby increasing the availability or risk of uptake by 
organisms.
Arctic Oil Spill Recovery Operations:  
Technology and Tactics
Effective Arctic oil spill recovery operations require advanced 
planning and international cooperation. All available methods must 
be available and considered for each situation although some meth-
ods have proven more effective in ice-covered waters. Along with 
planning and cooperation, training, incident communications and 
risk management are key elements to any oil recovery operation.
Mechanical recovery techniques combined with oil detection 
and tracking methods, currently dominate the in-field capabilities 
of most nations. However, tracking, detecting, as well as model-
ing oil in ice-covered waters has inherent environmental limitations. 
The mechanical methods are often considered the most environmen-
tally friendly recovery methods. The concept is to create barriers via 
floating or alternative booms, recover the oil out of the sea with a 
mechanical skimmer and then do the post-treatment for the recov-
ered oil in a controlled manner in environmentally safe conditions. 
However, the mechanical methods are laborious and time consuming 
and their efficiency is low. Further, mechanical methods often require 
complicated logistical support in the form of equipment and per-
sonnel transportation, which in remote or harsh conditions cannot 
easily be provided. Mechanical recovery in ice and snow conditions 
must meet challenges in terms of booming, skimming, recovery and 
pumping capabilities. Each of these areas has specific challenges to 
optimum recovery efforts.
Chemical dispersion can be utilized to promote the formation of 
oil droplets in order to accelerate the natural dispersion and biodeg-
radation of spilled oil. Dispersants (surfactants) can be applied to 
control offshore slicks or oil that accumulates in coastal areas that 
have significant tidal or flushing action. In order for dispersion to 
be effective there needs to be limited weathering of the spilled oil, 
a cohesive slick, an oil within the viscosity ranges of dispersibility, 
an appropriate dispersant to oil ratio and turbulent mixing. Only 
a few research studies have been performed in the past 20 years 
regarding the use of dispersants on oil spills in ice-infested waters, 
either from an effectiveness or environmental-impact perspective, 
and these are of limited value in assessing the situation in realistic 
terms. Logistical support and effectiveness may also be a challenge 
when using dispersants. Limited studies such as the Joint Industry 
Program (JIP) on Oil in Ice, have followed the long-term fate of 
dispersed oil, but most impacts have been derived from laboratory 
studies. 
In-situ burning, or ISB, is a treatment method that can be used 
for oil on open water, on ice and in broken ice, if adequate oil thick-
ness can be achieved to sustain burning. This may require the use 
of booms or herding agents. While continued studies are needed 
to best determine the ISB effectiveness window of opportunity, for 
in-situ burning to be a viable option, planning, special equipment 
and training specific to ISB must be in place before the limited 
window of opportunity presents itself during a spill. Burnability is 
a function of oil type (chemical/physical factors), oil thickness on 
the interface and its state of weathering/degradation. While colder 
Arctic temperatures are a force to overcome for ISB in ice-covered 
waters, other natural degradation processes such as slower rates of 
spreading, evaporation and emulsification have supported burning. 
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From the recovery rate point of view, in-situ burning seems to be the 
most effective method for clean-up of oil spills in ice and snow con-
ditions. Furthermore, removal efficiency exceeding 90 percent can 
be achieved in ideal conditions (open water, fire booms and quiet 
conditions), but a burning rate of 60 to 70 percent can be considered 
as representative for burning on ice-free water. The burning rate 
can also be zero percent if the oil is not ignitable. ISB may be more 
limited due to weathering of the oil than the use of dispersants. 
This is significantly more effective than rates of 10 to 20 percent 
for mechanical recovery. Alternatively, in-situ burning will gener-
ate smoke and soot, thus moving part of the pollution from the sea 
to the air, and will leave a burn residue that must be recovered. 
Monitoring and assessment of these results is always necessary. 
Oil may be removed by biological degradation. Oil-degrading bac-
teria naturally exist in the seas with oil, including the cold and icy 
waters. By adding oxygen and/or nutrients and/or bacteria a pos-
sible acceleration of this fundamentally natural process can occur. 
While bioremediation is an effective countermeasure for small spills 
with high surface areas (e.g., very thin staining or coating on shore-
lines), it is a relatively slow process, possibly requiring months if not 
years to fully accomplish and is best suited for post-spill response 
final treatment. 
Protection of People and Property 
The current search and rescue, or SAR, infrastructure in the 
Arctic, while varying between regions, is limited. For example, while 
there is a robust set of assets off the coast of Norway to respond 
in an emergency, there is little to no infrastructure along the coast 
of Greenland to respond to a passenger ship in distress. A survey 
of search and rescue resources among Arctic states indicates lim-
ited availability of fixed wing aircraft and helicopters in most of 
the region. Some survey responses included icebreakers and seasonal 
patrol vessels that can be used for SAR when near enough to an 
incident. However, in general, there are shortages of critical SAR 
response assets, such as long-distance, heavy-lift capacity helicop-
ters. The usefulness of these assets is often limited by weather and 
other operating conditions. Emergency response efforts are further 
hampered in many regions by an insufficient shoreside infrastruc-
ture needed to provide basic logistics and support functions for 
SAR missions. The location and availability of SAR assets are often 
problematic given the vast distances and frequent harsh operating 
conditions typical in this region. In some instances, such as in con-
nection with oil and gas activities, private industry addresses these 
gaps and shortfalls by providing its own supplemental SAR capacity 
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The approximate number of lives saved in 2007 because
of the Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue System.
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tourism, shipping, research and resource development also increases 
the risk of accidents and, therefore, the need to further strengthen 
search and rescue capabilities and capacity around the Arctic Ocean 
to ensure an appropriate response from states to any accident,” 
states the Ilulissat Declaration. “Cooperation, including on the shar-
ing of information, is a prerequisite for addressing these challenges. 
We will work to promote safety of life at sea in the Arctic Ocean, 
including through bilateral and multilateral arrangements between 
or among relevant states.”
Passenger Vessel Safety in the Arctic
The most significant emerging challenge to the existing search 
and rescue infrastructure arises from the increase in marine tourism 
and passenger vessels operating in Arctic waters. As large passenger 
vessels continue to operate more frequently and farther north in the 
Arctic, the prospect of having to conduct mass rescue operations 
with limited SAR resources increases. Recent growth in Arctic marine 
tourism is outpacing infrastructure investment, development and 
support throughout the region. There are several potential problems 
associated with responding to an incident aboard a cruise ship. The 
potential number of people that would have to be rescued from a 
cruise ship far exceeds the capacity of most SAR response vessels and 
aircraft available in the Arctic. Cruise ships have a minimal capac-
ity for self-rescue. Compliance with IMO guidelines for passenger 
as part of its ongoing Arctic operations, but this remains the excep-
tion rather than the rule.
Arctic states have attempted to maximize the effectiveness of 
existing SAR resources by entering into bilateral and sub-regional SAR 
agreements with neighboring nations that have improved coordina-
tion of SAR responses in specific areas of the Arctic. For example, the 
Russian Federation, Canada and the United States have a search and 
rescue agreement. Norway and the Russian Federation have a bilateral 
search and rescue agreement for the Barents Sea that is exercised 
annually. There are also informal search and rescue arrangements with 
local governmental and private entities. There is no multilateral search 
and rescue agreement covering the entire Arctic region.
The future increase in human activity in the Arctic, including 
Arctic marine shipping and the continued overflight of the Arctic 
region by commercial aircraft, will place increasing demands on the 
SAR infrastructure. Many of the infrastructure deficiencies discussed 
in this report, such as the insufficient number of accurate charts 
or the need for better real-time information concerning the opera-
tional environment and communications difficulties, will also impact 
search and rescue efforts.
The need to strengthen search and rescue capabilities was specif-
ically recognized by the representatives from the Russian Federation, 
Canada, the U.S., Denmark and Norway who met in Ilulissat, 
Greenland, in May 2008. “The increased use of Arctic waters for 
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vessels operating in remote areas is voluntary and, as a result, the 
planning and capability for self-rescue varies. Passengers are likely 
to be ill-prepared for the weather, which decreases their likelihood 
of survival if they are not rescued quickly. There are also a host of 
logistical challenges associated with the lack of shoreside infrastruc-
ture in most of the Arctic needed to accommodate and care for those 
that are rescued, including the lack of sufficient food, lodging and 
medical facilities. In many cases, the only available platform with 
capacity to feed and house rescued passengers would be another 
cruise ship.
A number of potential actions are available to address the chal-
lenges presented by emergency response to passenger vessel inci-
dents in Arctic waters. First, ships intending to conduct passenger 
vessel transits in the Arctic would greatly improve the prospects for a 
successful rescue and survival of passengers and crew if they coordi-
nated their transits with other passenger ships in the vicinity. In two 
incidents in the Antarctic, passengers and crew from stricken ves-
sels were successfully transferred to other nearby passenger vessels. 
One of the stricken passenger vessels, the M/V Explorer, sank shortly 
after the transfer. Second, provisions in the Enhanced Contingency 
Planning Guidance for Passenger Ships Operating in Areas Remote 
from SAR Facilities (IMO 2006) provide valuable guidance for passen-
ger vessels operating in remote areas such as the Arctic. The volun-
tary guidelines provide detailed information on emergency drills and 
inspections, and contain additional requirements for lifeboats, lif-
erafts and survival kits that would allow passengers and crew to bet-
ter survive the harsh Arctic environment until SAR response arrived 
on scene. The value of these guidelines is dependent in large part on 
the degree to which they are adopted and implemented. Third, search 
and rescue operations could be improved and limited resources used 
to best advantage by sharing information, lessons learned and best 
practices arising from incidents that have already occurred in polar 
regions, including the two latest Antarctic incidents. 
The advantages of mutual assistance between vessels operating 
in the Arctic, although particularly significant for passenger ves-
sels, extend to all vessels. Voluntary systems have been established 
that allow search and rescue authorities to identify and request 
assistance from other vessels in the vicinity of a vessel in distress. 
The Automated Mutual-Assistance Vessel Rescue System (AMVER) is 
one such established system that can be accessed by Arctic SAR 
authorities to identify a possible source for assistance in any dis-
tress case in the Arctic region. There are more than 17,000 vessels 
enrolled in the AMVER network, representing 155 countries. On any 
given day, more than 3,500 vessels are available to divert and assist 
in a distress situation at sea. Approximately 450 lives were saved 
in 2007 because of AMVER. Participation is voluntary unless man-
dated by a vessel’s flag state, shipping company or other authority. 
Emergency response is particularly challenging in the Arctic for a variety of 
reasons, including the remoteness and great distances that are often involved 
in responding; the impacts of cold, ice and a harsh operating environment on 
response personnel and equipment; and the lack of shoreside infrastructure 
and communications to support and sustain a response of any significant 
magnitude.
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Participating vessels provide regularly updated information on their 
SAR capabilities and intended track to rescue coordination centers. 
AMVER information is released only to recognized SAR agencies for 
safety-of-life-at-sea purposes, and provides rescue coordination cen-
ters with data on vessels in the vicinity of a SAR case that may be 
available to divert and assist.
Another example is the Russian Vessel Monitoring System, 
referred to as VMS Victoria. The system is intended for near real-time 
automated monitoring of vessels positions provided vessels are fit-
ted with the ship satellite communication systems: INMARSAT-C or 
INMARSAT-D+, and for delivering the collected position reports data 
via Internet to remote users. VMS Victoria caters to the shipowners, 
operators and organizations responsible for control and surveillance 
of maritime vessels, as well as for search and rescue at sea. There 
are more than 1,200 vessels enrolled in the system, among them 
more than 600 foreign flag-state vessels. VMS Victoria operates con-
stantly and allows its users: to track the movements of their fleets 
by receiving regular automated position reports from the vessels; to 
request an immediate position report from any vessel on demand if 
required; and to send short text messages and FleetNet broadcasts 
to a vessel/vessels. VMS Victoria processes messages in real time and 
then transmits them to INMARSAT. It is anticipated that the estab-
lishment of the LRIT-system will be an important system to identify 
ships in the vicinity of a distressed vessel, thereby requesting them 
to provide assistance.
Promoting the use of mutual vessel assistance systems such as 
AMVER or VMS Victoria would serve to supplement the extremely limited 
search and rescue resources and improve SAR capacity in the Arctic. 
Although Arctic states often have existing agreements in place 
to coordinate SAR operations with neighboring nations, there are 
several advantages to creating a multilateral Arctic SAR agreement 
that would cover the entire northern region for both aeronauti-
cal and maritime SAR. A multilateral SAR agreement for the entire 
Arctic region would facilitate the most effective use of limited SAR 
resources throughout the Arctic and would ensure that available 
Arctic SAR facilities closest to a vessel or aircraft in distress are 
identified and respond first, regardless of nationality, in order to 
reduce response time and potentially save the most lives. A region-
wide agreement would also improve SAR response by serving as the 
framework within which to conduct joint exercises and training; 
share information, lessons learned and best practices; and identify 
and improve mechanisms for mutual cooperation, coordination and 
support in search and rescue and emergency response. 
The creation of a more comprehensive multilateral SAR agree-
ment would build on existing proposals for an aeronautical Arctic 
SAR Memorandum of Agreement to include both aeronautical and 
maritime SAR, as encouraged by the International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, as amended; the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, 1944 (Annex 12), as amended; and the 
International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual 
(IAMSAR Manual). The proposed Arctic Region SAR agreement would 
identify aeronautical and maritime SAR region lines of delimitation; 
as affirmed in both conventions, such delimitation of SAR regions 
is not related to and would not prejudice the delimitation of any 
boundary between nations.
A multilateral SAR agreement would serve as the centerpiece of 
cooperation and coordination in support of Arctic emergency response 
operations while providing an important example of a mutually ben-
eficial regional approach among Arctic nations to address important 
shared issues of concern.
Since Arctic and Antarctic emergency responses are similar in 
many ways, Arctic and Antarctic nations engaged in polar SAR could 
benefit from consultation and cooperation on issues of mutual 
concern and applicability. The five nations responsible for SAR in 
the Southern Ocean (New Zealand, Australia, Argentina, Chile and 
South Africa) currently meet to address many of the same challenges 
that face the eight Arctic Council nations concerning distance, 
harsh environment and limited SAR resources. In August 2008, New 
Zealand, Australia, Argentina, Chile, South Africa, United States, 
France, United Kingdom and the Council of Managers of National 
Antarctic Programs (COMNAP), met in Valparaiso, Chile, to discuss 
improving Antarctic SAR coordination and cooperation. One means 
of enhancing cooperation would be through mutual efforts of the 
Arctic Council and Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings. Future 
proposals and recommendations on polar SAR could be coordinated 
between both international fora to ensure continuity and standard-
ization where appropriate.
Gaps in Preparedness and Response Operations
Remote surveillance and detection technologies (i.e., satellite 
communications, GPS availability, weather stations) are critical for 
establishing situational awareness for both preventive and response 
issues. This overall capability is limited in the Arctic due to a lack 
of coverage and the availability of real-time weather information. 
Lightering in emergency situations and salvage typically repre-
sent two distinct marine activities that may be used in whole or 
in part to prevent and/or recover pollutants, and are considered in 
many cases synonymous with mechanical response capacities. 
While all Arctic states individually support the overall strategic 
goal of limiting negative environmental impact and establishing 
€4.4B
The amount of money invested since 2004 to improve Murmansk’s deepwater port 
facilities to include new oil, coal and container terminals as well as expanded rail lines.
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sustainable development, the potential for increased shipping has 
led to increased concern for threats, risk and evaluation of potential 
consequences worldwide. This leads to a high expectation by public 
and environmental groups for adoption of stringent preventive mea-
sures, as well as thorough mitigation and restoration measures in the 
event of an incident. This has also contributed to an increasing gap 
in maintaining realistic response expectations. To address this pres-
sure many recent workshops and panel discussions have indicated a 
need for more harmonious pan-Arctic shipping rules. Cooperation at 
this level requires nations to develop common goals and objectives 
based upon mutually acceptable and scientific criteria. Ultimately 
the communication of these objectives is vital in maintaining real-
istic expectations. 
While there are exceptions, there are few Arctic-based resources 
to address oil spills, especially the ability to recover trapped oil in 
hulls and compartments in both shallow and deep water. A multi-
lateral oil spill contingency plan or an oil spill agreement may be 
options to address this issue.
Ports
 
In temperate maritime areas, deepwater ports and the services 
they provide are typically relatively close to global maritime ship-
ping and often taken for granted. The situation in the Arctic is quite 
different. Deepwater ports, places of refuge, marine salvage, ade-
quate port reception facilities for ship-generated waste and towing 
services are rarely available. The availability of port infrastructure 
and support directly influences the level of risk associated with tran-
siting a particular waterway and corresponds to the levels of marine 
insurance rates. 
Ports and Intermodal Transport Links 
There are few deepwater ports in U.S. or Russian waters near 
the Bering Strait. The closest U.S. harbor with deep water is Dutch 
Harbor in the southern Bering Sea. On the Russian Federation side, 
the nearest deepwater port is Provideniya. Other Russian ports near 
the Bering Strait that are closed to foreign ships are Egvekinot, 
Anadyr and Beringovsky. 
© Kristina Baiborodova
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A key AMSA workshop, Opening the Arctic Seas: Envisioning 
Disasters and Framing Solutions, was held in March 2008 at the Coastal 
Response Research Center of the University of New Hampshire. The cen-
ter, a partnership between the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration and UNH, develops new approaches to spill response 
and restoration through research and synthesis of information.
In cooperation with the U.S. Coast guard and U.S. Arctic Research 
Commission, the center hosted the workshop to identify key strate-
gies, action items and resource needs for preparedness and response 
to potential Arctic marine incidents. The 50 workshop participants 
represented a spectrum of constituencies and expertise including 
government agencies, the marine industry, Arctic indigenous groups, 
academia and non-governmental organizations. Experts from the U.S., 
Denmark, Canada, Russian Federation, Norway and Finland and one 
non-Arctic state, South Africa, participated. 
The workshop focused on the qualitative risk factors for five plau-
sible Arctic marine incidents developed by the organizing committee 
and bear some similarities with incidents that have already occurred in 
polar waters. The incidents were designed to explore: spill response; 
search and rescue; firefighting and salvage; communications; gover-
nance and jurisdiction; and legal issues. The five incidents were:
•	 Cruise	ship	grounding	in	the	west	coast	of	Greenland
 Mid-September grounding in a fjord of a cruise ship with 1,400 
passengers. Progressive flooding makes the ship unstable and all 
passengers and crew must abandon ship.
•	 Bulk	carrier	trapped	in	ice	in	the	central	Arctic	Ocean
 September/late season crossing of the Arctic Ocean en route to the 
Bering Strait and the Pacific Ocean. Ice damages the ships’ rudder 
and propeller. The ship’s non-ice strengthened hull makes win-
tering impossible. Rescue operations are challenging due to the 
remote location and changing sea ice cover.
•	 Fire	and	collision	in	offshore	operations	in	the	Beaufort	Sea	
 In late winter, a drill ship, two oil spill response vessels and one ice 
management icebreaker are conducting exploratory drilling oper-
ations in 50 meters of water 20 nautical miles offshore within the 
disputed U.S.-Canada border area in the Beaufort Sea. An engine 
room fire on the icebreaker causes it to lose control and collide 
with the drill ship, rupturing a ballast tank. The drill ship empties 
700 barrels of Arctic grade diesel fuel to maintain stability; 300 
barrels of diesel fuel are also spilled because of the fire on the ice 
management ship. Crew members on both vessels suffer injuries.
•	 Oil	tanker	and	fishing	vessel	collision	in	the	Barents	Sea	
 The collision occurs in near-zero visibility within the disputed 
Russia-Norway border in the Barents Sea. The tanker releases 
Arctic Marine Incidents Workshop
25,000 barrels of crude oil in the water and must be towed to a 
place of refuge to avoid potentially spilling its remaining cargo. 
The fishing vessel sinks making salvage impractical.
•	 Tug	and	barge	grounding	on	St.	Lawrence	Island	in	the	Bering	
Sea In May in broken ice conditions, a tug loses power while tow-
ing a barge laden with mining explosives and other containerized 
cargo for several Arctic communities. Pushed by a storm surge, the 
tug and barge are grounded in an area that was a critical habitat 
for threatened and endangered species and a haul-out location for 
Pacific walrus. The tug and barge are separated by several miles, 
the tug ruptures a fuel tank, containers are in the water and some 
wash onshore.
Workshop participants were divided into five groups each work-
ing on a single, plausible incident. Four questions were addressed by 
each group: If this incident happened today in the Arctic, how would 
we respond? How would we prefer to respond? What are the gaps and 
needs that exist today that prevent us from responding in the pre-
ferred manner?  What do we need to do to address those needs and 
fill the gaps?
The exercise yielded the following themes:
 (A) Ports and Waterways Management 
•	 Designate	 potential	 places	 of	 refuge	 in	 the	 Arctic	 and	 develop	
guidelines for their use; an international effort should also rank 
them by seasonal environmental conditions.
•	 Establish	 policies	 and	 systems	 to	 control	 ship	 movements	 such	
as route planning; use of Automatic Identification Systems on all 
Arctic ships; vessel tracking systems and designation as Particularly 
Sensitive Sea Areas from IMO.
(B)	Vessels	and	Crew	Safety
•	 Institute	mandatory	safety	regulations	for	Arctic	operations;	the	
current IMO guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-Covered 
Waters address specific construction, fire safety, lifesaving, navi-
gational, operational and crew training issues, but they are vol-
untary; mandatory training for ice navigation and emergency 
response in polar environments is necessary; a non-binding reg-
ulatory framework seems inconsistent with the hazards of Arctic 
navigation and the potential for environmental damage in the 
Arctic Ocean.
(C) Response Agreements and Plans
•	 Existing	 search	 and	 rescue	 and	 pollution	 contingency	 plans	 do	
not provide enough detailed information to facilitate an effec-
tive response; there is a need for Arctic-wide agreements for SAR 
and pollution response; agreements and response plans should 
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designate which nations respond in specific areas and clarify oper-
ations in disputed regions; agreements and response plans should 
also ensure foreign responders can participate in operations unim-
peded by customs and immigration issues; Arctic states could 
establish an integrated response management center to manage 
the execution of agreements and facilitate the decision-making 
process.
(D) Strategies to Improve Prevention and Preparedness
•	 Conduct	 comprehensive	 environmental	 risk	 assessments	 and	
impact assessments to assist in decision-making, route planning, 
emergency response, etc.
•	 Increase	emergency	 response	assets,	 equipment	and	 supplies	 in	
the Arctic, placing emphasis on regions of active development; 
self-sustaining, forward-operating response bases should be 
established.
•	 Improve	knowledge	for	Arctic	incident	response	through	training	and	
engagement of the local community, responders and the maritime 
industry; Arctic indigenous people should be trained in response and 
local communities must participate in response operations.
(E) Strategies to Improve Response
•	 Consider	 alternative	 countermeasures	 for	 oil	 spill	
cleanup; mechanical measures in ice-covered waters 
may be impractical and alternative response 
options should be considered (dispersants, chemi-
cal herders, sinking agents, in-situ burning, etc.).
•	 Expand	communications	capabilities	throughout	
the Arctic; expanded shore based (VHF and HF) 
and satellite systems are required.
•	 Improve	 logistical	 support	 capabilities	 for	
responders; support for response personnel in 
remote Arctic regions must be brought to the 
region of operations.
(F) Strategies to Foster Community Involvement
•	 Involve	indigenous	people	and	local	communi-
ties in planning, response, recovery and restora-
tion decisions and operations.
•	 Conduct	outreach	to	local	communities	and	keep	
all stakeholders well informed.
(G)	Strategies	to	Ensure	Availability	of	Funds	 
for	Response
•	 Establish	an	 international	Arctic	 response	 fund	 to	offset	 the	
costs of SAR and pollution response.
•	 Increase	penalties	and	insurance	requirements	for	ships	operating	
in the Arctic to ensure response funding and act as a deterrent.
The workshop identified three key areas of data and research 
needs: (1) the updating of weather data due to a lack of  overall informa-
tion, and investment to update navigational charts for Arctic regional 
seas, ports and waterways; (2) studies on the behavior of oil in cold 
water and technologies for spill response (including the detection of 
oil under ice as well as cleanup measures for oil in ice); and (3) improv-
ing the baseline information for Arctic resources (biological/ecological 
resources and areas important for human use and cultural significance) 
that could be affected by potential marine incidents.
Two themes resonated throughout the workshop: The Arctic states 
need to foster and enhance their cooperation to improve joint con-
tingency plans and multinational agreements, as well as to agree to 
develop mandatory safety regulations for Arctic marine operations. 
The proper management of risk using appropriate policies and strate-
gies, supported by scientific research, can lead to reduced risk for loss 
of life and environmental damage.
z  Map 9.4  Plausible 
Arctic marine incident 
locations. Source: AMSA
United States 
of America
Canada
Greenland
Iceland
Norway
Finland
Sweden
Denmark
Faroe
Islands
Russian
Federation
Arctic Circle 
Grounded Barge 
With Explosives
Mobile Drilling Rig &
Support Ships–Collision/Fire
Ore Carrier Sinking
Cruise Ship Grounding
Tanker & Fishing 
Vessel Collision
 ARC TIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT |  ARC TIC MARINE INFRASTRUC TURE 177
This situation differs with the region between the Atlantic 
and Arctic oceans, where there are many Norwegian, Icelandic and 
Russian deepwater ports. There are a number of deepwater ports 
along the west coast of Greenland. In the Arctic, there are essentially 
no deepwater ports along the North Slope of Alaska or throughout 
the Canadian Archipelago, except for that of Tuktoyaktuk, which, 
while having a relatively deepwater port, suffers from a shallow 
approach channel and a high degree of in-fill silting, situated as it is 
in the delta of the Mackenzie River. Mention should also be made of 
the limited port facilities at Resolute Bay, in the middle of the archi-
pelago, which acts as a center of transportation, communications 
and administration for the high Arctic but which can only handle 
ships of 5m draft alongside a sunken barge used as a dock. Ships of 
deeper draft must anchor in an open roadstead. 
In Hudson Bay, the Port of Churchill is Canada’s only northern 
deepwater seaport with well sheltered, along-side berthing facili-
ties. It provides access, via rail, to the interior of Canada and North 
America in general. The growing Port of Churchill offers four berths 
for the loading and unloading of grain, general cargo and tanker 
vessels. The Port can efficiently load Panamax size vessels. The link 
between Murmansk and Churchill has become known as the “Arctic 
Bridge” since it requires sea and rail systems to complete the trans-
port of goods to North American destinations. The use of the Port 
of Churchill eliminates time-consuming navigation, additional 
handling and high-cost transportation through the Great Lakes and 
St. Lawrence Seaway. The current shipping season runs from mid-
July to the beginning of November. The use of icebreakers could 
significantly lengthen the shipping season. Another significant port 
in the Eastern Canadian Arctic is Iqaluit, which requires that ships 
anchor and use barges to land their cargo and features some of the 
highest tides on the planet as well as one of the largest tidal ranges 
in existence.
The Canadian government has recently proposed an upgrade to 
the rail link to Churchill, as well as the development of a deepwater 
port at the old mining town of Nanisivik in Nunavut on Baffin Island, 
to be used primarily by the Department of National Defence.  It is 
unclear what facilities this port will have since it is not situated near 
a major population center, major shipping route or railroad. In addi-
tion to the proposed port at Nanisivik, future planned development 
on Baffin Island also includes the iron-ore mine at Mary River under 
construction by Baffinland Iron Mines Corporation that will include a 
railroad to the planned port at Steensby Inlet.
In contrast, the northern coast of the Russian Federation has 
several deepwater ports that have been supported by the Northern 
Sea Route Authority and fleet of icebreakers for several decades. 
Murmansk is well known for being the largest deepwater port north 
of the Arctic Circle that is ice-free throughout the year. Murmansk 
also provides intermodal access to northern European and Asian 
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industrial centers. In recent years, Russian Arctic ports in the 
Barents Sea, including Murmansk, have expanded significantly 
as offshore oil and ore production have increased in the region. 
Since 2004, more than €4.4 billion have been invested in improv-
ing Murmansk’s deepwater port facilities to include new oil, coal 
and container terminals as well as expanded rail lines. Murmansk 
port capacities are projected to increase to an annual 28.5 mil-
lion tonnes by 2010 and 52 million tonnes by 2020. Other Russian 
Arctic ports along the Northern Sea Route include Pevek, Tiksi, 
Igarka, Dudinka, Dikson, Vitino, Arkhangelsk and Novy. These ports 
are well-established and supported by the Russian icebreaker fleet, 
although many require long river transits to access.
Unique to the region is the Port of Varandey on the Pechora 
Sea coast. As oil production expands in the Russian Arctic, LUKOIL, 
in cooperation with ConocoPhillips, has developed Varandey into 
a deepwater oil export terminal. The Varandey facility consists of 
an onshore tank farm with a total rated capacity of 325,000 cubic 
meters (2,000,000 barrels); and an innovative fixed ice-resistant oil 
terminal 14 miles offshore, with a height of more than 160 feet. The 
terminal includes living quarters and a mooring cargo handling sys-
tem with a jib and a helicopter platform; two underwater pipelines, 
connecting the onshore tank battery and the offshore oil terminal; 
and an oil metering station, auxiliary tanks, pumping station and 
power supply facilities. Sovkomflot has one new 70,000 DWT ice-
strengthened oil tanker in operation and two being built in South 
Korean shipyards, to shuttle oil to Murmansk, as well as other loca-
tions in Europe and North America.
Places of Refuge
The Ilulissat Declaration outlined the need to cooperate to improve 
search and rescue and disaster response capability in the Arctic as 
marine activity increases. Central to this objective is the need for 
deepwater places of refuge and marine salvage/support capability.
According to IMO’s Guidelines on Places of Refuge for Ships in 
Need of Assistance, a place of refuge means a location where a ship 
in need of assistance can take action to enable it to stabilize its con-
dition and reduce the hazards to navigation, and to protect human 
life and the environment. A ship in need of assistance means a ship 
in a situation, apart from one requiring rescue of persons on board, 
which could give rise to the loss of the vessel or an environmental 
or navigational hazard. 
With an increase in international Arctic shipping, it is likely that 
ships in need of assistance may need to request refuge in sheltered 
waters of the Arctic states. There are likely to be significant practi-
cal difficulties to be encountered in finding and supporting suit-
able places of refuge for ships in need of assistance in the Arctic 
and in providing such ships with adequate support. In the Arctic, 
harsh environmental conditions and increasing marine traffic densi-
ties make this course of action even more critical. Potential place 
of refuge guidelines detail the process by which port authorities 
decide where to allow a damaged ship to berth. In an attempt to 
balance shipping interests with the protection of natural and cul-
tural resources, selection of such places should incorporate input 
from potentially affected governments, communities, the shipping 
industry and other stakeholders. Authorities should also rank places 
based on seasonal environmental conditions. 
The European Union Places of Refuge Framework provides a 
model for the development of potential place of refuge guidelines by 
Arctic nations. Western Norway has an established system for places 
There are likely to be significant 
practical difficulties to be encoun-
tered in finding and supporting  
suitable places of refuge for ships  
in need of assistance in the Arctic 
and in providing such ships with  
adequate support.
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of refuge based on IMO guidelines and the EU framework, includ-
ing predefined places if applicable. The system will be expanded to 
include the entire Norwegian coast, including Svalbard, by late 2009 
or early 2010. The places of refuge are evaluated based on the EU 
Safety at Sea project.
Other Infrastructure Components
 
Arctic marine infrastructure includes components not required or 
taken for granted in temperate waters. Polar icebreakers and marine 
salvage capability are risk mitigators from the perspective of marine 
insurance companies. If a vessel navigating in the Arctic has readily 
available polar icebreaker and/or marine salvage support, the risk to 
the vessel and corresponding financial risk to owners and insurers is 
substantially reduced.
Icebreakers
Government and private icebreakers are a key resource in the 
development of the Arctic. Generally, icebreakers are able to carry out 
the following roles: maintenance of shipping tracks in ice-covered 
waters, close escort of shipping in ice, provision of ice information, 
sovereignty support/representation, search and rescue, environmental 
response, command platform for emergency response, medical evacu-
ation in remote areas, harbor breakout, electrical power supply, sci-
ence platform, constabulary function (maritime security), transporting 
cargo (northern re-supply and logistic support) and fisheries conserva-
tion and protection.
There are some 50 icebreakers in the world fleet. The Russian fleet 
is by far the largest and most powerful, counting icebreakers powered 
by nuclear power plants, with five of 75,000 shaft horsepower (shp). 
The Russian Federation recently announced the allocation of some 15 
billion rubles to build another 75,000 shp icebreaker. The next largest 
The world’s icebreaker fleets are 
aging and will require significant 
investment during the coming years 
to maintain their effectiveness and 
capability.
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fleet of Arctic-class icebreakers is that of the Canadian Coast Guard. 
The Canadian Government recently announced an investment of $C720 
million to provide an Arctic-class replacement for the CCGS Louis S. 
St-Laurent. Most other countries that operate icebreakers own one or 
two, other countries such as Denmark and Norway have small fleets 
of ice-strengthened vessels generally intended for fisheries patrol and 
interdiction. The world’s icebreaker fleets are aging and will require 
significant investment during the coming years to maintain their 
effectiveness and capability. For instance, Canadian icebreakers are 
on the average 30-plus years old, while those of the U.S. are 30 years 
old, with the exception of the USCGC Healy, which was built in 2000. 
Of note is the recently issued report, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing 
World, which is a needs analysis of U.S. icebreaking requirements in 
the coming years. In addition, it is also known that a number of other 
countries are either building or planning construction of new ice-
breakers primarily intended for science research, namely the European 
Union and South Korea.
Icebreaker construction is very specialized and very expensive. 
Steel is thicker and stronger than that required for normal cargo ship 
construction. In addition, there are other necessary specific features, 
such as horizontal and vertical construction members that are deeper 
and stronger, reinforced icebelts and redundant features. These details 
are specified in a number of national regulations governing con-
struction of ice-class ships, namely those of the Russian Federation, 
Canada, Finland and Sweden; as well as classification societies such 
as the American Bureau of Shipping, Det Norske Veritas, Germanischer 
Lloyd and Lloyd’s Register. Recently, the International Association of 
Classification Societies approved their Polar Class construction stan-
dard as one of a number of “Unified Requirements.” Classification 
societies have one year to enter the new requirement in their respec-
tive rules. Classification societies have the new requirements in their 
respective rules, and some are expected to keep their existing rules.
Marine Salvage Support
In the Arctic Ocean, with the exception of Norway, Iceland and 
ports along the Northern Sea Route, there are few places of refuge 
or government/commercial salvage response to support commercial 
shipping. Generally, there are limited ship repair and/or salvage infra-
structure and pollution countermeasures capabilities based around the 
Arctic basin. This lack of an Arctic salvage capability is a concern to 
the marine insurance industry.
There is inadequate port, salvage, towing and other necessary 
marine infrastructure support for the growing amount of commercial 
traffic transiting the Great Circle Route through the Aleutian Islands. 
This was highlighted by the 2004 M/V Selendang Ayu engine failure 
and subsequent grounding with a spill of more than 1 million liters of 
fuel oil along the northern side of Unalaska Island (See page 88). This 
incident could have been prevented if large tugs and adequate salvage 
support were nearby; instead, the nearest tugs capable of handling 
this type of emergency were in Seattle, Washington. After the 738 
ft M/V Selendang Ayu’s engine broke down in gale-force Bering Sea 
winter weather, several efforts to tow it by small tugs based out of 
Dutch Harbor failed. 
 
Baltic Sea Case Study
Introduction
As the Arctic Ocean becomes seasonally ice-covered, coupled 
with the likelihood of increased marine shipping activity, an evalua-
tion of the Baltic Sea marine shipping regime could be considered as 
a model for ship operations, information systems, incident response 
and harmonization of regulations.
The countries of the Baltic Sea Area work to protect the 
marine environment of the Baltic Sea from all sources of pollution 
through intergovernmental cooperation under the Convention on 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area 
and its governing body, the Baltic Marine Environment Protection 
Commission (HELCOM). All detailed information of the HELCOM 
activities is placed on website www.helcom.fi.
The Baltic Sea area is a sensitive marine ecosystem that needs 
comprehensive nature conservation and protection measures. The 
Baltic Sea states within the framework of HELCOM designated 89 
areas as Baltic Sea Protected Areas (BSPAs) on the basis of their 
significance for marine nature conservation and protection of habi-
tat and species. Work is still ongoing to designate other offshore 
areas as BSPAs. In order to harmonize the approaches and implemen-
tation process for marine protected areas (MPAs) in the Northeast 
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Atlantic and the Baltic Sea, HELCOM and the OSPAR Commission, 
the governing body of the Convention for the Protection of the 
Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, have developed a 
detailed work program on marine protected areas closely linked to 
the European Union network for the protection of European fauna 
and flora, the so-called NATURA 2000 network.
The Baltic Sea States are dependent upon safe, secure and sus-
tainable sea transports. The maritime traffic in the Baltic Sea area is 
dense and has increased notably since the beginning of the 1990s. The 
annual turnover for oil and oil products in the Baltic Sea is calculated 
to be approximately 160 million tonnes. On top of that, 500 million 
tonnes of other goods are annually transported by ships within the 
Baltic Sea area. Therefore an extensive regime of protective measures 
consisting of both international and national regulations is in place 
inside and adjacent to this semi-enclosed sea; examples of relevant 
measures are compulsory reporting and traffic surveillance, routing 
systems, compulsory pilotage and the designation of the area as a 
Special Area under Annexes I and V; and as a SOx Emission Control 
Area under Annex VI of the MARPOL 73/78 Convention.
Navigation Systems and Ship Operations 
The Baltic Sea has some of the densest maritime traffic in the 
world. More than 2,000 ships are en route in the Baltic on an aver-
age day, not including ferries, smaller fishing boats or pleasure craft. 
Among those 2,000 ships, some 200 are oil tankers with a cargo up 
to 150,000 tonnes. 
Several ferry lines connect the states in the Baltic proper. Some 
of the world’s biggest ferries are transporting goods and people 
© Aker Arctic Technology
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300 gross tonnage are required to participate in the GOFREP system 
when sailing in the international waters in the Gulf of Finland. This 
reporting system will allow automatic reporting with AIS and auto-
matic response from the GOFREP.
IMO resolution MSC.138(76) recommends masters use new and 
improved navigation equipment including Electronic Chart Display 
and Information System (ECDIS) onboard ships navigating Route T 
with a draft of 11 meters or more; oil tankers navigating the Sound 
with a draft of seven meters or more; chemical tankers; gas carriers; 
and ships carrying a shipment of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium 
and high level radioactive wastes (INF cargoes) irrespective of size. 
ECDIS supports plotting and automatically monitoring ships’ posi-
tions throughout their voyage. The risk of collisions and groundings 
will be reduced by superimposing AIS and radar information on the 
electronic chart display.
between Sweden and Finland and there are several other ferry lines; 
i.e., between Sweden and Germany, Denmark and Germany, and 
between Denmark and Sweden. Most of the year intensive fishing 
for herring, cod and salmon takes place, sometimes in close vicin-
ity to the major shipping lanes. Incidents are not rare considering 
that up to 2,000 fishing boats could be at sea on an average day. In 
summer, large numbers of cruise ships from all over the world enter 
the Baltic Sea area to visit the many coastal cities of cultural inter-
est, such as Helsinki, St. Petersburg, Tallinn, Riga, Gdansk, Rostock, 
Lübeck, Copenhagen, Visby and Stockholm. Also numerous pleasure 
craft are sailing between the more than 500 ports or between differ-
ent archipelago areas in the Baltic Sea. Oil and gas activities are for 
the time being few, but are expected to grow in the southern section 
of the area.
Compulsory Reporting and Traffic Surveillance
When ships enter the Baltic Sea they have to go through the 
Kattegat and the Great Belt or the Sound. There is intense traffic in 
the northern part of the area, where an extensive part of the traf-
fic goes to and from Denmark as well as to and from the Baltic Sea. 
Large vessels follow the traffic lane Route T.
It is recommended that all ships of 20,000 gross tonnage and 
above navigating Route T should participate in the radio reporting 
service SHIPPOS together with all ships with a draft of 11 meters and 
more; loaded oil-, gas- and chemical tankers of 1,600 gross tonnage 
and above; and all ships carrying radioactive cargoes. 
The system provides beneficial information to ships about other 
ship movements in the area. IMO has adopted a mandatory ship 
reporting system in the Great Belt Traffic Area. Ships with a gross 
tonnage equal to or exceeding 50 and all ships with a draft of 15 
meters or more are required to submit a ship report to the VTS 
Centre. 
Mandatory ship reporting systems have been established nation-
ally by the Baltic Sea states in approaches to oil terminals and other 
ports. Article 4 of the EU directive 2002/59/EC of June 27, 2002, 
establishing a community vessel traffic monitoring and information 
system, states the operator, agent or master of a ship bound to a 
port of a member state shall report information to the port authority 
at least 24 hours in advance or in certain cases earlier. The informa-
tion includes ship identification, port of destination, estimated time 
of arrival, etc. 
A new mandatory reporting system has been introduced in 
the Gulf of Finland using the Gulf of Finland Mandatory Reporting 
System, GOFREP. In accordance with the IMO resolution, Finland, 
Estonia and the Russian Federation require that all vessels exceeding 
z  Map 9.5  Location of oil spills observed in the Baltic Sea area in 2007.  Source: HELCOM
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Routing Systems  
A transit route (Route T) through the Kattegat, the Great Belt and 
the Western Baltic has been established for deep draft ships. Routing 
systems have been established for ships navigating the Sound. A 
deepwater route (DW) from Bornholm, south of the Hoburgen bank 
and up to the border with the Estonian Economic Zone fulfilling the 
IHO S44 standard for hydrographic surveying has been established. 
With a clearance of 10 nautical miles to the banks, this will allow 
a ship with, for example, an engine failure, ample time for speed 
reduction to be able to drop anchor.
Fifteen traffic separation schemes are established and adopted 
by IMO in eight parts of the Baltic Sea Area. Two schemes are estab-
lished in Samsø Belt/Great Belt, two in the Sound, one off Kiel light-
house, one south of Gedser, one south of Öland Island, one south of 
Gotland Island, two in the entrance to the Gulf of Finland and five 
in the Gulf of Finland.
Pilotage 
Pilotage services are established locally by the port states and 
are normally compulsory for ships over certain sizes.
Due to the Copenhagen Treaty 1857, ships sailing to or from 
the North Sea to the Baltic Sea are not required to use pilots. The 
IMO recommends that when navigating the entrances to the Baltic 
Sea, local pilotage services should be used by ships as identified in 
Resolution MSC.138 (76). Certified pilots for the entrances to the 
Baltic Sea are available in Denmark and, for ships passing through 
the Sound, in Sweden. Certified Baltic Sea deep-sea pilots are avail-
able in all Baltic Sea States. 
Weather and Wave Information Systems
Weather and wave monitoring and information systems have 
been established by the Baltic Sea States in the Baltic Sea area. 
Weather and wave information is available for seafarers at all 
times.
Ice Information Systems
Baltic Icebreaking Management (BIM) is an organization 
with members from all the Baltic Sea states: Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, the Russian 
Federation and Sweden. The overall objective of BIM is to ensure 
a well functioning, year-round maritime transport system in the 
Baltic Sea through the enhancement of strategic and operational 
cooperation between the Baltic Sea countries in the area of win-
ter navigation assistance.
Research Opportunities
q Research to advance the convergence of critical naviga-
tional information including hydrography (ENCs), weather, 
ice conditions and other data into integrated shipboard 
navigation systems.
q Research into technologies for hydrographic data collec-
tion, especially for adaptation to the Arctic environment. 
This should include the use of unmanned, underwater 
(under-ice) vehicles, multibeam technology, through-the-
ice data collection, and airborne systems for the collec-
tion of nearshore depths and for shoreline identification.
q Research on satellite remote sensing and surface valida-
tion to develop means of monitoring ice thickness across 
the Arctic Ocean.
q Simulated conditions or field testing of oil spills and 
other pollutants to determine behavior including fate and 
effects. This should include improvements in remote sur-
veillance and detection technologies; improved oil-in-ice 
modeling capabilities and long-term fate and effects of 
lingering oil.
q Focus on further development and improvement of ice 
service products and services on ice thickness, iceberg 
detection, forecasting of ice drift and drift of icebergs.
q  Research on behavior of oil in cold, ice infested areas 
including establishing forecasting models to compute the 
drift of oil in such waters.
q  Further development of satellite based oil detection algo-
rithms for ice-covered areas.
q  Research on effective response techniques and technol-
ogy for oil spill recovery on ice, broken ice and cold water.
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The Internet site, www.Baltice.org, is a single access point to 
reliable and up-to-date information related to winter navigation in 
the Baltic Sea area. 
Protection of People and Property:  
Incident Response and Overall Coordination
Search and rescue at sea means saving and protecting lives of 
persons in distress in the sea area. This includes many different 
duties like assisting vessels and boats in distress at sea, prevent-
ing disasters, searching for missing people and performing medical 
transport in the archipelago and sea area. The basis for carrying out 
these duties is enacted in international treaties and decrees. All 
authorities operating in the Baltic Sea area carry out SAR at sea. 
Also participating are merchant shipping and voluntary organiza-
tions. For example, in Finland, the Border Guard is responsible for 
SAR service at sea and the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre and 
maritime rescue sub-centers lead SAR operations. When the persons 
or environment are no longer in danger, commercial companies carry 
out the salvage of vessels and cargo.
Protection of the Environment:  
Oil and Other Hazardous Spills Response
The cooperation in combating spillages of oil and other harmful 
substances in the Baltic Sea area is based on the Helsinki Convention 
and HELCOM Recommendations on combating matters, adopted by 
the Helsinki Commission. 
In accordance with the Helsinki Convention the Contracting 
Parties shall maintain the ability to respond to spillages of oil and 
other harmful substances into the sea threatening the marine envi-
ronment of the Baltic Sea area. This ability shall include adequate 
equipment, ships and manpower prepared for operations in coastal 
waters as well as on the high seas. 
According to the Helsinki Convention, the Contracting Parties 
shall agree bilaterally or multilaterally on those regions of the Baltic 
Sea Area in which they should conduct aerial surveillance and take 
action for combating or salvage activities whenever a significant 
spillage of oil or other harmful substance or any incident causing or 
likely to cause pollution within the Baltic Sea area has occurred or 
is likely to occur. 
In cases where a Contracting Party is not able to cope with 
a spillage by the sole use of its personnel and equipment, the 
Contracting Party in question can request combating assistance from 
other Contracting Parties, starting with those who seem likely also 
to be affected by the spillage. 
Monitoring / Enforcing Compliance  
with Marine Regulation
Port State Control 
Port State Control systems have been established by the Baltic 
Sea States in all Baltic Sea ports in accordance with the Paris 
Memorandum of Understanding.
Aerial Surveillance
By international law, any release of oily wastes or oily water from 
ships is prohibited in the Baltic Sea, where oil pollution can affect 
sensitive ecosystems for long periods. But ships persist in making 
illegal discharges, despite improvements in port reception facilities 
and a harbor fee system, which means there is no financial gain 
to be had from polluting the sea. Every year national surveillance 
aircraft detect several hundred illegal oil discharges in the Baltic 
Sea. The actual number of illegal discharges is probably much higher 
than this. In fact, during most years more oil is released on purpose 
around the Baltic Sea than is spilled accidentally.
Internationally Coordinated Surveillance Flights 
The HELCOM states endeavor to fly, at a minimum, twice per week 
over regular traffic zones including approaches to major sea ports, as 
well as in regions with regular offshore activities; and once per week 
over the regions with sporadic traffic and fishing activities. Twice a 
year, several Baltic Sea states jointly organize surveillance flights 
(24 to 36 hours): one covering the southern part of the Baltic Sea 
and another flight over waters further north.
Arctic Maritime Training 
Maritime training in ice conditions is available by private compa-
nies in the Baltic Sea area. 
The content of the courses includes ice characteristics and ice 
classifications, ice charts, ice classes, winterization, ship operations 
in ice, independent navigation in ice, icebreaker operations and ice 
navigation in convoy. Training of ship maneuvering in ice is done in 
a full-mission simulator. Z
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Findings
 
 1] Considering the Arctic operational environment and the lack of infrastructure, safe navigation in the Arctic is 
often dependent on the skills of a limited number of seasoned northern mariners. The demand for skilled mariners 
is increasing, the number of experienced Arctic mariners is decreasing and there are no universal or mandatory 
formal education, training and certification requirements in place for ice navigators or crew to prepare them for 
Arctic marine operations.
 2]  Based on the information provided, significant portions of the primary Arctic shipping routes do not have adequate 
hydrographic data, and therefore charts, to support safe navigation. This appears most critical in the Canadian 
Archipelago and the Beaufort Sea and possibly other areas in the Arctic; at the same time the Russian Federation 
has broadly identified a requirement for updated hydrography in its Arctic waters. In addition, expansion of the 
current routes is required to allow alternative courses when hazardous ice conditions are encountered, for entry 
to points of refuge when necessary, and to support access to natural resources. 
 3] Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS), especially when coupled with Digital Global Positioning 
System, improves navigational safety by providing precise, real-time positioning along with holistic display of 
navigation and environmental information critical for safe navigation in the Arctic. ECDIS may also reduce the 
requirements and costs associated with deploying and maintaining traditional aids to navigation systems. This 
creates a high expectation that hydrographic offices will have electronic charts ready for use in the primary navi-
gation routes in the Arctic by 2012. However, the use of ECDIS is wholly dependent on the availability of accurate 
navigational charts, which rely on comprehensive hydrographic surveys and data. 
 4] Arctic Maritime Traffic Awareness - There are few systems to monitor and control the movement of ships in ice-
covered Arctic waters as an effective way to reduce the risk of incidents, particularly in areas deemed sensitive for 
environmental or cultural reasons.
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5]  There are serious limitations to radio and satellite communications for voice or data transmission in the Arctic 
because there is not complete satellite coverage of the region.     
      
6]  There is no binding requirement to implement the recently developed and adopted International Association of 
Classification Societies (IACS) Unified Requirements concerning Polar Class and the December 2002 IMO Guidelines 
for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters; consequently polar vessel construction standards are unevenly 
applied.
 
7]   For safe operations, ships navigating in the Arctic need the same suite of meteorological and oceanographic data, 
products and services as in the other oceans plus a comprehensive suite of data, products and services related to 
sea ice and icebergs. As the shipping season becomes extended, significant increases in resources will be needed 
to expand the information services accordingly.
8]   Emergency response capacity for saving lives and pollution mitigation is highly dependent upon a nation’s abil-
ity to project human and physical resources over vast geographic distances in various seasonal and climatic 
circumstances. The current lack of infrastructure in all but a limited number of areas, coupled with the vastness 
and harsh environment, makes carrying out a response significantly more difficult in the Arctic. Without further 
investment and development in infrastructure, only a targeted fraction of the potential risk scenarios can be 
addressed.
9]   The operational network of meteorological and oceanographic observations in the Arctic, essential for accurate 
weather and wave forecasting for safe navigation, is extremely sparse.
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z  Shipping traffic in the Arctic for the AMSA survey year 2004.  Source: AMSA
Nautical Miles
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*Note:	Ship	traffic	off	the	coast	of	Norway	
much	higher	than	legend	indicates.
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